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ABSTRACT: 
 
The phrase “the fullness of time” touches upon one of M. M. Bakhtin’s most consistently 
upheld tenets; for Bakhtin, philosophical and everyday utterances rely on their historical 
embeddedness  for the material and concrete reality from which they draw their meaning 
and through which they are conditioned, inflected, and re-evaluated.  In his very last work 
Bakhtin stated that all meanings are in continuous evolution.  In this thesis the attempt is 
made to interpret Bakhtin’s corpus by concentrating particularly on the movement of 
historical and philosophical becoming, the art of responding to philosophy and the events 
of everyday life, and the particular mutual inter-relatedness of the disciplines of ethics, 
aesthetics, biology, psychology, psychoanalysis, and linguistics as these discourses are 
taken up in Bakhtin and the Bakhtin Circle’s writings.    
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A work of literature... is revealed primarily in the 
differentiated unity of culture of the epoch in which it is 
created, but it cannot be closed off in this epoch: its fullness is 
revealed only in great time.  
—Bakhtin, Speech Genres, p. 5.
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Introduction 
 
A. The Vertigo of History 
“Finally the Great Artisan ordained that man, to whom He could give nothing belonging only to himself, 
should share in common whatever properties had been peculiar to each of the other creatures.  He received 
man, therefore, as a creature of undetermined nature, and placing him in the middle of the universe, said this 
to him: ‘Neither an established place, nor a form belonging to you alone, nor any special function have We 
given you, O Adam, and for this reason, that you may have and possess, according to your desire and 
judgment, whatever place, whatever form, and whatever functions you shall desire.”  
—Pico della Mirandola1  
 
Pico della Mirandola called us the “nuptial bond of the world,” and the “interval between 
enduring eternity and the flow of time,” but he failed to mention the vertigo caused by 
this suspension between heaven and earth. 2  ‘Man’ is free!  So says Pico.  Free to crawl 
as low as vermin, free to fly as high as the angels.  But there is an ambivalence tied up in 
this freedom.  We are chameleons, as much shaped by as shaping our environment.3  My 
intent in this thesis is to speak with many voices.  Do men and women—and those for 
whom these gendered categories prove insufficient—have the capacity for self-conscious 
becoming, or contrariwise does becoming have human beings?  Am I free to speak with 
many voices?  The institutions and ideas that make us what we are, as beings, sometimes 
grip us very tightly indeed.  Pico struck M. M. Bakhtin as a cautious man, somewhat still 
held by the past, by the cultural inheritance of his forebearers and by the idea of a natural 
order in which humans fit snugly in their place.4  The idea of hierarchy was archetypally 
embedded in humanism during the Renaissance.  Of this there is no doubt.  But Pico 
focused on movement rather than on a static one-time creation; in some sense he placed 
the importance on the event rather than being.  You are what you sow.  According to 
Pico, where we cultivate vegetative germs in human soil, we grow into carrots, and where 
we plant the seeds of sensitivity, we grow into animals.  But where ‘man’ is rational there 
he will be a brother to the angels.5  His ideas about the mutability of ‘mankind’ bumped 
up against similar notions in Giambattista Porta and Giordano Bruno, and “especially 
Campanella.”6  This metaphor of the seed as it appears in Renaissance humanism evinces, 
as the story goes, the first loosening of the great chain of being.  The importance of this 
epochal and perceptual shift away from the Medieval mind cannot be overestimated.  
 At first glance, the problem of speaking with many voices and of knowing when 
and how to listen are not complex questions.  It seems self-evident that I speak for myself 
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and no one else and that no one else speaks for me.  Yet no one seriously believes they 
are objects among objects, or that they can communicate in private languages.7  In our 
everyday lives, we usually use words as if they are transparently our own property.  Yet 
we do not invent the language in which we speak, play, think, pray, work, and love.  If 
pressed most of us will readily admit this.  We are not wholly self-consistent.  I will claim 
my action to the extent that I do not trip over myself, and the rest... well ‘the devil made 
me do it.’  Yet a wholly transparent selfhood is not supported by the evidence.  There are 
exceptions and endless qualifications of course, all the necessary reservations.  We rest 
assured: we have the power to speak with at least a tacit and tentative voice of our own—
from the very heart of our subjectivity?  Somewhere at the centre of my existence, a voice 
reassures me that I am a centre around which the world has arranged itself, even if what I 
try to say comes out somewhat garbled and double-voiced.  A little reflection on this felt 
freedom to speak our minds, however, and we grow worried.  We know that we are not 
free where our institutions are concerned.  And these institutions have a hand in making 
us who we are.  Are they not at least in part responsible for shaping what we believe?  Do 
they not mediate between the world and this little tacit voice that whispers ‘I am myself, 
after all, of that there can be no doubt?’  Even where others are concerned, we are by 
turns impugned and praised, assisted and resisted, taught how to love, how to pray, how 
to speak, and how to live.  And much of this teaching and assistance, criticism and 
approbation, takes place before we learn to write our own name.  So just like Pico, each 
one of us is as much shaped by the past as we are active in shaping the future.  The same 
antecedents who provided Pico with the new humanist certainty that ‘man’ is born free 
also haunted him with hierarchies; they told him that the nature in which he was 
immersed was prepared in advance, fixed, ready-made.8  The belief in a God pantocrator 
has no small part to play in many of the conflicts that arise between human beings, since 
what we believe translates into how we act.  In this sense, it makes all the difference in 
the world whether one defers their motivation to an unseen hand or, contrariwise, whether 
one believes human beings alone have the power of meaningful action. 
 Our institutions should also worry us.  Without denying that this worry is itself 
given shape within the milieu of institutions, the greater part of critique is nevertheless 
born among and falls back upon institutions.  One might speak in an almost child-like 
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manner when grasping to understand the intuition: to riff on Deleuze and Guattari, in a 
slightly different key, we might allow a little silliness here and say that everything is an 
institution.  Engels, for example, said the hand and the tool were mutualist institutions.9  
Critique is only meaningful when it takes the form of a dialogue between human beings 
and the institutions they create.  The human being is itself an institution.  Where they are 
working at their highest capacity—i.e., crystallized in the institution of thought—the 
efficacy of our institutions ought to be continually questioned.  Do they provide us with 
the maximum ‘freedom’ while at the same time offering the least resistance?  After all, is 
that not what an institution does?  In terms of essences—and one should always retain a 
healthy scepticism as regards essences—an institution facilitates and lubricates the world 
while making sure to get out of the way of the human bodies it supports.  In a world 
where everything seems to live and die according to its status as institution, there arises 
an emergent necessity to perpetually question the value of our institutions in all their 
ubiquity.  But if the human being is itself an institution—i.e., an inherited idea passed to 
us by our antecedents, and if everything knowable about the human being is made known 
by the human being, how do we measure the value of this knowing?  The old humanist 
problem of ‘man’ as measure of ‘himself’ rears its head here.  How does a ruler measure 
itself?  Can a ruler tell you how big a centimetre is? 
 History should also worry us.  We are likewise conditioned by as much as we 
condition history.  Tied up in history, between the earth and the sky, are many major and 
minor narratives.  There is a canon of our dearly departed and kindred philosophers’ 
proper names, which we must recite and learn as if by rote.  But for how long?  Is it not 
sad if we go on forever thinking this way?  Jules Laforgue said, “La vie est trop triste, 
trop sale.  L’histoire est un vieux cauchemar bariolé qui ne se doute pas que les 
meilleures plaisanteries sont les plus courtes.”10  Insomuch as we are unconsciously 
conditioned by history it bears us up tightly in its arms, and we suffer from the delusion 
that the more we critique it the more we shall loosen its grip, never suspecting that we are 
this history incarnate.  But history is not only a nightmare, it is an adventure and a farce.  
The same history that holds us from absolute possibility provides us with its legacy.  Our 
forebearers’ accomplishments in religion, ethics, natural history, psychology, linguistics, 
literature, physics and all of our institutions restrain our freedom to become while 
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providing the very possibility of historical becoming.  We never move forward without 
presupposing a firm footing on the cultural achievement of the past. 
In my graduate work I have been twice blessed.   
First I have discovered in the work of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin a crossroads 
of sorts.  Which comes first, being or responsibility?  Ontology before ethics!  This used 
to be a personal maxim until Bakhtin convinced me otherwise.  Language conditions 
being, and—by extension—our ethically active human understanding.  To proceed from a 
strictly theoretical ontology without the living ingression into being, without answering 
theory by architectonically conjoining it with practice, is to remain wholly on the side of 
theoretical cognition—as Graham Roberts defines it, the word architectonic refers to “the 
science of relations, of how parts relate together to form a (dynamic) whole.”11  In 
proceeding from this strict theoretical point of view we amputate the real everyday 
material aspect of our lives qua becoming.  To proceed from the other direction, wholly 
from the sensual aspect of our lives, consigns sense itself to the rubble of human history; 
living this way, we lose our cultural and socioeconomic birthright to a wholly 
aestheticized life.   
As we will see, in Section Two, both of these approaches to ethics are necessary 
but insufficient.  Ontology and ethics are wed inseparably to each other in Bakhtin.  The 
world calls out to us and exhorts us to answer what he terms once-occurrent being-as-
event—i.e., life in its creative and ever-rejuvenating present.  For Bakhtin, we ought not 
cease asking the question of the relationship between discourse and life.  Life as it is lived 
is a perpetual process that human beings are self-evidently held responsible to answer—
this is the price demanded us for the gift of self-consciousness.  Bakhtin calls the ethically 
active process of responding to the present moment the architectonics of answerability.   
Since the sensual world is in constant flux, and since our answers are ineluctably 
conditioned by the history we are attempting to answer, a constant re-phrasing is 
necessary.  In Section Two I will take up Bakhtin’s phenomenological and ethical 
writings.  These seek to establish the architectonically formed meaning of a life through 
co-authorship.  Never complete, co-authorship of a life is a perpetually renewed process 
that takes place between self and other—i.e., between the author and hero.  Authorship is 
always conditional and pending upon the verification grounded in the body and life of the 
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other.  This verification is possible because, for Bakhtin, the other has an excess of 
seeing—a sort of overflow of insight into the subject, which the other has and uses to help 
temporarily complete—consummate—the subject.  Since human beings are caught up in a 
situation, they always have a view from somewhere, a position, and their self-
understanding is necessarily limited as a result.  The other’s excess of seeing provides 
insight into those blind-spots, and the other therefore fills out the purview of the subject 
through an intersubjective relation.  It is only by being-with, only this exotopic 
condition—i.e., by being located outside of the other rather than being co-extensive with 
the other—that we can answer the call of being-as-event and consummate our lives.  
Authorship and ethical answerability are always active.  They take place through 
unending dialogue between the subject and other and between the subject and the world. 
Second, Bakhtin has been a profound teacher and touchstone for me in terms of 
what I consider the question of 20th century philosophy—namely, ought humanism give 
way completely to what Foucault has called the hermeneutics of the subject?  Bakhtin 
stands in the interstice between our fading faith in humanism and the rise of what Allon 
White refers to as “semantic personalism.”12  M. M. Bakhtin provides us with a rich 
account of world history from the point of view of the life’s ‘big questions.’  Post-1960’s 
philosophical cynicism and the suspicion of all things relating to the subject do not tend 
to humour these distinctly humanist concerns.  But in a world that is once again all too 
ready to throw its history in the dust-bin, to return to its repressed ground of existence, to 
grant its corporations personhood while rolling back the welfare state, I have yet to hear 
an argument that can dissuade me from the conviction that humanism is not wholly 
beyond redemption or that post-structuralism can save us from ourselves.  The first task 
as human theorists, it seems to me, is to be theorists without ceasing to be human, and to 
be human without ceasing to think critically.   
There will never be a satisfactory grand narrative, and certainly humanism must 
reject monological—i.e., univocal—teleology.  But there is nevertheless an ongoing great 
dialogue in which we need to actively seek a seat at the table, because we are all 
implicated.  This dialogue is neither wholly historical nor purely immanent to textuality, 
but both the text and history require a “rejoinder” from us—we historical-semantic human 
beings.13  What is the question asked in this great dialogue?  That is part of the territory of 
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this little survey.  We need the right ears to hear this question, but we can say from the 
very beginning that it is heard in a several modes and in a multiplicity of voices—it is 
polyphonic.  The question is not one but many.  I have already begun to hint at the 
intonation of this question as I hear it: what does it mean to be a human being?  What is 
the relationship between human beings and their institutions?  How is the relationship 
between human beings ethically and ontologically constituted?  How are we historically 
conditioned and how do we condition our history?  And perhaps most tacit of all, I hear 
these questions: What am I responsible for?  How do I ethically answer these questions?  
I do believe in redemption and its necessity.  If this makes me a utopian thinker, 
so be it.  Yet perhaps we need to begin critically rethinking Utopia as a polyphonic, 
double-voiced struggle, according to the logic of evolution and becoming.  As Michael 
Gardiner points out, both Merleau-Ponty and Bakhtin “uphold the Utopian possibility of 
an ‘ideal community of embodied subjects.’”14  This ideal is bolstered not for the sake of 
some monological vision of a singular collective telos realized at the end of history, but to 
keep ever-present at the forefront of dialogue the reminder that our situatedness is not 
solipsistic but intersubjective.  Let us be clear here: I believe in redemption’s necessity, 
but I do not believe in its absolute actualization.  Like the problem of history, justice is 
aporetic.  It calls to us and requires us to answer, but this in no way means that we are 
equal to the task.  Life compels us to live without ready-made answers.  Redemptive 
embodiment and ideal communities are virtualities not eventualities, but they are 
nevertheless embedded in the real socioeconomic milieu of everyday life and are self-
reflexive, like the “critical Utopias” of Gardiner’s own theoretical position.15   
There is no alibi we may give to the Reaper—he knows his chaff—and just so, it 
is not permissible to scapegoat my personal situation.  To live as if I am not myself is to 
live in an illusion, and to live passively is to rebuke life itself.  Where I hear a voice in the 
event that calls me to act—be it to help a fellow traveller or to seek to leave the world a 
more sustainable place for your grandchildren whom I will never meet—I must act.   
The ethical project of answering life as once-occurring being-as-event is an 
endless task.  As human beings, we tend to seek ready-made solutions, easy answers, and 
to lead finalized lives—i.e., as if we are wholly self-consistent and can live according to a 
blueprint.  The more we stutter toward uttering a true word, however, the more our words 
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seem to catch in our throat.  It bears repeating.  In what follows I will attempt to speak 
with many voices, presuming that this is both possible and permissible.  How often we 
treat others as if they were simply moments of our own life and as if they are not active 
historical adventurers in their own right.  I do not expect that my audience will always 
agree with what is to follow, heaven forbid!  Only dogmatism seeks to pre-empt 
disagreement.  This work is as much an invitation to the great dialogue regarding some of 
the ideas of Bakhtin’s own time and our own as it is a monograph on the man himself.  
 It is essential to enter this great dialogue with a view to great time.  That is to say, 
we are mortal players on this planet, but we nevertheless participate in immortality.  Yet 
at the time I am writing this, we have turned the page of history to the 21st century having 
almost entirely forgotten this long view of historical time—at least in our everyday and 
non-theoretical lives.  Even when we do look to the long view of history, there is a danger 
of seeing only its negative aspect.  Interpreted from the point of view of an individual life 
and death, the image of great time is often only negatively inflected; in the wholly 
negative polarization of the image of great time, we are reminded that our mortal lives are 
insignificant in comparison with images of immortality.   
The quasi-immortal Californian redwood, for example, can evince a feeling of 
temporal impotence.  In Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo there is a scene in which Jimmy 
Stewart (a.k.a. ‘Scottie’) and Kim Novak (a.k.a. ‘Madeleine Elster/Judy Barton’) are 
found walking among the California redwoods.  Both characters ostensibly suffer from 
personal limitations that obstruct their forward progression in life: Scottie from vertigo 
and Barton cum ‘Madeleine Elster’ from the belief that she is the reincarnated spirit of 
‘Carlotta’—a high society woman who drowned herself in the mid 19th century.  In a 
sense, both characters are immobilized by the vertigo of their personal history.  The 
audience overhears Stewart’s character read from a tourist placard: (referring to the 
redwoods) “‘Their true name is sequoia sempervirens... always green, ever living.’”  
When Scottie and Madeleine stop to view a cross-section of one of the fallen sequoias, 
Hitchcock uses one of his famed slow-moving camera pans across the trees-rings to 
intimate historical unfolding according to great time.  We see “1066: The Battle of 
Hastings,”  “1215: Magna Carta Signed,” “1492: Discovery of America,” etc., with 
arrows pointing to the chalked tree-rings.  Pointing to the rings Novak speaks the iconic 
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line: “Somewhere in here I was born ... and there I died.  It was only a moment for you.  
You ... you took no notice.”  The great age of the trees upsets Novak’s character.  They 
remind her she will have to die—that her life is insignificant relative to the quasi-eternal 
redwood.  As we will see in the fourth and in the last sections of this work, for Bakhtin 
there are both positive and negative polarities in images of life and death.  Elster/Barton’s 
verbal utterance expresses the wholly negative pole from which we understand great 
time.  Understood only negatively, our lives certainly appear insignificantly short when 
compared with the sequoia, the age of the earth, of a star, or of the solar-system.  
Nevertheless, there is also a positive polarity that can be coaxed out of images of life and 
death in great time.  When seen outside of the point of view of the individual, when 
understood in terms of the collective cultural and historical life, great time takes on a 
positive character in which the quasi-immortal human dialogue comes into sharp focus.  
From this vista, even the image of individual life and death becomes re-infused with the 
larger importance of the collective body of humankind to which it is connected.  In taking 
the problem of great time seriously, and by retaining in the image of individual life and 
death its bi-polar negative and positive aspects, our lives may undergo a dramatic re-
intonation of what it means to live in the face of death; great time pushes to the 
background some aspects of life with which we are often preoccupied and it brings into 
sharp focus matters that we do not usually consider from day to day.  If we have forgotten 
how to view great time in terms of the great dialogue, we are in danger of hearing only its 
negative inflections: ‘But why must I die?’  ‘I expected more out of life!’  ‘You only live 
once, better take while the taking’s good!’  Such attitudes are the expression of a 
vertiginous relationship between the individual and the larger whole with which he is 
connected.  Bakhtin provides us an alternative to the strictly negative and impotent image 
of individual life and death, and we need now more than ever to hear what he has to say. 
Bakhtin’s corpus and the writings of the Bakhtin Circle give us particular cause to 
celebrate.  By taking a long view of history and by returning to the big problems of 
science, the humanities, and philosophy, he provides us a path back into the human 
historical and cultural past with an eye to redeeming and rejuvenating what we cannot 
leave behind without ceasing to be embodied self-reflective and semantic persons.  As 
such, he brings the self-autonomy promised in humanism back to life without promoting a 
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manifest destiny or re-inscribing dogmatism, and at the same time he avoids the spirit of 
absolute relativity that leaves philosophy and science without direction.  In a sense, 
Bakhtin is a funambulist.  He walks a tightrope between the largely authoritarian human 
past and the complete openness of the undisclosed future.  The problem of history is the 
problem of determining the proper weight we ought to ascribe to freedom and necessity, 
and this problem is one belonging to the ontological category of becoming not being.  In 
other words, the problem of history is something set out for humans as a task and we 
deceive ourselves when we propose ready-made solutions or attempt to finalize it.  In 
offering his particular perspective on history, Bakhtin shows a way forward that does not 
dismiss the past as a mere nightmare.  He never loses sight of the big picture—he always 
has an eye to how the individual opens onto the greater narrative of species, of the bi-
polarity inherent in images of life and death.  Only when understood with an eye to this 
bi-polarity can the great weight of history be reborn as laughter.  Only where we have an 
ear for hearing the great dialogue and when we have taught ourselves to see the fullness 
of time will we place the image of human beings back in the scale of great time. 
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B.  Outline of the Whole 
Rather than proceeding strictly analytically, I will attempt a more thematic and narrative 
style throughout this work.  This is not to say that analysis will not be an essential 
component.  No commentary can answer its subject without detailed and acute analysis, 
but I wish to follow a style more akin to that of Bakhtin himself.  Therefore, I hope that 
what follows will be productive for the reader by gradually building up these themes in 
additive rhythms rather than by providing a strict analytical reconstruction.  This latter 
approach is sometimes unavoidable, but I have usually found it leads to dry and spiritless 
prose.  There are now so many monographs on Bakhtin that I would be remiss if I did not 
attempt to entertain as well as to inform. 
Before we begin I will briefly outline some of the themes which I will take up 
section by section.  Those who wish to plunge right in without this spoiler can skip to 
Section One.  
Section One will outline some of the more salient details of Bakhtin’s early 
biographical education leading up to his first book length publication Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics in 1929.   
Section Two provides a perspectival account of Bakhtin’s ethics.  That is, it does 
not attempt to exhaust his ethical writings, which are found, for the most part, in Toward 
a Philosophy of the Act and Art and Answerability.  Since no neutrality is possible, no 
attempt at neutrality can or will be made here.  My reading of Bakhtin’s ethics attempts to 
find a middle ground between Christian-doctrinal/liberal and Marxist-semiotic and 
semantic appropriations.  The former are found in the writings of Ann Shukman, Michael 
Holquist and Katerina Clark, and others.  I take Allon White as a proponent of the latter.  
I tend to fall closer to White’s reading, by emphasizing the conceptual rather than 
religious basis for Bakhtin’s own appropriation of both Christian and Marxist concepts.  
The first part of this section will therefore focus on Bakhtin’s notion of ethical 
consummation between subject and other.  As we all know in experience, we appear 
differently to others than we do to ourselves.  Phenomenologically speaking, the subject 
appears open to the world while the other appears as something whole unto itself, but 
because of this fundamental difference neither subject nor other can achieve a synthetic 
unity of this inside and outside appearance by their own power.  Under only my own 
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power, I cannot author my own life from both the point of view of the subject as well as 
the point of view of my subjectivity as seen from the other’s perspective.  The world 
viewed from inside my own consciousness and my world as viewed from the perspective 
of the other require a fundamentally phenomenological moment of analysis from inside 
consciousness where the two perspectives of my life can be fused together in an ethically 
active moment of answering what I have understood about myself through the other.  The 
self from inside and outside consciousness will never fuse without the help of the other’s 
transgredient position—i.e., her state of being outside of my consciousness.  As a result, 
the subject needs the other in order to see itself from outside, and vice-versa.  This surplus 
of seeing, or transgredience, allows for co-consummation—or temporary ontological 
completion—of self and other.  As we will see, consummation has two essential 
moments, an intuitive projection of the subject into the other and its return into its unique 
perspective outside the other.  It cannot do without either of these moments and still 
achieve the ethical act of answering between self and other.  In this section I focus on 
projection of the self into the other as it might be inflected through the Orthodox virtue of 
kenosis.  In doing so, I hope I have shown that while Bakhtin is heavily influenced by 
Russian Orthodox concepts, his concern is not with the spiritual supermundane aspects of 
theology, but with their socioeconomic and materially contextualized implications for 
ethics. 
In the fourth subsection of the Section Two, I turn to the genealogy of Bakhtin’s 
theory of intersubjective relation.  Implicated in this is Bakhtin’s cornerstone idea 
developed out of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, namely architectonics.  Like Kant, 
Bakhtin was concerned with how externally unrelated faculties—or what I have called 
institutions in this introduction—might be brought into immanent relations and influence 
one another within the same conscious existence.  Today we might refer to this as 
interdisciplinarity.  By adding to this concern the distinctly Russian virtue of 
responding/responsibility to one’s fellow human being, Bakhtin essentially maps the 
concern with interdisciplinary relations onto a second ethically-inflected field regarding 
self-other relations.  Again, these relations are always read through the notion of 
responsibility—of the necessity to answer the human sciences, the event, and the other as 
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they arise as a problem within conscious existence: hence the architectonics of 
answerability.   
The concern between both self-other relations and interdisciplinarity will set the 
tone for the larger whole of this work and shall be revisited throughout the subsequent 
sections.  Bakhtin’s philosophical corpus is polyvalent, but he is everywhere preoccupied 
with the dialogue between subjects, between disciplines and between ideas.  We will 
attempt to show how he seeks an answerable and additive response between the 
disciplines of ethics, biology, psychology and psychoanalysis, linguistics, literature, and 
history in the relevant sections that follow.  In this work, ethics comes first in that it 
grounds the possibility of answering the other disciplines while at the same time 
establishing the dynamics of their ontological relation and exploring the possibility of 
dialogue between the disciplines.  
 The third section of this thesis explores a paper published under the name of 
Bakhtin’s friend I. I. Kanaëv entitled “Contemporary Vitalism”.  The authorship of this 
paper is highly debatable, but I proceed under the assumption that whoever penned it, the 
essay is the product of collaboration.  This section will begin by reviewing in brief the 
history of vitalism.  I will then review Bakhtin and Kanaëv’s critique of the vitalist Hans 
Driesch’s work The Science and Philosophy of the Organism.  As the paper ends with the 
authors’ proclaimed commitment to dialectical materialism in the sciences, I attempt to 
develop an account of how the sciences are fundamentally grounded in sociology and 
cultural production—i.e., I try to show how the limited methods of biology are 
themselves answered by their relation to sociological theory.  In transitioning to the 
following section I take up Freud’s borrowings from biological science to reinforce his 
dualistic turn found in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  This new stage in psychoanalytic 
theory evinces no small influence from the relation between body and mind and to the 
spiritual agency that haunts vitalism. 
The fourth section moves into psychoanalysis proper and its critique under the pen 
of another member of the Bakhtin Circle, namely Valentin Voloshinov. Voloshinov’s 
book Freudianism: A Marxist Critique attempts to replace Freud’s ontological distinction 
between consciousness and the unconscious with the ideological distinction between 
official and unofficial discourse—roughly categorical distinctions between sanctioned and 
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unsanctioned utterance, not wholly unlike what Deleuze and Guattari call major and 
minor literatures.  Following Voloshinov, Freud is critiqued in this section for remaining 
committed to a highly introspective approach to psychology—albeit an ingenious and 
highly nuanced one.  I will show that Voloshinov attempts to find a middle ground 
between introspective and behavioural psychology by once again turning to dialectical 
materialism and the architectonically answerable dynamic relation between discourse in 
scientific theory/praxis and discourse in everyday socioeconomic life.  As Voloshinov’s 
book is largely a propaedeutic invitation to further research along these lines, the final 
part of this section will then go on to show how Freudianism can ameliorate 
contemporary visions of Freud.  In doing so, I review the merits of Allon White’s attempt 
to extend the Bakhtin Circle’s critique of psychoanalysis—as a bourgeois repression of 
the carnivalesque and the grotesque body, and I also attempt to extend White’s productive 
revisitation of psychoanalysis within the fields of sociological theory and modernist 
literature. 
The fifth section takes on Saussurean linguistics, first from the point of view of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s critique in his lectures on “Child Psychology and Pedagogy” 
and then along the lines found in Voloshinov’s second book Marxism and the Philosophy 
of Language.  A pattern will begin to emerge here, as Voloshinov again seeks to establish 
a middle ground based on everyday socioeconomic discourse.  Here the third term falls 
between two major trends in linguistic study, namely what Voloshinov calls individual 
subjectivism and abstract objectivism.  In order to show how the Bakhtin Circle makes 
use of this third term, I will then go on to explicate Bakhtin and Voloshinov’s own theory 
of discourse in art as it is related to and founded upon discourse in life.  This analysis will 
set the stage for the subsequent section on Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. 
Section Six will attempt to explicate the first territory of Problems by showing 
how the polyphonic novel marks a new and important development in the history of 
novelistic discourse.  At the same time, I will also show that by emphasising 
Dostoevsky’s personalist approach to the characters in his novels, he is able to effect a 
profound critique of German Ideology and enter into the great dialogue as it existed in his 
own time and to show how the ground is prepared for its future life within his literary 
corpus.  
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Finally, Section Seven will take up a number of major themes in Bakhtin’s oeuvre 
regarding novelistic genres, space-time, and history.  Not least among the problems 
within these spheres is the historical aporia between freedom and necessity. The 
exploration of this historical aporia is explored through Bakhtin’s theory of 
chronotopicity—loosely, the perceptually relative experience of space-time.  Particular 
emphasis will be placed upon the oppressive weight of neo-Platonic philosophy and the 
part it has played in enframing occidental human self-understanding.  In this section I will 
also review the major chronotopes provided in Bakhtin’s essay “Forms of Time and of the 
Chronotope in the Novel”; the Rabelaisian chronotope and Goethe’s talent for seeing the 
fullness of time play the starring roles in this section.   
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§ 1.  Biography: M. M. Bakhtin 
 
1.1 A Novel Education: Bakhtin’s Bildungsroman in Brief 
“By biography and autobiography (the account of a person’s life), we understand the most 
immediate transgredient form in which I can objectify myself and my own life artistically.” 
 —Bakhtin16 
 
The narrative of Bakhtin’s early years is muddled and distorted by both a lack of evidence 
and false testimony.  The Gospel of M. M. Bakhtin according to Clark and Holquist’s 
eponymous biography often strays into the apocryphal.  By his own word, Bakhtin 
graduated from St. Petersburg in 1918, but this has since been disproven.17  It seems that 
Bakhtin’s ‘autobiography’ was part truth and part creation.  Before arriving in St. 
Petersburg in 1914 to study alongside his brother and mentor, Nikolai, Clark and Holquist 
place Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin in the gymnasiums of Vilnius and Odessa.  We may 
go on faith that aspects of this are correct, since Bakhtin’s writings evince an intimidating 
breadth of knowledge of the classics.  He is said to have studied both Latin and Greek, 
and it is apparent that he was saturated in theology and the philosophical thought of the 
19th and early 20th centuries—especially Martin Buber and Kierkegaard.18  He was also 
influenced by the Russian symbolist Vyacheslav Ivanov, and had already read Marx, 
Engels, and Nietzsche.19  St. Petersburg was newly christened Petrograd at the time 
Bakhtin came into contact with Russian Futurists and Formalists.20  These two strains of 
the avant-garde he would co-opt and critique by turns throughout his career.21 
Bakhtin seems to have been heavily influenced by his brother’s professor in 
classical philology at Petersburg University, one Faddei F. Zelinsky.  Zelinsky may quite 
possibly be the source of one of Bakhtin’s most controversial claims—that distinctly 
novelistic genres can be traced back to ancient times.  Zelinsky believed that the ancient 
writers had already formulated and begun actualizing all species of literary genres, from 
the epic to the novel.22  It is Bakhtin’s commitment to this canonically eccentric definition 
of what constitutes the novel as a literary form which in turn allowed him both to display 
his exhaustive familiarity with the history of literature as well as to begin to develop a 
theory of folk culture the scope of which would likewise span some “thousands of years”; 
this founding idea of Bakhtin’s theory of the novel is perhaps defended most strongly in 
his essay “Epic and Novel”.23  He believed that the remnants of ancient Grecian cultures 
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that lay dormant in this millennial folk culture could be reborn “periodically” throughout 
history.24  For some intellectuals the October Revolution marked the commencement of a 
hoped for Renaissance of Hellenism.25  
Mikhail’s brother Nikolai left St. Petersburg, joined the White Guards, and would 
communicate with Mikhail little before his hasty departure from Russian soil soon 
thereafter, and the two brothers would never again see each other in the flesh.26  By 1918, 
at the tender age of twenty-three years, Bakhtin had already begun to evince a maturity 
and philosophical insight that won him the friendship of some of those destined to 
intellectual and cultural fame in Russia and abroad.  Bakhtin’s friend Lev Vasilievich 
Pumpiansky had coaxed Bakhtin into joining him in the unlikely cultural Mecca of 
Nevel.27  Once in Nevel, Bakhtin had made the acquaintance and begun a philosophical 
dialogue with, among others, Valentin Voloshinov, Pavel Medvedev, and Matvei Isaevich 
Kagan; with these intellectual friendships Bakhtin began a lifelong commitment to 
dialogue, co-authorship, and professional collusion.  This so-called ‘Nevel School’ of 
philosophy discussed subjects as diverse as theology, the theory of language, 
philosophical discourse, art, and dialectical materialism. Their conversations were as 
heady as the copious samovars of strong tea they sat drinking long into the night.28  The 
group was also publically active and produced plays, lectured, and staged musical 
performances.29   
Pumpiansky was tempted away to Vitebsk in 1919 where he organized a seminar 
in neo-Kantian philosophy.30  Bakhtin followed Pumpiansky to Vitebsk and the Nevel 
Circle gradually began to disband.  What remained of the group slowly re-orientated its 
intellectual centre around Bakhtin himself.31  Since the revolution Vitebsk had grown 
increasingly bohemian; the town was transformed overnight from a quaint outpost in what 
is now Belarus, to a bustling base of experimental art and radical politics.  
Parenthetically, Vitebsk was also the childhood home of Marc Chagall, who had returned 
from Europe in 1918 to actively participate in the left-leaning cultural explosion now in 
full swing.32  It is perhaps most surprising that this artistic upspring was taking place in 
the midst of what was effectively a civil war, but the early days of the revolution were 
every bit as much aesthetic as political.  Theory and practice were in no way separate for 
these artists and intellectuals, and the civil war did not begin and end in politics.  For 
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example, the Futurist Malevich and the “folkloristic” painter Chagall had themselves 
fought an ideological war wherein Malevich achieved supremacy and eventuated 
Chagall’s departure from his hometown.33  Clark and Holquist hint that Bakhtin had 
ambivalent feelings about the seismological cultural inversion taking place in Vitebsk.  
He had still not exorcised the influence of the second wave of Russian symbolists 
represented in the figure of Ivanov—an influence against whom Formalists such as 
Shklovsky were constitutionally opposed.34  The state of being outside of these artistic 
movements no doubt had a profound effect on him.35 
 For a man who suffered from painful inflammations brought on by osteomyelitis 
and who was struck with typhoid, losing his right leg in the process, Bakhtin managed to 
keep surprisingly active. 36  His days in Vitebsk were spent in service to the community.  
He earned his modest living by teaching, while at the same time organizing literary and 
women’s liberation seminars, provided economic and bookkeeping services to the local 
statistical bureau, and staged theatrical mock defence trials for infamous literary 
personae; this last item is an extraordinary biographical detail considered from the 
perspective of Bakhtin’s later theory of polyphony and the central idea in Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics—i.e., that Dostoevsky hear the voices of his characters.37  By all 
accounts Bakhtin became a skilled orator, though this talent was not always manifest in 
his youth.38  In 1921 Bakhtin met and married Elena Aleksandrovna, who steadied and 
cared for him during his frequent periods of convalescence.39 
In the same year that Bakhtin arrived in Vitebsk, he wrote the earliest extant text 
of his oeuvre.  In English it is known as “Art and Answerability”.  The brief essay 
silhouettes the particular strain of thought which would occupy him for the next five years 
in various guises.  Like the artistic trajectory of the so-called Nevel Circle, the essay 
opposes an immanent, life-orientated art to an accidental, mechanical form of art; as we 
will see later, this latter type constitutes a clumsy synthesis of disparate elements that 
Goethe would have rejected as “arbitrary constructions.”40  A truly immanent unity of the 
artistic experience can only be achieved inside of consciousness and only through an 
effort to bring back to life what is experienced in the work of art.41  Taking a page out of 
Kant, Bakhtin asserts that there is an architectonic relationship that can be constructed 
between art and life and that it is, moreover, our responsibility to consummate this 
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relationship as authors of our own lives.42  Anything short of such an attempt is a 
perversion of the properly conceived relationship between art and life: “inspiration that 
ignores life and is itself ignored by life is not inspiration but a state of possession.”43  It 
was precisely this effort to place art back into the realm of life as it is lived that inspired 
Kagan’s exhortation that art ought to “involve itself more closely with life and not to 
serve the interests of any one faction or ethnic group.”44  This turn toward everyday life 
was in the air and was equally expressed by the Circle’s communist counterparts in those 
early days of revolutionary optimism.45   
As is well known, the two texts re-discovered during the 1970’s shortly before 
Bakhtin’s death, one set of writings anthologized as Art and Answerability and the other 
an unfinished treatise on ethics, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, belong to this period; 
however, the transition from these notebooks to translated and published texts is 
convoluted and not without controversy.46  The central themes that hold this body of 
writings together are their consistent dedication to questions of authorship—the so-called 
“master trope” of his worldview. 47  Existential responsibility does most of the heavy 
lifting in these texts, as Bakhtin attempts to position himself in the history of philosophy.  
His early approach to authorship, disciplinarity, and the responsibility inherent between 
subjects and the world is overwhelmingly phenomenological and neo-Kantian.  
Bakhtin’s earliest surviving notebooks evince a multifaceted philosophic avenue 
into various theoretical concerns that at times contract together in agreement and at times 
expand into different points of view—for example, the different approaches to ethics and 
authorship evoked in his phenomenological and textual studies.  Bakhtin’s oeuvre is, in 
short, dialogical from its very beginning.  This kind of contradictory co-existence in the 
same body of work is part and parcel of Bakhtin’s style of writing, which consistently 
privileges theme over analysis; moreover, Bakhtin is not the most economic writer, and 
his works tend to be prone to long digressions that do not always fit back into the whole 
of his stated task.48  What it lacks in Germanic economy, however, it manages to 
compensate for in fairness and insight, polyvocality and virtuosic journalistic 
performance.  Indeed, the voice of the poet journalist Walt Whitman often enters into 
conversation with me when I read Bakhtin’s works, for example:  
You shall no longer take things at second or third hand, nor 
  look through the eyes of the dead, nor feed 
19 
 
 
 
  on the spectres in books, 
You shall not look through my eyes either, nor take things 
  from me, 
You shall listen to all sides and filter them from yourself.49 
 
Throughout his corpus Bakhtin remains committed to seeing the other side of an 
argument, to hearing the voice of the internal ‘thou’ and the external other.  It is precisely 
this commitment that allows us to speak of his work as being informed by both 
centripetal and centrifugal forces, by both contraction and expansion, both ergon and 
energeia, both being and becoming, and to approach these works from a polyvocal rather 
than dogmatic perspective.  These themes will stay with us throughout the present text, 
just as they tarried with our Russian thinker throughout his own life and work. 
 Bakhtin’s philosophical apprenticeship, in those revolutionary days of tumult, 
sickness, economic depression, and profound productivity, was perhaps most consciously 
and directly shaped by the proponents of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism.  Most 
notable among these was the so-called “sage of Marburg”, Hermann Cohen.50  Cohen 
attempted to expunge the gap in the Kantian dualism between mind (phenomenon) and 
world (noumenon), and his philosophy won him many devotees in both Russia and 
Germany.  For Cohen, Kant’s Ding an sich (thing as such) was not to be approached as an 
absolutely unknowable substance, but as “merely the limit of conceptualization.”51  Our 
concepts of the thing as such, according to Cohen, proceed to greater and greater clarity.  
If this is the case, then it follows that the conceptualization of the thing as it is in itself is 
not wholly beyond conceptualization, but quite to the contrary, there is no end to its 
conceptualization.  Cohen wanted to make Kant over into a monist, to permanently bridge 
the gap between subjectivity and the world: there is no world wholly unto itself; there is 
only the world of conception and concept formation.   
According to Clark and Holquist, this placed Bakhtin on the far side of the neo-
Kantian divide diametrically opposed to Cohen.52  While he was greatly influenced by 
Cohen’s assertion that conceptualization could never come to a full stop—that at its limit 
concept formation was wholly unfinalizable, Bakhtin rejected the idea that matter could 
be nothing other than a conception.53  ‘The other’ and ‘alterity’ are important categories 
which Bakhtin respects in the formation of his concepts.  Moreover, the gap between 
mind and world is not a division that Bakhtin would want to permanently conjoin in a 
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unity without difference.  In other words, for Bakhtin, “all that is living is alive precisely 
because of a noncorrespondence with others."54  Unlike Cohen, Bakhtin sees this gap 
between mind and world as an ontological divide that can be crossed but never 
completely closed, and he therefore remains a dualistic thinker.  In fact, it is precisely 
because this dualism is hardwired into what he calls the once-occurrent being-as-event 
that we cannot foreclose on the sense of existence.  That is to say, everyday conscious life 
as it arises phenomenologically maintains a gap between subject and world and between 
subject and object.  Today we would describe Bakhtin’s philosophy as a body of 
utterances that expresses an ideological preference for discourses of becoming. 
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§ 2. Ethics: Toward a Philosophy of the Act and Art and Answerability 
 
2.1 Lost in Translation?: Bakhtin Meets the West 
“In the beginning was the deed.”  
–Goethe55 
 
No commentary can wholly resist predication.  Ideological intonation is inevitable.  In Art 
and Answerability, Bakhtin says, “no one can assume a position toward the I and the 
other that is neutral.”56  In this section I intend to accomplish two essential tasks that I 
hope will outline how the present work ties in with the very large and growing body of 
Bakhtinian scholarship.  First, I want to show that Bakhtin’s early notebooks translated as 
Toward a Philosophy of the Act and Art and Answerability are informed by Christian 
doctrine, and specifically the Orthodox kenotic tradition.  This influence is not 
transparent, but it can be elucidated by a careful exposition of the intersection between 
the distinctly Russian virtue of kenosis and Bakhtin’s conception of projection as an 
essential, but not exclusive, moment in his ethics of answering what he calls once-
occurrent being-as-event.  Kenosis is essentially the word used to describe Christ’s 
sloughing off his Spiritual substance and taking on a wholly material body when he 
became incarnated as ‘man.’  In Russian Orthodoxy the virtue of kenosis is essentially the 
doctrine that one should attempt to empathize with the other and treat them as a worldly 
brother to whom they must respond ethically.  It is my belief that Bakhtin’s projection 
self-consciously allies itself with the virtue of kenosis.  As projection is used in Bakhtin’s 
writings, the notion is not without dispute, and it is crucial to state at the outset that 
projection is an intuitive moment of union between subject and other and not 
ontologically actualizable.  There is a very real connection here with Kant’s concept of 
Einfuhlung, or empathy, which was adopted by a number of Germanic thinkers including 
Wilhelm Dilthey and Hermann Cohen.  This is not to say that Bakhtin accepts the 
possibility of unmediated co-empathizing between subject and other.  In a very real sense 
there is no overcoming the alterity of the other and no reduction of difference to a 
monological unity.  For Bakhtin, in the words of Michael Gardiner, empathy is “only the 
initial moment of alterity; after this, we must ‘return’ to ourselves.”57   
Second, this section will seek to establish the so-called ‘master trope’ of both 
Bakhtin’s corpus and the present work: namely the architectonics of answerability as an 
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authorship of self through a deeper understanding of self-other relatedness.  Since this is 
the section of my thesis devoted to ethics, I will attempt to show how this architectonic 
method of answering works within Bakhtin’s ethical thought—with a particular focus on 
the relations between subject and other.  In doing so, however, it is my intention to lay the 
ground-work for the remainder of this thesis, vis-à-vis how answerability also informs the 
manifold of relations between disciplines as Bakhtin understands them.  Bakhtin’s 
interdisciplinarity—or peregrinations between disciplines—will then be further explored 
in the subsequent sections of this thesis. 
 
Julia Kristeva’s “Une poétique ruinée” launched Bakhtin’s Problems of Dostoevsky’s 
Poetics on the French reading public in 1970.  Kristeva asks “how will this text be 
understood” at the remove of some forty years since its publication.58 Her work is tightly 
associated with other key figures in the semiotics movement in Europe in the late sixties 
and early seventies, and most especially Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, and Tzvetan 
Todorov, the last of whom composed a monograph on Bakhtin entitled Mikhaïl Bakhtin: 
le principe dialogique (1981).  Kristeva praises the Circle, including Medvedev and 
Voloshinov, for effectively correcting Russian Formalism’s failure to capture the truly 
objective “‘scientific object’” of study they sought: “Bakhtin and his group show that one 
could cover fresh ground, within the Formalist and poetic range of problems, if one were 
to question the workings of literary meaning from the point of view of their place in the 
history of meaning-systems and of their relationship to the speaker.”59  Kristeva follows 
Medvedev and Voloshinov’s charge that the Formalists collapsed the object of their study 
into mere “categories of language”—which is to say, they fallaciously reduce literary 
utterances to linguistic and formal categories.60  The Circle primarily adds two important 
facets to literary study that were missing from the Formalist method of scholarship.  First, 
the material value-laden “meaning-systems” were not reducible to a “unified field,” 
regardless of whether this field was conceived of as composed entirely of mind or 
meaning.61  Second, one could not treat the social-context, or milieu, as an empty husk—
material and socioeconomic context could not be stripped away from the utterance.62  The 
practice of language production therefore jumps out into the forefront as a problem of the 
construction of a theoretical apparatus which can account for the “language-user.”63  
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According to Kristeva, the tangible language-user nevertheless remains deficient in 
Bakhtin’s first publication—i.e., Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics.  Kristeva accuses 
Bakhtin of psychologism, a common philosophical fallacy in fin-de-siècle European 
philosophy, which attempts to ground logic and semantics wholly in the space-time of 
psychological discourse.64  Finally, Kristeva accuses Bakhtin of apparently glossing over 
his own covert Christian commitments and humanist remainders.65  By her own 
admission, Kristeva therefore reveals these supposedly latent religious undertones in 
order to redeem the remainder of the text; she wants “to  salvage,” however unknown to 
its author, the “kernel” of what he “really meant” to say; her critical intervention would 
then bring this authorial intention into contemporary semiotics as one of its “hitherto 
unknown precursor[s].”66  It was thus that Bakhtin was introduced to the West. 
I have no interest in taking up Kristeva’s accusation of psychologism here, as it 
will not foreground in any way my anticipated discussion of Bakhtin’s philosophy, nor 
will it add to or interfere with my account of his critiques of ethics, vitalism, 
psychoanalysis, linguistics, or humanism.  Bakhtin does provide an account of the 
language-user that takes a phenomenological tack, however, and it will figure importantly 
here.  The texts in which he does this were still unknown, even inside of Russia, at the 
time of Kristeva’s writing of this essay, so it would be unfair to criticize her for this 
omission.  We are on firmer ground if we state, along with Charles Lock, that while 
Kristeva’s attempted semiotic appropriation of Bakhtin says much about “her perception 
and scruples that she was able to recognize and admit traces of Christianity; less happily, 
it says more about the need to stereotype Bakhtin.”67   
In addition to Kristeva’s introduction of Bakhtin to the West, Sergey Bocharov’s 
“Conversations with Bakhtin” and Clark and Holquist’s biography have become standard 
sources for the study of the theological inflections in Bakhtin’s work.  In an important 
passage from Bocharov’s “Conversations”, Bakhtin stresses the fact that he was vitally 
aware of Soviet censors and intimates that he repressed his religious and philosophical 
views in his publications; this supposed repression had left them “morally flawed” as a 
result.68  Aesopian prevarications or not, the titles of the 1920’s penned under the names 
of Voloshinov, Kanaëv, and Medvedev show a precocious and unique extension of the 
philosophical thought of Marx, Freud, the Russian Formalist school, behavioural 
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psychology, and biological science.  We will have opportunity to explore a great deal of 
this critical work in the sections to follow.  Suffice it to say, there is no absolute authority, 
no last word, on the authorial intent of these works. 
 
2.2 Christ or Marx?: How to Read Bakhtin’s Ethical Writings 
Bakhtin’s interest in theology is essential in understanding the narrow contractions of his 
philosophical thought and how he perceives alterity.  This account is also central to his 
theory of the materiality of the word, and therefore also implicates his translinguistics—
i.e., a linguistics that is founded in the surrounding extraverbal socioeconomic milieu.  
This is a fine line to walk, since it seems that the motivation for this exploration is usually 
one of misappropriation according to an extra-Bakhtinian agenda.  I have no intention of 
repeating liberal selective readings of Bakhtin for the purposes of furthering personal 
religious commitments, since I have none.  For my part, I will also leave to one side 
Bakhtin’s personal faith in matters of religious devotion.  What is more interesting and 
productive is Bakhtin’s nuanced exploration of Christian themes, or what we might call—
somewhat paradoxically—Bakhtin’s radical orthodoxy.   
In his ethical writings, Bakhtin attempted to erect a bridge between his theological 
interests and his theoretical activity and writings.  The deeply philosophic traditions of 
Orthodoxy as a cultural storehouse from which Bakhtin fortified many of his most 
important concepts tends to be dismissed out of hand.  The reasons for this, I suspect, 
often have more to do with the personal experience and unfounded worries of those who 
want to appropriate his work along Marxist avenues, however selectively.  This is not to 
say that there are not more academically sound concerns underlying the shying away 
from these Christian themes.  It is often held—and usually without question—that if one 
accepts Christian conceptions of the world one must also reject strong materialist 
accounts.  But I believe this supposition has more to do with the history of the early 
Christian church, especially after Augustine’s conversion from Manichaeism as well as 
with the official censure of various heresies during the fourth and fifth centuries.69 
In letter and not spirit, I follow Clark and Holquist’s argument that there are 
“connections between Bakhtin’s Christology and the major, apparently non religious 
concerns of his thought.” 70  Clark and Holquist make themselves easy targets, since their 
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claims regarding Bakhtin’s ‘religious’ views seldom turn on direct textual evidence from 
Bakhtin’s own oeuvre.  Instead, the biographers conjecture that as Westerners, it is 
unlikely that readers outside of Russia are truly qualified to judge such connections.  This 
claim is dubious, first since as Westerners—at least those of us outside of Slavic and 
Religious Studies discourse—it is at least equally likely that we would paint all religious 
Russians with the same orthodox brush and assume that they have all read The Way of the 
Pilgrim thoroughly.  This Franny and Zooey-ization of the Russian religious-other must 
inevitably yield proskynesis to those specialists in the know, as it were.  We would 
therefore take Clark and Holquist’s Christianisation of Bakhtin at face value.   
Alternately, one could say that those of us who are in the West could not only 
understand Eastern Orthodox tradition but could help to consummate it from the 
outside—i.e., we could help it to better understand itself through dialogue.  The claim that 
non-specialized Westerners are simply not knowledgeable enough to understand the 
nuances of the Russian Church is made according to precisely the same logic as the 
claims made by Bakhtinian Russian scholars who explain—with feigned professional 
concern—that non-Russians simply cannot comprehend the nuances of M. M. Bakhtin’s 
work and therefore are doomed to misappropriate it.  But to state with a straight face that 
well-intentioned and otherwise acutely knowledgeable academics are incapable of 
moving beyond a cultural-linguistic barrier is highly unsatisfactory.  Not only are these 
positions based on a dubious faith in the assumed authorial intention of the author, they 
are neither constructive of anything resembling theoretical substance, nor are they 
productive in making Bakhtin relevant to contemporary theoretical pursuits.  What is 
more, they overlook the value of Bakhtin’s theory of transgredience, the ability of the 
other to stand outside and help consummate a life, and therefore have no purchase on 
reanimating Bakhtin’s theoretical corpus.  In my reading of Bakhtin, it can be shown that 
the idea of kenosis not only founds the theological underpinnings of the Russian religious 
mind, it is also an essential moment in transgredience itself.  
Clark and Holquist are on much safer ground if we read them factually and leave 
to one side their speculative remarks on Bakhtin’s personal faith—especially where it is 
supposed to come into his work.  The way I would like to approach this problem, as I will 
try to demonstrate—and the only way forward as I can see it, is to place ‘Bakhtin’ back 
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into scare-quotes as Allon White does in his article “The Struggle Over Bakhtin” and to 
read him strictly intertextually against the religious traditions that are supposed to have 
held sway over these texts known as ‘Bakhtin.’71  Anything less than this approach runs 
the very real risk of epistemological anarchism.  We simply don’t know what Bakhtin, the 
man himself, believed.  We have only the author ‘Bakhtin,’ and he requires a reader to 
breathe new life into his lungs.   
Clark and Holquist often run into trouble with the intentional fallacy and provide 
little textual evidence to support their claims.  As a result, we are left to take it on 
authority that Bakhtin’s association with the likes of A. A. Meier, his love of Cohen and 
Buber—both Jewish—and his frequent references to Manichaean-like oppositions, make 
Bakhtin into a believer whose work is everywhere (covertly) infused with dogma.72  We 
are told that Bakhtin was referred to as a Cerkovnik, or churchman—i.e., someone who 
took his faith seriously.73  Yet Bakhtin was not strictly Orthodox, and he also openly 
discussed the value of other religions.  This openness is only in keeping with his 
commitment to what he will later formulate as dialogism.74   
 
2.3 Beyond Orthodoxy: Kenosis and an Ethics of the Event 
It is no great secret that Christianity in the West has been profoundly marked by neo-
Platonism and through it by the Platonic polarizing elevation of spirit and corresponding 
“degradation” of matter.75  More often than not Platonic dualism between mind and body 
has been carried over wholly intact, at least effectively, into the Christian ethos.  This is 
the meaning of the so-called musiktreibender Sokrates, an inversion of the figure of 
Socrates embossed out of historical obscurity by Plato. 76  As Nietzsche reminds us, this is 
the Socrates who knows how to dance, who has remembered his lyre and now obeys the 
god’s bidding that he should compose poetry rather than philosophy.  A Socrates who 
plays music and who does not fear such imperfect, embodied, degraded copies, throws off 
his overly rational adherence to the ideal and the world-denying bad-conscience that 
causes every good Western Christian after the Council of Trent to put fear and hatred into 
his song.77  The “negative-theology” of Plotinus, after Plato’s Republic, situates the good 
beyond the reach of mortal man in his earthly digs—effectively reinforcing this world 
denial.78  What Ricoeur calls “empirical individuality,” and what Derrida calls the “tode ti 
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of brute existence”—i.e., embodied sensual experience—has largely been put to one side 
in Western Christianity.79  The reaction against this bad conscience and world denial, 
rigorously critiqued by Marx and Engels’ dialectical materialism, and then psychologized 
by Nietzsche, has been amplified into a practically universal suspicion of all things 
Christian in the 20th century—and not least by the disciples of Marxism and Nietzschean 
philosophy.  At the slightest whiff of the familiar logic of the topos ouranios and 
supermundane, or the world-denying search for guidance from on high, well-meaning 
commentators take flight.80 
 In the Republic, Plato placed “the good” outside of the world of appearances; his 
method is worked out into the two-fold process of hypothesis making and testing 
according to dialectical reasoning.  This was supposed to be the proper method to 
approach true knowledge of the good.  This method still works well enough to put it to 
use as a crucial part of scientific method—i.e., where science must presuppose the unified 
sense of a particular scientific discourse.  But in constructing this method, Plato also 
erected a hierarchy moving from conjecture to true knowledge.  There are four rungs on 
this ladder which ascend into the supernal realm of knowing; they are: conjecture, belief, 
understanding, and knowledge.  ‘Knowledge’ for Plato was exclusive to the world of 
ideal knowing.  Thus one moves from mere opinions or doxa, which arise from the 
senses, to understanding, which can be verified by apodictic verification—algebraic truths 
and geometric forms belong to this category.  Finally through the formation of 
hypothesis—literally ‘to put under’ qua the support for an idea—one arrives at the 
invisible transcendental category of knowledge, vis-à-vis ideas.  The “Idea of Ideas” in 
Plato is the good, but the good is not directly accessible by human cognition.81  It is what 
has become known in philosophy as the invisible, and is the supposed by Plato to be the 
perpetuum mobile of thought—that is, the unconditioned Idea of Ideas is the generator of 
all conditioned ideas.  By analogy, Plato provides the example of Helios.  The sun 
provides the means of seeing, but is not itself light or the condition of seeing.  The good 
would here correspond to light, the transcendental condition of seeing.  In this way, Plato 
places beyond sense-certainty the condition of possibility for the senses; he does not place 
the good in any object but posits the good in-itself.82  Later Kant’s idea regarding the 
intuitions of space and time will follow the same logic.83  By taking up this logic of the 
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visible and the invisible, by making the good essentially supermundane, Western 
Christianity after Proclus has tended to emphasize the next life and the otherworldly 
character of holiness and right living, and he effectively creates in humanity the need for 
redemption—an absolute redemption that we inevitably are powerless to bring about 
ourselves, as mundane creatures.84   
 We are right to be suspect of this kind of world-denial that has by and large 
gripped the West for two millennia.  The atheistic declaration of the death of God and the 
humanist flattening of the hierarchical order in scala naturae, did not catch up with all 
ideological discourse immediately.  No doubt there is still ideological and psychological 
residue in the Western soul from the great chain of being—just as there is a long delay 
between Darwin and Scopes.  Kristeva’s auto-immunity to Bakhtin’s theological 
influences is, however, misplaced.  I believe she has unfairly quarantined Bakhtin with 
patients who are indeed infected with the virus of bad conscience and ressentiment.  
Bakhtin’s work is not uncritically influenced by Christian dogma, and where this 
influence is at all overt, the emphasis is on bringing the theological and the properly 
philosophical into a conceptual mutualism.  Nowhere do any of his appropriations of 
Christian concepts betray these Platonic and neo-Platonic commitments to the 
supermundane.  Rabelais and His World is more than a thinly veiled Aesopian polemic 
against Marxism in favour of Bakhtin’s hidden commitments to another, more Christian, 
world.  Regardless of Soviet suppression of the Orthodox Church in the USSR, Bakhtin 
had absolutely no need to transcribe his supposed Orthodoxy into disguised concepts, 
since unlike its Western counterpart, the kenotic tradition understands the incarnation to 
imbue all matter with divinity and all divinity with matter—“all matter is potentially 
divine.”85  It is difficult to see, therefore, how the distinctly Russian inflection of Kenosis 
could contradict a Marxist and materialist worldview—at least on the surface and putting 
to one side the overt antipathy between Marxism and religion in general.  
Bakhtin seems to have been sympathetic to the kenotic tradition, and yet from 
what evidence we have of his religious activity during the early twenties, we may still 
infer that he was not a devotee to any particular sect.86  Where he was outspoken, and 
where recognizably Christian ideas do enter into dialogue with his works, he privileges 
Christology not eschatology, embodiment not spiritual ascension, and he ascribes to a 
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collectively active spirituality not a solemn, solipsistic, individual austerity.  David 
Lodge’s attempted Catholic appropriation cannot stand the test of this simple contextual 
framing.  In kenotic virtue, the image of Christ as an attendant to the poor as well as 
charitable human sympathy are stressed.  Naturally there is an emphasis on pouring 
oneself out into the other human being, on living for the other, and on “self-
humiliation.”87   
Kenosis is an essential aspect of what G. P. Fedotov calls “ethical dualism.”88  For 
Fedotov, kenosis exists as one pole of the Russian religious mind.  There is another side 
of the polarity of spirituality motivated by fearful submission to Christ-Pantocrator; this 
aspect is named the Byzantine ethical component by Fedotov.  While it would be wrong 
to say that the social hierarchical structure of Russian society was wholly flattened in 
kenosis, hierarchy is only “presupposed,” while ethical responsibility exhorts devotees to 
self-degradation through the imitation of the “humility of Christ.”89  Kenotic monasteries, 
as a matter of fact, practiced submission and communal service, equality among “high 
and low,” and the “loosening of discipline.”90  Therefore fearful submission is practiced, 
but so is humility and life lived for the other.  Byzantine subservience and kenotic love 
for the other are both observed side by side; they exist as a bi-polar movement of spiritual 
and earthly devotion.  The mundane and the supermundane exist together.  This is ethical 
dualism.  The tenet that “all men are brothers” is meant to encourage an active 
engagement with the lower orders of society, while judgement is often most strongly felt 
for class positions of higher rank.91  Here we already see traces of the inversion of social 
hierarchies that will play such a prominent role in Rabelais.92  Social hierarchies are not 
actually inverted, however.  They are only suppressed and again only in the kenotic 
polarity.  Nevertheless, the pyramidal structure of power in Catholicism and the role of 
priest as intercessor would have an apocryphal ring in Bakhtin’s ear.  He appears to have 
been concerned instead with the teachings of ‘Christ’ and the role of the earthly 
community not a heavenly hereafter. 
 Allon White’s complex discussion of Bakhtin’s position between post-
structuralism and humanism will further help us to position the kenotic elements of 
Bakhtin’s philosophy.  In his paper “The Struggle over Bakhtin”, White rejects outright 
the notion that Bakhtin can in any way be appropriated by Christian apologists such as 
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Lodge, Ann Shukman, and “more seriously,” Clark and Holquist.93  Although White 
gives no credence to theological influences—indeed they do not seem to be on his radar 
at all, he deems that Clark and Holquist’s attempts to discard Bakhtin’s Marxism in 
favour of a less critical and indeed “conventional biography,” is nothing less than a 
misprision of the office of theoretical commentator.94  As I am arguing in favour of 
Bakhtin’s Christological influences, it may seem paradoxical that I also agree with 
White’s assessment of Clark and Holquist’s biography.  This apparent contradiction, 
however, is just that, merely apparent.  In fact, it is from Clark and Holquist that much of 
White’s own knowledge of Bakhtin’s life and the life of the Circle have for the most part 
all come through the filter of Clark and Holquist.95  However, the fact that Clark and 
Holquist attempt to downplay Bakhtin’s commitment to Marxism is not overruled merely 
by their proximity to the original texts.  Clark and Holquist suggest that “the second part 
[of Marxism and the Philosophy of Language], while not free of Marxist declarations, 
seems more purely Bakhtinian in its stress on context and intonation in meaning and its 
analysis of different speech levels.”96  For both White and for myself, this supposition 
seems to ignore Bakhtin’s own commitments to authorship as a collaboration.97  It also 
seems highly unfair to indict Bakhtin for the “familiar casuistic” use of Marxism, since 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language engages with Marx precisely to the extent that 
is necessary to compose a propaedeutic theory of language from the Marxist point of 
view.98  It and Freudianism are meant as entry points into a Marxist theory of linguistics 
and psychoanalysis; they are self-consciously prolegomenal rather than exhaustive.  As 
such, they should be read as an exhortation to a larger effort by a community of theorists.   
What Clark and Holquist cannot possibly argue convincingly is that the 
Voloshinov texts attempt to undercut Marxist theory, since everywhere they are informed 
by its theory of ideology and by dialectical materialism.  They may claim that these texts 
are cursory efforts, superficial analyses, even opportunistic, but they cannot claim that 
they are not authentically Marxist.  Moreover, the form of these texts is saturated with 
collaborative thought as is the content.  The problem of indirect and quasi-direct 
discourse, for example, and of reported speech, as well as speaking throughout in the first 
person plural “we,” all of these factors point to the stress on an open-ended and 
cooperative creation which liken literary and theoretical products to the solidarity of 
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workers called for by Marx and Engels. 99  These texts are academic and extra-academic 
social experiments in Bakhtin’s tripartite theory of authorship.  I will not go so far as to 
assert that Bakhtin is most definitely the author, hero, or apostrophe in these works, but 
they are most definitely produced within the framework of a division of labour.  Thus 
‘Voloshinov’ and ‘Bakhtin’s’ voices, if they are indeed both present, are no doubt 
intertwined.  We may bow to Bakhtin’s conviction that these voices do not merge, but I 
am not convinced that these voices can be distinguished within the Voloshinov texts.  
‘We’ simply cannot agree with Clark and Holquist’s supposition that they have some 
special privileged ear with which to do so.  As a brief aside, we do have every reason to 
not only believe that Bakhtin could hear distinct conflicting voices in Dostoevsky since 
we can hear these voices ourselves.  The conversations between Alyosha and Ivan in 
“The Grand Inquisitor” chapter of The Brothers Karamazov, for example, is a tour de 
force of multi-voicedness; Alyosha, Ivan, the author ‘Dostoevsky,’ the Grand Inquisitor, 
and the Prisoner (‘Christ’), all speak with separate and distinct voices even while they are 
overlapping and embedded—without fully merging—within the single consciousness of 
the reader. 
White wishes to read Bakhtin between post-structuralism and humanism without 
simply resolving this contradiction into a unity, but instead he wants to place the author 
‘Bakhtin’ on the frontier between these two discourses.  Just as dialogue takes place 
between interlocutors, so Bakhtin’s thought fluctuates between this “contemporary 
disagreement” between humanism and post-structuralism without ever coming to a rest or 
being reduced to a homogeneous unity.100  White makes use of Kate Soper’s division of 
humanism into territories of human agency and teleology, and he accepts agency in 
Bakhtin’s humanism while denying that dialogism can in anyway be reconciled to a 
humanist teleology.101  In order to embed this humanism in its apparent opposite—i.e., 
post-structualist thought, White relies on Bakhtin’s account of what he calls semantic 
personalism and what White refers to as vocalic intonational ghosting.102  By these 
enigmatic phrases we simply mean to invoke Bakhtin’s notion that the “who” of an 
utterance is irreducible to the “what” or wholly verbal or textual meaning of that 
utterance; yet if this who remains intact, it is nevertheless inseparable from both the 
semantic content and the context in which the utterance emerges.103  Here the struggle 
32 
 
 
 
between the discourses of humanism and post-structuralism, the latter of which has given 
to us the discourse now known as post-humanism, “appears to be [a] contradictio in 
adjecto, an impossibility”104; in other words, White puts their very inter-communicability 
into question.  Nevertheless, this contradiction is merely an appearance, since it is clear 
that “the putative poverty [of humanism] only serves as a semantic device to underpin 
post-structuralism,” which is to say that we are to understand the semantic person—the 
subject of the utterance, as itself conditioned by the social milieu in which it speaks.105  
The humanist agency here is a semantically conditioning agency.  Humanism is itself read 
through the human condition—which is, for Bakhtin, steeped in historical materialism 
and textuality.  The semantic personalism, for example, that Bakhtin endorses in the 
penultimate paragraph of his late essay “Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences” 
points toward studying the subject as per se a subject of meaning who is always-already 
engaged in a dialogue with another semantic subject—insomuch as an address 
presupposes the “anticipation of a response.”106  
As we have already seen, Cohen sought to ‘expunge the gap in the Kantian 
dualism’ with which Bakhtin continued to struggle.  Here Bakhtin was unable to follow 
Cohen.  He could not posit a permanent closing of the gap between the polarities of 
matter and the conceptual, ideological being—or again, between the tode ti of brute 
existence—what Kant would have called the noumenal—and phenomena.  It is not the 
case that the subject is entirely devoid of a personal agency.  The subject of Saussurean 
parole is inept.  Husserl’s idealism does not convince me that the intentional act can 
account for an autonomously acting subject.  What White calls Bakhtin’s semantic 
personalism ostensibly leaves room for this autonomy by (un)grounding it in everyday 
lived experience.  Not unrelated is the capitulation by that greatest of all sceptics, Hume, 
to the force of sensation: ‘I play backgammon therefore I am.’107  Bakhtin does not 
reinscribe the Cartesian knowing subject, or the gnoseological subject as it is found in 
Kant, or the liberal personalism that flows from the humanist tradition—a tradition that 
cannot escape the solipsism inherent in a reduction of language to rationalism and 
subjectivity to idealism.   
Nevertheless, White’s apparent fear of Bakhtin’s theological forays is as 
misguided as was Kristeva’s before him, even if he does not fall into the transparent 
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liberal agenda for which he critiques Lodge, and Clark and Holquist.  This is because 
Bakhtin’s kenotic commitments do not represent a retention of the subject as such, but an 
emptying of it.108 
As we have already suggested the notion of kenosis refers to the self-emptying of 
the divine Christological spirit out of the flesh and blood Christ as ‘man.’  By implication, 
we do not understand Bakhtin’s commitment to kenosis to be a betrayal of his faith in 
materialism; quite to the contrary, it is a fulfilment of this commitment.  To be fair, 
kenosis is divisive even within the Orthodox tradition, and notably divisive along class 
lines in Russian history.  The degree to which a devotee is meant to imitate Christ as a 
flesh and blood being is contentious within the tradition.109  It seems that there is a 
gradation in the praxis side of kenosis which is meted out along class lines.  Nevertheless, 
Bakhtin seems to interpret the virtue as active and universally applicable to all ethical 
subjects.  For Bakhtin, kenosis is the moment in his theory of transgredience or 
outsideness that requires a projection of self into the other through what he calls 
"empathetic co-experiencing.”110  It bears repeating: kenosis is one moment of 
transgredience and the return into self is a second—non-successive—moment required in 
the act of consummation.   
In Art and Answerability Bakhtin’s phenomenology of the experience of empathy 
as actively understood from the point of view of the author.  Here the author can complete 
the hero—i.e., provide his consummation—only from “outside [the hero’s] bounds.”111  
By dint of my ability to project myself into another, and empathetically co-experience life 
from within its internal rhythm, I can then complete her.  But we must be careful here.  
For projection in itself is not sufficient.  Kant’s notion of Einfuhlung, or standing in 
someone else’s shoes, is only a moment—and is not even the chronological primary 
moment.112  Ann Shukman clarifies the matter as follows: “Bakhtin disputed the neo-
Kantian expressive aesthetics based on the concept of Einfuhlung (empathy), and Cohen’s 
version of it, ‘aesthetic love,’ for its failure to take account of form and of the separate 
identity of perceiver and perceived, author and his created hero.”113  A complete fusion of 
consciousness is not only undesirable, it is impossible.114  It does not follow from this that 
kenosis is likewise impossible.  Bakhtin does endorse “self-renunciation” for the sake of 
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the other, only this refutation cannot be understood as a renunciation of my unique 
position in once-occurrent being-as-event.115   
There is no wholly identical moment between the subject and other, author and 
hero.  If this were the case the author would be powerless to create a truly dialogical life 
outside itself—i.e., the hero and author would merge—and the ethical subject would be 
powerless to complete and find his completion in the other.  Projection is essentially the 
first movement in the intentionally understood condition of becoming self.  The second 
movement is, as we have said, a return into the self to re-establish the necessary distance 
from the other in order to answer for the other.  This answering is to be understood as an 
ethically responsible act of supplementation, redemption, and temporary (in)completion 
of the other.  The return is not only absolutely necessary to this consummation, but it 
cannot be ontologically avoided: 
Even if we succeed in encompassing the whole of our consciousness as 
consummated in the other, this whole would not be able to take possession of us 
and really consummate us for ourselves: our consciousness would take that whole 
into account and would surmount it as just one of the moments in its own unity 
(which is not a unity that is given but a unity that is set as a task).116 
 
Even the unity of consciousness in Bakhtin is therefore something yet to come.  We can 
understand the semantic personhood of the subject in the sense of a present participle 
form—the -ing—of becoming.  Semantic personhood remains in motion.  In this way, it is 
not a matter of deciding the either/or—either there is a subject or there is not, but in 
understanding the subject as aporetic, open, and undecidable.   
The subject of language in Bakhtin, the so-called semantic personalism, is a 
disappearing/appearing subject and not merely the copular subject of propositions and 
deduction; by this we mean that the Bakhtinian subject is disappearing from the pages of 
the history of philosophy as it has been written and appearing momentarily in the ethical 
act of answering for the other.  The subject is a subject of becoming not of being—
Bakhtin’s subiectum is a dialogic subject.   
The fact that Democritus and Epicurus, on whom Marx wrote his dissertation, 
were ancient theorists of kenos—i.e., were theorists of the vacuum or nothingness—
presents circumstantial evidence that a marriage between Marx and the concept of kenosis 
on which the tradition has been founded is not entirely indefensible.117  Hegel speaks of 
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kenosis as Spirit’s “externalization of itself,”118 but through the mutual kenotic 
externalization of self-consciousness and substance he posits a spiritual unity between the 
two.119  For Bakhtin this proposed unity found in Spirit would be too much to posit either 
intuitively or to justify ethically.  One could not live in this unity and have anything more 
than an aesthetic existence.120  If kenosis suggests a pouring out, therefore, there must 
nevertheless be a return into self.  Again, Bakhtin is working specifically with a kenotic 
notion of degree rather than a complete negation of self. The logic of peregrination 
and return is repeated in the phenomenology of love provided in Toward a Philosophy of 
the Act.  The pouring out of oneself into the other, i.e., kenosis, may even be said to be 
one of the fundamental virtues of phenomenal existence.  In fact, the projection of self in 
kenosis is a fundamental condition of living ethically in the world; without it we could 
neither justify the existence of another nor find this justification for ourselves.  Nor, as we 
shall see, could we answer once-occurrent being-as-event.   
More recent Bakhtin scholarship has allowed for a rejuvenation of the interface 
between kenotic theology and intersubjective ethical understanding in Bakhtin’s early 
notebooks.  For example, in “Bakhtin and the Hermeneutics of Love” Alan Jacobs argues, 
along the same lines that I have been trying to trace here, that there is indeed a kenotic 
thread woven throughout these texts: 
the early Bakhtin understood at least theism and perhaps even Christian belief to 
be necessary for anyone who hopes to love the other in the ethical or aesthetic 
(hermeneutical) spheres.  The kenosis of ‘Christ’ establishes the pattern for our 
own answerable deeds: it is his ‘I-for-myself’ and ‘I-for-another’ that reveal to us 
the proper form of self-activity and empower us to pursue it persistently and 
faithfully.  This may be a point at which the Bakhtinian ethics-aesthetics-
hermeneutics cease to be merely consistent with Christian theology and becomes 
an elaboration of that theology.121 
 
In other words, Bakhtin argues not that we must all become Christians, or even that we 
ought to adhere to kenotic belief, but instead appropriates the gospels symbolically and 
emphasizes the Christological sacrifice of divinity.  The weight of his appropriation of 
kenosis falls entirely on a vision of emptying out of the ideal self in order to take on flesh.  
In Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtin attempts to move ethics away from 
abstraction and show the fundamental difference which exists between once-occurrent 
being-as-event and its abstracted conceptual representation.  There is in some sense an 
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impossibility of representation in Bakhtin.  To follow Kant and found ethics on merely 
“theoretically valid judgement[s]” is only to “assign to it a certain theoretical unity” and 
to abdicate my active participation in the world.  We see this in what Fedotov calls 
“Anglo Saxon ethics” where law hovers above the entire order of nature.122  Fedotov calls 
this species of ethics the “cult of purity,” which appeals to the law in the form of custom.  
But here custom—the nomos—is nothing more than a pure abdication of the ethical 
responsibility to answer the event as it arises in its unique once-occurrent being-as-event.  
Anglo Saxon ethics assumes an alibi in being—that is, it abdicates personal ethical 
responsibility by deferring to the law.123  Fedotov writes “never in Russian history was 
either purity or law dominant morally.”124  The law does not adjudicate itself; ethics 
cannot provide its own evaluative grounds on which to answer being in the act of 
becoming.  The law can only answer being through the architectonic unity accomplished 
within a real living consciousness.  In the manifold of a theoretical unity, on the other 
hand, every proposition is valid, no matter how atrocious the conclusions which follow.  
They may have apodictic certainty and still be unjust.  Ethics requires a life to 
consummate it and deem that it is just through the ethical act of answering—and this can 
only be done with an “emotional-volitional referral” to oneself from the position of a 
unique chronotopic and perspectival embodied existence.  It cannot be accomplished in 
theoretical or intuited aesthetic consciousness alone. 
 Bakhtin’s semantic personalism consists of a constantly self-emptying subject of 
meaning; it is a humanist subject whose very humanism is grounded in a constantly 
shifting verbal and extraverbal milieu.  This semantic subject cannot be entirely alienated 
from its material existence into a purely theoretical form.  An analogous example can be 
taken from technological research and development; when technology is alienated from 
human life and is developed only according to its immanent manifold existence—i.e., 
only according to what is possible, allowing proposition after proposition to become 
actualized sheerly by the force of its permissibility and according to its own internal 
structure, the result is then not founded for human existence but for itself.  Ethics can only 
find its justification by bridging the gap between theoretical and practical being through 
the actively answering act of practical consciousness; again, this answering cannot be 
performed by cognition alone: 
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The theoretically cognized world cannot be unclosed from within cognition itself 
to the point of becoming open to the actual once-occurrent world.  But from the 
performed act (and not from the theoretical transcription of it) there is a way out 
into its content/sense, which is received and included from within that actually 
performed act; for the act is actually performed in being.125 
 
A wholly lawful cognitive-theoretical approach to ethics fails, but what if we approach 
from the other direction—i.e., from sensuous existence and specifically through aesthetic 
intuition?  
Aesthetic intuition achieves a greater synthesis than theoretical cognition, since in 
it consciousness has passively synthesized the content and form of the external world.126  
But while aesthetic being can achieve what theoretical cognition could not, vis-à-vis 
“pure empathizing,” the aesthetic world from which this empathy is achieved is not the 
world of once-occurrent being.127  Whereas the unity achieved within theoretical 
cognition is an abstract theoretical unity and cannot provide ethical norms from within 
itself, aesthetic consciousness’ achievement of pure empathizing is likewise an abdication 
of the ethical subject’s responsibility to its own unique place in being.128  It is literally a 
senseless abstraction of oneself—i.e., the very opposite of a theoretical abstraction.  
Kenotic projection is therefore a necessary moment but not yet sufficient for a truly 
answerable act by participative consciousness.  Unlike theoretical cognition, one can live 
within the aesthetic being of empathetic co-experiencing, but then life amounts to a mere 
performance; a wholly aesthetic life merely “play[s] a role,” and does not live life for 
itself and for the other as a responsibly ethical subject.129   
Thus theoretical cognition and aesthetic intuition go astray when they attempt to 
live entirely from within theoretical unity, on the one side, and pure empathy on the other.  
I would liken the ready-made ethical activity of the law in theoretical cognition to 
“Christ-Pantocrator” whose lawful word is outside of time and space—i.e., is valid now 
and for all time.130  Theoretical cognition is therefore to be likened to the Byzantine virtue 
which appeals to hierarchical class structures to regulate the enforcement of the law.131  
For its part, kenosis can be likened to aesthetic intuition, since it is only in intuition that 
we have the power to co-experience life from the point of view of the other.  As human 
beings, we must effectively and ethically empty ourselves of content in order to take up 
the other’s perspective.  Both movements are necessary but neither is sufficient for the 
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truly ethical act.  Even kenosis thus proves insufficient, if necessary, for the 
consummation of the other by the ethical subject. 
 Bakhtin repeats this line of argumentation again in the two extremes of content 
ethics and formal ethics.  Content ethics takes as its law either the veridical propositions 
in the theoretical unity that we have already seen, or else it founds its laws on 
“primordially relative” fiat.132  Either way it goes wrong by attempting to fabricate a 
ready-made universal imperative out of that which is actually contingent upon once-
occurrent being.  This moment would likewise align with Christ-Pantocrator, or what 
Bakhtin calls the “lawgiver.”133  These laws cannot be justified from within themselves 
either.  They require a transgredient outside consciousness capable of bringing the 
theoretical (law) and the practical (the event) into a synthesis.  This synthesis is short-
lived, inchoate, and requires the continual practice of a lifetime.  This synthesis is what 
Bakhtin means by ethical answering.  An event is made answerable when it is not 
understood as merely beholden to one of the forms of abstraction we have been 
discussing.  The event therefore cannot be ethically justified either by the merely 
theoretical cognitive unity, the aesthetic (quasi-practical) intuited unity of subject and 
other—i.e., empathy—or by attempting to formulate the theoretical on pre-established, 
ready-made, content.   
Finally, what Bakhtin calls “formal ethics” attempts to decline the event by way of 
a pre-established, ready-made form.134  In this way ethical thought proceeds from the 
opposite direction of content ethics.  Theory is no longer made to follow life but life 
theory.  However, the presumption that ethical comportment can follow pre-established 
rules of engagement leaves the propositions of formal ethics entirely one-sided.135  
Formal ethics thus determines the “law as such, in itself, or the idea of pure legality,” as 
its ground from which all its propositions follow.136  But this ground is only assumed and 
is nowhere proved scientifically.  Formal ethics thus loses the object of its inquiry, the 
ethical deed itself, and replaces it with an abstract conception of law for law’s sake.  
Colloquially, we typically call this species of ethics legalism, and Kant’s categorical 
imperative can be said to be one of its avatars.  Legalism does not broach life itself: “The 
actual deed is cast out into the theoretical world with an empty demand for legality.”137  
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Formal ethics is founded not in the answerable act, but wholly within theoretical 
cognition. 
 The ethically answerable deed (postupok) is not directed toward this sort of 
theoretical legalism, but it is instead concerned with answering actual existence.  For 
example, if I am a proprietor of some business and am asked by someone for a job, how 
can do I go about ethically answering for myself in this situation.  Let us make the 
problem easy, let us say that I have need of one additional worker.  Let us also say that 
there are no special skills required for the position.  I can only become ethically 
answerable by responding to this request according to the real living person here in front 
of me.  Whether I hire this applicant, my decision cannot be based upon some ready-made 
company policy that would leap over the present situation and find my pending approval 
or rejection of her application already decided in the past.  For an answer to be ethical it 
must find its justification in the supra-rational and unique, singular, character of the 
present situation.138   
I will provide an example from another concrete situation—a disagreement 
between husband and wife.  The two truly love each other in our example, but they have 
had a disagreement about whether they can continue to support their political party.  They 
have always voted for this party, since they found a matter of ideological agreement that 
trumped other conflicting political concerns.  Let us say that this concern was an 
environmental policy.  The party has recently gained numerous new seats in government 
and has gone from supporting a carbon-tax on business to supporting a tax on middle-
income families.  The couple is divided, since the husband will continue to support the 
party.  He has reasoned that the change in policy is merely to make the party more 
palatable for a wider swath of voters.  The wife no longer wants to support the party, not 
as a matter of principle, but because she believes a carbon-tax is practically efficacious 
and will not cripple middle-income families.  Nevertheless their discussion becomes 
argumentation and then full-blown anger.  They begin to argue more and more from 
polarized positions, both of which become more and more hypothetical and abstracted 
from their current situation.  They forget for a moment the common ground that is 
always-already established beneath their feet: this tangible kitchen where they prepare 
their meals together, the social and economic alliance they have erected, and most of all 
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the real life, perhaps even banal, fact that they love one another.  They lay all of this aside 
in order to argue from their new abstracted positions, and as such they have ceased to 
participate in the real life socioeconomic conditions of their lives and have therefore 
abdicated the immediate meaningful context in which all ethical concerns must be rooted.  
What I am attempting to state here in writing, in all truth, cannot even be stated on paper.  
It is an irony, and one we should not fail to observe, that the language which conditions 
semantic personhood also fails us.  Merleau-Ponty had something like this in mind when 
he proposed his “tacit cogito.”139 
 In Bakhtin, one’s word (slovo) demands embodiment.  Everything follows from 
this, whether we are speaking of the ethical comportment between subjects or the ongoing 
architectonic answer that the subject gives in response to the event.  There are no alibis 
for existence. 
 
2.4 I and I: A Genealogy of Ethics  
In Art and Answerability Bakhtin provides a genealogy of the I-for-myself and the I-for-
another in the section translated as “The Value of the Human Body in History”, which is 
framed as the “‘idea of man’”—i.e., as a humanism.140  This “value” changes throughout 
history.  Indeed, the genealogy that Bakhtin offers us is one of different polarizations of 
the ‘I’ and the other.  These are axiological categories which are not absolute but are 
moments of experience.  The dominant mode of perception of the I and other in the world 
of antiquity are interlocking, and the I is wholly determined according to the aesthetic 
external body of the other—as opposed to a psychological inner mode of self-
understanding.  This explains why the ancient’s self-identification was wholly on the side 
of the physiological group; the Spartan was born to go to war, for example, and Achilles 
becomes a sacrificial lamb for the Greek people—a fate from which even his demigod 
status cannot redeem him.  And they say double-dipping is uncouth!  
At the time of the Bacchanalian mystery cults, the I-for-myself begins to emerge, 
is present, but is not yet distinct from the category of the I-for-another and remains 
wholly determined by it.141  Individuation sets in here and the wholly aesthetic existence 
of ‘man’ begins to give way to an ethical mode of being.  This being is presented to 
Hellenistic ‘man’ and to us “as a task to be accomplished,” and this process of 
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individuation is experienced as something inwardly painful.142  Ethics does not exist 
before this historical moment.  The emergence of Epicureanism marks the historical 
moment of the cordoning off of the body as a separate organism while not fully alienating 
itself from the other; furthermore, the notion that I-for-myself is a spiritual problem begins 
to emerge with the Stoics; the corresponding notion of ‘man’ modelled off of spirit owes 
itself to this paradigmatic shift.143  The “plastic” outward physical body as the ground of 
the I-for-another completely disappears with neo-Platonism and is replaced with an I-for-
myself that wholly encompasses the category of otherness.  Henceforth, otherness is only 
understood as a negation of the I-for-myself, and not by dint of its own existence for itself.  
The other is then wholly conditioned as a moment within the I-for-myself polarization: “I 
give birth to the other inside myself, without going beyond my own bounds and without 
ceasing to be alone.”144   
Fission occurs at this point in the category of the ‘I,’ “the emanationist theory 
prevails,” and the I becomes at once that which thinks and that which is thought.145  Here 
we may posit the genealogical beginning of semantic personalism.  I now have not an I-
for-another, experienced as objective reality, but an I-as-I-appear-for-the-other—a 
wholly phantasmal spectral I.146  This spectral I in turn ossifies the notion that ‘man’ is a 
project of religious self-justification; this is the emergence a completely ethical mode of 
being.  For Bakhtin, it is at this point that the supermundane—i.e., the merely theoretical 
or formal ethical consideration—first becomes a motivating principle for human action, 
and the body as it is given in time and space is understood as degraded being while at the 
same time it is the condition of possibility for all truly answerable ethical action: 
Hence, neo-Platonism also includes the most consistent denial of the body: for me 
myself, my body cannot be a value.  Purely elemental self-preservation is 
incapable of engendering any value out of itself.  In preserving myself, I do not 
evaluate myself, for self-preservation is accomplished outside any valuation and 
justification.  An organism simply lives, without any justification from within 
itself, for the grace of justification can descend upon it only from outside.  I cannot 
be the author of my own value, just as I cannot lift myself by my own hair.  The 
biological life of the organism becomes a value only in another’s sympathy and 
compassion with that life (motherhood).  It is the other’s sympathy and 
compassion that introduce biological life into a new value-context.147 
 
From this vantage point we now begin to see the phenomena of Christianity forming, but 
in a highly aggregated unfolding.  Here the movement has traversed the initial stage of 
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formation of the collectivity—“the people”—as one undivided organic entity we bear 
witness to a complete interiority of the subject requiring justification from outside 
itself.148  What comes into existence here is the realization that self-justification is 
impossible—the Baron von Münchhausen moment.149  Bakhtin repeats the image 
between this self-lifting by one’s own hair and self-justification in Toward a Philosophy 
of the Act.150  Here the metaphor is invoked in order to emphasize the inability of 
theoretical cognitive unity to find immanent self-justification.  We can already see, 
therefore, that Bakhtin’s account of answerability according to ethics and his account 
according to the subject-other co-relation can be mapped onto each other.  Just as 
theoretical cognition must find a transgredient justification outside itself in once-
occurrent being so to must the phenomenological subject—the I-for-myself. 
In the genealogy of transgredient justification, the figure of ‘Christ’ comes to 
represent the model of a perfect “ethical solipsism,” whereby ‘Christ’ is recognized as an 
infinite I-for-myself in all its depth—and is therefore alone capable of redeeming the 
other.151  ‘Christ’ becomes flesh, the internal spiritual I externalizes itself (kenosis), and 
pours itself into the other, since it has depth and can redeem while the other is all surface, 
an empty husk in need of redeeming.  While therefore it is true that there is an aspect of 
this account that seems to retain the neo-Platonic world denial of the I-for-myself in need 
of redemption, the I has already understood ‘Christ’ as the I-for-myself that has infinite 
depth which can complete the other, vis-à-vis myself.  Conversely, since “I-for-myself can 
also be the other for God,” I take up the attitude of the I-for-myself of infinite depth—
modelled on ‘Christ’—that I may likewise sacrifice myself, or pour myself out for the 
sake of the other.  ‘Christ’ therefore becomes the model of the I-for-myself whereby I 
assume the sacrificial mode of being; I empty myself out into the other (projection).  
Then I return into myself that I might consummate the other; the other performs the 
mirror image of this redemption for me.  Both formal ethics and content ethics miss this 
moment.   
Lastly, we observe that the necessity of redemption appears to be at least as 
historical as ontological in Bakhtin; it has grown out of the genealogy of perception of 
autonomy and the becoming-isolated of the subject.  It is unimaginable that the Spartan 
would have conceived of the need for redemption in the other, since he lived a wholly 
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physiological existence—since even his cultural self was wholly defined according to his 
preparedness for battle.  The lack of historical evidence of this genealogical account of 
the emergence of the solipsistic subject does not negate the present necessity of 
redemption in human perception. Another way to say this is that we must take a detour 
through the other in order to come back to ourselves as consummated subjects and 
especially as subjects of meaning-making.  The idea that we can have and create a world 
without the other is absurd, and yet how often to we catch ourselves lost in moral 
solipsism and uninterested in trying to listen to the other’s voice on its own terms. 
 
2.5 In the Flesh: Slovo, or the Word as Deed 
The kenotic ‘Christ’ of Philippians 2:5-8 is therefore not a hidden theological motivation 
of Bakhtin’s work, but the theological equivalent of ontological projection. Theorists who 
would excoriate this moment of grace do nothing more than mortify the flesh of Bakhtin’s 
theory of self-other relationality.  Moreover, they overlook the fact that Bakhtin is 
attempting to provide a genealogy of how our present ontological understanding of self-
other relations has been passed down to us from the Greeks.  In this way he is following 
the methodology that can be traced through his teacher Zelinsky and inevitably through 
Nietzsche.  But where the latter theorizes the genealogy of ressentiment and bad 
conscience, Bakhtin provides the conceptual line of descent for the necessity of external 
justification, or grace.  Bakhtin scholars who bypass the role of grace, which comes from 
outside and is equally for me to give as it is for me to receive, do his early philosophy a 
great injustice.  What’s more, they risk losing the line of sight between these theologically 
motivated concepts and his notion of outsideness on which all ethical justification is 
grounded.152  This is, after all, the meaning of transgredience—that only I can 
consummate the other, and only the other can provide me with the gift of justification.  It 
is also an essential moment in all economic exchange, metabolic existence, and, in the 
final analysis, it is at the heart of the experience of love.153   
The movement that Bakhtin describes in this section ultimately founds itself on a 
gradual move inwards to self-conscious awakening to the need of redemption by the 
consummating activity of the other.  The crisis of neo-Platonic world-denial not only 
hampers Christian ethics, but to my mind it is also echoed in all instrumental reasoning.  
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It is a movement away from ethical existence into a merely theoretical cognitive and 
ready-made virtue.  On the other side, a wholly aesthetic intuitive form of absolute 
empathizing does no better at providing an account of the other as a subjective I.  This 
form equally reduces the other to an object, finalizes her, although this time it does so by 
assuming it can speak from inside the other’s consciousness.  As we have seen, there is no 
merging of consciousnesses, and the other cannot be reduced to an objectivised other—
which would amount to nothing more than an object among objects.154   
I would like to make it clear that it is not the case that Bakhtin is following the 
road of the middle-term or seeking a compromise between the two.  Theoretical-cognitive 
and aesthetical-intuitive approaches to ethics, while they are comprised of active 
ingredients necessary to a truly ethical answering, are completely deficient in themselves.  
They are also completely deficient if they are merely combined together. There is no 
middle road between them that will lead to ethical answering, and to take this view-to-
compromise would merely make a monstrous assemblage out of their ethically active 
ingredients.  It is true that cognition and projection are essential moments in ethics, but an 
a priori-aesthetic assemblage composed of ready-made categorical imperatives and 
aesthetic merging with the other will not bring me a step closer to answering for the other 
from my unique place in once-occurrent being.  In themselves or combined, these 
approaches are deficient—one wholly gnoseological and the other wholly aesthetic; as 
such, they each express only compartments of life as lived and do not approach the type 
of synthesis that we experience within participative consciousness.  This type of synthesis 
is a unity-in-difference, or the subject who understands the other as another I who cannot 
be reduced to a monological mergence with subjectivity.  For this reason perhaps 
Bakhtin’s early notebooks would more aptly have been anthologized as From Theoretical 
and Aesthetic to Ethical Answerability. 
Bakhtin emphasized the kenotic strain of Orthodoxy; as such, we can understand 
his commitments not as some world-denying longing for a supermundane spiritual life, 
but as bolstering his conception of embodiment of the word as flesh.  Thus it might also 
be interpreted as a renunciation of the ressentiment toward life that Nietzsche condemns 
in the Western tradition.  Messianism and the utopian eschatological refutations of the 
present are themselves subject to excommunication in Bakhtin’s thought155; this rejection 
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of eschatology again shows up in the theme of unfinalizability and great time, which we 
will have opportunity to say more about below.  Arguably, unlike the Western or 
Byzantine Christian tradition, the community trumps the individual in Bakhtin’s stance 
towards theology.156  He genuinely seems to believe in an “ideal community”—perhaps 
not so unlike the occasional utopian movements in the West such as the Hussite rebels of 
Bohemia.  Clark and Holquist call this communal ethical basis “something like the 
Bakhtinian polyphony or heteroglossia translated into social terms.”157  What they seem 
to miss, is that the essential thread running through these themes is in no way akin to the 
liberal and heavily individualist shades of thought that would pervert the corporeal and 
material focus of Bakhtin’s writings.  It is this focus which manifestly saves Bakhtin from 
the accusation of an “‘unrecognized influence of Christianity in a humanist 
terminology.’”158  As we have shown and will continue to show, neither Bakhtin’s 
Christological or humanist tendencies are strictly orthodox. 
The ideal community is not a separate community, however.  Bakhtin was 
repelled by the isolationist spirit of certain factions that began to form within Voskresenie 
and whose utopian spirit impelled its adepts to withdraw to separate communities.159  
Like humanism, Bakhtin’s relationship with utopian thought is again not strictly 
transparent.  We will return to this in the section on dialogue and dialectics below. 
We ought to take up the question of Bakhtin’s Christological influences from the 
outside.  He invites us to do so, even as he skirted various forms of faith while 
nevertheless abhorring the pyramidal and hierarchical structures of organized religious 
affiliation.  Bakhtin practiced what he preached, namely transgredience, exotopy, 
outsideness.  There is a double movement between the virtue of the law, personified by 
Christ-Pantocrator, and the virtue of kenotic/empathetic projection of the subject into the 
life of another, but neither of these movements is sufficient.  The architectonic 
consummation between external elements—here between system ethics and ethical acts, 
between subject and object—is an art.  The art of answerability assures my non-alibi, my 
non-abdication, of becoming an ethical being from my unique place within it.  In 
answering the other and life from the outside I may bring to each the excess of being that 
can neither be understood or witnessed from within itself. 
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 Finally, there is a real sense here in which Bakhtinian ethics and the Circle’s 
translinguistics overlap—here one should think of the figure of the Venn diagram, and 
this too is not a wholly satisfactory image.  Bakhtin’s philosophy is self-reflexive in that 
his individual studies complement and complete each other from the outside.  
Nevertheless, it takes some reading before one begins to perceive the inner dialogue along 
disciplinary lines between socioeconomics, linguistics, ontology, phenomenology, 
biology, psychology, ethics, and cultural history, which is being perpetuated in Bakhtin’s 
corpus.  None of these faculties are reducible to the other, but they are taken up 
throughout his oeuvre as mutual-aids.  The whole remains inchoate and is set as a task.  
Ethics brings to translinguistics the idea of the word made flesh.  As we will see below, 
Voloshinov emphasizes the materiality of the word and the primacy of this materiality in 
shaping consciousness—hence the concept of a translinguistics.  There is no question for 
either Voloshinov or Bakhtin that in the beginning was the deed, or more precisely, the 
word as deed.  When the witness and judge first appeared on earth—i.e., when the 
phenomenon of reflection first came into earthly being, it emerged in the form and 
content that the word actively constituted.160   
 Saint Cuthbert’s is the oldest surviving codex on earth, housed in the British 
Library, and it happens to be the Gospel of Saint John.  The earliest extant book on earth, 
therefore, begins ‘In Principio erat Verbum’ (In the beginning was the word).161  The 
Latin verbum connotes both word and verb.  In the Greek original, the ὁ λόγος of the 
opening verse of St. John’s Gospel (Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος), was understood as half god and 
half man, both spirit and material in nature.  Verbum, like slovo, like logos, carries the 
connotation of both meaning and action, or perhaps meaning-in-action.  The English word 
was once understood as everywhere active rather than passive.  Etymologically word can 
be traced from its Indo-European roots not only to a familial connection with verbum, but 
to the Latvian vārds—to give one’s word and to promise to take action.162  It is to change 
the event itself through evaluative inflection.  When I give my word I change the material 
nature of the social situation in which this word is embodied, just as the spiritual nature 
becomes incarnate in the kenotic moment.  The merely symbolic and abstract character of 
the wholly theoretical and cognitive side of life again catches up with embodied life in 
motion—if only temporarily.  When one’s word ceases to be connected with the material 
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conditions of life, when it is wholly spiritual, his words become ready-made and passive.  
The passive word, impossible before the advent of writing, no longer seeks to materialize 
and change the situation in which it is enmeshed.  When I treat my word as a detachable 
abstraction of myself, rather than a material bridge from the world to myself, I begin to 
lose my ideological orientation in the world; that is, I pretend that my utterances can be 
axiologically neutral.  Ironically, Marxist political-economy is haunted by the materiality 
of the word.  The political-economic focus of Marxism, as Gardiner points out, in which a 
“determining base” determines the superstructure, was simply inadequate to the task of 
explaining the utterance.  It was entirely too abstract.163   
 Now that we have begun to see how an ethically active subject answers once-
occurrent being-as-event, we will widen our inquiry into the answerability that ought to 
take place between the faculties.  We must everywhere keep in mind the materiality of the 
word—the word is an ethically active deed or it is nothing but an empty-husk.  Although 
we typically talk as though our thoughts are wholly produced internally, somewhere deep 
in the somatic, before they magically appear as material for the phonological apparatus 
and finally become meaning for another, this is not the case.  We will see in what is to 
come, for Bakhtin—and notably for infants—words are not born inside of people but 
between them.  Both verbal and extra verbal words are actions before they are things and 
they are things before they are abstract notions.  It also seems to be the case that the 
virtual or written word has this same existence or potential existence for Bakhtin, since he 
suggests that one can live on through one’s rewritings—or more precisely that one’s 
words can be reborn.164  The written word is action in potentia. 
Words are materialistic from top to bottom, and exist much as things in the world 
exist; they are matter in motion, subject to inflection and intonation.  We may state that 
naïve consciousness implicitly understands words as intentional entities—we think of 
them as an outward embodiment, the clothing of our thought.  Words everywhere seem to 
be directed outward.  Bakhtin reverses the ontogenetic order here, so that the word is 
delivered of the subject rather than the subject delivered of the word.  Just as the baby 
first learns to say ‘mama’ when her mother is present and only then internalizes the word 
as inner speech, thought itself begins with words that help to shape our concepts.  So it is 
that Bakhtin’s translinguists, as we will see below, runs deeply into the movement of 
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being and the sensual world around us.  Insomuch as the architectonics of answerability 
constructs bridges between our institutions, therefore, this bridge-building is to be 
accomplished only alongside of a socioeconomic and materialist account of the word.  
This material existence requires a response outside itself, from within the life of 
consciousness.  The life of consciousness itself begins with matter in motion—with 
becoming—just as the word begins with the deed.  The verbally and extraverbally active 
word—i.e. intonation—is the medium with which we witness, answer, and judge 
existence.  In what is to follow we will look closely at the line of critique embraced by the 
Bakhtin’s Circle’s writings on biology, psychology, psychoanalysis, linguistics and 
discourse, and theories of space-time.  Each of these disciplines are brought together 
through the construction of architectonic bridges between them and by attempts to ground 
them in the material and socioeconomic origins of conscious life. 
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§ 3.  Biology: Bakhtin, Kanaëv, and “Contemporary Vitalism” 
 
3.1 A Brief History of “Contemporary Vitalism”:  
Contextualizing the Kanaëv Paper  
 
Life can be consciously comprehended only in concrete answerability.  A philosophy of life can 
only be a moral philosophy.  Life can be consciously comprehended only as an ongoing event, and 
not as being qua a given.  A life that has fallen away from answerability cannot have a philosophy: 
it is, in its very principle, fortuitous and incapable of being rooted. 
—M. M. Bakhtin165  
 
“Life... is [nature’s] best invention; death means greater life to it....  It is whole and eternally 
unfinished.  As it creates, so can one create eternally.” 
  —Goethe, “Nature”166 
 
In this section I will review Bakhtin and I. I. Kanaëv’s paper “Contemporary Vitalism,” 
still largely ignored in Bakhtinian scholarship.  After providing a brief account of the 
history of vitalism, I will then show how their paper critiques neo-vitalism as a subjective 
and uncritical approach to biology.  I also intend to provide an account as to how 
dialectical materialism fits into the Bakhtinian critique of vitalism specifically and also 
the architectonics of answerability more generally.  Then I will proceed to an analysis of 
Freud’s borrowings from the biological sciences and the vitalist theory that seems to 
influence his “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”.  The present section will primarily take up 
the question of forming an architectonic between biology and sociology—or more 
properly, dialectical materialism.  I will transition from bio-scientific-sociological 
answerability to psychological-sociological answerability in the next section.  In order to 
accomplish this transition, I want to take up the question of Freud’s peregrination into 
biology in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”.  This will achieve three ends.  First, we will 
see where the strictly subjective account of biology that Freud provides goes wrong.  
Secondly, and almost cursorily (almost, but not entirely), this analysis will establish 
Freud’s relation to vitalist-like principles and their detrimental influence on 
psychoanalysis.  Finally, this analysis will set the stage for Voloshinov’s critique of 
psychoanalysis proper; Voloshinov’s critique shall be the subject of our next section.   
 
Between 1924 and 1927, Bakhtin and Elena Aleksandrovna were living in an apartment 
building owned by Kanaëv in Leningrad on Preobrazhenskaya Street.167  Under the 
auspice of intellectual curiosity, the biologist Kanaëv took Bakhtin to a lecture that was to 
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be given on the concept of chronotopicity by the Russian physiologist A. A. Ukhtomsky.  
The lecture was held in Peterhof; the year was 1925.168  This seems to have been the 
occasion which would inspire the composition of “Contemporary Vitalism,” an article 
critiquing the vitalist theory of Hans Driesch which Kanaëv and Bakhtin co-wrote.169  
George Rousseau locates the heart of Bakhtin’s scientific disposition in the short two part 
paper which appeared under Kanaëv’s name; there were to be more papers to follow in 
subsequent issues of the journal Man and Nature, but these never materialized.170  The 
paper concludes with a short defence of dialectical materialism as the proper road for 
science to follow.171  It is dialectical materialism as a scientific method that Bakhtin 
wants to endorse, according to Rousseau, because he understood the efficacious approach 
to scientific inquiry to move along “the axis of empirical subjects from physiology to 
biology.”172  Bakhtin was in no way a follower.  We have seen already this in his critical 
appropriation of Russian Orthodoxy and, even more narrowly, of the kenotic tradition.  
His neo-Kantian commitments were no less critical, and he did not blindly react to vitalist 
doctrine and reject Driesch’s neo-vitalism only to fall back into a “merely logical and 
epistemological” set of relations; that approach could at best only revivify the spectre of 
Cartesian rationalism.173  This supposition is in agreement with Michael Gardiner’s work 
on Bakhtin and Merleau-Ponty, “‘The Incomparable Monster of Solipsism’”: 
From his earliest writings[, and “Contemporary Vitalism” is his first co-authored 
work,] Bakhtin likewise argues that the impoverishing dualism of Cartesian 
rationalism can only be combated by a repudiation of the abstractions of idealist 
philosophy, so as to grasp the nature of the concrete deed or ‘act’ as it constitutes 
the essential ‘value-centre’ for human existence.174 
 
The question that opens the paper on vitalism, “what is life,” therefore takes on added 
significance in light of Bakhtin’s commitment to moving beyond Cartesian-rational and 
Kantian-categorical paradigms. Marx’s famous paradigmatic inversion of Hegel, 
expressed in the dictum that consciousness is determined by life, everywhere informs 
Bakhtin’s work, from the earliest notebooks—Art and Answerability—to the very last 
word in “Toward a Methodology of the Human Sciences.”175  If we are to understand why 
Bakhtin and Kanaëv put so much emphasis on dialectical materialism as the proper 
methodology of the biological sciences, then, we must follow his post-Cartesian critique 
of Driesch and Bergson.  For simplicity sake I shall again invoke the proper name 
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‘Bakhtin’ as the author of “Contemporary Vitalism”, although this in no way supposes 
that I am deliberately excluding the possibility that Kanaëv was actually penned the 
article.176   
There are three approaches to the question “what is life,” which are taken up in 
“Contemporary Vitalism”: namely the mechanist, the vitalist, and the positivist.  The first 
declares that there are no essential boundaries between the organic and the inorganic, and 
they can each therefore be reduced to self-consistent planes of physical and chemical 
properties from which all experiments and explanations are to be conducted.  
Contrariwise, vitalism grants that life itself follows distinctive non-physico-chemical 
laws, and the whole is therefore greater than the parts.  Finally, positivism lives and dies 
by what is in essence Newton’s maxim: Hypotheses non fingo, and works merely with 
what is given.  Positivism hesitates to provide hypotheses until such a time as when 
Science is “on firm, reliable, footing.”177  This last position is necessary for the 
“descriptive stage” of biological science, but this stage had long passed by the early 20th 
century, and Bakhtin therefore rejects positivism outright, since looking for nothing, it 
was sure to find it.178  What Bakhtin was looking for was a philosophically active science; 
science is supposed to respond to life, after all.  Between biology and life, therefore, he 
placed the method of actively and architectonically answering life by bio-scientific 
means. In biology as in life, we are responsible not merely to say what is but also to 
establish what ought to be—in other words, what should properly be set as a task for 
biology.  In this supposition, Bakhtin shows where he remains indebted to the Kantian 
philosophy even while trying to supersede it by placing it back in life as what he calls a 
participative consciousness.179  Positivism attempts to establish “‘a well-founded’ 
neutrality between the mechanists and the vitalists,” but this position ignores both the fact 
that biology has already established a methodology and that a full answer to the question 
“what is life” is not only unnecessary, but is not wholly answerable.180  Positivism 
therefore ought rightly to be discarded, both because the descriptive stage of biology is 
already behind it and because no neutrality is possible.181  
 Vitalism has passed through a series of stages throughout history; it has travelled 
through what Hegel would have described as a succession of forms.182  Although 
Rousseau latches onto two main important categories of vitalism in Bakhtin’s paper, the 
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old and the new strain, there are three essentially different historical stages through which 
vitalism has had to move and which are described in “Contemporary Vitalism”.  These 
are the ancient, the modern, and the contemporary forms.  Recognizably vitalist and 
mechanist strains of philosophy were both debated by the Greeks.  According to Bakhtin, 
the Greeks understood the distinctive characteristics of life to be purposiveness, freedom 
and answerability.183  Vitalism has survived more or less throughout the Western 
philosophical tradition since Aristotle, and was roughly patterned after Aristotelian 
thinking.  There are in fact only two moments in the history of Western philosophy in 
which vitalism could not be considered alive and well, for a relatively short period during 
the seventeenth century—directed as it was toward rationalism and the mathematization 
of nature, vitalism was in its death throes.184  More recently, vitalism has suffered a 
second excommunication from the biological sciences roughly since Crick and Watson’s 
discovery of DNA.  It could be argued, though I will not do so here, that a vitalist style of 
thinking has fled the world of sciences altogether and found a new life in the 
humanities—that the false imposition of agency as a necessary fiction is equally applied 
to political thinking, and that the idea of organic unity has since been equally applied to 
the concept of the autotelic text.   
By all accounts the 17th century was overwhelmingly mechanist and tended to 
push vitalism to the margins of philosophy.  However, vitalism was not altogether 
expunged—and even the mechanists often admitted the necessity of teleological 
principles.185  In the 18th century, William Paley’s universe may have been a clockwork, 
but it still required a watchmaker to set it in motion.  Newton himself could not shake the 
idea that celestial mechanics required something akin to Aristotle’s first mover, and, as 
Hans Eichner points out, “the arch-materialist... Baron d’Holbauch, as late as 1770, 
ascribes to dead matter an innate ‘nisus,’ or striving, which, rather than gravitation, 
accounts for the fall of bodies.”186  Finally, what Bakhtin refers to as contemporary 
vitalism is a self-described critical vitalism, since by and large it owes its epistemic 
grounding to the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment” in Kant’s third 
critique.  Bakhtin denies, however, that there is anything objective or critical about 
Driesch’s contemporary vitalism.187 
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The vitalism of the 18th and early 19th centuries was dogmatic, and its proponents 
largely presumed some form of nisus or agency was necessary to explain life and the 
motility of matter.  As far back as William Harvey’s opifex or “artificer,” proponents of 
the modern dogmatic line of descent, who posit some form of vital agent, stretches 
through Caspar Friedrich Wolff (vis essentialis corporis), Albrecht von Haller (vital 
spirit), Georg Ernst Stahl (vital fluid), the Brunonians (Lebenskraft), Blumenbach (nisus 
formativus), Robinet (élan vital), and many others, culminating with Kant’s critical 
positing of a teleological principle in the power of reflective judgement.188  In the second 
part of the third critique, Kant injects the tension between mechanical and teleological 
principles directly into to his critical philosophy, relying on his concept of reflective 
judgement and final cause as merely regulative principles, so as to leave the 
epistemological door open and retain his critical—i.e., non-dogmatic—position.  
  According to Kant, living organisms, unlike inorganic matter, cannot be thought 
merely according to “nexus effectivus,” or efficient cause, but require the subordination of 
mechanical causal explanations to the “nexus finalis,” or final cause.189  In the “antinomy 
of the power of judgement,” Kant begins from the thesis that “all generation of material 
things is possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws,” while his antithesis states 
that “some generation of such things is not possible in accordance with merely 
mechanical laws.”190  All of nature ought to be thought according to mechanical or 
efficient cause, or there can be no science of nature at all.  Without these laws science has 
nothing to quantify.  However, experience teaches us that we cannot help but to 
understand organisms according to a second, higher cause, which works according to the 
logic of ends.  Organic things therefore present us with an apparent contradiction; they 
are at once self-caused and determined.  As with the antinomy of causation in the first 
Critique, the antinomy of judgement will turn out to be illusory.191  The antinomy 
collapses when we posit a special reflecting power of judgement as a merely regulative 
judgement which can account for natural ends where a priori determining judgement 
cannot do so.  The central practical importance of this principle, as Helmut Müller-
Sievers rightly points out, was to enable “scientists to determine the range of their 
problems and to avoid the trap of answering questions outside their fields, precisely the 
temptation that had led to the inconsistencies in Haller’s, Buffon’s, and Wolff’s 
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systems”192; that is, each of these philosophers of the organic had dogmatically assumed 
life required a non-mechanical causal agency.  Bakhtin follows Kant half-way; he also 
wants to provide a propaedeutic to the biological sciences.  Unlike the efficient cause 
supplied by determining judgement, however, reflective judgement’s nexus finalis “is a 
mere idea, to which one by no means undertakes to concede reality.”193  It is merely 
reflective, and in principle does not contradict or subvert mechanical causal accounts.194  
Thus Immanuel Kant erects the framework on which the “critical vitalism” of Driesch 
shall be presented, but of course Driesch actually posits an hypostasized forming agency.  
Bakhtin therefore deems neo-vitalism every bit as dogmatic as ancient vitalism: 
We in no way want to say that vitalism has actually succeeded in making itself 
critical.  We do not think it has; we hope to convince the reader that vitalism, by 
its very nature, can never transcend dogmatism; in other words, that in the final 
analysis, it may only be a matter of personal faith, in no way a basis for scientific 
knowledge.  We term contemporary vitalism critical in the subjective sense, that 
is, we mark only the fact that its representatives strive to be critically-minded, 
whether they succeed or not.  They give their constructions a principled, 
methodological shape; they endeavour to consider the strengths of the mechanistic 
position in biology, and this side of neo-vitalism must be noted.195 
 
As we will see, it is not Driesch’s empirical practices that err but the conclusions he 
draws from them.  In forming his hypotheses he leans too far toward the hypostatization 
of an autonomous formational agency. 
 
3.2 Bakhtin and Kanaëv’s Critique of “Contemporary Vitalism” 
Bakhtin focuses his critique on Driesch’s work, and specifically the three—non-
technical—of his four proofs of vitalism.  The first of these is known as “organic 
regulation” and is supposed to ground the theory of Driesch’s neo-vitalism.  Organic 
regulation is further subdivided into regulation of process, or “morphological regulation 
or restitution.”196  Regulation includes any attempt by the organism to restore damaged 
parts or interrupted functions, and the example is given of the self-regeneration observed 
in earthworms.  Organic regulation is held up by Driesch as the first and most important 
evidence for an extra physico-chemical force necessary to and inherent in all life.197  
 Driesch’s first proof for the autonomy of life is most fully expounded in his 
reported experiments with sea-urchin “fission,” through which he gives a fuller account 
of organic regulation by artificially interrupting normal cell division of the blastomeres.198  
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In sea-urchins, blastomeres are cells under normal conditions, which divide from their 
initial state of the embryo as a single cell.  Fission occurs from this first blastomere until 
about 800 cells have accumulated.  An internal “cavity” is formed.  This is the stage of 
the “blastule.”199  The blastule simply marks a “new period of embryonic development” 
in which the endoderm and the ectoderm begin to form and the embryo begins the 
gastrule stage of development.200 
 Driesch preformed three experiments on interruption of ‘normal’ cell duplication 
and was satisfied that there was sufficient proof that each cell has at any point in this 
process an “equipotential” to perform the task required for one stage of growth or 
another.201  First, at the two cell stage Driesch artificially separated the blastomeres and 
thus interrupts the progression to the third stage.  The individual cells then repeat the 
normal growth from stage one to stage two without any abnormal result from their having 
been divided—except for a slight diminution of size.  In the second experiment a single 
blastomere is artificially separated off from the group during the four cell stage.  The cells 
will again achieve normal growth, and again there is a slight diminution in the size 
observed in the organism.  In the third experiment artificial fission is performed on a fully 
grown blastule, and each half then forms a slightly smaller but otherwise complete sea-
urchin.202 
 The enormous flexibility of the blastomeres seems to point to a freedom of 
potential development which Driesch calls “‘prospective potentials.’”203 This is to say 
that each blastomere potentially has the capability of contributing any functionality 
required for the realization of normal growth.  Which part each blastomere actually plays 
he calls “‘prospective significance.’”204  A second type of experiment seems to play out 
the idea that every blastomere possesses “equipotentiality”—meaning that “all the 
elements of our system have identical prospective potentials.”205  In this experiment the 
developing embryo’s ‘vertical’ axis of growth is restricted by placing it between glass 
plates from the four cell stage to the eight cell stage.  The group of blastomeres are then 
released and they proceed uninhibited, developing both vertically and horizontally.   
What is at stake here?  An explanation of the sea-urchin’s growth does not seem 
to be exhausted by the “spatial location” and “size of the system.” 206  In addition to the 
mechanical constituents guiding the sea-urchin’s development, Driesch’s conception of 
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equipotential requires a third, actively participative influence.  This agency has the power 
to freely direct growth toward the consistent organization of the whole.  Driesch calls this 
entelechy after Aristotle, but his meaning is closer to the Aristotelian eidos—or the 
“blueprint of the whole.”207  The notion here is that while this agency cannot interfere 
mechanically with the physico-chemical properties of the organism, it nevertheless has 
the power to govern form. 
 No matter how many ways you slice it, says Driesch, the machine theory of 
organicity cannot account for the consistent unfolding organization of the blastomeres, 
and we must look beyond mechanistic causation.  Unlike inorganic matter, organisms 
cannot be thought merely according to nexus effectivus, but require the subordination of 
mechanical causal explanations to the nexus finalis.208   For Driesch, therefore, 
morphogenesis is autonomous of physical and chemical causality: 
It seems to me that there is only one conclusion possible.  If we are going to 
explain what happens in our harmonious-equipotential systems by the aid of 
causality based upon the constellation of single physical or chemical factors and 
events, there must be some such thing as a machine.  Now the assumption of the 
existence of a machine proves to be absolutely absurd in the light of the 
experimental facts.  Therefore there can be neither any sort of machine nor any 
sort of causality based upon [a] constellation underlying the differentiation of 
harmonious-equipotential systems. 
For a machine, typical with regard to the three chief dimensions of space, 
cannot remain itself if you remove parts of it or if you rearrange its parts at will. 
Here we see that our long and careful study of morphogenesis has been 
worthwhile: it has afforded us a result of the very first importance.209 
 
The essential error in Driesch’s theory occurs entirely on the side of his theoretical 
hypothesis.  It is the logic of the concept that errs, however, and not the observations he 
has made or the state of biological knowledge at the time these experiments were 
conducted.  Driesch’s equipotentiality is an example, and we will see more below, of the 
subjective theoretical projection onto what ought to be an objective theoretical practice.  
We remember that Driesch claimed there were many prospective potentials for each 
blastomere.  This was universally true and true at each stage of development, but there 
was also only one prospective significance actualized in each stage.  Driesch thesis 
posited equipotentiality for each blastomere at all stages of development until the 
formulation of the blastule was achieved.  Yet the experiments with the sea-urchin 
embryo were conducted at each stage of development and even under conditions that 
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restricted growth along the vertical axis altogether.  At no time during these experiments 
were any alternate possibilities expressed or signified by the organism itself.210  There is, 
therefore, a gap between what has been observed and what Driesch’s theory of 
equipotentiality posits.   
Driesch’s mistake is to overstep the bounds of the role of subjective interpretation 
in the hard sciences.  By attributing to the organism a hypostatized teleological form of 
causation—i.e., final cause, he has snuck in subjectively perceived ends by the back door.  
Without wit of it, he has secretly changed nexus effectivus into nexus finalis—hey, presto!  
For Kant, however, final cause can only play a regulative function for scientific theory as 
it progresses forward. Institutionalized science is self-motivating, and refines and discards 
its concepts by turn and according to the degree of adequation they obtain for the 
progression of scientific knowledge.  In the sciences we are not free to hypostasize 
purposiveness or to anthropomorphize nature; where we attempt to exchange mechanical 
laws with subjective agency, we commit a paralogistic ingression of perceptual 
phenomenon into the things themselves. This is the part of Kant which Bakhtin accepts, 
but not as an epistemological limit.  The limit is rather to be understood as a limit 
between being and becoming.  Kant’s limit remains gnoseological.  Bakhtin’s limit is 
built into the limit of the historical framework which has conceived, birthed, and nurtured 
biological science to its current state.  Note, there is nothing in Bakhtin’s paper that 
would contradict Crick and Watson’s discovery of DNA and RNA or protein guided 
growth of organic bodies, since in the latters’ work proteins do the work of the 
autonomous agent presupposed by vitalism, and Crick and Watson do not, therefore, 
require an extra-materialist account of the organism and do not have to appeal to forces 
beyond the physical and chemical to account for self-unfolding and self-individuation. 
Neither Kant nor Bakhtin deem life to actually have a teleological agency.  This 
becomes especially tricky since we tend to look at the world in terms of its use and 
according to our own ideologically directed ends.  This is also true of the way we look at 
biology, but we must be careful not to attribute actual ends to life.  As a regulative 
principle, nexus finalis provides biology with light enough to go forward but not enough 
to claim this type of cause is real. 
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We see this everywhere in biological study.  Take the eye, for example.  We used 
to say the eye is for seeing.  It is efficacious to say so, since the eye is principally thought 
of in terms of sight and since sight plays such a large role in our culture and biology.  Yet 
we cannot strictly say that the eye developed exclusively for sight in reaction to light.  
There is nothing about light that should require an organism to develop the eye as an 
organ of sight.  There is nothing in light that is exclusively devoted to vision or to making 
visible.  It is only the visual function of the eye that tempts us, retroactively, to say the 
telos of light is to make visible.  Lacan, for one, takes skin pigmentation as evidence 
against this teleological account of the ocular.211  Of course, the eye is still studied 
according to its ends as a receptor of light, but this oracular course is tied up in the 
concept eye, as well as the fact our world is overwhelmingly visually orientated, and not 
the organ itself, and which may even possess non-ocular or even anti-ocular capacities. 
Likewise, the purported harmony that is supposed to emerge from Driesch’s 
distribution of functions along the blastomeres via equipotentiality is nothing more than 
the spectre imposed upon living matter by “subjective, valuative consciousness.”212  
Bakhtin does allow for a certain mode of objectivity which would understand the 
organism as a harmonious self-regulating whole, but only on the side of perception.  
Therefore it is no contradiction to suggest that the dance of the male bird of paradise 
arouses its mate through the power of sensual attraction, and we can justifiably substitute 
this for a physico-chemical explanation.  Nevertheless, Bakhtin rejects the “uncritical 
transference” of perceptual appearances onto mechanical and lawfully bound 
processes.213  The teleological conception of nature is therefore to be understood not only 
as final cause, but also and only from the end that has already been achieved.  Again, 
according to Bakhtin it is only in retrospect that we can contemplate the phenomenon 
from the point of view of nexus finalis.214  Below, “Freudianism”—so-called—will 
likewise be critiqued in part for its fallacious retrogressive method.215 
At the end of their essay, Bakhtin and Kanaëv also draw attention to the machine-
like character of the organism.  Against Driesch, they affirm that the organism is a strange 
machine.  From the top to the bottom, the organism is a self-assembling, regenerating, 
regulating, and living machine.  Taking this statement at face value, one might be tempted 
to recall in advance Deleuze and Guattari’s axiom: “Everything is a machine.”216  But 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s machines subsist on a plane of immanence, of “nondifference or 
dispersion.”217  Their machinic philosophy moves in both directions at once: there 
vitalism moves away from organic unity and toward mechanism and mechanism away 
from “structural unity” and toward living machines which can only be considered an open 
unity.218  But Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic philosophy is not mechanistic, or is not 
exclusively mechanical.  Meanwhile Bakhtin’s account remains committed to an 
explanation by mechanical cause.  
 
3.3 Biology and Dialectical Materialism 
The principle importance of Bakhtin and Kanaëv’s paper is kept in the background and 
only surfaces briefly and is underemphasised.  This is true to the extent that Clark and 
Holquist have become convinced that Bakhtin’s endorsement of dialectical materialism is 
only lip-service to the Soviet censors, but the homage to dialectical materialism is not 
simply a walk along the party line.  It is instead an acknowledgement that scientific 
method itself is evolving and relies on social institutions for its momentum, and that what 
one learns in science in turn changes these institutions.  The institutions that guide 
biological scientific practice are themselves changed by this practice and this symbiotic 
relation exceeds the sphere of the biological sciences and its epistemes; they also 
encompass adjacent territories—territories of governmental funding, of chemistry play 
sets, of the first science fiction novel, of the ability to imagine little machines, of nanobots 
and their technologies, of linguistic practice, of having a proper breakfast.  In some sense, 
everything is an institution.  All of these parts, Bakhtin was crucially aware, are not 
merely adjacent to the “complex phenomena [of] organic relations,” but are themselves 
part of the productive work of science.  Yet if Bakhtin was committed to dialectical 
materialism as a method, and if he remained a dualistic thinker, he likewise accepted a 
gap between consciousness and the world.   How could he endorse Butler’s bee-pollen-
flower assemblage, or Deleuze and Guattari’s molar-molecular dispersion?  Deleuze and 
Guattari’s machines go all the way to the bottom; they find a way to unify the vitalist-
mechanist assemblage by placing the subject, the consciousness that does science, to one 
side, and by looking instead at the movement of desire, collectivities—the molecular, or 
microscopic machines, and on the other side at mass phenomenon, societies, institutions, 
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planets, individuals—i.e., the molar, on the other, in a real sense their solution both erases 
and multiplies the gap between the molar and molecularity: “at this point of dispersions of 
the two arguments [vitalism and mechanism], it becomes immaterial whether one says 
that machines are organs, or organs, machines.”219  Is this really as messy—and schizo—a 
solution as Deleuze and Guattari believe, or does it repeat the search for an elegant 
unified universe?  Bakhtin does not search for a plain of immanence, and this is the 
difference. 
Perception has the effect of slowing the advance of science.  Perception is as 
much cultural as it is biological.  If the landscape of scientific consciousness is as much 
shaped by scientific practice as by advances in theory, then this too goes all the way to the 
bottom of perception.  The historian of science, Steven Shapin relates the story of the 
Paduan professor who “refused to look through Galileo’s telescope to see with his own 
eyes the newly discovered moons around Jupiter,” while observers of telescoped 
terrestrial objects not only believed what they saw but were amazed.220   Seeing is 
believing, certainly, but the question is what do we see?  What we see is always-already 
telescoped by an instituted socioeconomic condition. 
Insomuch as it is a science of life, biology is Bakhtin’s ideological dominant.  As 
such, he and Kanaëv are focused not on answering the question “what is life,” 
definitively, but in establishing a theoretical framework for biology that takes into 
consideration life as it is lived and the sciences as they are practiced.  Biology therefore 
presupposes sociology.  In the background of their text, therefore, Bakhtin and Kanaëv 
never lose sight of the methodological prerequisite that science must be self-reflexive.  
Scientific hypotheses are formed though conscious striving, but this consciousness is 
itself first formed by the material practices that give to it its distinctive style and territory 
and which, in turn, shape scientific consciousness.  The scientific genre is borne along by 
the rhythm of everyday speech.  Here it finds its bedrock and the sedimented ideological 
material with which to form linguistic communities and discourses.  It is for this reason 
that we can say for certain that Bakhtin and Kanaëv are also in dialogue with one another 
in the essay, since while Kanaëv has helped to tutor Bakhtin in conversation and helped 
him establish the scientific veracity of his theoretical position, Bakhtin has invested 
biological practice with the art of sociologically answering, so to speak.   
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To make this clear, we must again look for a moment at the paper “Art and 
Answerability.”  There, Bakhtin shows that the “three domains of human culture—
science, art, and life” bear merely external—i.e., mechanical—relations to one another 
and can only achieve an internal unity in the fertile soil of a consciousness capable of 
consummating each by answering one with the other.  Thus science is answered by life, 
life by art, art by science, and so forth.  This is done by bringing to science what one has 
“understood in art.”221   
Furthermore, the concept of the understanding has a technical meaning in 
Bakhtin, as Allon White clarifies: 
Thus understanding, for ‘Bakhtin,’ always carries more than its purely cognitive 
meaning.  It always includes that further sense of active and sympathetic solidarity 
with the other; it is an emotive-evaluative act as well as an act of pure knowledge.  
It is an act of elective inclusion, of unification, though never in the sense of 
denying social and cultural differences and distinction.  For ‘Bakhtin’ 
acknowledgement and knowledge flow together.222 
 
Understanding does not begin and end by fitting sense-perception into neat cognitive 
categories, and in this way Bakhtin is not only attempting to move beyond the rationalism 
of Descartes, but is also post-Kantian.  It is therefore not simply a matter of doing science 
on paper or remaining within abstract theoretical formulation and deduction, but one must 
answer the once-occurrent being-as-event.   
If we have said that biology, in its orientation toward life, is Bakhtin’s 
ideologically dominant approach to the sciences, it is only dominant where it can 
architectonically unify the other faculties—notably the sociological—within the unity and 
uniqueness of consciousness by the witness and the judge.  The particular cultural domain 
of biological science as a theoretical practice is not to be understood as loosely—i.e., 
mechanically—connected to his larger philosophical project. It is not a matter of there 
being a disjuncture between the two, nor is it a matter of Bakhtin changing his mind 
between his early notebooks and the publication with Kanaëv.  Quite on the contrary, the 
critique of vitalism that he offers us fits into the larger edifice on which he began to work 
during this period, during the early to mid-1920’s.  Again, Toward a Philosophy of the 
Act makes a concerted effort to show how one cultural region of life, science and art—
and here ethics—fits into his ontology: 
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Our time deserves to be given full credit for bringing philosophy closer to the 
ideal of a scientific philosophy.  But this scientific philosophy can only be a 
specialized philosophy, i.e., a philosophy of the various domains of culture and 
their unity in the form of a theoretical transcription from within the objects of 
cultural creation and the immanent law of their development.  And that is why this 
theoretical philosophy cannot pretend to being a first philosophy, that is, a 
teaching not about unitary cultural creation, but about unitary and once-occurrent 
being-as-event.  Such a first philosophy does not exist, and even the paths leading 
to its creation seem to be forgotten.  Hence the profound dissatisfaction with 
modern philosophy on the part of those who think participatively, a dissatisfaction 
that compels some of them to have recourse to such a conception as historical 
materialism which, in spite of all its defects and defaults, is attractive to 
participative consciousness because of its effort to build its world in such a way as 
to provide a place in it for the performance of determinate, concretely historical, 
actual deeds; a striving and action-performing consciousness can actually orient 
itself in the world of historical materialism.223 
 
Of course, Bakhtin’s commitment to continued dialogue and to interpreting being as an 
event rather than as a thing restrict him from accepting wholesale the Marxist account of 
historical materialism and its eventual resolution in a classless society.224  Historical 
materialism, along with anthroposophy and theosophy “commit the same methodological 
sin,” none of these approaches attempt to be answerable to the event and cannot 
distinguish methodologically “between what is given and what is set as a task, of what is 
and what ought to be.”225  Positivism is only the most extreme form of this fallacy, which 
as we have said, adheres merely to what is given and makes no attempt to erect a 
philosophic foundation, or here an architectonic, to answer being.   
It is essential for us to remember, again with Allon White, that the character of the 
unity Bakhtin supposes between art, science, and life is a unity-in-difference.  For creative 
thought, which has had the historical (ad)vantage of post-structuralist hindsight, already 
more or less rejects grand-narratives and monological unities of the Hegelian sort, so this 
perspective may seem pedestrian.  However, at the time of Bakhtin’s writing, we recall, 
other neo-Kantian practitioners—Hermann Cohen for example—continued their efforts to 
subdue this difference, to reconcile all historical becoming to the copular, propositional, 
unity of being as concept.  
We still do not take the species—or “trends”—of biology and science seriously 
enough.226  Science must always have a frontier.  Sometimes sciences share a frontier 
along “boarder zones”; today we would call these zones of interdisciplinarity.227  Bakhtin 
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says that trends originate in these interstices, and we see this most notably in the wholly 
new discourses as they are instantiated in Darwin, Freud, and Marx.  Darwin worked on 
the edge of the biological sciences, Freud in the interstices of psychology, and Marx in 
the margins of political economy and social theory.  When science reflects on its own 
activity, this “supra existence,” or radical reflection, of science will change the practices it 
is looking at.  In effect the entire structure of a scientific discipline changes when it 
becomes actively self-aware.  Self-conscious reflection and the bare consciousness of an 
object are clearly different things.  Bakhtin says that there is a discernable moment in 
great time in which being in and for-itself first came into existence.228 
This moment is not reducible to essentially human characteristics and neither, 
therefore, can this ontological difference be solely shouldered by humanism.  The 
“supraperson” effectively leads its own life, in the grand cosmic scale of great time.  We 
can infer that to be conscious is to be a personal and singular consciousness, to have a 
perspective, to be a unique situation seen from a particular vista: to take part in the 
“supra-I.”229  In the supraperson I see myself in my entirety.  I am not simply one 
existence among others and am definitely not an object among objects, but I am also a 
sense of that existence.  My life takes on a second sediment of meaning from the point of 
view of the in-itself and for-itself.  But the supraperson depends upon the external social 
milieu for its origin and development and it only approaches its great complexity long 
after birth:  
Everything that pertains to me enters my consciousness, beginning with my name, 
from the external world through the mouths of others (my mothers, and so forth), 
with their intonation, in their emotional and value-assigning tonality.  I realize 
myself initially through others: from them I receive words, forms, and tonalities 
for the formation of my initial idea of myself.  The elements of infantilism in self-
awareness (‘Could mama really love such a...’) sometimes remain until the end of 
life (perception and the idea of one’s self, one’s body, face, and past in tender 
tones).  Just as the body is formed initially in the mother’s womb (body), a 
person’s consciousness awakens wrapped in another’s consciousness.  Only later 
does one begin to be subsumed by neutral words and categories, that is, one is 
defined as a person irrespective of I and other.230 
 
The discipline of biology is like this.  We have constructed it in our own image.  Biology 
only emerged as a science after thousands of years spent as a descriptive practice—and 
for a long time was limited to Medieval bestiaries and was driven by a profoundly 
64 
 
 
 
sympathetic (microcosm and macrocosm) and anthropomorphised style of thought.  The 
answers given in chemistry and physiology have in turn reflexively calibrated natural 
history, and we have been able to re-organise genetic taxonomical families around 
genetically veridical natural species.  Historical hermeneutical interpretation tends to take 
up the study of history through its own ideological lens.231  
 
3.4 Introducing the Soma, Instincts, and the Pleasure Principle into
 Psychoanalysis 
 
We are now ready to transition from Bakhtin’s critique of vitalism to Voloshinov’s 
critique of psychoanalysis.  We will do so by first providing a brief analysis of Freud’s 
borrowings from vitalism and biology.  Before moving to the next section I want to show 
that Freud’s account fails along the same lines as Driesch’s—vis-à-vis the purely 
subjective mode of analysis he provides and his omission of history from both his science 
and biological/psychological development.  As a trained medical doctor, biology heavily 
bookends Freudian psychoanalysis, but we will limit our comments to the case of the 
hysterical biological influence that returns in his later work, in “Instincts and their 
Vicissitudes” and “Beyond the Pleasure Principle.” 
I picture Freud M.D. and academic caught between his search for an etiologic 
psychoanalysis and his bio-scientific curiosity regarding the somatic origins of purposeful 
behaviour.  It is hard to explain his speculations on “germ-plasm” and ontogeny without 
first promoting a distinction between how Freud seems to understand his metapsychology 
and what he would like it to do. 232  Freud indeed set out to provide a theory for both the 
history and the destiny of the psyche, its functioning and its repair. There seems to be a 
double Freud here, however—a split consciousness.  How do Freud’s biological 
speculations in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” jive with the Freud who wants to make a 
science of the psyche?233  There seems to be an inside and an outside to psychoanalysis.  
Psychoanalysis seems to evince an unfulfilled longing to establish the essence of the 
somatic.   
In Freud’s 1915 paper, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”, he recognizes that all 
sciences must begin in description, just as we have seen in Bakhtin.234  He further admits 
that concepts must be “imposed” upon science so long as it remains in this natal stage; the 
ideas begin with “some degree of indefiniteness.”235  Ideas in science begin as 
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conventions, and Freud’s notion of the instincts is no different.236    He then makes the 
distinction between physiological stimulus, coming from without, and to which the 
organism can respond by taking flight, and instinct, which originates within the organism, 
remains constant, and to which “no actions of flight avail against them.”237  Freud then 
does something strange.  He assumes, and it is nothing more than an assumption, that the 
interior life of the psyche is allergic to stimulus, so to speak.  That it wants to return to a 
state or rest, or a wholly non-stimulated state.238  It is only by this will to return to a state 
of rest that can account for the development of the nervous system.  Since instincts are a 
constant “afflux” of stimulus from inside the organism, the nervous system has been 
developed as a sort of internal flight mechanism, whose purpose is to nullify this internal 
disruption of organic quiescence.239  Freud then supposes that the “unpleasure” of these 
disruptive instincts is therefore subject to the pleasure principle.240  The organism wishes 
to fly from the unpleasureable sensation that his disturbed its dormancy.  Finally, Freud 
posits that these instincts are not only internal to the organism, but, speaking biologically, 
they arise in the écart or interstice of the psychic and the somatic: 
If now we apply ourselves to considering mental life from the biological point of 
view, an “instinct” appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental 
and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from 
within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made 
upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body.241 
 
We are therefore assured that “instinct” is a frontier conceptualization, and the concept 
itself therefore must be more clearly, if tentatively, defined in terms of this body to mind 
dualistic relation. 
For psychoanalysis interprets biological and psychical development as a 
negotiation of the interior-exterior relation as it pertains not only the organism as a unity, 
but between its psyche and the somatic.  For Freud, the subject must come to identify 
with those desired objects exterior to it and only thereby does it interiorize them and 
make them its own.242  This renegotiation of identity-alterity as interiority-exteriority, 
then, seems be in flux and has a vector moving from high to low irritation, with the aim of 
releasing building pressure, or “Drang.”243  Under the constant afflux of pressure the 
individual develops an economy and valuation of interior-exterior relations.  This is 
Freud’s principle of constancy: he says, “the pleasure principle follows from the principle 
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of constancy: actually the latter principle was inferred from the facts which forced us to 
adopt the pleasure principle.” 244  The instincts coax the organism to let down its defence 
in order to interiorize those objects deemed necessary for survival.  Ultimately, this 
interiorization is accomplished by thwarting or rerouting the defence mechanisms of the 
nervous system through self-identification with those exterior objects; again, for Freud, it 
is only through such identification that the psychic and somatic defences against 
exogenous stimuli can be compromised.245   
The drive which motivates the gaze—the scopophilic “aim”—is defined generally 
as “looking as an activity directed toward an extraneous object,”246 and the scopophilic 
vicissitudes of reversal of the active to passive form—i.e., scopophilia becoming 
exhibitionism and “turning round upon the subject’s own self” can,247 and should, be seen 
as vicissitudes through which the scopophilic instinct will have to pass.  In first turning 
his scopophilic instinct to his own body, the subject makes himself the object of his own 
inspection.  This is the primary scopophilic stage and it would correspond to the stage of 
primary narcissism in Freud’s theory.   In the next stage of scopophilic drive 
development, the subject solicits the gaze of the other.248  The important take away here is 
that for Freud, scopophilia is born in the subject as an instinct whose source is somatic 
but ultimately unknown.  The instinct must achieve its aim by cathecting, i.e., investing 
desire in, an object.  Again, in primary narcissism, the object selected is the subject’s own 
body.   Freud posits this as the beginning of the scopophilic instinct, when the subject 
contemplates his own genitals, and they are cathected as the desired object through which 
the instinct may achieve its aim.249  Through repression and the castration complex, 
however, the child must learn to displace his object of choice and find a proxy—though 
Freud does not here specifically elucidate the vicissitudes of “repression” or 
“sublimation”250; as the subject first passes from the auto-erotic stage, the “active 
scopophilic instinct” takes hold of an external object, cathects it, and thereby “leave[s] 
narcissism behind.”251  Again, note that the movement is unidirectional in terms of origin, 
that the movement is one of exteriorization, even if “instinct” is a truly frontier concept 
between mind and body. 
 Freud complicates the categories of interior and exterior through the further 
positing of the “three polarities of mental life,” 252 each of which complicate in divergent 
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manners according to their subject matter.  All three polarities can be understood as a 
(re)negotiation of the relation between interiority-exteriority. The three polarities are 
categorized in terms of the biological, the real, and the economic; but more importantly, 
Freud categorizes the three polarities according to the instinctual aims themselves, which 
tend to hold sway.253  The biological polarity is defined in terms of individual organisms, 
the real polarity is demarcated by the ego-to-externality relation, and as the borders of the 
ego are redefined through identification and projection, so too is the interior-exterior 
relation renegotiated.  Finally, in the development of the pleasure principle in primary 
narcissism, the economic polarity of the interior-exterior relation emerges.  In this 
polarity interiority and exteriority of the subject are (re)negotiated strictly in terms the 
pleasure and unpleasure. Subjective identification is bound by pleasure, whereas 
unpleasure is to be expulsed and disavowed254: “[t]hus the original ‘reality-ego,’ which 
distinguishes internal and external by means of a sound objective criterion, changes into a 
purified ‘pleasure ego’, which places the characteristic of pleasure above all others.”255   
Henceforth this economy of pleasure-unpleasure helps condition identity and 
alterity and ultimately what is considered endogenous or exogenous to the organism.  The 
split-ego then abandons the portion of itself it finds unpleasureable by projecting the 
abhorred part of itself out into the world.  The external world is no longer seen as 
indifferent, but now is considered strictly “hostile” by default.256  According to Freud, we 
may here begin to discern a second opposition in the normal development of object 
love.257  In this second opposition he terms “love-hate”; indifference is now considered 
secondary to, or merely derivative of love or hate.  This is because in Freud there are no 
passive instincts.258  The example of scopophilia should express a resistance to the 
external world by the secondary opposition that is characterized by indifference that now 
stems out of the primary love-hate opposition.  The indifference to the world is 
manifested in the subject’s auto-erotic play during narcissism, the exploration of his 
limbs,259 or quite literally in the obsessive self-appraisal of the scope of the subject’s 
body.260    
We are now ready to formulate a preliminary thesis on the movement of the 
Freudian vicissitudes: the logic of interior-exterior is grafted onto and runs parallel to the 
logic of the subject position in general.  For all practical purposes, development always 
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pushes toward a resolution of any contradictory evidence that ‘I am in here’ and ‘the 
world is out there.’  In short, in the change from the “reality-ego” of the earliest 
developmental stages of the I,261 to the “pleasure-ego” born in primary narcissism,262 the 
ego comes to identify with those things it finds pleasurable and therefore attempts to 
reconcile those exteriorities it finds pleasant by interiorizing them into itself.   
Toward the end of “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, Freud writes that “the third 
antithesis of loving, the transformation of loving into being-loved, corresponds to the 
operation of the polarity of activity and passivity, and is to be judged the same way as the 
cases of scopophilia and sadism.”263  This third psychoanalytic declension of love, qua 
instinct, also will require a little unpacking. The first listed vicissitude, an instinct’s 
reversal into its opposite form, from active to passive, Freud explains in terms of the 
sadistic instinct.  Moreover, for Freud, masochism is never a primary aim of the drive.264  
This will make sense if we also recall that in love it was only through identification that 
the object could be internalized.  Meanwhile, masochism maintains the otherness of its 
object.  The possibility of being-loved implies that we have long since passed from the 
primacy of the biological polarity through the real-external vicissitude of the real polarity 
and into the pleasure-unpleasure dynamic of the economic polarity.  Therefore, the love 
of the other always requires a highly complex interworking of all three polarities.  This 
intertwining of the pleasure principle, the reality principle and the somatic functioning of 
biology are the instinctual Gordian knot that Freud is trying to untie.  The biological 
polarity of activity and passivity remains operant, as does the real-external, even with the 
emergence of the third polarity during narcissism; in other words, what was a temporary 
and preliminary state has become a psychically adjunct state—which is to say that they 
psychically “co-exist alongside one another.”265 
In the third antithesis of love, we are concerned with the transformation of activity 
into passivity.  In wanting to be loved by the external object, the subject must pass 
through the vicissitude in which the instinct turns into its “opposite,” and then finally 
enters the vicissitude in which the instinct falls “back on itself.”266  All of this is to say 
that in seeking to be loved by another, the subject displaces himself.  He takes his 
pleasure vicariously through the eyes—the gaze—of the other.  Only the object has 
changed, however, and not the aim, since the subject has successfully displaced himself 
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while the subject’s Eros instinct remains intact and falls back upon himself vicariously 
through the other.  In the case of scopophilia, the vicissitudes follow the same trajectory 
and find their satisfaction in the release of somatic instinctual pressure from an unknown 
source.  In gaining their satisfaction, instincts will either direct the ego toward narcissistic 
self-absorption, fall directly upon the other as projected gaze, or thirdly, fall back on the 
subject through his vicarious enjoyment of the other’s gaze.  But the other is always 
treated as an external object during the vicissitudinous movements of the instincts. 
Although “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” is only a preliminary attempt toward 
the description of the frontier concept “instinct,” Freud’s analysis intertwines the three 
polarities and the two vicissitudes that it explores with astounding perspicuity.  Still, it is 
often difficult to know for certain at which points he crosses the gap and helps himself to 
the biological and anthropological theories of origins that border on the mythic, 
Romantic, vitalistic, and wholly subjective mode of analysis; in the next section we will 
have opportunity to review Voloshinov’s charge that Freud remains too subjective in his 
analysis.  We will provide a specific example of how this plays out in the “Instincts and 
their Vicissitudes”.  Beyond the primary stage or narcissism, it is hard to be certain from 
this essay when Freud means the vicissitudes as stages of ego development, and when he 
means them as descriptions of adult psychical activity.  Assuming that Freud implies both 
as possible descriptions of the function of the vicissitudes—i.e., that any one of these 
vicissitudes might repeat themselves in adult life, we can then say that the primary stage 
will merely cease to dominate universally through the necessity of “self-preservation” 
alone.267  Hence the development of the ego-interior and the real-external division.  As a 
result, in the stage of primary narcissism, the reality-ego becomes the pleasure-ego and is 
regulated according to the economy of pleasure-unpleasure.  Again, we find a de-
emphasis on what is purely interior in terms of biology—i.e., the somatic.  External 
objects can be identified with and internal objects projected alienated from the ego 
according to the new parameters of the pleasure principle.  We see then that the word 
“polarity” emphasises the frontier, or the relation, between interior-exterior, and it does so 
especially in terms of the dynamic dialectical movement of the ego through the various 
psychical and developmental stages in psychoanalysis.  In Freudian psychoanalysis, these 
themselves turn states-evidence, so to speak, in the form of the underlying ideological 
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utterances.  Tellingly, at no point does Freud offer us a wholly objective method of 
analysis of the conventional notion of “instincts.”  Whereas copious behavioural 
phenomena has become subject to a quantitative set of analytical practices within 
psychology and biology, the term “instincts” has yielded to no such objectivity.  As such, 
it has not moved beyond the scientifically natal stage of development; the term instincts 
remains a wholly subjective notion, and as such it will always belong to the domain of the 
descriptive science known as psychoanalysis.  
Before turning to “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” I will briefly sum up what we 
have witnessed in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”.  In our example, Freud understands 
the psychical instinct scopophilia as born out of the individual alone in the primary stage 
of psychical development; it results from an afflux of tension originating in an unknown 
somatic source that remains constant.268  Qua instinct, scopophilia has four important 
vicissitudes; they are: first, the reversal of the instinct into its opposite; secondly, the 
instinct falls back upon the subject (Deleuze and Guattari’s “il se rabat sur”)269; thirdly, 
the instinct is repressed; finally, an external object is sublimated and the instinct thus 
acquires its satisfaction.  I have briefly dealt with the first two vicissitudes here, as does 
Freud.  The first vicissitude has to do with the active-passive dichotomy, and in keeping 
with Freud’s principle of instinctual constancy, it is hard to see how an instinctual 
pressure could be other than active.  Therefore, the first vicissitude sets the stage for the 
explanation of the second—whereby the subject displaces the object of his desire; the ego 
displaces itself and thus scopophilia becomes exhibitionism, while the pressure (i.e., 
activity) remains positive and constant even while appearing to be externally displaced.  
In this way the ego is able to identify with the gaze of the other and exploit it for his own 
pleasure.  In this displacement, the ego remains the object of its own pleasure.  Through 
the three polarities, Freud has given an account of the dialectical development of the 
interior-exterior relationality of subject to world.  Nevertheless, this relation remains in 
flux. The primary state of the biological polarity Freud calls activity-passivity, and it is 
presumed to psychically co-exist alongside the real polarity of ego-external world and the 
economic polarity of pleasure-unpleasure.  Only after these relations have been 
themselves economized—summed, or “synthesized”—can the “word ‘love’” be 
employed. 270  In other words, the source, or proper name of the instinct lies behind this 
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tangled weave of active negotiations of ego-instinctual motivations for self-preservation.  
Everywhere the ego remains the object of its own affection, so to speak.  The primary 
operative logic of interiority remains the subject’s ideal psychical position at any one 
time, and it never ceases to re-align itself to this ideal; we must never lose sight of the fact 
that for Freud the interior is always associated with pleasure from the narcissistic stage 
onward.  This is not the real interior of the individual organism; it is the psychical interior 
which remains in flux and is defined according to the economy of pleasure-unpleasure 
and ego self-identification.  This is to say that regardless of Freud’s compounding of 
polarities, in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, pleasure remains his ideological 
dominant.  This is not what Freud says, but this is what is revealed in the logic of the ür-
polarity of interior-exterior relations between ego and world.  Moreover, this ür-polarity 
is everywhere guided by an ür-motivation—that of seeking pleasure or, what amounts to 
the same thing, taking flight from unpleasure.  Pulsion always moves toward expulsion, 
from interiority to exteriority.  If all of this seems rather like the fortuitous dialectic of a 
mental contortionist, this is not accidental; by following Freud in the black letter of his 
theory we are attempting to make manifest the univocal directionality of the 
psychoanalytic subject.   
   
3.5 Freudian Appropriations of Biological Theory and Praxis: 
 Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
 
In the 1920 paper, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, Freud resumes the development of 
his economic model of psychic experience by again borrowing from biology.  He 
presumes stimulation to be the primary origin of distinction between the interior-
psychic—“perceptual consciousness”—and the exterior world. 271  Psychoanalysis takes 
up into its theory of psychic origins a recapitulation of a natural-historic and 
embryological development.  This is not to say that Freud actually historicises 
psychoanalysis; he does not.  He merely appropriates the theory of recapitulation for his 
own programmatic ends.  Moreover, recapitulation is itself not fully historical but is 
merely mimetic of the historical evolution of species at the plateau of the individual.  
Instead of a blastule or a central nervous system being formed, Freud posits an outer layer 
of the psyche whose primary function is to protect against stimuli, like a crust, “some 
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degree inorganic.”272  After this psychical aegis has formed the outer layer begins to die, 
essentially taking on inorganic properties as “a special envelope or membrane resistant to 
stimuli.”273  We briefly note the messianic phrasing “by its death, the outer layer has 
saved all the deeper ones from a similar fate.”274  The sensory organs sit physiologically 
and topographically beneath the outer nervous crust and make only “tentative advances” 
into the world due to their acute sensitivity.275  The outer layer then differentiates itself as 
the stimulus receptor at the psycho-somatic threshold of the external world.   
The “perceptual Consciousness,” however, does not have a mechanism to shield it 
from “internal excitations.”276  We have already seen this logic in Freud’s distinction 
between instinct and stimulus, between what is internal and external to the organism.  As 
a result, what we might call the internal nervous condition of the subject will be 
overwhelmingly more influential than external stimuli.  Particularly stressful internal 
excitations will be treated as external stimuli.  As such, the external psychic shield can be 
deployed against internal excitations.  “This is the origin of projection,” in 
psychoanalysis, but we note that this portrayal of projection does not take into 
consideration the world as an event but as a screen—an object—on which the psyche 
alienates itself; unlike in the account Bakhtin has provided us, Freud is not interested in 
the phenomenal limitation of consciousness at the intersubjective hinge between self and 
other as herself an autonomous subject.277  Moreover, Freud’s vision of the cell here is 
entirely militaristic; it is seen from the point of view the bourgeois pathologist implicitly 
fortified against the outer world of society.  Therefore, Freud’s vision of the cell is 
likewise a projection of the psychopathology of everyday bourgeois life.  As we will see 
in greater detail in the next section, the problems of trauma originate here for 
psychoanalysis, as do the problems of mastering and binding loose energy, the polarity of 
pleasure and unpleasure, and of the dualism between Eros and the death instinct.  Each of 
these problems emerges and is analysed wholly in accordance with a subjective 
conjecture made to appear objective—by objective we simply mean that which is 
methodologically repeatable in principle. While Freud’s observations may be repeatable 
his conclusions and analyses are not; we have already seen this subjectivism in Driesch’s 
leap from observations to conclusions. 
73 
 
 
 
 “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” begins with the attempt to define pleasure and 
unpleasure.  He suggests that unpleasure results from unbound energy, but is more likely 
directly related to the interval of time in which this energy remains unbound rather than to 
its quantity.278  But unlike his earlier work in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, Freud 
now admits of the possibility of an interruption of the pleasure principle.  Here, he finally 
falls back upon the notion that an individual organism—as a unity—must sometimes 
reject the pleasure principle as disruptive of its own ends and even as dangerous to its 
survival.  The status quo qua inactivity cannot be maintained without damage or even the 
death of the organism: 
Under the influence of the ego’s instincts of self-preservation, the pleasure 
principle is replaced by the reality principle.  This latter principle does not 
abandon the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless 
demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction [delay], the 
abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the 
temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure.  
The pleasure principle long persists, however, as the method of working employed 
by the sexual instincts, which are so hard to ‘educate,’ and, starting from those 
instincts, or in the ego itself, it often succeeds in overcoming the reality principle, 
to the detriment of the organism as a whole.279 
 
It becomes painfully obvious here that Freud is working without a conception of the 
mutualism or symbiosis of organism and environment, and that his conception of the 
organism therefore remains without the complexity witnessed in real life within the milieu 
of organism and environment.  Everything is determined according to the isolated 
individual, and the wider sphere in which it finds its means of life is entirely abstract in 
psychoanalysis.   
Freud says that the drive to self-preservation conflicts with the pleasure principle, 
and often instincts are repressed which, if fulfilled, would destroy the viability of life.  
Thus it happens that instincts which seek pleasure are made manifest as unpleasure when 
their energy escapes cathexis and is not properly bound.  Freud attributes “all neurotic 
unpleasure” to the anti-cathected repression of detrimental instincts.280 
Beyond the pleasure principle, as it were, the compulsion to repeat plays an 
essential role.  In support of his theory, Freud presents the circumstantial explanation for 
dreaming as the retrospective attempt to master the influx of stimuli during waking life.281  
Here one is compelled to return to an earlier, and often unpleasant, state of affairs.  It is 
74 
 
 
 
not enough to recollect this prior state, but one must play it out.  Ostensibly this 
dissatisfaction with the mere memory of the traumatic event, mother leaving you behind 
for example, causes Freud some concern282; one seeks to relive the event in order to 
master the unpleasant stimulus.  It is not only neurotics who practice this mastery; this 
repetition is also a part of the psychopathology of everyday life.  For example, children 
also try to master “unpleasureable experiences” through repetition.283   Upon observing 
the child’s game of Fort-Da or ‘gone’ and ‘there’ (return),284 Freud hypothesises that 
there must be a dominant instinct more primeval than the pleasure principle.  Officially, 
Freud supposes the compulsions to return to former psychical states implicates the 
biographical moments in the individual’s life that were anything but pleasurable.  On the 
face of it, the pleasure principle is simply not equipped to explain the active repetition of 
unpleasure.  He therefore concludes that there must indeed be a second more primitive 
drive which may commune and even be brought into the service of the pleasure principle, 
but which cannot be reduced to the same origin: 
on mature reflection we shall be forced to admit that even in the other instances 
the whole ground is not covered by the operation of the familiar motive forces.  
Enough is left unexplained to justify the hypothesis of a compulsion to repeat—
something that seems more primitive, more elementary, more instinctual than the 
pleasure principle which it over-rides.285 
 
Indeed, but Freud has explained very little.  His genius is to open up problems rather than 
to solve them, as I hope to show in what follows. 
Freud may be primarily concerned with the psychoanalytical source of repetition 
in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, but he is not content to restrain himself to 
speculations within his field.  The somatic returns in this essay; psychoanalytic thought 
again takes a peregrination into the field of evolutionary biology.  Freud muses that 
compulsion to repeat may also explain the migratory habits of birds and what appears to 
be the embryological recapitulation of species descent, as well as what Driesch has called 
the regulatory and regenerative functions of the organism.286 The salamander, one might 
say, regenerates its tail, not simply to replace what has been lost, but for the sake of 
returning to the former state.  These are clearly different explanations in that one proceeds 
from the image a normalized whole, understood from an exterior point of view, and the 
other purports to give an explanation immanent from within the organic system itself.   
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Freud then toys with the theory that we are physically and instinctually marked by 
the history of our antecedents.  He is convinced that the compulsion to repeat is not only 
the stamp of a biological interest in our figure within the grounding environment, but is a 
cosmic echo of the very first moment of the universe in what Bakhtin has analogously 
referred to as great time: “In the last resort, what has left its mark on the development of 
organisms must be the history of the earth we live in and of its relation to the sun.”287  
Again, in all of its speculative accounts, psychoanalysis proceeds according to a logic of 
the original state.  Whatever phenomena are to be explained must contain seeds that were 
present from the very beginning of our universe—in principle, at least.  If we posit the 
dualistic principles of Eros and the death instinct, for example, they must be shown to 
have been present in great time, from the start.  In this way psychoanalytic recapitulation 
is actually more akin to preformationist theory in which there is nothing new under the 
sun.  We do not mean that Freud believes there can be wholly new phenomena, only that 
he hesitates to postulate a truly spontaneous and emergent phenomena.  In this way also, 
psychoanalysis is entirely retrospective in its explanatory direction.  It always appeals to a 
backward reference and is in no way forward looking.   
Dr. Freud discursively deduces that if the aim of the instinctual compulsion to 
repeat is to return to an earlier state of things, then we must eventually arrive at non-
existence, although here he says “death.”288  Again the recapitulatory echoes of biological 
and organic death repeat themselves here in a psychoanalytic theory of the instinctual 
death drive.  To paraphrase Bakhtin, physiological death is born of Eros to become 
thanatos on a higher level.289  Importantly, the inorganic pre-life historical state of nature 
is assumed to be somehow contracted in the instinctual memory of the individual; this 
instinct-memory is then redeployed as a forward-looking death-orientated inflection of 
this so-called original historical state.  This future orientation does not contradict what we 
have said about the backward referential directedness of psychoanalysis, since it is only 
looking forward in order to return to a previously extant state.  
 Freud speculates that returning to the inorganic state of affairs may have been 
delayed by unavoidable and indefinite suspension of individual death.  Taking into 
consideration the great time of evolutionary progress a great many circuitous “détours” 
may have become hardwired in the instincts, and “what we are left with is the fact that the 
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organism wishes to die in its own fashion.”290  Thus Freud asserts the second, primeval, 
“ego-instincts” which compel the organism to return to its original inorganic state.  As a 
result he commits himself to a dualistic theory that distinguishes two primary instinctual 
principles, namely Eros and the death instinct:  
ego-instincts [the death instincts] arise from the coming to life of inanimate matter 
and seek to restore the inanimate state; whereas as regards the sexual instincts, 
though it is true that they reproduce primitive states of the organism, what they are 
clearly aiming at by every possible means is the coalescence of two germ-cells 
which are differentiated in a particular way.291  
 
We are now in a position to analyses the meaning of what I am calling Freud’s 
Weismannian turn.   
 The Weismannian turn represents a somatic revolution of sorts in psychoanalysis; 
specifically, Freud’s turn toward the dualism of Eros and the death instinct and away 
from the monism of libido.  The biologist August Weismann’s theory of the relation 
between species and individuals posits a dualism between immortality and mortality in 
the figures of the germ-cell and the soma.  While the soma is “destined to die” the germ-
plasm concerns reproduction.292  However, Weismann makes a clear distinction between 
these two struggling tendencies only in the higher organisms.  Freud cannot follow him in 
this and uses his recent dualistic amelioration to psychoanalysis to refute this claim.293  
He does not accept natural death in organisms on face value but wants to provide an 
account of death from the point of view of the natural forces which drive living beings 
toward death.  In Weismann, death is nothing but a “matter of expediency.”294  The 
trouble with this account, in Freud’s opinion, is that the elemental forces that drive 
reproduction and death must be traced back to the first appearance of life upon earth.  
This cannot be done if physical death only appears with multicellular organisms.  That 
said, Freud is not interested in the merely internal physical death of the organism.  He 
wants to define death from the point of view of the forces operant in it.  In this way Freud 
actually proves a more subtle thinker than Weismann—although Weismann is actually in 
the laboratory conducting observations of protozoa and metazoa, whereas Freud is only 
speculating from a textual and subjective position.  Nevertheless, Maupas and Calkins 
provide evidence to contradict Weismann’s assumption that physical death only applies to 
metazoans. It would appear from these experiments that even protozoan organisms will 
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die if they are not rejuvenated through conjugation.295  What is more, Freud goes further 
to grant that death is the result of an organism’s “incomplete voidance of the products of 
its own metabolism.”296  He therefore suggests that far from invoking physical death for 
the first time, metazoans may actually have the power of self-rejuvenation and the 
prolongation of life precisely by dint of their multicellularity, since one cell may help to 
rejuvenate another. 
 What happens next is most extraordinary and essential for our purposes.  While 
Freud claims to have arrived at his dualistic theory of Eros and the death instinct 
independently of biology, and while he purports to be searching for the real internal 
primal forces responsible for reproduction and organic death, he shows very little interest 
in doing anything but appropriating from and critiquing biology.  Yet he is willing to 
apply elements of his metapsychology to germ-cells by attributing to them a form of 
narcissism: “to use the phrase that [he is] accustomed to use in the theory of the neuroses 
to describe a whole individual who retains his libido in his ego and pays none of it out in 
object-cathexes.”297  Thus the avenue Freud constructs between bio-science and 
psychoanalysis is a one-way street.  
Naturally, we ought to be suspect of a retroactive implementation of the biological 
theory of Weismann et al. to bolster Freud’s dualist principles, Eros and the death 
instinct.  Our suspicion is well-founded since for all of Freud’s borrowings from biology 
to, ostensibly, architectonically answer psychoanalytic dualism, nowhere does he attempt 
to struggle with contrary evidence—at least with regard to the influence of evolutionary 
biology.  In fact, he claims to have arrived at his dualism independently of Weismann’s 
mortal and immortal soma and germ-plasm.  As a result, his production in “Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle” is artful, no doubt, but it is also wholly mechanical.  That is, Freud’s 
synthesis of biological and metapsychological theory at times remains entirely aesthetic 
intuitive in method and at other times theoretical cognitive, but nowhere does it seek to 
ground itself in the dialectical materialist movement of biological or psychological 
theory—or for that matter in everyday life.  As such, it cannot truly pretend to objectivity.   
Nowhere does Freud present us with methods of testing his hypotheses that are 
repeatable by anyone and yet he claims the scientific—i.e., objective—validity of his 
theories of the pleasure principle, the ego and its vicissitudes, internal-external polarities 
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of the organism, the biological, real, and economic polarity, the germ-plasm and soma, 
dream analysis, Eros, and the death instinct.  It is this lack of objectively repeatable 
methods, combined with his apparent disregard of the socioeconomic history of biological 
and psychological practice, more than anything else, which has contributed to his demise 
in the latter half of the 20th century.  This is not to say that Freud no longer has any value.  
His theories remain useful descriptions—if entirely bourgeois and subjective in their 
concepts.  Ironically, they offer us a unique historical plane from which to view, rewrite, 
and reanalyse the fin-de-siècle cultural milieu in which he himself was immersed.  
In closing this section I want to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that 
“Beyond the Pleasure Principle” was published hard on the heels of Freud’s introduction 
to a book on war neurosis.  The cessation of hostilities at the end World War One loom 
large in the background, with all its political, socioeconomic, and historically traumatic 
disjecta membra.  Perhaps it would be reading too much into Freud’s trauma at seeing 
Europe descend into an apparent death wish.  Would it be too much to suggest that the 
repression of the social in Freud begins to suggest itself to him after the catastrophic 
collision and suicidal conflagration of the whole of society?  In any case, I am certainly 
not the first to do so.  History surely plays its part as ghoulish persona non grata in 
“Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, as well as in Freud’s theory of the instincts—although I 
would argue that “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” is written from a completely a-
historical point of view, whereas in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” Freud is clearly 
beginning to think the socio-historical implications of his theory, even if he will not be 
ready to give this aspect of psychoanalysis a self-conscious evaluative utterance until 
Civilisation and its Discontents.  It is transparently clear that the pleasure principle does 
not remain dominant in Freud after WWI.298  
Finally, to my mind the gap between the individual and species remains what is 
essential to “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”.  While the vast majority of ink has been 
spilt on the compulsion to repeat, the dualism that opens up between the individual and 
the species in this essay is one of those ‘big picture’ problems with which philosophy will 
always concern itself.  I cannot help but think that there is a great deal more to the idea 
that once the individual has reproduced it becomes superfluous.  I am aware that this 
supposition will not be warmly received by all readers.  Nor should it.  It is not that I lack 
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belief in the sanctity of all life, but when our world has brought itself to its knees, as I 
believe it will in the coming years, through the perceived absolute import of individual 
pleasure seeking, we ought to take this proposition more seriously than we do.  I will 
provide an anecdote as a microcosmic example of what I mean to say.  In the 1960’s my 
grandfather watched as the many family-owned farms surrounding his were bought up 
one by one.  When he retired he passed his farm on to his son, who wanted to work it.  
Eventually his son was also tempted away from the life he loved simply because it was 
economically infeasible that he keep it.  The life that had persisted for the vast majority of 
people in this hemisphere since they arrived here—and we could trace this back by 
millennia if we followed their antecedents into Europe—disappeared overnight.  My 
grandfather was a simple man, and he had one question: but who will feed my 
grandchildren when all the farms are owned by these big companies?  I am not an 
economist or an agriculturalist, and I do not pretend to be an expert in markets.  But I am 
a grandson and I do know a lack of foresight when I see it.  Given the present rapidity of 
the growth in income disparity, drought, species extinction, global warming and famine, 
should it not concern us that it now seems the world would be better off without us?  The 
individual, after all, is supported by the generations which came before him, and ought to 
try to save something for those who will come after he has long since passed on in great 
time. 
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§ 4.  Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Freudianism: A Marxist Critique 
 
4.1 Between Marxism and ‘Freudianism’: 
Valentin Voloshinov & Psychoanalysis 
 
You’re like my yo-yo 
 That glowed in the dark. 
 What made it special 
 Made it dangerous, 
 So I bury it 
 And forget. 
  —Kate Bush, “Cloudbusting”299 
 
It would be futile to say that love has to do with proteins and society.  This would amount to 
reviving yet once more the old attempts at liquidating Freudianism.  
—Deleuze & Guattari300 
 
In this section I intend to review, in brief, Valentin Voloshinov’s critique of Freudian 
psychoanalysis.  In order to do this I will first distance myself from Clark and Holquist’s 
view that Voloshinov’s supposition that Marxism is a legitimate avenue to critique Freud 
is somehow disingenuous and merely a prevarication aimed at flying under the Soviet 
censors.  I will then show where there actually are shortfalls in Voloshinov’s analysis and 
attempt to make clear the merits of a Marxist critique and an analysis of official and 
unofficial discourse in Freudian psychoanalysis.  This will require us to look closely at 
the last two sections of Voloshinov’s treatise, especially in terms of the highly 
introspective type of psychological method that Freud prescribes.  It will also entail 
making visible the bourgeois ideology that everywhere infiltrates Freud’s theories of 
transference, the Oedipus complex, and his introspective approach to psychology in 
general.  Once we have reviewed these central aspects of Voloshinov’s Freudianism: A 
Marxist Critique, I will then show what I perceive to be the proper extension of both 
Freudian theory as viewed through the lens of the Bakhtin Circle and Allon White’s paper 
“Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis.”  This in turn will 
implicate Bakhtin’s notions of the carnivalesque and the grotesque, and will therefore 
prefigure the last section of this thesis, which takes up Rabelais and his World directly.  I 
believe White’s paper goes a long way to show how sociology and psychoanalysis can be 
brought into an architectonic relation of the type Bakhtin has in mind.  In this way I hope 
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to consummate my exposition on the Bakhtin Circle’s work on Freud, both in the 
previous section and in what follows.  
 
First published in 1927, Valentin Voloshinov’s Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, presents 
psychoanalysis as an introspective, subjective, and bourgeois ideological inflection of the 
sciences.  Generally speaking, this critique follows the same pattern of the 
Bakhtin/Kanaëv essay and Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language.  
There is the obligatory exposition of the monological, isolated, basis of Freudianism as 
wholly subjective.  Voloshinov shows how both the psychoanalytic and behavioural 
methodologies go wrong, and ultimately undercut their own socioeconomic ground. As 
such, these approaches to psychology prematurely draw indiscriminate lines between the 
everyday discourse of life and the more specialized discourse of the sciences.  Bakhtin’s 
“Speech Genres” also performs this line of critique.  Proper attention to the “primary” 
everyday genres is not stressed in the monological approach to science and theory tends 
to outstrip practice.301  This one-sidedness in turn effects a vulgarization of the 
purportedly objective scientific theory, and in psychoanalysis specifically the cult of 
bourgeois subjectivity prematurely forecloses its larger socio-historical and material 
context.  The writings of the Circle then tends to emphasize the diachronic and historical 
mutualism between science and discourse in everyday life.  Bakhtin and the Circle seek to 
establish the importance of dialectical materialism between scientific practice and 
scientific theory; this ultimately leads to an attempt to supplant the established 
monological theory directly with what Holquist calls dialogism.  Finally, the 
architectonics of answerability which the young neo-Kantian Bakhtin first sought to 
establish, with all of its ontological commitments to a fixed gulf between life, science and 
art, everywhere underpins and bolsters the Bakhtin Circle’s critical method. In every way, 
Voloshinov’s critique of Freud follows this pattern.   
Clark and Holquist rightly acknowledge in Bakhtin’s stead that Freud made an 
attempt to incorporate sociological method into psychoanalysis in his final texts 
Civilization and its Discontents and Moses and Monotheism.302  However, in my 
estimation, the biographers are largely mistaken that Voloshinov’s text is not 
authentically sympathetic to Marxism.  This méconnaissance leads them to a second and 
more profound error: they deem the final chapter of Freudianism, “The Content of 
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Consciousness”, to be largely a critique of Soviet psychologist appropriations of Freud.303  
Far from utilizing Freud to critique behavioural psychology, however, Freudianism is 
very much a polemic against the essence of Freud’s subjective methodology, and its 
greatest merit is along these lines.   
Where behavioural methods are concerned Voloshinov is ready to endorse Pavlov, 
so long as he sticks to quantitative analysis of outward behaviour and likewise seeks a 
socioeconomic ground in the discourse of life on which all science is founded.304  Clark 
and Holquist argue that the book “is a critique less of Freud himself ... than of Soviet 
psychologists who sought to appropriate Freud into a new science of the mind.”305  This 
proposition seems to me to be in bad faith.  One might just as well argue that Voloshinov 
is trying to do is to disprove in one blow the theories of introspection and behaviourism in 
order to put up in their place a middle term grounded in gestalt theory, as Wolfgang 
Köhler attempts to do in his Gestalt Psychology.306  While the work certainly serves to 
warn against following the psychoanalytic edifice, since its concepts remain in essence 
entirely subjective, the general thrust of the book is certainly directed as a polemic against 
Freudianism proper.  If one were to follow Clark and Holquist’s lead here, one could 
again disregard the fact, which I believe is quite clear, that Voloshinov and Bakhtin are 
everywhere influenced by Marxism and want to found psychology and all sciences on the 
firm ontological grounds of a socioeconomic theory and dialectical materialism; 
regardless of how Voloshinov may privately resent Soviet interference and censorship, 
both he and Bakhtin were ready to engage in a dialogue with Marx and Engels.  They 
seem to have perceived in the sociological theory of Marxism and in dialectical 
materialism the last-best hope of grounding psychology, which was still in its early stages 
of development.  As we saw regarding biology, science cannot afford to wait for its last 
word to begin constructing its conceptual framework, hypotheses making, and building a 
methodology.  The simple fact of the matter is that Voloshinov is attempting to critique 
both the subjective, thinly masked, bourgeois psychoanalytic method of Freud as well as 
the Soviet trends in behavioural psychology.  He wishes to ground both in the 
socioeconomic discursive practice of dialectical materialism without destroying what is 
truly valuable in either theoretical direction.  He is not always successful, but we must not 
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mistake his missteps and cul-de-sacs for a veiled liberalism and disingenuous 
prevarications. 
Nevertheless, while Voloshinov’s critique of Freud is correct in essence, he does 
tend to gloss Freud’s marked evolution from his early days in studying and hypothesising 
on hysteria with Josef Breuer.  From that point in his career until his abandonment of “the 
cathartic approach,” which led eventually to the formulation of his systematic theory of 
the Unconscious, Freud constantly changed his mind and, I believe, genuinely attempted 
to modify his theory to fit his observations.307  The trouble is that he did so, by and large, 
in isolation, and as such, his theory remains wholly introspective.  Notwithstanding the 
fact that many of these changes came within the influence of the milieu of Freud’s inner 
circle of psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists, Alfred Adler, Otto Rank, Stanley 
Hall, Ernest Jones, C. G. Jung et al., introspection everywhere remained Freud’s primary 
mode of concept creation and analysis.   
By 1912 Freud had already publicly explicated the different vectors of the theory 
of the unconscious, distinguishing between the descriptive, dynamic, and systematic 
unconscious.308  Perhaps the most notorious amelioration of his theory, as we have seen, 
is the dualist approach he presents in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”.  There, the 
addition of the death instinct, which caused Wilhelm Reich and others to abandon the 
International Psychoanalytic Association altogether, probably marks his greatest 
evolution since The Interpretation of Dreams appeared in 1900.309  Reich acted rejected 
Freud’s turn away from the univocality of the pleasure principle to the dualism between 
Eros and the death instinct.  Voloshinov describes this dualism as follows: 
By Eros Freud means the instinct striving toward organic life, toward its 
preservation and development at whatever cost, whether in terms of the 
continuation of the species (sexuality in the narrow sense) or preservation of the 
individual.  The death instinct is understood as aiming toward the return of all 
living organisms to the lifeless state of inorganic, inanimate matter—a striving 
away from the exigencies of life and Eros.310 
 
Voloshinov goes further than we have, and states that where there is life the Eros 
principle retains its dominance.311  He calls this period the “third period of development” 
of psychoanalysis.312  To this period also belongs Freud’s move away from the merely 
systematic unconscious, which dream analysis played no small part in helping him 
formulate, to the dynamic unconscious model.  Here all important theory of the id comes 
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to play the central role.  What is important in this shift away from system is the renewed 
emphasis on the “shadowy, elemental force” which accounts for the pulsion of the 
instincts.313  I will not deal with the superego, or the elemental and rational aspects of the 
id and ego, as does Voloshinov.  It is enough that we have pointed to the renewed 
importance of the primal forces of the unconscious during this third period.  Below, this 
will become essentially important to Voloshinov’s critique. 
 
4.2 Freudianism: A Marxist Critique 
Freudianism presents an uncanny presentiment of the possibility of a semiotic Freud 
avant le mot—and before Lacan.  Here we see the possibility, in seed form, of reading 
Freud contemporaneously through Marxism and Saussure.  In the final two chapters of 
Freudianism, Voloshinov attempts to show that the “strife” of the psyche can actually be 
better interpreted as a struggle between two ideological positions in conflict, what 
Voloshinov calls official and unofficial discourse.  This seemingly idiosyncratic and 
superficial Marxist reading runs counter to the official psychoanalytic attempt to posit 
“psychical” forces wholly from the subjective position of the great man of science, as 
Freud himself tries to achieve.314  Amid admonishment, Voloshinov evinces a great 
admiration for Freud, later echoed by Bakhtin, since even as a proponent of subjectivist 
psychology his ingenuity broke away from classical introspective starting points and 
specifically their “naïve psychological [and] biological optimism.”315   
As we have seen in the biological sciences, every new science has a honeymoon 
period in which it must remain merely descriptive.  Nascent science is developmentally 
delayed by its lack of field knowledge, but this is only true retrospectively.  However, in 
evolving from psychoanalysis’ first theory of the unconscious—the descriptive, to the 
systematic unconscious, Freud’s theory moves in the opposite direction, away from 
distinctly objective ideas grounded more strictly in observation.  Psychoanalysis becomes 
progressively more subjective; the methods for determining the systematicity of the 
unconscious rely to a great extent on dream analysis and talk therapy.  But this talk is 
limited to doctor and patient, and therefore it remains saturated with a bourgeois and 
highly-subjective ideological perspective.  
85 
 
 
 
Voloshinov wants to make the claim that Freud has not exposed ontologically 
different kinds of entities in the consciousness and the unconscious—a claim implicit in 
psychoanalysis, but only that consciousness and the unconscious are ideologically 
different kinds of evaluative inflections, namely the official and the unofficial. 
Psychoanalysis’ claim that it has discovered the “elemental forces” of the psyche are 
simply mistaken: 
The motives of the unconscious that are disclosed at psychoanalytical sessions 
with the aid of ‘free association’ are just such verbal reactions on the patient’s 
part as are all other, ordinary motives of consciousness.  They differ from the 
latter not in kind of ‘being,’ that is, ontologically, but only in terms of content, 
that is, ideologically.  In this sense Freud’s unconscious can be called the 
“unofficial conscious” in distinction from the ordinary “official conscious.”316 
 
Since consciousness is, according to Voloshinov, packaged in the shape of “verbal 
expression,” and since all verbal expressions are axiologically intoned by ideology, and 
since finally everything made conscious “operates through words,” there is no ontological 
distinction possible that can be posited by the subjective methods of psychoanalysis.317   
 It follows from what we have said that not only is psychoanalytic method not 
objective, neither can it be made objective without a thoroughgoing justification.  This 
justification is delivered from the “social situation in which the utterance emerges.”318  It 
must find its ground there rather than in the non-witnessed unseen primeval psychical 
forces—even if these do exist, we simply have no evidence with which to theorize this 
existence.  Without this theoretically bounded social territory—let us give it the visual 
image of a socioeconomic eruv, all that is possible are the “arbitrary constructions” of the 
type that Freud provides.319  The systematic topography must first be assembled.  The 
personalities, if we may refer to them as such, of the systematic unconscious—i.e., the 
ego, the id, and the superego remain descriptive, not truly objective hypostasized 
elements in psychic life, as Freud presumes.  They are objectively “unverifiable” and, like 
all merely descriptive and purely theoretical conceptualizations, entirely one-sided.320   
Freud seems almost to have implicitly understood the weight of social context in 
his conception of doctor patient transference.  It is not the persona of the id that will 
ground psychoanalysis, but the real socioeconomic and specifically bourgeois familial 
relations—i.e., the holy family.  The family becomes the ür-structure of all human 
relationships in Freud: “Here is the source for the dramatism that marks the Freudian 
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construct.  It is also the source for that personification of psychical forces which we have 
already mentioned.  Here, indeed, people, not natural forces, are in conflict.”321  To be 
precise, this quotation refers to the doctor-patient relation, but transference is built upon 
the Oedipus complex, which in turn is directed primarily back to the familial relation 
before it becomes embedded and shapes the doctor-patient relation.  Voloshinov separates 
these two moments, but I believe this to be a mistake.  The doctor, insomuch as he is 
informed by the ‘science’ of the Oedipus complex, injects the entire baggage of the holy 
family—and by it a microcosm of capitalist hierarchy—into this moment of the doctor-
patient relation.  It is not easy to untie these knots, as even the present social milieu, 
which Voloshinov privileges, implicates absent ideological constellations. 
The attribution of mental illness—as well as the psychopathology of everyday 
life—to personified psychical forces is nothing other than a typically bourgeois resistance 
to social life in all its forms.  Freud simply projects the dynamic, strife-ridden, 
relationships between people, in their social and ideologically saturated context, onto his 
theory of the unconscious.  He does this by making a distinction between thought and 
things where there is no clear distinction here—for Voloshinov thought and things are 
inseparably tied together in the materiality of the word:   
When contemporary psychology attempts to draw a borderline between
 experience and things, it is compelled ultimately to come to the paradoxical
 conclusion that there is no such borderline, that everything depends on the point 
of view.  One and the same thing, depending on the connection and context in which we 
perceive it, is now a psychical body or social phenomenon.322  
 
 As we will see, Voloshinov seeks to ground the discourse of the sciences and arts 
architectonically in the verbal and extraverbal socioeconomic base of everyday life—i.e., 
in the social milieu with all its axiological inflections of ideology.  It is only by first 
preparing this propaedeutic sociological research that ethics, biology, psychology, and 
linguistics can objectively answer once-occurrent being-as-event and thus seek to form an 
architectonic method of answering between these disciplines.  All of this, points back to a 
philosophy from the point of view of becoming; for Bakhtin, this becoming is a dialogical 
or architectonically answerable disposition in which the autonomy of the event, or the 
other, is respected.  
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 Freud’s leap of faith from his discursive and symbolic practice to the 
hypostatisation of the Oedipus-complex is an especially telling example of where his 
introspective psychology fails.  The edifice of this complex is built not on the testimony 
of children but only ‘retrospectively’ from the point of view of the grown-up.  Deleuze 
and Guattari also make this point in Anti-Oedipus: “Oedipus is first the idea of an adult 
paranoiac, before it is the childhood feeling of a neurotic.”323  Freud’s error is to have put 
too much faith in the adult’s perspective and the evidence presented therein.  Regardless 
of the fact that he must then interpret this evidence, he treats this testimony as if it were 
wholly transparent and amenable to interpretation.  What is more, his interpretation is 
founded on his bourgeois idea of sexuality and the holy family.  The result is that the trial 
is rigged.  There is no chance of finding objectivity by interpreting childhood ‘complexes’ 
strictly from the “point of view of the present.”324  Why is this?  It is because the purely 
verbal point of view of the present cannot escape the evaluative intonations of the 
ideology of the adult witness.  Who is the witness?  The adult patient who views the 
world through an adult ideological lens!  Who is the judge?  The bourgeois doctor—and 
in this case a doctor for whom the ‘holy family’ is the cornerstone of his social milieu.   
 Nevertheless, the ideological significance of the doctor-patient relationship is 
privileged in psychoanalysis and mimics the holy family’s little milieu at the expense of a 
wider social sphere.  Voloshinov puts the case as such:  
“Sexual attraction to the mother,” “the father rival,” “hostility toward the father,” 
“wish for the father’s death”—if we subtract from all these “events” that 
ideational significance, that evaluative tone, that full measure of ideological 
weight which accrue to them only in the context of our conscious “adult” present, 
what would they have left?325 
 
The answer is a deserted anteroom in the Freudian psyche. 
 Freud’s leap is no doubt informed by factual observations and by patients who 
want very much to help their doctor help them, but this is not what is at issue.  
“Freudianism is not at all a series of facts.”326  It is a naïvely formed ideological 
construct.  Voloshinov provides us with the example of Otto Rank’s birth trauma, which 
is little more than a birth drama built on the top of the bare fact of physiological trauma 
during birth.  The facts, real as they are, have been staged to appear under a certain light, 
are clothed in a particular disguise, as if someone were rearranging the scene of a crime.  
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The room is the same, but the furniture has changed position.  Certainly “the organism 
experiences a physiological shock at the moment the child is born into the world,” but 
Rank wants to make of this fact a “purely ideological formulation projected into the 
psyche of a child.”327  All we are left with is a psychologically introspective 
methodology; as a result, psychoanalysis is impoverished by its absolute adherence to 
bourgeois individualism: What is your problem?  Why don’t you tell me?  I can’t possibly 
answer for myself!  Aren’t you the doctor, why don’t you tell me?  The wider social milieu 
of the we has dropped out entirely.  In hysteria, for example, it is assumed that it makes 
no difference that Anna O., Breuer, and Freud together established the efficacy of 
catharsis.  Likewise, the causal effect of the milieu in which psychoanalysis establishes its 
practices is assumed to have, at best, a benign influence. 
 The challenge to psychology, according to Voloshinov, is to avoid the Scylla and 
Charybdis of subjectivism and “naïve, mechanical materialism.”328 It would appear that 
for Voloshinov only dialectical materialism can institute a dialogue between the methods 
of objective psychology and “the extremely important issues raised by 
psychoanalysis.”329  Only dialectical materialism begins from presuppositions which 
effectively serve to ground psychology, since it begins by assuming that the 
socioeconomic social milieu has a determining role to play.  Because dialectical 
materialism answers psychology with what has been learned in translinguistics, it 
endeavours to account for both verbal and extraverbal ideological content.  In short, a 
dialectical materialist psychology begins from the materiality of the word and can account 
for its shifting axiological meaning, since this ideological-linguistic component itself is 
given with the whole of the event as a task to be accomplished.  Voloshinov supports 
dialectical materialism as the proper method for the science of the psyche because it alone 
can keep one eye trained on the mutual influence of psychological practice and the theory 
of the psyche. 
Bourgeois psychoanalytic subjectivism attempts to retain an ontological divide 
between psychical forces and the material basis of everyday life while at the same time 
arbitrarily isolating doctor and patient as privileged purveyors of these forces.  Thus 
psychoanalysis puts aside the “sociological essence” that not only ought to ground the 
work of objective psychology but is germane to all its hypotheses and practices.330  In 
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essence, psychoanalysis haunts behavioural psychology, since left to its own quantitative 
practices, the latter steers too close to the eddy of mechanical reductionism.  The former, 
meanwhile, so long as it remains isolated from its sociological grounding, will inevitably 
flounder on the rocks of bourgeois subjectivism.  Meanwhile, Voloshinov prescribes a 
broader historical account grounded in material practices and socioeconomic context: vis-
à-vis dialectical materialism.  Nevertheless, the interface between praxis and theory 
cannot be reduced to a dialectics of nature, but in keeping both polarities connected, 
dialectical materialism can “illuminate” the ‘fact’ that ideological conflict is inherent in 
all scientific utterances.331  No neutrality is possible.  An objective account is at the same 
time an account that illuminates the ideological undercurrents of the scientific hypotheses.  
With an eye to this omnipresence of ideology, science can thereby embed a corrective 
measure with the teeth to make visible the axiological motivation behind all scientific 
utterances—even, for the sake of argument, where this ideological content is simply ‘I 
want to present a theory that is ideologically neutral.’  The investigation of the 
unconscious through strictly verbal and behavioural analysis is not sufficient. These 
verbal utterances and behavioural patterns have been given shape by wider 
socioeconomic forces; these are essentially historical forces, and these utterances cannot 
be understood—and understood in the active sense we spoke of above—if these material 
roots of psychological phenomenon are not likewise considered alongside them.   
 I am not wholly transparent to myself.  Freud understood this very well and 
founded the entire edifice of his project on what is in essence a psychology of the double, 
of the I and thou, of the ghost in the machine.  But his introspective methods run too 
deeply in one direction, they are wholly one-sided, and as a result he misses the 
externality of this otherness of self.  As we have already said, the self originates from the 
external social environment and not the other way around.  Even though words are not 
things, they begin as things and have primarily a material basis for us when we first 
become conscious of the world.332  This is to say that I cannot become more transparent 
to myself merely by looking inward.  My own subjectivity begins in objectivity and not 
the other way around.  The personalities of the unconscious, however inchoate they may 
be, are produced as a result of the social sphere in which I am immersed.  One can think 
here of the individual who tries to use a wholly private language.  As Allon White says, 
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“Freud’s insistence on a purely sexual aetiology and an individualist perspective obscures 
a fundamental sociohistorical matrix of his narrative.”333  This matrix is made up 
fundamentally of the verbal and extraverbal material content of the everyday life of the 
patient, which is always-already historical and which is evinced in the uttered and the 
axiologically intoned word.  Ideology, for Voloshinov, is as deep as perception.  There is 
no unconscious realm in which ideology is manufactured; the mental unconscious, if it is 
anything, is more akin to a warehouse then a factory.  Words are produced between living 
ideological subjects, between semantic persons.  Meanwhile, Freud’s ego-logical subject 
can only enter discourse through the door of the descriptive.  This is why Voloshinov is 
right—rather than idiosyncratic—to say that the unconscious and consciousness are not 
ontologically but ideologically different.  They exist on an immanent plane; they are 
descriptive.   
 Voloshinov’s accusation that the high degree of isolation of the bourgeois subject 
has been detrimental to the objectivity of psychoanalysis is judicious, but he does not go 
far enough to show how socioeconomic factors enter into the dialogue between doctor 
and patient.  John Parrington also espies a gap between Voloshinov’s claims regarding the 
socioeconomic and material base of the word and his exposition of how he would 
transform this observation into a scientific or linguistic method: “what Voloshinov’s own 
work lacks is the empirical scientific evidence that proves such a connection [between 
consciousness and reality] exists.”334  Likewise, his supposition that Freud has 
monstrously overestimated the role of sexuality is correct to the letter but insufficient in 
substance.   
If sociology, as a psychologically transgredient discipline, is to form an 
architectonic unity—an idea that has itself fallen out of fashion, then it must make this 
architectonic unity from the art of what we now call interdisciplinarity.  Thus, I agree 
with Kant that we would need to see a “schema” which would give a blueprint or map as 
to how this answering might take place, but I also disagree with Kant that this schema 
could ever be provided a priori.335  In this sense, Freudianism requires something more.  
What is missing is precisely the spadework of showing that the psychological event can 
be made answerable—i.e., brought at least temporarily into a unity of a systematic 
consciousness, if I might be allowed this play on Freud’s terminology.  Again, 
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Voloshinov is right, this consciousness cannot be perceived as isolated unto itself as it is 
in bourgeois naivety—and, for that matter, in Kantian philosophy.  The ground of 
consciousness is not transcendental categories but living linguistic beings.  Nevertheless, 
this unity is not achieved outside of consciousness, as Bakhtin has stated and as everyone 
intuitively knows—there is no collective consciousness, no sphere of unified intentionally 
directed acts outside of people.  As an aside, this is a source of great frustration for many 
of us who would see a more collectively directed effort in shaping our global economies.  
That we only find the ground of this unity in consciousness does not mean that ideas do 
not have an immanent power to move, only that they need the fuel of living unified 
organisms to turn over the engine.  It is not enough to say that consciousness is multi-
sided, or that words are material or that genres and official and unofficial ideologies are 
the “drive belts” moving history and scientific theory along their road.  This road must 
lead somewhere.336  
All of this is to say that I am thankful that Freudianism is not a stand-alone 
manifesto on interdisciplinarity, for as such it is insufficient and preaches rather than 
practices grounding the work of psychoanalysis.  We must peregrinate elsewhere, into 
other texts and other thinkers if we want to establish a method of ideological analysis, and 
I am not hopeful that even with a thoroughgoing self-reflexivity that these relations would 
ever bring anything like a scientific systematicity from sociological to psychological 
practice as Voloshinov envisions it.  It is therefore difficult to imagine that we could 
likewise re-establish psychoanalysis as an objective science through the broad strokes of 
official and unofficial ideological and historical research.  This brand of analysis is much 
more conducive to scientifically dialogic practices that are themselves descriptive rather 
than quantitative and analytical—i.e., I believe we can use Voloshinov to attempt to 
establish a self-reflexive hermeneutics of science rather than a science proper, but I do not 
believe this propaedeutic can seriously and everywhere ground psychology in social 
science.   
Before closing this section I want to take a look at a piece of work that actively 
takes up the Bakhtin Circle’s work on Freud in what I consider to be a productive and 
natural extension of the propaedeutic presented in Freudianism and also in Bakhtin’s 
work on the carnivalesque.  Taken together, Allon White’s retrospective on Freud’s 
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studies on hysteria and Bakhtin’s writings on carnival present an excellent case study on 
the type of hermeneutical and critical work that can come of Freudianism.  I will 
therefore proceed to a brief description of White’s paper and try to tease out the art of 
hermeneutical answering of the historicised ego-logical subject of psychoanalysis with 
which it engages. 
 
4.3 Extending the Bakhtin Circle’s Critique of Psychoanalysis 
To my mind, there is no question that White’s paper “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: 
Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis” is the right kind of addition to the work implicitly set 
as a task by Freudianism—vis-à-vis placing psychoanalysis within its historical and 
cultural milieu.  White understands Voloshinov’s insight into the bourgeois ideological 
sublimation of the so-called elemental forces into hyper-individualized personifications—
the id, the ego, the super ego, etc.  For White, an organized process of substitution, or 
repression, began sometime in the 17th century, whereby ancient folk-festive and carnival 
culture became re-inscribed by state ideology, militarization, and symbols.  This process 
gradually pushed carnival from the centre of public life.  Symbolic forms gradually co-
opted ritual.  Sublimation of the real everyday life of the lower orders of social practice 
forced the internalization of carnival forms of catharsis.  This in turn led to the growing 
dissolution of unofficial public gatherings, to the victory of Victorian common sense, and 
especially to bourgeois hysteria.  The result was a sort of hyper-individualized, über-
intellectualized, popular isolation. Under these circumstances, what Bakhtin calls the 
lower bodily stratum was driven into the underground of psychic life.  
White cites the transformation of folk-festive culture by state apparatuses of 
capture into a militarization of carnival as the site which still requires the most attention 
from Bakhtinian cultural critiques of the carnivalesque:  
By and large, literary critics have not asked how or why this ‘carnivalesque’ 
material should inform modern art because, busy with the task of textual analysis, 
they move too rapidly away from the social practice of textual composition.  Yet 
the social historians who have charted the demise of carnival as social practice, 
have not registered its displacements into bourgeois discourses, like art and 
psychoanalysis: adopting a naïvely empirical view, they have outlined a simple 
disappearance, the elimination of the ‘carnivalesque.’337 
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White’s paper is motivated by two essential suppositions in the work of Voloshinov and 
Bakhtin.  He follows the distinctively—although not exhaustively—Marxist claims in 
Voloshinov’s Freudianism that bourgeois ideology distorts the true empirical value of 
psychoanalysis.  Secondly, he takes up one of the essential and yet inchoate claims made 
by Bakhtin in Rabelais and his World.  The Romantic error degrades carnival by 
interpreting it wholly from the perspective of “individual life and death” and thus glosses 
the importance of its cyclicality.338  Romantic sublimation effectively reduces the 
grotesque to its negative polarity alone, and the trope of renewal emphasised by the 
grotesque is forgotten—in the gothic genre for example.  In the Romantic epic the 
importance of the hero’s “individual destiny” short-circuits the emphasis on cyclicity that 
emerged historically within the Rabelaisian chronotope and in Medieval cultural more 
generally.  Thus the positive nature of carnival and its populist roots are hidden beneath 
19th century ideology.339   
Bakhtin notes that Goethe’s description of the Roman carnival in his Italian 
Journey, to which we shall return in the final section of this thesis, senses the “cosmic 
principle” of this cyclicity, but also leaves it underdetermined.340  But if Goethe comes 
close to diagnosing cyclicity as a symptom of the larger historical and collective social 
body, the Romantic movement on the whole misunderstands it and interprets it from a 
largely individualist point of view: “The negative aspect of [the Romantic’s] appreciation 
[of the grotesque] is its idealism, its false concept of the role and limitations of subjective 
consciousness... human freedom broke away from necessity and became a supermaterial 
force.”341  The negative aspect contributed to the repression of the lower bodily stratum, 
to the clinicalization of the material flows of the body, to the degradation of carnival 
laughter and the loss of its rejuvenating power, and lastly to the acquisition of “a private 
‘chamber’ character” in the Romantic genre.342  Most importantly, Romantic idealism 
misunderstands both the form and especially the content of Rabelaisian discourse; 
because it fails to recognize the cyclical and rejuvenating character of the Rabelaisian 
chronotope, Romantic idealism becomes instead the “expression of subjective, 
individualistic world outlook [that is] very different from the carnival folk concept of 
previous ages.”343  
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 As we have seen, psychoanalysis improperly interprets the past from the point of 
view of the present.  The retrogressive transference of adult hysterical symptoms onto 
childhood games “obscures the fundamental sociohistorical matrix of this narrative.”344  
White points to a lacuna in the historicity and sociological reconstructions of “the 
complex relation of the discourse of psychoanalysis to festive tradition.”345  Interpreting 
the copious disjecta membra of carnivalesque ritual as it surfaces in the symbolic 
symptoms of hysteria, White provides us with a compelling account of bourgeois hysteria 
as a “return of the repressed” of the once cathartic traditions of carnival: “The language of 
bourgeois neurosis both appropriates and disavows, fears and longs for, a communal 
festive tradition no longer available.”346  Social historians have missed this connection, 
according to White, and they have missed it precisely because they do not give enough 
attention to either sublimation or the so-called return of the repressed.347  In this 
supposition, White not only follows a properly Bakhtinian critique of bourgeois neurosis, 
nor just a simple repetition of the Bakhtin Circle’s critique of psychoanalysis, but he also 
manages to carry the banner of carnivalesque critique forward by making a productive 
use of Freudianism itself. Thus psychoanalysis and Bakhtian cultural critique are drawn 
into an architectonically answerable relation in which both benefit from their mutual 
interaction.  
What we are dealing with here in this submersion of the carnivalesque is 
essentially an inversion of an inversion—what White calls an uncanny reversal.348 White 
reworks Dr. Schnyder’s analysis of a patient named Renata.  Here the negative aspect of 
the Romantic carnivalesque surfaces.  Renata’s symptoms can possibly describe a case of 
clinical anorexia nervosa, and in any case can certainly be diagnosed as an internalization 
and symbolic inversion of the grotesque.  According to White, Schnyder’s patient 
symptomatically expresses the repression of populist elements of the carnivalesque in 
favour of the merely subjective image of the body.  The body qua other is therefore anti-
cathected as if it were the source of a painful memory from childhood.349  In Romantic 
idealism, we also see this growing self-isolation among bourgeois culture.  Renata wakes 
every evening to don a corset, she vomits when she eats or when she thinks of her womb, 
and she tries to push back these unpleasant sensations (‘repousser ces sensations’) which 
arise from the somatic, the chthonic, vis-à-vis her body.350  White’s perspicuity is a 
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convincing argument that Renata’s hysteria can be interpreted as this same bourgeois 
inversion of material lower bodily stratum.  By converting repressed carnivalesque 
images and memories “into symptoms of the top half of the body,” bourgeois culture 
effectively cuts itself off from the now abject earth, which is its ground and origin.351  
Thus the inversion of the inversion is accomplished.  Although this inversion may have 
begun with the Romantic and lyrical hero, it nevertheless continues throughout the 19th 
century.  I will argue below that it can also be traced in the modernist writings of 
Gertrude Stein, Mina Loy, and Djuna Barnes.  
Bakhtin paints in broad brush strokes and the grotesque image of the body may 
indeed be at work here, but let us consider this proposition for ourselves. First there are 
poles of the grotesque body, both positive and negative.  This is, as we have noted, 
likewise true of the Romantic image of the subject and the other.  Only, the polarity is not 
entirely one-sided in the grotesque body.  In the Romantic image, the subject is wholly on 
the side of himself; there is a strict topographical division between subject and body qua 
other, without the ability to actively “understand the possibility of combining in one 
image both the positive and the negative poles.”352  Bakhtin specifically refers to G. 
Schneegan’s “The History of Grotesque Satire” (1864).353  Schneegan makes the typical 
error common throughout the 19th century, of ignoring the positive aspect of the 
grotesque.  Schneegan’s grotesque is relegated to the satirical species of literature; as such 
it is wholly formal in content and leaves out the positive pole of the grotesque genre 
altogether.  Bakhtin follows Schneegan’s example of Harlequin in the Italian commedia 
dell’arte also discussed by Flögel and Fischer before him.  In this clownish genre, 
Harlequin gives birth after much labour to a “difficult word.”354  The latency in the image 
of the pregnant body that nearly chokes on the satirical word can be understood as a 
virtual pointer to the lower bodily stratum, but Schneegan’s interpretation encompasses 
only the self-directed subjective laughter of Harlequin.  The positive collective laughter 
that would point to the comedy of life as a cycle is omitted from Schneegan’s 
commentary.  By the 19th century the Rabelaisian intonations that carry with it both the 
negative and positive polarities is missing.  
Grotesque laughter in satire revolves around the axis of pleasure and displeasure 
with uncrowning as the elemental force to effect this symptomatic laughter.  The comic 
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aspect is supposed to be created by “the impossible and improbable nature of the image”; 
the image is “hyperbolic,” but it also has a foot in reality.355   What the late 19th century 
ideological lens misses in the comic and grotesque alike is that the colour, warmth, non-
sense, transgression, and joy makes possible the bi-polarity of Rabelais’ world.  
Schneegan is blinded to the possibility that birth and death can reside in precisely the 
same grotesque image: “The pregnant and two-bodied images could not be grasped by 
Schneegan; he did not see that, in the grotesque world of becoming, the limits between 
objects and phenomena are drawn quite differently than in the static world of art and 
literature of his time.”356  What is most interesting for our purposes is that Bakhtin places 
in the middle of his review an image of Schneegan as psychologist: “he sought to 
discover through analysis the purely formal psychological mechanism of their perception, 
instead of concentrating on the objective content of these images.”357  Schneegan’s model 
of the psyche is likewise one-sided.  He simply does not recognize the reversible polarity 
of the grotesque image: “he could not understand the possibility of combining in one 
image both the positive and the negative poles” of the grotesque; as a result, he likewise 
represses the social ground of psychology.358  The Rabelaisian image does not have this 
problem, since “the limits between the body and the world are erased, leading to the 
fusion of the one with the other and with surrounding objects.”359   
 The scene in which Harlequin nearly chokes on the word, properly understood, 
marks an inversion of high and low and emphasizes the unofficial image of cyclicity over 
the official Byzantine-hierarchical image.  This inversion is the source of the humour 
because of the polarity of pleasure and unpleasure, and the audience therefore laughs at 
this degradation.  Here the satire emphasizes that the material word necessitates that even 
official discourse is born in a low state.  There are echoes here of Christ’s emptying out of 
his spiritual divinity to be reborn in this low state.  The word is associated with the head, 
with the discursive light of reason; no doubt, this is the grotesque actively understood 
according to the logic of hardnosed Victorian realism.  But if the grotesque and comic 
elements in Schneegan’s example were properly emphasized, the unborn word’s inverted 
association with the genitals, the abdomen, and the “ugly Proserpine, queen of the 
underworld,” are all reminiscent of the chthonic character of the underworld—i.e., the 
unconscious.360  It is the Victorian axiological refraction of the grotesque that provides 
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the polarized view of the grotesque, just as the petit bourgeois analyst makes sexuality the 
cornerstone of his theory.  The ‘official’ ideological inflection of Romanticism and 19th 
century realism glosses over the lower bodily stratum and what is suggested in the 
unofficial ideology of folk-festive images.  In these it is as if the very elemental forces of 
life were about to be unleashed; it is as if individual life existed as so much fodder for the 
assurance that the cosmic and collective aspect of life will continue unrestrained: 
The mighty material bodily element of these images uncrowns and renews the 
entire world of Medieval ideology and order, with its beliefs, its saints, its relics, 
monasteries, pseudoasceticism, fear of death, eschatologism, and prophecies.  In 
this world to be swept away the pilgrims are only tiny, pitiful figures, which can 
be swallowed down unnoticed in salad and almost drowned in urine.  The material 
bodily element has here a positive character.361 
 
But this positive character is lost in the revulsion of the 19th century repression of the 
lower bodily stratum. 
Similar examples of revulsion at the phallus, for example, can be found in the 
modernist poet Mina Loy.  The influence of Gertrude Stein’s poetics cannot be 
overestimated in Loy’s work, and both poets sought to “recapture the value of the 
individual word, [and] find out what it meant and act within it.”362  Both Loy and Stein 
fashioned the word after its immanent ideological content, but they tend to place this 
content entirely on the side of official discourse.  This is typical of the Bohemian 
sublimation of carnival, as described by White.363   
Loy’s poem “Gertrude Stein” is more than a character sketch or ode, and it reveals 
as much about its author as its subject; here there is a surfacing, symptomatic 
preoccupation with the consciousness of the artist: 
Curie 
 of the laboratory 
 of vocabulary 
  She crushed 
 the tonnage 
of consciousness 
congealed to phrases 
  to extract 
a radium of the word364 
 
This radium of the word is, notably, a metal extraction—categorized chemically as an 
alkaline earth metal.  In ‘Aphorisms’ Loy writes “you stand not only in abject servitude to 
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your perceptive consciousness—/ But also to the mechanical re-actions of the 
subconscious, that rubbish heap of race-tradition—.”365  For Loy, there is a distinct 
connection between the act of becoming conscious of the systematic and the unconscious 
nature of the mind as it unearths the word.  In her poem “The Effectual Marriage or the 
Insipid Narrative of Gina and Miovanni”, an early attempt to exorcise her estranged lover, 
Italian futurist Giovanni Papini, it is Loy’s preoccupation with the emptiness of married 
life and lack that is conveyed in an image which expresses absence: 
  In the evening they looked out of their two windows 
Miovanni out of his library window 
Gina from the kitchen window 
From among his pots and pans  
Where he so kindly kept her 
Where she so wisely busied herself 
Pots and Pans  She cooked in them 
All sorts of sialagogues 
Some say that happy women are immaterial.366 
 
The tension is heightened by the “sialagogues,” another abject addition that implicates the 
bodily fluids and the connection between love-making and cooking.  But here both are 
noticeably absent.  The pots and pans are now empty, and although the libidinous images 
remain, the connection between consummation and consumption do not draw together in 
a positive fashion; since the image of the body is likewise absent, they cannot be 
positively united within the same image.  Finally, Loy’s infamous “Love Songs” provides 
us with an image of the phallus as “Pig Cupid” whose “rosy snout root[s] erotic 
garbage.”367  Again, the bare nature of the language and the degraded image of the 
phallus do not achieve the bi-polarity of the Rabelaisian grotesque image.  Like 
Napoleon’s caricatured proboscis in Schneegan’s example of the grotesque—an obvious 
metaphor for the phallus—Loy’s “rosy snout” is grotesque without being positive and 
linked to the communal ground of the cosmic bi-polar image.368  The snout/phallus ought 
to link high and low, positive and negative polarities, but Loy fails to fuse the image with 
the all-important comic element.  What Bakhtin calls “the social, choral nature of 
laughter” is simply not present—nor is modernism, in general, prone to its invocation.369  
Laughter is wholly absent, as is the rejuvenating possibility of the pleasure-unpleasure bi-
polarity of the Rabelaisian image. 
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The laughing rejuvenating function of carnival is likewise repressed in the work 
found in Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood.  In the latter case, the theme of class turns on the 
dying aristocratic culture and circus imagery.  In Nightwood, the character Felix is 
latently motivated by the unofficial life of the circus but quietly remands himself to the 
solitude of official life in the church: 
The emotional spiral of the circus, taking its flight from the immense 
disqualification of the public, rebounding from its illimitable hope, produced in 
Felix longing and disquiet.  The circus was a loved thing that he could never 
touch, therefore never know.  The people of the theatre and the ring were for him 
as dramatic and monstrous as a consignment on which he could never bid.  That 
he haunted them as persistently as he did was evidence of something in his nature 
that was turning Christian. 
 He was, in like manner, amazed to find himself drawn to the church, 
though this tension he could handle with greater ease; its arena he found was 
circumscribed to the individual heart.370 
 
White himself cites the example of Jean Rhys, for whom autobiography is equally 
revealing of this continued bourgeois repression of the lower bodily stratum.371  
Moreover, White also contends that modernism continues the (originally Romantic) 
privileging of the individual and the introspective over the rejuvenating and collective 
elements of carnival: “The modernist novel in general tends toward a selective 
sublimation of certain carnival practices and as such is deeply ambivalent, both 
comforting and disturbing a polite and decorous culture.”372  
The fact that Ulysses was censured and banned would seem to reinforce this 
repressive aspect of modernism.  Joyce’s novel tidies up the gore of childbirth by 
obscuring it in old English roots and high Germanic etymons. Bloom’s onanism on the 
Strand while watching Gerty MacDowell is the height of lower bodily expression in the 
novel, and the most overt image to attract the censors.  But it is hardly an image at all.  In 
spite of my own passion for both Joyce and this novel, it does not work with images, and 
it does not paint pictures for its readers.  Under this circumstance, it would be difficult to 
understand Ulysses as without a like repression of the lower bodily stratum, which is 
textually omnipresent and yet never quite made visible. Bloom’s masturbatory adventure 
may adeptly capture the modernist tropes ‘stream of consciousness’ and ‘Edwardian 
indecency’—Gerty’s thigh is showing “high up above her knee”373—but one has to 
rationalize these images before taking pleasure in them.  In short, the lower bodily 
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stratum has to enter through the head.  The modernist “‘agency of disgust,’” described 
with such acuity in White’s paper, is also keenly felt in the sterility of modernist 
stylistics.  This sterility makes itself felt with ubiquity from Virginia Woolf’s To the 
Lighthouse to Ezra Pound’s ‘imagism’—home to some of the most antiseptic images in 
the canon.   
 Looking forward, we may say that the materiality of the sign becomes the 
ideological dominant in Voloshinov’s work.  While Ferdinand de Saussure seems to have 
known this implicitly, his dualism between langue and parole negates the effectiveness of 
conceiving of words as part of the real fabric of everyday life that helps to shape 
consciousness.  Marx and Engels likewise stop short of providing a full account of how 
language shapes consciousness qua its materiality.  This does not mean that the formation 
of consciousness by the materiality of language is in any way transparent.  Ideology is 
refracted in language and to gloss over this fact would be to oversimplify the relationship 
of the word to other ideological, and material, phenomena: 
Words cannot wholly substitute for a religious ritual; nor is there any really 
adequate verbal substitute for even the simplest gesture in human behaviour.  To 
deny this would lead to the most banal rationalism and simplisticism.  
Nonetheless, at the very same time, every single one of these ideological signs, 
though not supplantable by words, has support in and is accompanied by words, 
just as is the case with singing and its musical accompaniment.374 
 
Nevertheless, even where ideological refraction occurs, the word is implicated both as the 
vehicle of intonation and axiological inflection and is actively employed by the 
understanding and the work of hermeneutics.375  
 In their critique of Freud, the Bakhtin Circle shows that psychoanalysis leans too 
heavily on introspective methods of analysis, and thus its propositions regarding the 
primal forces in which the instincts find their origin cannot be raised to the level of 
objectivity.  While Freud does turn toward sociological theory toward the end of his 
career, he never quiet acknowledges the full importance of the social and linguistic 
vehicle through which his theory is formed and practiced.  As such, he could use a good 
dose of the Marxist theory of consciousness and its dependence on the socioeconomic 
milieu with which it is saturated.  Moreover, Freud pays lip service to history and natural 
history but his method, like Saussure’s, effectively castrates the diachronic and relegates 
history itself to the dustbin of scientific praxis.  For this reason, and because he is not 
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keenly aware of the importance that the medium of language plays in the externalisation 
of thought, psychoanalysis has, to this day, been largely unable to pretend toward 
objectivity.  For their own part, the Bakhtin Circle’s invocation of dialectical materialism 
does not seem to be disingenuous, but neither does it really add any serviceable method to 
found a closer relationship between scientific theoretical discourse and practice.  It is true 
that scientific speech genres found themselves on everyday utterances, but one must say 
more in order to effectively assemble a self-consciously productive relation between the 
two.  In order to compel science to answer the everyday, to bring to life what one has 
learned in science and art, it is not sufficient to write propaedeutic treatises.  This will 
only reinforce the disconnect between scientific method and philosophy.  The need to 
show to practitioners of science the importance of philosophy grows each day, but the 
growing complexity and specialization of researchers daily makes this task infinitely 
more difficult.  For John Parrington, the work of L. S. Vygotsky is a useful extension of 
Marx’s tenet that life determines consciousness.376  To my mind, as I hope that I have 
shown, the work of Allon White likewise builds bridges over the gaps that both the 
Bakhtin Circle and contemporary social theorists have opened between what is and what 
ought to be within the territory of their own research fields.  The task of science, as well 
as the task of building bridges between the disciplines, must be understood not only as a 
collective task, but also as a task for generations to come.  
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§ 5. Discourse: A Critique of Saussurean Linguistics 
 
5.1 Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Saussurean Linguistics: 
 Child Psychology and Pedagogy: the Sorbonne Lectures 1949-1952 
 
In this section I will first provide a critique of Saussurean linguistics along the lines of 
that provided by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his recently translated Child Psychology and 
Pedagogy: the Sorbonne Lectures 1949-1952.   Although on first glance this may seem 
like an odd digression, Merleau-Ponty’s appraisal of Saussure will lead directly into 
Voloshinov’s own account—which for its own part lacks the breadth of Merleau-Ponty’s 
exposition. The first part of this section will therefore serve to ground my subsequent 
exposition of Voloshinov’s own critique of what he calls abstract objectivism in 
linguistics—i.e., the species of linguistics to which Saussure belongs.  This critique in 
place, I will then show that Voloshinov and Bakhtin’s approach to discourse in everyday 
life and verbal artistic creation establishes the concrete social reality of real living human 
beings at the centre of their own linguistic thought.  This trajectory will accomplish four 
objectives.  First, it will serve as a survey of both this previously obscure lecture of 
Merleau-Ponty regarding the ontogenetic development of language in children, as well as 
continue our estimation of the merits of the Bakhtinian corpus by taking on their 
linguistic work.  As such, Voloshinov’s texts Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 
and “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, and Bakhtin’s own “Content, Material, and 
Form in Verbal Art” will be essential to our little study.  Second, it will, as we have just 
stated, clarify both Merleau-Ponty and Bakhtin’s critique of Saussurean linguistics.  
Third, the present analysis will set out clearly the Bakhtin Circle’s own concerns 
regarding linguists and discourse in life and art.  Finally, in delineating the Bakhtin 
Circle’s linguistic commitments, this section will prepare the ground for the penultimate 
section of the present work which deals with Problems in Dostoevsky’s Poetics.  
 
The origin of language is the “prehistory” of language, explains Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
in his lecture notes on Child Psychology and Pedagogy: “to explain the origin of language 
is to try to derive it from other things,” and he espies just such a misstep in Otto 
Jespersen’s Language: Its Nature, Development, and Origin.377  In other words, to try to 
locate the aggregates of language before its formation presupposes a sort of hysteron 
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proteron pre-existence of language itself—as if language could be found avant le mot, 
preformed and encapsulated, in the elements from which it is composed.  But this 
etiological line of reasoning ignores the spontaneous creation of language in history—or, 
indeed, in prehistory.  Proceeding in this way ignores the phenomena of language itself as 
it truly arises in the life of its community of users.  It is not to recognize that the origins of 
language are obscured, and not only by our lack of historical evidence—not the least of 
which is the lack of a record of how our first linguistic ancestors actually spoke.  There is, 
after all, no vehicle outside of language to convey this record.  We must realize, once and 
for all, against Herder and his contemporaries who sought to explain our linguistic 
origins, the fundamental contradictory nature of the search.  As it will turn out, a 
community of speakers is not even sufficient.  We must try to understand language as the 
stuttering active internal difference of creative utterances in themselves.  These arise with 
no small degree of spontaneity, and Saussure’s structural account of the negative 
differential relation of signs is not wholly sufficient to explain the essence of the 
linguistic phenomena in itself.  As we will see below, it is as if language leads a life of its 
own. 
 Part of the trouble in coming to an understanding as to the nature of language can 
be attributed to a “gap between expressive forms and language” in-itself.378  Both 19th 
century philosophy and proto-linguistics attempt to close this gap with a theory of the 
spoken utterance as a complex form of phonation that was built on top of, or evolved out 
of, onomatopoeia.379  If a mimetic theory of language were a sufficient etiology, however, 
the origin and development of language could be shown to have continuity between the 
first human stuttering toward speech and that prelanguage which came before it.  We 
would find our linguistic roots everywhere in the natural world.  Thus one could trace the 
communicative function of language back through simpler forms until reaching an 
animistic society that took its spoken language directly from sonorous nature, but “no one 
supports this idea anymore.”380  Still others thinkers thought the origin of language is to 
be found in the interjection.  However, almost all interjections can be shown to be, after 
all, conventional constructions.381  
 Linguistics does not study signs as if there were a mimetic relation between 
spoken word and the object to which it refers.  In structural linguistics, the signifier does 
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not bear a natural resemblance to the signified and in fact has no positive or affirmative 
value.  It is the task, therefore, of post-Saussurean linguistics to deconstruct the negative 
differential relation of the sign.382  For the Saussurean linguist, the signifier can achieve 
its referential power to the signified only in virtue of the virtual negative differential of 
one sign to another; in Saussurean linguistics it is the structure, or what is called the 
negative space in the plastic arts, that can do the accounting where the structural bestowal 
of meaning is concerned.  A sign has its value according to all other signs within a given 
language, and especially its relation to all other signs that congregate around it, due to 
their difference from and relational position to all other signifiers.  A sign is given weight 
only through the negation of all other signs—A is A because it is none of the other 
significant values in the alphabet, but A in itself has no positive value.  It is only through 
this multiple negation, through these negative sets, that A qua sign, holds its place and 
takes its meaning.   
Since Aristotle, objects have usually been thought of as having an essential quality 
or species which makes them what they are.  ‘Furniture,’ for example, is what it is 
according to its species, vis-à-vis being that which furnishes, whether this connotes 
comfort, or holding our bodies or furnishing our lives, etc.  The same logic of species and 
genera has come to be applied to signs themselves, and especially from the influence of 
Boethius onward.383  Again, for linguistics it is the differential between species of signs—
furniture, vehicles, animals, buildings, which help each to take their meaning according to 
its negative associative value.384  Is it sufficient to say that ‘furniture’ may also 
distinguish itself according to the genera and species of other signs?  Is it sufficient to say 
that the sign ‘electric chair’ is the sign ‘not love seat,’ ‘not hammock,’ ‘not my favourite 
chair,’ and ‘not the chair of Le Collège de France,’ and that it is not any of these at once.  
Saussure answers a resounding yes: all of these negations hold their positions insomuch 
as they also sediment within a linguistic community to form a static structural unity of 
language—at least for a time.385  However, Saussure’s idea of a state of language, a 
synchronic system, leaves wholly to one side the question of the historical movement and 
foundation of language.  Synchrony goes a long way to explain the significant value of 
the sign in relation to all other signs, but it cannot account for the (spontaneous) birth of 
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the sign, nor does it leave any room for the emotional valuative intonation of the sign as it 
is used in the living speech of flesh and blood human beings leading real lives. 
 The linguistic state, as studied in “synchronic linguistics,” purports to deal 
exclusively with “coexisting terms” and not diachronically fluctuating signs, just as the 
historical study of epochs excludes the study of historical periods, which are to be 
understood as successive events.386  Thus it would seem to hold that the study of signs in 
terms of the unique historical utterance can gain no purchase according to their 
negatively determined synchronic and associative clusters which surround that historical 
utterance.  Synchrony alone, according to Saussure, is responsible for its sense.  This 
would effectively render the work of philology, and we also must admit, all work of 
linguistic reconstruction of the past—in short the question of origins of both word and 
world—puerile and superficial in comparison with synchronic linguistics: 
Generally speaking, static linguistics is much more difficult than historical 
linguistics.  Facts of evolution are more concrete, and stir the imagination more 
readily: the connexions link sequences of terms which are easily grasped.  It is 
simple, and often entertaining even, to follow through a series of linguistic 
changes.  But a linguistics concerned with values of coexisting terms is much 
harder going.387 
 
Moreover, the diachronic study of the emotional-volitional tone in the utterance would 
require the addition of the self-understanding of historical subjects as revealed through 
their utterances.  Since, however, these speech acts remain utterly tied to an unknown past 
synchronic system of emotional-volitional tonescapes—if I may be allowed the coinage, 
the diachronic is left entirely outside of the study of linguistic states.  These past states are 
epistemologically and critically excluded.  Yet for this to be the case, it must be admitted 
that the history of words—their genealogies, and their evolution—can add no significant 
weight to the molar mass of the sign.  To admit anything less than this axiom would call 
into question the very possibility of a science of synchronic linguistics as Saussure 
imagines it.  We could call this the problem of the steady state of language.  One must 
assume language has a steady state through time, that through it linguistic phenomena can 
be studied from the point of view of being rather than becoming.  The reverse proposition 
is to admit that language proceeds entirely according to becoming and is tantamount to 
application of a version of the uncertainty principle to linguistics.   
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The problem of the historical utterance does not magically disappear into the ether 
of history; quite to the contrary, the diachronic calls into question the methodology of 
synchronic linguistics as a science: “we cannot deny, at the very least, the historicity of 
language ... In certain constellations, there is a given creation that was not possible until 
now.  To admit a history of language is to simply admit that we cannot come to a certain 
state without passing through successive stages.”388  Thus Merleau-Ponty complicates 
Saussure’s desire to draw a hard division between the historical development of 
language—i.e., a “diachronic” linguistics—and the unchanging states of language, or the 
“synchronic.”389  The synchronic cannot escape its diachronic movement of linguistic 
change and verbal creation (and spontaneity), and the establishment of a new utterance 
that was until this time not possible remains outside of the scope of the linguist’s territory. 
Nevertheless, this spectre that haunts Saussurean linguistics makes the puissance of 
history felt even in the Cours:  
Demarcation in time is not the only problem encountered in defining a linguistic 
state.  Exactly the same question arises over demarcation in space.  So the notion 
of a linguistic state can only be an approximation.  In static linguistics, as in most 
sciences, no demonstration is possible without a conventional simplification of 
data.390 
 
The question we would pose to Saussure, then, is how scientific can this conventional 
simplification be?  Since you seek a mathesis of language, what is the coefficient of error 
and how is it determined? 
If we attribute to the synchronic system alone the cause of the utterance, then we 
truly have no foothold on the past utterance, having privileged a once living “system” of 
language that is now dead and subjected it to the striations of mathematical calculation. 
This is not to say that one cannot submit the linguistic event to calculation, but merely 
that in doing so one makes of it a paschal lamb readied for (s)laughter.  If we look at the 
past condition of language simply as what is given in a historical example, we have left 
out the spatial and temporal problem of its becoming—we have said nothing of the living 
interval which lies between Saussurean states.  It is this interval, in which the mystery and 
creativity of language comes into being that was, after all, the origin of human linguistic 
curiosity.  But in turning toward the speech event Saussurean linguistics inevitably casts it 
aside and has captured only a dead butterfly to add to its collection of patterns and 
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hypostatized linguistic structures; it has totally disregarded the linguistic state’s indirect 
relation to and transcendental dependence upon the living speech event.  Therefore, even 
the past, dead, utterance must be grounded in the living tongues of human beings who 
may breathe into it a new life—what we might call the Pentecostal linguistic moment.  
Language, like fire, is a process not a state.  It carves out a space for itself where nothing 
had previously existed.  However, this is not where the question of historical utterance 
itself dies, nor is it rendered unintelligible; quite on the contrary, the question of this 
vector, with all its mysteries, fractures, splitting and especially where it leaves no 
discernible future legacy, presents itself as a question to the living linguistic community:  
Language neither accommodates itself to one or to the other.  It obliges us to 
consider history as a contingent course and a logic of things where phenomena 
can outline themselves and then be systematized by acts of social life or of 
thought.  For example, the negation “pas” was begun by being a word that 
designated a man’s progression when walking (“I do not do that” {je ne fais pas} 
in the sense of “I am not advancing a step” {je n’avance pas}.  It is by a sliding 
that the word “pas” is given its negative sense.391 
 
Therefore, to short-circuit Piaget and the behaviourists, we may also state that whatever 
else might be the case, there can be no possibility of an “empirical origin of language.”392 
 If we still take seriously, then, the question of the origin of language, we need 
some conception of a pre-history of language—a “‘prelanguage.’”393  As Merleau-Ponty 
points out, Otto Jespersen proceeds precisely along this vein.  He proposes the emergence 
of language from an analysis of song,394 a process by which a verbal sign may be 
produced.  The central tenet here is that language diachronically grows progressively 
more complex—“more expressive forms [grow] from the less expressive.”395  Deleuze 
and Guattari are helpful here: 
Speech communities and languages, independently of writing, do not define 
closed groups of people who understand one another but primarily determine 
relations between groups who do not understand one another: if there is language, 
it is fundamentally between those who do not speak the same tongue.  Language is 
made for that, for translation, not for communication.396   
 
Were this not the case, language as representation would not so much be impossible as it 
would be wholly unnecessary. In this sense the Babel moment of humanity is not the 
providential destruction of language, but the gift of its necessity—i.e., its very condition 
of possibility.  Language is from the beginning a multiplicity and therefore it is a struggle 
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between differences by its opposed users.  Against Hobbes, we may say that language is 
born through the need to translate collective forms of thought into action between 
different social groups; it does not come into being through the Adamitic bestowal of 
proper names.397  Indeed, one wonders if the linguistic concept could have ever grown out 
of a unified community—but then at base such a concept as ‘unified community’ is 
etymologically and otherwise a contradictio in adjecto, as Derrida has made clear.398  
Whatever retrospective foothold linguistic science achieves after the speech event, it is 
clear that it nevertheless arises from the necessity to dialogue—i.e., between users. 
In terms of the origin of language, therefore, what we want is a theory that has the 
power “to describe certain forms of prelinguistic expressions that, without being causes of 
language, would be language’s cradle.”399  The mystery of language is such that it is first 
nowhere to be found and then it is omnipresent as a multiplicity.   Saussure’s great 
achievement is to prove once and for all that there can be no first word exclusive unto 
itself, for were this the case, the theory of the negative differential, which is supposed to 
give language its sense, would lose all effectiveness.  Language springs forth like a geyser 
up from a reservoir (Ursprung)400; it is a dehiscent and emergent phenomenon.  Saussure 
recognized this and therefore exhorted his students to study the immanent system of 
negative differential signification instead of looking outside of the linguistic circuit, but in 
doing so he misses the positive nature of linguistic expression at the site of its creation.401  
He did this for fear of muddying the waters of linguistic evidence.  However, Saussure’s 
axis of simultaneity, which “concerns relations between things which coexists, [and in 
which] relations from the passage of time [are] entirely excluded,”402 leaves behind 
precisely the momentum of expressivity and the becoming of language (spontaneity).   
In brief, by relegating the study of language to the synchrony of this simultaneity, 
and by doing so at the expense of the successive diachrony of the historical utterance, we 
not only leave out the non-empirical question of origin completely, but we sacrifice our 
original question: what is language?  We put in its place the truncated empirical question: 
how can we effectively capture, quantify, and decline the utterance according to what it is 
not.  Neither the philosophical project nor the scientific one, therefore, is open to 
completion.  Both are open, however, to interpretation and reinterpretation—or if we like, 
to definition and redefinition.  Saussure’s linguistic science remains descriptive, since it 
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actually does attempt to study ideal forms from the concrete speech event, or to deduce 
causes from effects—and this can only be done descriptively and is never finalizable.  
That said, it also remains true to this day that no more thorough going scientific method 
has taken us so far up that mystic linguistic river than has Saussure’s two fundamental 
and related distinctions: the one which is between langue and parole and the other 
between synchrony and diachrony.403  The philosophy of language stands forever in his 
debt: 
Whether or not we can expect from science the knowledge of being itself, in no 
case can philosophy dispense with finding a philosophical link and status for its 
“verification” methods.  Linguistics is the most rigorous examination of language 
as an institution; we cannot conceive of a philosophy of language that is not 
obligated to collect and articulate on the basis of its own truths the truths that 
linguistics establishes.  If we consider philosophy to be the elucidation of human 
experience, and science as an essential moment of that experience, the dilemma 
disappears. 
 Thus, what we will ask linguistics is not their philosophical conclusions 
(as philosophers, they are not more solid than others).  We will seek to participate 
with their experience of language.404 
 
In contradistinction to Saussure’s assertion that it is the sign system of simultaneity, the 
synchronic that determines the structure of language, Merleau-Ponty suggests that parole 
has a fundamental role to play, since it contains within it an immanent “pregrammar” 
which would contain the necessary pitch for erecting a conventional and written 
grammar.405  
 The evolution of language seems to proceed according to a law of sufficiency and 
a ‘law’ of play.  When a sufficient expression is found that is considered necessary—i.e., 
essential—to a linguistic community, it may take hold for a time, but there is nothing as 
sure as change in language and this change would seem to proceed according to chance.  
It is not an accident that there are relatively few discernible parts of speech.406  As 
Merleau-Ponty tries to show, these forms of semantemes and morphemes are far from 
stable across time, nor are they steadfast at the frontiers of particular languages.  At no 
time are we able to call prescriptive or even universal grammar essential to language 
itself—for language is of another order which does not exhaust itself with its play upon 
the phonatory organs, the written form, or the ostensibly unified system present in the 
Saussurean experience of language.  Let us be clear: language in the moment of its 
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creation escapes the circuit.  It can no longer be a question merely of reducing language 
to its most essential and categorical structures or grammatical aggregates, and we cannot 
do so even if they appear to be universally realized across all human languages—for 
language would seem to have its own essence that is not anthropomorphic, but which lies 
outside of all linguistic communities and is beyond a communicative telos, convention, or 
mimesis.  It has one foot in all of these to be sure, but is also otherwise engaged with that 
“which has no name in any philosophy” and which the ancients hinted at in their 
designation “element.”407  It is as if it were personified and stood at the Four Corners, 
simultaneously a visitor in each state, but a citizen to none. 
For his part, Saussure cannot embrace at once both of the “Humboldtian aspects of 
language, ergon and energeia, but must focus exclusively on the ergon, or structure, of 
language phenomena, and to abandon as hopeless any leaping over this seemingly fixed 
gap between the synchronic system langue and the diachronic dynamism of parole. 408  
The virtue of Saussure’s method is that it cuts short all the lacunae—those usual 
epistemological gaps, which always come to the surface when one wishes to quantify 
qualitative experience: “one solution only, in our view, resolves all these difficulties.  The 
linguist must take the study of structure as his primary concern, and relate all other 
manifestations of language to it.”409  
  
5.2 Between Ergon and Energeia: 
 Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 
 
Voloshinov identifies two distinct “trends” or “arteries” of language study in the modern 
period—namely “individual subjectivism” and “abstract objectivism.”410  Not surprisingly 
this distinction essentially follows the vein we have already seen in the previous section 
between the two major trends in psychology, vis-à-vis introspection and behaviourism.  
The first trend takes language to be essentially an individual creative act of meaning-
making that regards ready-made forms of language a mere “inert crust,” heuristically 
useful but otherwise inessential to the formative linguistic act.411  The second takes the 
reverse approach and regards linguistic phenomena as essentially a ready-made, closed, 
non-ideological system in which individual creation amounts to little more than an 
ineffectual and temporary distortion of the otherwise stable synchrony.412  Wilhelm von 
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Humboldt is the preeminent proponent of the first trend and, not surprisingly, Saussure is 
that of the second.  Voloshinov also distinguishes two dispositions toward linguistics 
which he rejects outright; they are “academic eclecticism” and “academic positivism.”413  
As we have already seen, Bakhtin and Kanaëv reject positivism for its refusal to develop 
a working bio-scientific method and for its misleading argument for neutrality; 
Voloshinov likewise charges academic positivism with a “surreptitious” disposition 
toward the facts of linguistic inquiry.414  Academic eclecticism fares no better; in fact, 
both theoretical positions “amount to one and the same thing,” since by either accepting 
or rejecting all theoretical propositions neither school can establish a foothold on 
linguistic science.415 
  Voloshinov’s critique of abstract objectivism, and by implication of Saussure, is 
materialist in its approach.  It is self-evident, according to Voloshinov, that the view from 
above—i.e., objectivity—will never provide us with a wholly synchronic system of 
negative differentials based on an unchanging normative state.416  Quite to the contrary, 
this normative aspect of language is itself in constant motion.  A truly objective 
linguistics would have to grant that the life of language in-itself is a ‘state’ of pure 
becoming:  
Thus a synchronic system, from the objective point of view, does not correspond 
to any real moment in the historical process of becoming.  And indeed, to the 
historian of language, with his diachronic point of view, a synchronic system is 
not a real entity; it merely serves as a conventional scale on which to register the 
deviations occurring at every real instant in time.417 
 
Therefore, and quite remarkably, the synchronic is actually a wholly subjective view of 
language—it exists only for the subject.  The critical move that Voloshinov condones 
prefigures the post-structualist tenet that the normative is subjective and historically 
based.  It also looks back to Marx and Engels insomuch as the normative-subjective must 
admit to standing in alliance with the official.   
We must be clear here, however, that the normative-subjective can be understood 
as temporarily objective, but it is not unchangeable and it relies on its situatedness for its 
power qua objective fact.  What is objective here is precisely the relation between a given 
semantic person and his normative disposition toward his language as a synchronic 
system of linguistic facts, but this no more makes it an “incontestable” and unchanging 
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set of facts for all time—or for a given state, in the sense we discussed above—than a 
geocentric model of the cosmos.  Without denying a truly objective transcendental state 
of affairs—a question which he leaves open—Voloshinov is interested in a “certain kind 
of objective relationship”; that is to say, the type of factuality which can be admitted to 
has more to do with what is perceived to be effectively real rather than reality per se.418 
For the most part, therefore, abstract objectivism depends upon a faith in the 
transparency of linguistic facts—the parts of speech, etc.—and the uncritical acceptance 
of the existence of the synchronic system of negative differentials and the linguistic state.  
The problem of objectivity sits on a razor’s edge—do we put the word objective in scare 
quotes of not?  Abstract objectivism “provides no clear-cut solution.”419   
As it turns out, for Voloshinov the very idea of language as an abstract objective 
system is itself an idiosyncratic—and ideological—point of view; moreover, it is also 
limited to a handful of highly specialized theorists.  The average language user does not 
produce the verbal utterance from the position of the linguist, and least of all from the 
ideologically synchronic vista of the Saussurean.  To put this another way, a normative 
‘objective’ notion of language adds nothing to the ability to speak from “some particular, 
concrete context.”420  Abstract objectivity ignores the speaker and bases its theory on the 
listener who understands what is said—even Saussure admits this, since it is the 
understanding that is equated with the ready-made synchronic unity of langue rather than 
the messiness of the production of a verbal utterance from the point of view of parole.421  
But the understanding—vis-à-vis she who understands—likewise does not rely on the 
deployment of the synchronic system of signs in order to comprehend what has been said.  
Here abstract objectivism has confused the understanding with recognition and the sign 
with the signal: “only a sign can be understood; what is recognized is the signal.”422  The 
signal is most certainly a moment in linguistic activity, but it is not an essential moment, 
nor does it originate in linguistic activity.  The signal can even become an obstacle to 
linguistic production.  We see this in foreign language learning—a form of linguistic 
acquisition that is wholly different from the learning of one’s native language.  If I am 
learning French, for example, and I do not understand that the sign ‘repousser’ means ‘to 
push (to the) background,’ then the word is nothing more than an obstacle to my learning.  
This is a problem of recognition rather than of understanding.  The whole point of the 
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understanding is that it removes the necessity of recognition by making language 
immediate.  It makes no difference that this recognition can become a passive moment, 
since synchrony is supposed to function universally as a necessary moment of 
understanding, yet here the signal actually becomes an obstacle to the understanding.  
Saussure’s theory simply cannot incorporate this contradictory evidence.  
The case is entirely different once the absorption of the signal by “pure 
semioticity” has taken place.423  Here the personal historical context in which a word has 
been used comes to the fore.  Everything depends upon context where the understanding 
is concerned.  The present situation invokes past associations of usage, and these 
situations insomuch as they are invoked are material and embodied, ideological, and find 
their home in the consciousness of the speaker—her verbal intonation, axiological and 
evaluative inflection, and the like.  Voloshinov goes even farther.  The word itself is 
pushed to the background.  What is presented front and centre, so to speak, is value: 
In point of fact, the linguistic form ... exists for the speaker only in the context of 
specific utterances, exists, consequently, only in specific ideological context.  In 
actuality, we never say or hear words, we say and hear what is true or false, good 
or bad, important or unimportant, pleasant or unpleasant, and so on.  Words are 
always filled with content and meaning drawn from behaviour or ideology.  That 
is the way we understand words, and we can respond only to words that engage us 
behaviourally or ideologically.424 
 
We find a similar critique of Saussure in the work of the Gestalt psychologist Karl 
Bühler.  In fact, his work can be read as the application of a theory of linguistic context to 
Saussure’s theory itself.  In his Theory of Language, Bühler contends that Saussure’s 
systematic displacement of inner sense is unanalysable, that the intuition of the language 
researcher plays an altogether more fundamental role in erecting an architectonic of 
language study than has hitherto been admitted.  One does not arrive at the historical 
epoch of Saussurean synchrony without already owing a debt to the previous evaluations 
of the linguistic phenomena, and one cannot simply proceed in the reductive manner of 
the physicist. Just as we have seen with the laboratory practices in the biological sciences 
between biologist and biological theory, there is a mutualism in the evolution of linguist 
and linguistic theory.  The language researcher must turn once again to “the concrete 
speech event,” as it is embodied, and one must do so without attempting to answer it 
according to its immanent and individual sense: indeed, the concrete speech event is 
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“something unique like each stroke of lightning and sound of thunder and Caesar’s 
crossing of the Rubicon, a happening here and now that has a certain place in 
geographical space and in the Gregorian calendar.”425  We therefore proceed not in the 
manner of the physicist, who is free from the incumbency of giving an account of the 
qualitative phenomena of thermodynamic entropy in human bodies.  The physicist, of 
course, does not deny that he lights a stove to keep himself warm and not to increase the 
entropy of his kindling, but neither were Boltzmann or Joule concerned to record the 
emotive vicissitudes of an increase or decrease in body temperature.  Roy Orbison’s 
evaluation that “love is like a stove that burns you when it’s hot” will never be relevant to 
the quantitative entropic analysis, but it is relevant to the person who has just broken up 
with his partner.  By analogy, the language researcher ought not to be primarily interested 
in the particular amplitude or pattern of sound waves issuing from the phonatory 
equipment of a speaker—the history of structural and behavioural linguistic analysis 
notwithstanding.  While doing so, linguistic research does provide valuable quantitative 
results which may be objectively paired off against one another; but where linguistics 
assumes such exclusivity, it is bound also to achieve only a limited result which, in the 
final analysis, misses altogether its original object of investigation—an answer to the 
embodied speech event provided “in vivo.”426 
As John Parrington notes in his paper “Valentin Voloshinov”, there is no 
ontological difference between inward and outward speech for Voloshinov, both are 
essentially of a material origin.427  The materiality we are concerned with here centres 
around the material nature of the word itself: “we do, after all, think and feel and desire 
with the help of words; without inner speech we would not becomes conscious of 
anything in ourselves.”428  Language is always-already social in character.  Neither 
linguistics nor psychology can be studied without a view to this social and objective 
character of language, and in fact they presuppose this social ground; indeed, for 
Voloshinov no conscious thought is possible without a corresponding grounding in the 
material aspect of words themselves.  What we have already said about language 
becoming possible only between societies is a fortiori true about communications 
between organisms, and in this Voloshinov—like Bakhtin—has in mind the long view of 
history—i.e., great time: “The complex apparatus of verbal connections is worked and 
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put into practice in the process of long, organized, and multilateral contact among 
organisms.  Psychology cannot, of course, dispense with objective, sociological 
methods.”429  Indeed, the material and organized labour of organisms has, since Engels’ 
Dialectics of Nature, been the interface for not only the attempted application of 
dialectical materialism to nature herself, but is nothing short of the attempt to unify a 
theory of linguistic and social production: 
the development of labour, necessarily helped to bring the members of society 
closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, and by 
making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual.  In short, men 
in their making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each other.  
Necessity created the organ; the undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but 
surely transformed by modulation to produce constantly more developed 
modulation, and the organs of the mouth gradually learned to pronounce one 
article sound after another.430  
 
While Freud brings to centre stage the conflict between inner and outer speech by 
attempting to develop his theory of the psyche as part unconscious and part conscious, he 
misses the social origin of this process and, by implication, ignores the possibility of a 
wholly objective grounding for his psychology.  Likewise, Saussure cannot account for 
the mediation of language as a tool of communication between a speaker and an 
“understander.”431  It is for this reason that Voloshinov feels that he has found the proper 
grounding not only of a Marxist philosophy of language, but has managed to correct 
Freud’s gloss by asserting history as the material basis of the word and therefore, by 
extension, of consciousness itself.432 
 Insomuch as words are the fulcrum on which the social text is authored, therefore, 
they are also the dialogical slate on which all ideologies of the organism—always already 
social, are written, erased, and rewritten: 
This “content of the psyche’ is ideological through and through; from the vaguest 
of thoughts and dimmest and most uncertain of desires all the way to 
philosophical systems and complex political institutions, we have one continuous 
series of ideological and, hence also, sociological phenomena.  Not a single 
member of this series from one end to the other is the product solely of individual 
organic creativity.433 
 
Nevertheless, this ideology cannot simply be reduced to meaningless dichotomies as is 
sometimes done in vulgar Marxism.  We are not dealing here with a naïve Manichaeism, 
and over-simplified binary distinctions between individual and state, between good and 
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bad, or right and wrong, or proletariat and bourgeoisie, or insider and outsider, or 
especially between false consciousness and class consciousness.  That said, there is 
always an uneven conflict between the unofficial discourse and what Voloshinov calls the 
“ideological dominant” of any discourse434—and this dominant therefore perpetuates a 
Manichaean-like struggle, not between opposites, but between active and affirmative 
differences in themselves.  
Ideology is not wholly transparent.  There is no one to one ratio between the 
materiality conditions that shape consciousness and their expression.  The Bakhtin 
Circle’s linguistic turn couched in a nuanced formulation of Marxist ideology—itself 
diversely formulated throughout Marx’s life—is necessarily inchoate and unfinalizable.  
In an attempt to formulate ideology as it is, to quote Gardiner, “imbricated with language, 
or, more precisely, with its concrete instantiation in forms of oral and written 
discourse,”435 the Circle first wanted to bridge—rather than close—the gap perpetuated in 
the dualism of form and content.  This involved “stressing that the formal organization of 
discourse was itself essentially a social construction, and that the signifying medium 
influenced the production and reception of ideological messages as much as overt 
thematic content.”436  In other words, because ideology is itself a material phenomenon, 
its form and its content are always found together in an interplay that is productive of the 
conscious subject, but in a way that adds the “refraction” of reality to Marxist 
“reflection.”437   
Ideology adds an emotional volitional tone such that, when speech interference 
occurs in the quoted utterance, for example, the active listener can hear two voices 
somewhere between syntax and intonational difference—the utterance is found to be 
“serving two masters” as it were.438  This struggle occurs through the immanent 
manifestation of what the Circle came to call “speech genres,” roughly the conventionally 
accepted mode of speech within a given particular social context.  There are primary and 
secondary speech genres, those of the everyday patois and those of discourse within the 
scientific and literary faculties.  There is, however, no such thing as a discourse of the 
individual and therefore it does not make any sense to pit individual against society in 
terms of ideological discourse—just as we have seen was the mistake made by bourgeois 
psychoanalysis.   
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Speech is always a social phenomenon and it always partakes in more or less 
overtly ideological speech genres.  As we have said, the distinctions between everyday 
and scientific speech genres are not absolute but transform one another in a dialogic give 
and take.  In Bakhtin’s essay “The Problem of Speech Genres” he attempts to show that 
these genres are both topographical and dynamic, that their form is open and influences 
and is influenced by their socially determined content.  To quote Bakhtin: 
Hence the more or less distinct dialogization of secondary genres, the weakening 
of their monological composition, the new sense of the listener as the partner-
interlocutor, new forms of finalization of the whole, and so forth [come about].  
Where there is style there is genre.  The transfer of style from one genre to another 
not only alters the way the style sounds, under the conditions of a genre unnatural 
to it, but also violates or renews the given genre.439 
 
Speech genres are for Bakhtin the “drive belts from the history of society to the history of 
language.”440  They are that force which perpetuates the constant shift in meaning.  “The 
Problem of Speech Genres” argues that no utterances escapes from a relation to one or 
multiple speech genres, but they are instead “real unit[s] of speech communication.”441  
As such, they are constitutive of the meaning, style, and grammar appropriate to words 
and sentences and by extension are constitutive of the subject herself—vis-à-vis her 
semantic personhood. 
 
5.3 “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”  
As we have seen, the once-occurrent being-as-event requires a response from the position 
of the subiectum, or subject.  Voloshinov’s works reflect and refract this ideological point 
of view.  His most concise word on the matter is to be found in the short essay “Discourse 
in Life and Discourse in Art”.  The intention of this essay is to show that discourse in art 
is grounded in discourse in life.  Discourse in everyday life relies on extraverbal 
socioeconomic content from the surrounding milieu and is a necessary and transcendental 
condition of literature, although everyday discourse in no way exhausts the species 
characteristics of artistic discourse.  At the same time, the essay serves as a two-fold 
critique of the formal method in literary criticism and of the hyper-subjectivism of 
psychology—and as such echoes the critique of psychoanalysis contained in 
Freudianism.  Here, verbal and non-verbal intonation and gesticulation serve to bridge the 
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abyss between the formal properties of the utterance and the evaluative, ideological, 
undergirding of all dialogical speech acts.   
  In artistic discourse the speaker from whom the utterance issues is called the 
author in both Voloshinov and Bakhtin.  But no true utterance is left to metastasize on the 
lips of the speaker; all utterances require a listener.  There is always a doubled direction 
of vector of the utterance present in every intonation; dialogue is not limited to two 
interlocutors diametrically opposed faccia a faccia.442  Certainly, the utterance is directed 
toward the “ally or witness”443; this is Voloshinov’s name for the listener in discourse.  
But there is also a second vector which is always directed toward “who or what” is being 
addressed in discourse, although stating it this way will sound deceptively over-
simplified.444  There is always a “third participant” in discourse, and not simply the 
author—or speaker—addressing the witness or listener,445 as we typically understand 
authorial activity or as we naïvely understand everyday speech.  In both discourse in life 
and discourse in art, there is always a third participant.  This third term, the who or what 
that is addressed, can be equated with an apostrophe, and it is therefore usually 
understood as a personified agent whom Voloshinov names “the hero.”446 
  We are now in a better position to understand Bakhtin’s apparent mystical 
relation to projection that we spoke of in Section Two of the present work.  Voloshinov’s 
hero, the apostrophic other, has a regulative function within discourse; she is addressed as 
if she were present.  The relation to the apostrophic other, and by implication to Christ 
qua third party addressee, could be called mysterious, but only so long as we naïvely 
assume that there are only two interlocutors in discourse.  Theologically, Christ would not 
even be the proper analogy here; one would have to admit that the apostrophe or hero is 
something more allied to the Holy Ghost.  Typically we do not think of the apostrophe 
when we address a listener, and its invocation in this tripartite scheme therefore seems to 
mark a religious or mystical turn in Bakhtin’s thought.  This is, however, not the case.  In 
discourse we always address a listener even while we implicitly address a situation or 
ideal listener—i.e., an apostrophe.  Again this second form of address is merely regulative 
in speech.  We may chose to see it as mysterious—the very fact that we can convey 
inexhaustible meanings to each other through the finite material body of signs can be seen 
as a mystery in human conversation.  From the phonetic and auditory apparatuses 
119 
 
 
 
somehow an infinite world of sense emerges.  Another way to say this is that form and 
content have a mysterious relationship to one another, and that while the idea is very 
much a spiritual aspect of life—insomuch as it is virtual, it is nevertheless inseparable 
from the matter which conveys it.  However, where Christian apologists would have us 
convert Bakhtin into the Saint John of the Cross of discourse, we cannot follow them.  
There is nothing mystical in this tripartite schematic of author, reader, and hero in art—or 
alternately of speaker, listener, and apostrophe in life.   
Authorship and interlocution is very much grounded in the real material situation 
and everyday experience of discourse.  In Salinger’s Franny and Zooey, Franny’s maxim 
that she has lifted from The Way of the Pilgrim to “‘pray without ceasing’” functions as a 
perverse form of asceticism, and would run counter to our argument here.447  The problem 
is with Zooey’s interpretation of this maxim, not with its possible content.  We could 
understand the exhortation as a simple reminder to be attentive to the fact that every 
utterance we make is akin to a prayer to a third party interlocutor: a fact that once again 
we normally forget in naïve everyday interlocution.  Mysticism was a late arrival in 
Russia.448  The idea to pray without ceasing seems to have originated with Saint 
Theodosius, who preached “perpetual” prayer—what is commonly known as the Jesus 
prayer.449  As Fedotov reminds us, the prayer was indeed practiced by religious mystics, 
but for Saint Theodosius it was “but a form of ejaculatory prayer, the shortest and easiest 
formula for perpetual prayer.”450  Likewise the apostrophe is omnipresent in speech, but it 
is not to be regarded as a hypostatization of a Pentecostal spirit from on high.   
Why is this important?  Let us take the example of a literary theorist who works 
with Dostoevsky.  If he omits the apostrophe regulative function in speech, then he has 
lost sight of the hero’s own context altogether and will inevitably attribute the hero’s 
motivation to that of the author’s.  In essence the theorist will conflate the author with the 
hero—their intentions and ethically answerable acts will be entirely undifferentiated.  
Thus, what Raskolnikov or the Underground Man say in earnest may be inflected by the 
theorist as merely ironic—or vice versa.  The intonation will be wrongly interpreted.  In 
life the consequences might prove more dire.  Problems of the omission of the apostrophe 
from the utterance often occur between cultures, since within speech communities the 
apostrophe is usually implicit and understood.  When the first pacts were made between 
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the aboriginal tribes of North America and their colonizers, for example, the phrase ‘as 
long as the waters run and the grass is green’ was a ubiquitous phrasing of the promises 
made to seal the treatise.  But the colonizers usually ignored such promises as mere 
nonsense, since they were interpreted merely from the point of view of a written and 
legalistic culture rather than from the understanding implied by the oral culture—where, 
as we have seen, one’s word still implied a promised action.  The apostrophes in this case 
are wholly different on either side.  For the colonizers the apostrophe is meaningless or 
puerile, but from the aboriginal vantage point it implies a situation in which nature will 
continue to follow her course, and therefore the pack is believed to be vouchsafed for all 
time.451  
The inchoate interlocutor in discourse, however, serves to demythologize the hero 
as the omnitemporal participant in speech.  Voloshinov also likens speech directed toward 
the apostrophic hero, the “agent of life,” to a prayer or incantation.452  We do not have to 
understand the agency of the hero here as hagiographic, since the intonation of speech can 
swing both ways on the Manichaeanesque fulcrum—like the listener, who can be 
interpolated as either an ally or enemy.  The apostrophe is not to be understood as a 
mystical or divine agency.  Nor is the hero fully formed, he (it) remains open and 
unfinalized.  It is as if the form of address to nature which is present in animism has 
survived in the verbal art of intonation, which not only bridges the gap between 
evaluative ideological disposition and the situation of the surrounding world, but also 
brings the very utterance with which it is pregnant to life:  
The aboriginal myth-making spirit seems to have remained alive in it.  Intonation 
makes it sound as if the surrounding world were still full of animate forces—it 
threatens and rails against or adores and cherishes inanimate objects and 
phenomena, whereas the usual metaphors of colloquial speech for the most part 
have been effaced and the words become semantically spare and prosaic.453 
 
It is in virtue of this animistic element that the hero becomes personified in speech.  As 
we have already hinted, in “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” this personification 
assumes the figure of ‘Christ’ of the Pentecostal ghost, and here Voloshinov gives the 
hero an archaic spiritual shape.  This shape is no less material for all its virtuality; it is 
present in every inflected word.  Material is the metaphor of spirit, just as form is carried 
along with content that is germane to it. 454  Formal content and material-form are 
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restorations of the properly embodied event.  The uniqueness of any given utterance 
depends upon both verbal and extraverbal gesticulation and intonation.455  Only the 
abstractions and anxieties of a “déclassé” formalism, psychological subjectivism, or 
linguistic abstract objectivism could project this self-ostracy of sense into the mere signal.  
As such, the utterance that remains purely formal or introspectively subjectivist and does 
not find its home in the extraverbal socioeconomic milieu is nothing but an empty husk.  
   Voloshinov describes the heroic regulative function as an enthymeme which 
implicates the un-vocalized, non-actualized premise grounded in the broader social 
milieu.456  Where this milieu is by and large in sympathetic harmony with the speaker, 
where the listener is conceived of as being in ideological agreement with the speaker, 
here Voloshinov posits a “choral support”; the choral support, like the supporting 
stretcher of a painters canvas, serves to provide a surface on which intonation can be 
“embroidered.”457  Of course, it is not always the case that this choral support will be 
present to the reader or apparent to the listener.  Sometimes the utterances come in the 
presence of an enemy.  The provisional exemplar given here is the man who laughs aloud 
only to find that he is laughing alone.  Under this circumstance of conflicting ideologies, 
the utterance may take on the character of tactile, sometimes visually haptic, anxiety—as 
when one says ‘you could cut the tension in the room with a knife’458: 
Thus, we now have a right to claim, any locution actually said aloud or written 
down for intelligible communication (i.e., anything but words merely reposing in 
a dictionary) is the expression and product of the social interaction of three 
participants: the speaker (author), the listener (reader), and the topic (the who or 
what) of speech (the hero).459  
 
Discourse in life and discourse in art are not wholly co-extensive.  The above tripartite 
schema of discourse in life—vis-à-vis speaker, listener, and topic (apostrophe), is self-
complicating and requires a special, albeit related, analysis of discourse in literary 
creation—vis-à-vis author, reader, and hero.   
 In art form and material are not to be conflated.  Content is likewise distinct, but 
inseparable from the form and the material.  If, for example, Earth was visited by sentient 
beings long after all human beings had evacuated the planet, and these beings happened 
to come upon Michelangelo’s David, we could forgive them if they did not recognize the 
form of a man let alone the ideological content signified by this hero in the service of 
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King Saul who stands triumphant after having slain Goliath.460  Nor should we presume 
they would read the implicit ideological content present in David. Content is always an 
ideologically refracted evaluation—here the “triumph” of Florence over the expelled 
Medici clan, and in art it always reflects the evaluative authorial intonation and gesture.  
Form must likewise be distinguished here, although it could not be by the extraterrestrial 
creature who had no surviving human being with which to compare David.  The form of 
Michelangelo’s best known work would look like little more than an oddly shaped slab of 
marble—perhaps idiosyncratically so, but certainly not artistic.  Bakhtin believes that the 
artist has an answerable responsibility to the work which alone can form and select the 
right content for its unified consummation: “it is impossible to isolate some real moment 
in a work of art that would be pure content … content and form interpenetrate, they are 
inseparable.”461  Yet the artist does not, or ought not inject his own personal ideological 
intonation into the work.  Instead, to create a true work of art it is necessary to raise the 
evaluative tone of the piece to “the level of social significance.”462   
It is the artist’s position outside of the work alone—and his ethical 
disinterestedness that provides him with the capacity to actively wed form and content 
into a unity within the work.463  An overbearing artist who conflates his personal 
ideological beliefs cannot do justice—i.e., answer—the work.  Here we already note a 
difference from the ideological intonation in the discourse of everyday life; there the 
speaker does not attempt to represent someone else’s social milieu but speaks as a 
semantic person—he attempts to reflect his own evaluative intonation; however 
successful he may be in this assay we leave to one side.  Yet the verbal artist must be 
prepared to participate consciously in art as if he had no other interest than the “adequate” 
relation of form and content.  Without this disinterested outsideness the artist cannot hope 
to achieve his purpose.  He must, in a sense, get out of the way of this higher social 
purpose: “‘the enemy’ might even be repulsive, the positive state, the pleasure that the 
contemplator derives in the end, is a consequence of the fact that the form is appropriate 
to the enemy and that it is technically perfect in its realization though the agency of the 
material.”464 Nevertheless, the discourse of life remains essential to the artist’s activity, 
but not in terms of its everyday personal ethical and cognitive component, which is 
regarded only in terms of its aesthetically appropriate relation to the work.    
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 When we turn from discourse in life to discourse in art, therefore, there is a shift 
from the ethical and ideological intonation to the aesthetic intonation of the author.  As 
theorists we must attune ourselves to this shift so as not to mistake the person who writes 
with either the authorial ideological position or the heroes.  The first consideration should 
have very little weight regarding how we read a text.  The author should be thought of as 
in scare quotes and present in the text rather than as a separate living entity; and again, the 
hero and author’s ideological positions ought not to be conflated.  Rest assured the verbal 
and non-verbal intonation and gestures remain constantly present, although active reading 
in terms of ‘hearing voices’ within the text is also an art—and one that also, no doubt, 
requires the commitment of a lifetime to master.465  We have already discussed the 
tripartite relations of the author, listener, and hero as they appear in real life, but it bears 
repeating that these relations change drastically when they inhere in the world of the 
verbal art; they are no longer “to be understood… as entities outside the artistic event but 
only as entities of the very perception of an artistic work.”466  This perception is that of 
the author’s, but again not of the author’s merely personal ideological intonations.467  
Unlike the everyday semantic person, the artist shapes his material toward an adequation 
of form and content; he must raise the axiological inflection of the work to a socially 
significant achievement.  The most drastic shift is with the listener, who must not be 
conflated with the reading public; the reading public must remain outside of the author’s 
sphere of influence, who is again to be thought of as (phenomenologically) within the 
text.  Instead, the listener becomes the authorially-perceived ideal listener.468  This 
listener, like the hero and the author himself—since he is also heard strictly according to 
his social significance, are formed qua form with an adequation to their immanent 
content.  Shakespeare would be a lesser author if he did not set aside a personal distaste 
for Iago and instead liquidated his detestable characteristics.  Iago must remain beyond 
redemption.  Without Iago’s genius for evil, Othello would not fall by his subterfuge, and 
the tragedy would amount to little more than a forgotten Elizabethan farce.469  
 There are three significant ür-relations involved in verbal work of art.  These are 
the hierarchical value between the hero and the author, their “degree of proximity,” and 
the proximity and relation to the hero borne by the listener.470  At times the listener is the 
ally of the author; this is often the case in classical works where there is no “presumed 
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disagreement” between them.471  This is a repetition in the discourse of art of what 
Voloshinov calls choral support in the discourse of life.  When the listener and the hero 
are understood as mutual enemies of the author, both are the object of the author’s 
ridicule—this is often the constellation heard in polemics and satires.472  If the author 
finds himself in league with hero and at war with the listener, the result is something akin 
to the Byronic hero, where any resultant laughter is at the expense of the listener.473  In 
the case of “playing the fool” and “lyrical irony” species of utterance, a complexity of 
relations can emerge; here the listener is given full autonomy to make what she will of 
what has been said and what is hiding, ideologically, beneath the verbal integument.474  
 It is essential for the verbal artist to have the ‘sides’ of discourse ever-present in 
his mind.  Short of this the author-listener-hero tripartite relation threatens to collapse into 
mere “stylization.”475  Without outsideness, the author cannot sustain its aesthetic 
existence, and what ought to be perceived as exterior speech collapses into interior 
speech.476  Style itself cannot be controlled, but is a matter of the verbal artist hearing his 
own voice, and again this takes a lifetime.477  Anyone who has attempted to edit his own 
work of verbal creation knows precisely how his daimon can toy with what he believes he 
is actually conveying to the listener.  One’s own voice is likewise elusive and it requires 
real artistry to master it.  Moreover, mimicry of other voices is easily as difficult: “It is 
naïve to suppose that one can assimilate as one’s own an external speech that runs 
counter to one’s inner speech—that is, runs counter to one’s whole inner verbal manner 
of being aware of oneself and the world.”478  Without this lifetime dedication to listening, 
style becomes forced, and the creation of the artist achieves nothing beyond the highly 
subjective form, a monologue, what Voloshinov calls the “maxim.”479  Thus the ends 
which are ideologically reflected in the verbal work of art are thereby degraded and 
resemble the ends of a bourgeois publisher more than the verbal artist.  More importantly, 
the implied socioeconomic base—meant in the widest sense—likewise collapses, and we 
are left with nothing more than a highly idiosyncratic piece of black letter legalism and 
not a work of art. 
 In closing this section we will attempt to connect what has been said about 
discourse in life and discourse in art to the art of answerability.  For Voloshinov, and a 
fortiori, for Bakhtin, theoretical poetics necessitates the propaedeutic study of 
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socioeconomic theory, but they cannot be exhausted by sociological study.  Aesthetics 
depends upon the disinterest of the verbal artist to sustain a unique artistic discourse 
grounded in the discourse of everyday life.  But it is also necessary to construct an 
architectonic, an art of answering, between the various genres of everyday life, between 
the scientific disciplines, and between the two types of genres.  Michael Gardiner 
describes architectonics aptly as 
a continuous dialogue with the ‘other’, with oneself (inner speech), and with the 
external world—which involves the active construction of relations between 
diverse phenomena… [and which] is constitutive of human subjectivity as such 
and represents an inescapable component of any possible creative thought or 
deed.480 
 
The advent of an architectonics then always signals a moment of conflict between 
competing ontologies and competing voices.  Competing ontologies because the 
subiectum is always experienced from within as an open and unfinalizable entity, whereas 
the other is always seen as a finished project complete unto herself.  The subiectum can 
only be “consummated” as a whole and autonomous person through the evidence given 
him by the grace of the shared and constructed world and by the other.  It is the 
“transgredience” or “outsideness”—i.e., the excess of the subiectum’s being beyond its 
own self-disclosure and his overflow into the world, through which the other has a 
surplus of my character.  I am only given access to this excess of seeing through my 
interaction with the other.  This conception is not unlike the Greek idea of the daimon—
that side of myself that only others see directly and which follows me like a shadow.  The 
related idea of exotopy, or an excess of seeing—of my own character and behaviour—
grants to the other a perception of myself as a complete and whole unity, final and as real 
as the bread that sustains her.  I likewise perceive the other as complete and whole unto 
herself.  It is only through a dialogue of self and other, only through their non-coextensive 
presence to one another, that meaning can enter into the world—that there can be 
meaning or a world at all.  The witness and the judge forever modify the world.  The 
ontology of the subiectum is, contrariwise, not perceived as a closed system unto itself, 
but is open to interpretation and competing voices.481 
The deed or act in Bakhtin is not only this act of sense bestowal and 
consummation of the other through my ontological outsideness.  The deed is also the 
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word itself (slovo).  Words and actions exist on a continuum with each other.  In Marxism 
and the Philosophy of Language, Voloshinov writes “the organizing centre of any 
utterance, of any experience is not within but outside—in the social milieu surrounding 
the individual being.”482  In other words, the dual character of the word, or what 
Voloshinov calls outer and inner signs, or official and unofficial discourse, is always-
already formed and given shape in the world as a social phenomenon outside of the 
individual.  The word is therefore addressed to a ‘who’ in the outer-world that I 
understand myself to be addressing within a “concrete social milieu.”483  This ‘who’ is the 
imagined apostrophic hero—i.e., a situation—to whom I direct the personal intonation of 
my voice.  In other words, while the ideology expressed in the word is never completely 
fixed, it is nevertheless framed within the confines of a particular social context and by 
the always-already social discourse of a particular class.  Linguistic abstract objectivism 
of the type we find in Saussure simply cannot account for this milieu even though, as we 
have seen, it is the ground from which significant abstraction first takes place.  As 
Voloshinov states this idea: all “utterance … depends on their real, material appurtenance 
to one and the same segment of being and gives this material commonness ideological 
expression and further ideological development.”484  This development therefore is not 
simply an upside-down reflection of material conditions but is itself a creative refraction 
of both material and ideological form and content.  Abstract objectivism leaves to one 
side the expression of this concrete ground. 
Ultimately the various ideologies are expressions of competing values, and 
systems of values strive to extinguish and obliterate one another in an attempt to “make 
the sign uniaccentual.”485 But the word itself is resistant to such stasis, just as all 
ideologies are ultimately unstable and may contain the seeds of their opposites.  
Voloshinov privileges language and understands the sign as a critically important “arena” 
of class struggle.486  If these various social ideologies have their base in material, they 
likewise have a history—i.e., diachrony—that may be understood as the history of signs 
acquiring “social value” through a struggle of competing ideologies.  Signs require more 
than a state or manifold unity that is prescribe in the theory of synchronic systems of 
language.  A ‘system’ that is wholly synchronic is merely a system of signals that must be 
first recognized before they can be absorbed by the understanding.  Of course, diachrony 
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is not a pristine forward progression.  It is first and foremost in periods of crisis, 
according to Voloshinov, that the inner dialectical struggle within the sign becomes 
externally visible.487  In Marxism he writes, 
This inner dialectic quality of the sign comes out fully in the open only in times of 
social crisis or revolutionary changes.  In the ordinary conditions of life, the 
contradiction embedded in every ideological sign cannot emerge fully because the 
ideological sign in an established, dominant ideology is always somewhat 
reactionary and tries, as it were, to stabilize the preceding factor in the dialectical 
flux of the social generative process, so accentuating yesterday’s truth as to make 
it appear today’s.  And that is what is responsible for the refracting and distorting 
peculiarity of the ideological sign within the dominant ideology.488 
 
What we have seen in the categories of prescriptive grammar and in the linguist’s 
experience of language holds doubly for objective knowledge.  We therefore put 
objective truth into scare quotes.  As Voloshinov hints in the above quoted passage, that 
which is considered common knowledge for us today will tomorrow have grown stale.489  
No knowledge beyond the tautological ought to be considered objectively true for all 
humans now and for all time.  It is my position that no laws are immune to this rule, not 
even our cherished laws of physics.  Moreover, that prized trophy of all human 
intellectual activity—namely pure logic—may stand as an exception, but only if we could 
be sure that we really do have a tautology in mind.  Only the syllogism admits of a true 
unity of opposites, and such tautologies are hard won and difficult to reduce to self-
evidence.  There is a truth, therefore, which lies beyond us, but listening for its voice is 
like attempting to listen to one of those wax cylinder records of Caruso as it melts in the 
sun, or like listening for an extra-terrestrial voice from deep space via satellite.  It is like 
listening for what Merleau-Ponty has called the “voices of silence.”   As we move 
forward into the penultimate section of the present work, we shall keep in mind the 
ideological nature of objectivity and the difficulties posed in what Bakhtin has termed 
Dostoevsky’s ability to hear voices in the “dialogue of his epoch.”490 
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§ 6.  The Polyphonic Novel: Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 
 
6.1 Hearing Voices: Polyphony in the Novel 
“I do not judge.  These characters praise one another, condemn one another—all that is none of my 
business”  
—N. G. Chernyschevsky491 
 
“Dostoevsky was capable of representing someone else’s idea, preserving its full capacity to 
signify as an idea, while at the same time also preserving a distance, neither confirming the idea 
nor merging it with his own expressed ideology.  The idea, in his work, becomes the subject of 
artistic representation, and Dostoevsky himself became a great artist of the idea.” 
 —Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics492 
 
Bakhtin published Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo in 1929 shortly before he was 
arrested.493  Caryl Emerson tells us in her preface to the book that Bakhtin may have had 
the book ready for publication as early as 1922.494  A second extensively reworked 
edition appeared in 1963 at the encouragement of a new group of scholars who had 
stumbled across the original publication.495  According to both Tzvetan Todorov and 
Michael Gardiner, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics consists of three perspectives on 
Dostoevsky’s oeuvre: first, the formal perspective and through the lens of German 
ideology—although polemically so; the second view places the literary corpus in line with 
Bakhtin’s theory of the carnivalesque; from the third vantage point Dostoevsky’s work is 
viewed from the vista of merging and diverging novelistic discourses.496  I will only 
cover the first perspective—the first three chapters of Problems—since we have already 
taken up the theory of discourse and the carnivalesque in the previous sections of the 
present work.  As a result, we will be centrally concerned here with three major themes of 
the volume, namely the polyphonic novel, the emphasis on heroic self-consciousness, and 
the idea as it appears in Dostoevsky.  These three aspects are intimately related to one 
another and are expressions of what could be formulated by the following proposition: as 
an author of the polyphonic novel, Dostoevsky is primarily motivated by a “profound 
personalism” which locates the idea between subjects where it exists as an open-ended 
and living object of dialogical struggle.497 
 Both Bakhtin and Bakhtin’s ‘Dostoevsky’ found univocity to be entirely 
antithetical to life as it is expressed by real people in everyday life.  As a novelist 
dedicated to accentuating polyphony—i.e., diverging ideological voices within 
simultaneous space of the novel—Dostoevsky’s works mark a new achievement in the 
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millennial folk-festive culture crystallized in novelistic discourse.  The search for a 
univocal system in German ideological philosophy is a highly rationalized genre of 
discourse, highly specialized, and torn out of real everyday contextual foundations; we 
have already seen a similar disconnect between the specialist’s account and everyday life 
in linguistics as abstract objectivism and in introspective psychology.  German Idealism 
seeks a unity outside of individual and personal inflections of truth; the gnoseological 
subject requires a universal truth that would be true in any context for any thinking being 
what-so-ever—a subjectless transcendental field.  In contrast, Dostoevsky sought to show 
the relation between the idea and simultaneous inflections of it by individual 
consciousnesses, through whom the supposed ideal truth is inflected in a movement 
between a “pro and contra” with a double-voiced logic.498  In Saussurean terms we might 
call this the synchronic aspect of the polyphonic novel.  However, Dostoevsky wanted to 
show the future life of the idea as it extended—still dialogically—from its current 
historical epoch into future.  To likewise call this the diachronic aspect would be 
somewhat misleading, however, since Dostoevsky is all simultaneity, even as regards the 
future.  The possible future worlds he heard within the idea still emphasized how the idea 
was inflected in the present.  In this way, the life of the idea could be shown in its 
perpetual re-appropriation by individual consciousnesses within their personal-historical 
situation without ever coming to rest in one avatar or finalized embodiment. 
 In the polyphonic novel, all relationships between personalities, and between 
individual personalities and an idea, are essentially dialogical, and only those relations 
that are understood as merely mechanical are truly monological—that is, those relations 
which are merely externally related to one another and do not affect any immanent 
change within the personalities or events of the novel499: “one could say that for 
Dostoevsky everything in life [is] dialogue, that is, dialogic opposition.”500  Unlike 
monological novels in which the author conflates his own idea with that of the hero and 
makes of the personality a mere mouthpiece of the author’s dominant theme, 
Dostoevsky’s particular brand of realism attempts to show life from the perspective of his 
heroes themselves.  The hero’s self-understanding is more important than ‘getting it right’ 
in terms of a moral or philosophical/rational idea.  The hero interests Dostoevsky as a 
particular point of view on the world, and not as the spokesman of the author’s ready-
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made agenda: “What is important to Dostoevsky is not how his hero appears in the world 
but first and foremost how the world appears to his hero, and how the hero appears to 
himself ... ultimately the hero’s final word on himself and on his world.”501  The author 
must therefore cut the “umbilical cord” between himself and the hero, and must stand 
outside him as one more consciousness among many with no privileged perspective.502  If 
the author is unable or unwilling to achieve this distance then the realistic aspect of the 
work suffers and the novel takes on a univocal manifesto-like quality in which realistic 
personalities are not given the opportunity to speak for themselves.  In the 
homophonous—single voiced—novel there is no objective distance from the hero; the 
author presumes to stand over and above his hero and assumes an ostensibly objective 
and God’s-eye view over the novelistic universe.  Contrariwise, the polyphonic novel 
portrays the hero not according to “who” or what he is, but in line with how he 
understands himself and his relation both to the idea and to others.503  Heroic self-
consciousness is therefore the “artistic dominant” the dominanta in Dostoevsky.504 
 
6.2 Heroic Self-Consciousness 
Since we have no absolute authoritarian position from which to view the hero under these 
polyphonic conditions, what becomes important is the vocal evidence presented to us by 
the personalities of the text.  Instead of finding out the elements of the hero’s biography 
or what it is like to know him definitively, we are given voiceprints, confessions, 
testimonies from the hero and those who know him, editorials and journal articles written 
in the hero’s hand, memories, dreams, fears, and all of these are given first and foremost 
by way of the utterance.505  In the polyphonic novel the truth is perspectival, polyvocal, 
and determined according to what the personalities say about themselves; once again, no 
neutrality is possible:  
the ‘truth’ at which the hero must and indeed ultimately does arrive through 
clarifying the events to himself, can essentially be for Dostoevsky only the truth of 
the hero’s own consciousness.  It cannot be neutral toward his self-consciousness.  
In the mouth of another person, a word or a definition identical in content would 
take on another meaning and tone, and would no longer be truth.  Only in the form 
of a confessional self-utterance, Dostoevsky maintained, could the final word 
about a person be given, a word truly adequate to him.506     
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According to Bakhtin, Tolstoy’s stories do not broach this kind of truth.  Even where 
characters are “ethically unfinalizable” we nevertheless know them so completely that we 
could never mistake them for actual personalities.  The truth is everywhere determined by 
the author’s message.  We get the sense that they could not hide anything from us or from 
the omniscience of the author.  Tolstoy’s characters are simply unable to achieve a real 
autonomy.  They are ready-made in the sense that they always serve the ends of the 
narrative and never serve their own implicit ends; neither are they capable of 
circumventing the larger blueprint of the novel.  In his short story “The Overcoat”, Gogol 
caricatured Devushkin as Akaky Akakievich, the “little man” who cannot change—not 
even in death.507  Bakhtin explains that it was this static and inept quality of Akakievich 
that raised Devushkin’s person ire.  What really offended him was the character’s 
finalizability and inability to speak for himself.  What offends Bakhtin’s sensibilities is 
the reduction of the personality, with all its contradictions, to the voiceless automaton 
created simply to serve its master—namely, the author; for Bakhtin there is something 
false in this kind of reduction: “In a human being there is always something that only he 
himself can reveal, in a free act of self-consciousness and discourse, something that does 
not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition.”508   
Representing mere characters in this way—i.e., without a real personality—
denies the author the ability to truly bring them to life.  Even if some aspect of these 
characters is true to flesh and blood reality in general—for example, Ivan Ilych’s 
hypochondria as symptomatic of his superficial relationship with the world, in the end 
these aspects either serve the author’s pre-established system or have the flavour of a 
blemish on the purported artistic purpose.  As such, the artistic dominant in the 
homophonic novel by-passes self-consciousness as the primary mode of revealing 
character; it surreptitiously betrays the personality by subjugating it to the all-knowing 
“high-altitude thought” of the author Pantocrator.509  In a sense, how they see themselves 
can only achieve a secondary and tangential importance.  The homophony of these novels 
takes on the reductive and solipsistic character of the modern cult of Cartesianism.  
Characterological representation never ascends to the level of the real life experience and 
the free action of other embodied subjects.  Yet, “man is not a final and defined quantity 
upon which firm calculations can be made; man is free, and can therefore violate any 
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regulating norms which might be thrust upon him” even by the supposedly omniscient 
author.510  To speak for the person, to interfere with his autonomous sovereign power to 
speak for himself, one attempts to define him “from above.”511  Between the monologue 
and the dialogue there are in effect two logics of sovereignty at work.  On the one side, 
the monologue, a hyper-cognitive embodied subjectivity is displaced in favour of what 
Michael Gardiner calls the “irrefutable system of crystalline logic and conceptual rigour” 
of Cartesian rationalism, in which the cogito splays out the embodied world and reduces 
it to the singular ideological value of knowledge.512  Gardiner paints us a picture: 
“Accordingly, the world lies prostrate before this omniscient subject’s preview, like the 
captured booty and slaves paraded triumphantly before a victorious warrior-potentate.”513  
On the other side exists the respected sovereignty of the self-conscious subject qua other, 
whose autonomy is equal with those of all other characters and the author himself, just as 
in everyday life the subject appears among a multitude of other subjects and is not 
solipsistically left alone at sea with only himself as company. 
The difference between the dogmatic or authorial representation of dialogue that 
is ready-made and reducible to the author’s solipsistic vision and that of the true dialogue 
in Dostoevsky’s work, according to Bakhtin, is that the former is the mere image of a 
dialogue, while the latter is a real dialogue with actual conflicts and moments of 
intractable disagreement; as a result, Dostoevsky legitimately grants to its hero an 
autonomous life that testifies on her own behalf: “the author speaks not about a character, 
but with him.”514  As we saw in Section Two, the transgredience or outsideness of the 
subject must not attempt to achieve a co-extensive life with the other.  Under such 
circumstances the subiectum could never provide an ethical answer for the other’s life 
from outside and therefore could not consummate that life.  The same situation occurs in 
verbal art.  If the novel is to represent actual life and not simply deploy the philosophical 
message of the author, then the lives of each of the characters must maintain their proper 
weight.  The author’s voice ought not to fuse with the heroic voice, “not swallow it up, 
not dissolve in itself the other’s power to mean.”515   
In this situation, the personality is in no way transparent to either the reader or the 
author, and indeed the hero can hide his deepest darkest secrets and even misrepresent 
himself throughout the course of the novel.  Raskolnikov, for example, provides a 
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rationalization for his murderous actions in a newspaper article, but the article is 
published, as it were, off stage, “before the action of the novel beings.”516  Moreover, just 
as in life, the personalities of Dostoevsky’s poetics are not even fully transparent to 
themselves.  They exhibit something akin to what Antonio Gramsci called “contradictory 
consciousness” in which one consciousness is indeed legion517:  
the consciousness of the solitary Raskolnikov becomes a field of battle for others’ 
voices; the events  of recent days (his mother’s letter, the meeting with 
Marmeladov), reflected in his consciousness, take on the form of a most intense 
dialogue with absentee participants (his sister, his mother, Sonya, and others), and 
in this dialogue he tries to “get his thoughts straight.”518 
 
At no time, therefore, is the self-determination of the heroic consciousness co-extensive 
either with the author or with itself.  It is portrayed as a slice of consciousness taken 
simultaneously within a milieu of other convergent and divergent consciousnesses in 
becoming. 
None of what we have said regarding the self-conscious autonomy of the hero is 
meant to imply that he exists independently of the work itself—i.e., as if the hero could 
actually write himself into existence or could compose his own story.  As we saw in the 
previous section, the Circle’s tripartite structure of discourse in art—vis-à-vis the author, 
hero, and reader, asserts itself within the textual and semiotic plane of consistency and not 
in real life.  It nevertheless retains a fundamental relation with real life—i.e., partially 
maps onto the speaker, apostrophe, and listener, but again discourse in art cannot be 
reduced to this ground as a mere textual repetition of actual—non-textual—existence:  
we must warn against one possible misunderstanding.  It might seem that the 
independence of a character contradicts the fact that he exists, entirely and solely, 
as an aspect of the work of art, and consequently is wholly created from beginning 
to end by the author.  In fact there is no such contradiction.  The characters’ 
freedom we speak of here exists within the limits of the artistic design, and in that 
sense is just as much a created thing as is the unfreedom of the objectivised 
hero.519 
 
In the next section we will see how human beings have defined themselves over the last 
two millennia first according to the image of God and later according to the image of 
‘man.’  In the verbal work of art the hero takes shape adjacent to the wholly textual image 
of the author, and in Dostoevsky most frequently according to the image of the idea.  We 
repeat, the hero takes shape adjacent to the image of the author and not fused with the 
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authorial intent or thesis statement.  As far as it goes, this was the writer N. G. 
Chernyshevsky’s notion of authorship.  He is almost correct, according to Bakhtin, but 
authorship is itself not a merely negative support on which the characters become self-
aware.  The author-image is itself involved dialogically with the text; the author enters as 
a voice within the polyphony of the truly multi-voiced novel.  Here a pattern is emerging 
for us in the Circle’s corpus—within each polarized proposition there is a second pole 
that struggles to be heard.  In this case, the wholly negative image of the author hides the 
bi-polarity of authorship.  As such, Chernyshevsky’s proposition is not wholly 
monological but neither does it achieve a fully polyphonic status, since for 
Chernyschevsky the author is merely the negative tabula rasa on which the text is 
written.  His poetics represent a middle ground between the older image of the author 
Pantocrator who does not enter the text himself and the truly polyphonic novel in which 
both author and hero enter and dialogue as equals. 
  It is not enough for the author to refuse to fuse his perspective with the hero’s 
into a dialectical synthesis of oppositions.  The author must not only let his characters 
speak of their own accord as unfinalized open and embodied wholes, he must also 
“actively broad[en]... his consciousness” in order to communicate directly with his 
hero.520  Rather than to stand over novelistic personalities from above by assuming the 
God-like status of the artistic creator, and rather than pretending to absolute passivity, the 
writer actively shapes his material by selecting what is important, by deciding what to 
leave in and to leave out.  As such the author’s own voice does enter the text to a limited 
degree, but again he nowhere attempts to subordinate the hero’s perspective to his own.  
The polyphonic artist is not the dogmatic artist.  This is easy enough to see, but we must 
not mistake him for the artist of pure relativity either.521  Just as every voice is given its 
proper weight—and therefore its proper autonomy, the author also respects his own voice, 
which must not be simply brushed aside as one more arbitrary position.  No ideologically 
unique voice in the polyphonic novel is to be regarded as merely relative—quite to the 
contrary, every voice is a monologically authoritative voice which asserts its essential 
correctness.  What makes the polyphonic novel—as a whole—dialogical, is both that no 
voice can be simply annulled and neither can it achieve supremacy. The so-called “great 
dialogue” in the novel depends upon this struggle of competing voices, at times over-
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lapping and at times opposing the wills of the author and hero.  Bakhtin provides the 
counter-example of Tolstoy’s “Three Deaths.”  In this story the author compares the death 
of “a rich noble-woman, of a coachman, and of a tree,” but he does so from outside of 
their worlds, without ever entering into them and thus achieving an immanent position 
with which to dialogue with these characters; they are not allowed the possibility of 
resisting or testifying against his authorial vision, since they never meet and dialogue with 
the author himself.522  He unites their deaths within his vision, but the characters only 
mechanically relate to each other—i.e., their relations are merely external to one another; 
they never co-exist on a plane in which they could enter into dialogue.  As such, Tolstoy’s 
homophonous story unfolds from beginning to end according to a preconceived idea.  At 
no time is the “counterpoint” operative; at no time is the free act of creation within the 
present moment of composition expressed.523  Homophony renders the novel a merely 
ready-made formulation of the author’s vision, which remains dominant—“all else being 
merely objects of its cognition.”524  
 The situation of the “Three Deaths” would have been essentially different if 
Dostoevsky had composed it, according to M. M. Bakhtin.  While the author, as 
organiser, retains some element of transgredient excessive sight, he would not have 
mechanically parsed out the worlds of the coachman, the noble-woman and the tree 
completely.  The three worlds would come into a proximity in which they could mutually 
refract each world dialogically: “He would have arranged a face-to-face confrontation 
between the truth of the noble-woman and the truth of the coachman.”525  Thus 
argumentation and struggle between their competing voices would be heard—only 
through such argument could polyphony and “echoes of the great dialogue” come into 
play.526  However, death does not provide a suitable ground in which a living dialogue 
may occur.  It is the struggle, the “turning points,” the “thresholds” of life which present 
the spaces in which dialogue can come to fruition, and not in the closed pre-established 
harmony of the authorial vision.527  Naturally, Dostoevsky’s author does obtain a surplus 
of vision, but this surplus restricts itself to the facts “necessary to carry forward the 
story”; authorial transgredience “enters on an equal footing” with the other characters in 
the novel.528  
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6.3 The Idea in Dostoevsky 
In the literary work of art, Idealism tends to utilize the idea in three main ways.  First, the 
idea becomes the Ürprinzip through which the entirety of the represented world takes its 
shape; the world takes on a singular tonality.  Second, he idea can therefore be deduced 
from the material that has been represented—i.e., it can be torn out of the reality or 
extrapolated from the various motifs of the novel, which themselves become a mere 
secondary vehicle of their conveyance.  Third, the protagonist or “main hero” becomes 
the mere mouth-piece of the absolute idea; he is nothing more or less than its 
personification.529  However, these three pathways to the idea do not have to be absolute, 
but so long as the text is monological any deviation or contradictory voice will not 
establish itself as anything more than an error or flaw in the artistic edifice: “Idealism 
recognizes only one principle of cognitive individualization: error.  True judgements are 
not attached to a personality, but correspond to some unified, systemically monological 
context.  From the point of view of idealism, only error individualizes.”530  When the hero 
is conceived of as only advancing the ideological tenor of the author, the plot suffers; it is 
treated as interchangeable with any given number of alternate plots.  In this situation plot 
is perceived as “merely accidental.”531  Romanticism takes this view of plot; the situation, 
the chronotope—i.e., the perceived space-time of the novel—is uniform and empty and 
serves only to advance the author’s idea.  Even here the character often maintains an 
individual personality, but he can be found stating a thesis of the author or the singular 
idea of the work that is quite alien to this personality.  This singular intonation of the 
monological work of literature is “expressed directly, without distance”; the 
homophonous source of the work, even where it truly sets the narrative world in motion, 
reduces all differences to an occasion for the negation of all dissent voices532: “within the 
bounds of that monologic world shaped by [authorial ideas], someone else’s idea cannot 
be represented.  It is either assimilated, or polemically repudiated, or ceases to be an 
idea.”533   
According to B. M. Engelhardt’s essay “Dostoevsky’s Ideological Novel”, the 
hero of Dostoevsky’s novels is the idea itself.534  Strictly speaking, however, this is not 
the case.  According to Bakhtin the idea for-itself does not exist in Dostoevsky.  Ideology 
is always embodied within the personality of the hero and cannot be torn away from him.  
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The converse is also true: the “person is born of that idea.”535  The two are wed 
inseparably to one another and wedded unto death.  But until death occurs, of course, 
neither the life of the “‘man in man’” nor the life of the image of the idea can be 
finalized.536  But this does not mean the idea and the hero wholly map onto one another; 
the idea is not merely the cookie-cutter shape of the personality of the individual hero.  
Instead of conditioning the hero absolutely according to the idea or vice-versa, the two 
exist in a relationship with one another.  The hero pursues his idea throughout the novel, 
trying to understand it, and the idea likewise actively changes the hero:  
Dostoevsky’s ideology knows neither the separate thought nor systemic unity in 
this sense.  For him the ultimate indivisible unit is not the separate referentially 
bounded thought, not the proposition, not the assertion, but rather the integral 
point of view, the integral position of a personality.  For him, the referential 
meaning is indissolubly fused with the position of a personality.  In every thought 
the personality is given, as it were, in its totality.  And thus the linking-up of 
thoughts is the linking-up of integral positions, the linking-up of personalities.537  
 
Personalities and ideas are united in a dialectical relationship, but one that finds no 
synthetic moment.  At heart, the hero remains unfinished; he is set out as a task for the 
author.  
In his pursuit of the idea, the hero in Dostoevsky’s novels attempts to live beyond 
himself in some sense; he cannot be enclosed even by the ideas he purports to belong to 
in taking them as his guiding principle—as his most essential characteristic and as that 
tenet which he holds most dear.  Without this dialogic overlapping non-coincidence of 
idea and hero there is no real danger that the hero will fail to live up to the task his idea 
has set out for him.  In other words, he will not be human.  If Alyosha pursues virtue, it is 
only to find that he will disappoint himself and remain human and irreducibly other than 
his ideal self, which can never be finalized or arrived at.  He will pursue this ideal self 
unto death in a dialogical struggle and without ever achieving the all-elusive synthesis 
between his particularity and the image of the idea that floats above him just beyond his 
reach:  
It is given to all of Dostoevsky’s characters to “think and seek higher things”; in 
each of them there is a “great and unresolved thought”; all of them must, before 
all else, “get a thought straight.”  And in this resolution of a thought (an idea) lies 
their entire real life and their own personal unfinalizability.  If one were to think 
away the idea in which they live, their image would be totally destroyed.  In other 
words, the image of the hero is inseparably linked with the image of an idea and 
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cannot be detached from it.  We see the hero in the idea and through the idea, and 
we see the idea in him and through him.538 
 
In this marriage the hero sacrifices himself to the pursuit of the idea and the idea remains 
conditioned through the particular life circumstances and utterances of the hero.  Bakhtin 
calls even the most atrocious deed—Raskolnikov’s murder of the pawnbroker—a wholly 
“unselfish” act.539  His crime can only be understood as unselfish if we subordinate this 
atrocity to Raskolnikov’s unwavering devotion to the idea that even the most heinous act 
is permissible—i.e., if we always have before us his self-sacrificial commitment to 
nihilism: “We repeat again: what is important is not the ordinary qualifications of a 
person’s character or actions, but rather the index of a person’s devotion to an idea in the 
deepest recesses of his personality.”540 
 Ideas do not exist in a vacuum and there is no one absolute Platonic Idea of Ideas 
in Dostoevsky.541  Unlike the bourgeois subjectivist spirit of isolation or the liberal 
feeling that the individual is sufficient unto himself—that is, so long as he is provided the 
basic infrastructure to achieve the necessities of life, the idea in Dostoevsky exists only 
by dint of its dialogic interaction with other ideas.  In this way ideas are born, struggle 
with one another, comingle, give birth to yet new ideas, grow, ripen, weary, rot, die, and 
are reborn.  In short, they live their lives within a quarrelling and cooperative 
environment among allies and enemy ideas alike.  Ideas cannot be wholly subsumed 
within an individual knowing consciousness; they are “intersubjective” and as such, they 
have an event-like quality toward which individual consciousnesses flock to struggle over 
their meaning.  Just as linguistic sense seems to have a life of its own, and just as the 
event requires an answer from the ethically active subject, the idea calls to the various 
Dostoevskian personalities to be heard, embodied, and ideologically inflected from 
various perspectives: 
The idea is a live event, played out at the point of dialogic meeting between two or 
several consciousnesses.  In this sense the idea is similar to the word, with which 
it is dialogically united.  Like the word, the idea wants to be heard, understood, 
and “answered” by other voices from other positions.  Like the word, the idea is 
by nature dialogic, and monologue is merely the conventional compositional form 
of its expression, a form that emerged out of the ideological monologism of 
modern times.542 
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Bakhtin therefore links the idea, specifically as it is enframed within the great dialogue 
between consciousnesses, to the greater edifice of both his translinguistics and the 
architectonics of answerability.  As such, the idea, like the event, requires an answer from 
the ethically active semantic person.  We have said that a personality both knows himself 
through the idea and the idea through the personality—they are wed, but this is not to say 
that the semantic person is reducible to the idea he pursues nor the idea to the person.  
Such a monological conflation of the two would stop all movement in Dostoevsky’s texts; 
it would set out in advance the answer for the event as it arises in the present living and 
creative context.  The monological conflation of the author and hero performs this 
reduction of the embodied person to the mere image of the idea.  That is why the 
monological text provides the key to all its secrets ab ovo.  It gives us the formula to the 
novel’s blueprint at the outset.  It is only by providing a multiplicity of incomplete 
inflections that the reader receives an image of the idea as it exists as a living dialogue 
that spans over a whole “epoch” and makes a forward and backward reference to other 
epochs.543  It is only because the idea cannot be reduced to one consciousness or one 
historical period that it can achieve the weight of its historicity.  The reduction to a 
synthesis or even to the so-called life of the Hegelian Spirit would, ironically perhaps, 
negate this very conflict that brings it to life and that raises it as a question for 
consciousness in the first place.  The dialogic life of the idea can only exist between 
consciousnesses and between these voices which struggle to reduce it—to tame its feral 
existence—to an easily handled and inevitably “easily refuted” state.544 
 The idea of ‘Dostoevsky’ himself—as an author-image—is therefore something 
that we must continue to struggle over.  As an author he equally exists for us as a ‘hero’ 
or apostrophe which we address but cannot wholly tame.  As such, Bakhtin has built into 
his Problems a dialogic self-critical stance, for ‘Bakhtin’ is also an author-image.   
The primary thesis in Problems is that Dostoevsky could hear the dialogic conflict 
over the ideas of his age, and within this conflict he could likewise hear the genealogical 
life of this struggle stretching backward and forward in history.  Dostoevsky bore witness 
to the ground being prepared for their future life; he had no interest in creating ideas from 
scratch, but listened for them in this intersubjective ground.  The wholly personal idea is 
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short lived.  Ideas are conveyed across generations and are pulled and stretched within 
different and often opposed ideological and socioeconomic milieus.   
Let us look at the example of the European idea of nihilism and show how it is 
ideologically inflected into opposite polarities and yet remains the same idea.  We will 
take Ivan Karamazov’s inflection of the idea that “infamy must be and is permitted.”545  
Ivan’s nihilistic idea of absolute permissibility prepares the ground for his future act over 
the course of the novel, but we also witness it in the Second World War and in Hitler’s 
‘final solution’ as Arendt reminds us.  Arendt explains that where not even the 
Fürhrerprinzip could bind certain members of the upper echelons of the Nazi party under 
a common cause, they where nevertheless bound by the idea that had been born in 
European nihilism:  
the loyalty of those who believe neither in ideological clichés nor in the 
infallibility of the Leader also has deeper, nontechnical reasons.  What binds these 
men together is a firm and sincere belief in human omnipotence.  Their moral 
cynicism, their belief that everything is permitted, rests on the solid conviction 
that everything is possible.  It is true that these men, few in number, are not easily 
caught in their own specific lies and that they do not necessarily believe in racism 
or economics, in the conspiracy of the Jews or of Wall Street.546   
 
The particular inflection of the idea, insomuch as we take Arendt’s thesis to be correct—
and this is itself contestable—is markedly different from Ivan’s.   For those of Hitler’s 
inner circle who did not believe in his personal infallibility still believed that they could 
expunge substance itself through the absolute will of the over-man—who was above all 
morality.  Contrariwise, for Ivan the very possibility of the ‘man in man’ can only be 
understood if everything is permitted, since only thereby could a space open up for his 
ability to know good and evil, and without this knowledge no morality could exist.  
Therefore the same idea—that everything is permitted—is inflected to into opposing 
polarities: “Do you understand why this infamy must be and is permitted?  Without it, I 
am told, man could not have existed on earth, for he could not have known good and evil.  
Why should he know that diabolical good and evil when it costs so much?”547 
 I have stated that Dostoevsky’s special talent in Bakhtin’s eyes was that of 
hearing voices in the personalities of his characters; however, it would be more exacting 
to say, in choral support with Bakhtin, that Dostoevsky heard “the dialogic relationship 
among voices, their dialogic interaction.”548  The artistic material of The Brothers 
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Karamazov or Crime and Punishment or The Possessed is not fabricated from the 
author’s mind, as we have typically come to understand the image of the author 
Pantocrator under the myth of the artist-genius.  To no small degree, Dostoevsky 
possessed the ability to step outside himself and incorporate the real political and social 
matter that surrounded him—what Bakhtin calls the prototypical idea-images in human 
history.549  Where this material was monologically inflected he also expanded it to fit into 
the great dialogue of human history; he had the ability to step aside and allow the great 
dialogue to express itself—without assuming that he could or should dismiss the 
importance of his own voice as author.  In this way, the image of the idea as it appears in 
Dostoyevsky’s polyphonic novels does not evolve into the typically monological ideal 
type often found in philosophic and scholarly works.550  In fact, “there is no evolution, no 
growth” of the idea at all.551  While it is true that ideas have a life of their own, they only 
appear to change as they are inflected through various consciousnesses.  Insomuch as they 
are open and not fully conditioned, they will of course appear to evolve, but they 
themselves do not actually change as if they could exist wholly independent, as objects, 
outside of individual consciousnesses.  On the contrary, like the once-occurrent event, 
they themselves do not change but are struggled over hermeneutically within the 
biographical lives of personalities.  From the point of view of a single consciousness, the 
idea is monological.  It is only when it is torn out of its static and univocal point of view 
and placed outside itself between voices that it can be perceived as dialogical.  The great 
achievement of the polyphonic novel is that it shows the dialogical flexibility of the idea 
where the basic intentional relation between an individual consciousness and the idea 
cannot. 
 The world represented in Dostoevsky’s multiple ideological mosh pit is therefore 
not systematic.  Against the current of typical systematic ideology, the polyphonic novel 
places the litmus of veridicality back at home in the person to whom it is attached and 
inflected.  Logic of the Hegelian sort runs in the opposite direction—and we might add 
Plato and Husserl’s Ideas to this species.  There the truth belongs to no one and is not 
perspectival.  In order to circumvent psychologism, Husserl was forced to define truth as 
universal and outside the influence of particular inflections, even if the manifold of 
relations must enter into an individual consciousness.  The whole point of the 
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phenomenological reduction is to ground meaning in the absolute truth of a unified set of 
relations.  Dostoevsky does not approach these types of unities at all.  His world is 
unapologetically messy.  But his idea does not seek to ground itself in an atemporal a-
spatial no-man’s land.552 
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§ 7.  Chronotopicity: Bakhtin’s Writings on Rabelais and Goethe 
 
7.1 Seeing Auras:  
Bakhtin’s Concept of Chronotopicity 
 
“There is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it extends 
into the boundless past and the boundless future).  Even past meanings, that is, those born in the 
dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all)—they will always 
change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent, future development of the dialogue.  At any 
moment in the development of the dialogue there are immense, boundless masses of forgotten 
contextual meanings, but at certain moments of the dialogue’s subsequent development along the 
way they are recalled and invigorated in renewed form (in a new context).  Nothing is absolutely 
dead: every meaning will have its homecoming festival.  The problem of great time.”  
 —Bakhtin553 
 
“Death is swallowed up in victory.”  “O Death, where is your sting?  O Hades, where is your 
victory?” 
—The Apostle Paul554 
 
 “Everyone treats death as an important matter: but as yet death is not a festival.” 
  —Nietzsche555 
 
In this, the last section of our little survey of Bakhtin, I want to explore the theme of 
chronotopicity as it is applied to François Rabelais and Johann Wolfgang Goethe.  I will 
begin by saying a few words regarding the development of Bakhtin’s notion of the 
chronotope, its derivation, and its context within the wider cultural and philosophical 
milieu with which Bakhtin is in dialogue.  In this section I will make the case for why the 
major works on both chronotopicity and novelistic genres exhibit a continuity in 
Bakhtin’s oeuvre as well as where his theory of both are lacking—with respect to 
distinctly modern forms of time and chronotope.  The major essays with which one must 
struggle to gain insight into the concept of chronotopicity are “Forms of Time and 
Chronotope in the Novel”, “The Bildungsroman and Its Significance in the History of 
Realism (Toward a Historical Typology of the Novel”, and certain thematic trends in 
Rabelais and his World.  I will then review the major forms of chronotope in the novel 
which Bakhtin himself explores in the first two of these works.  This done, I will explore 
what I see as the central chronotopic theme in Rabelais and his World which is by no 
means overtly stated therein.  In doing so I will tie together what is essentially a 
genealogical account of the shifting understanding of time and space between the 
Medieval and the Renaissance world—this account is dispersed throughout the Rabelais 
book.  The shift occurs, as we will see, according to the fracturing of the rigid hierarchical 
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great chain of being which we have already begun to discuss as it emerged out of neo-
Platonism.556  This exegesis will serve two purposes.  First, it will undercut Caryl 
Emerson and Gary Saul Morson’s supposition that the carnivalesque and chronotopicity 
are nearly mutually exclusive concepts.  This is not the case.  In fact, the Rabelaisian 
chronotope depends upon the horizontalization of hierarchical structures; this 
horizontalization could also be called the historicization of Medieval culture which takes 
place during the Renaissance—but which has its roots in the unofficial folk-festive 
chronotopes that date back to at least a millennium before the dawn of modern ‘man’; 
Bakhtin provides us with a thematic but compelling narrative of a human reawakening to 
the positive function of time and becoming during the Renaissance.  Finally, I will pass 
from the Rabelaisian chronotope to the image of time and space as it is taken up during 
the Romantic period by Goethe.   Let me say at the outset that Goethe’s chronotope is by 
no means wholly Romantic, however, and in many ways it resists the conflation of the 
individual and bourgeois image of ‘man’ that emerges in that epoch.  I will somewhat 
tangentially provide an account of Goethe’s relation to carnival as it appears in his Italian 
Journey.   
 
Bakhtin shares Kant’s belief that time and space are crucial to cognitive processes, but he 
moves away from Kant’s supposition that they are merely empty formal conditions of 
experience.557  Furthermore, Bakhtin makes no secret of his reliance on Einstein’s theory 
of relativity, but the latter’s theory of time and space is invoked more than it has any 
methodological or performative influence on Bakhtin’s usage of the term chronotopicity.  
He picked it up, no doubt, on the occasion of the Ukhtomsky lecture that he and Kanaëv 
had attended.  Loosely following Einstein’s theory of relativity, chronotopicity was 
defined by Ukhtomsky as “the perceptions of intervals of time and space,” and therefore 
we may see at once both the importance of the Kantian Copernican turn and the 20th 
century addition by Einstein, who makes time-space relative to perception. 558   
As is true elsewhere, we can confirm that Kant looms large in the background of 
his theory of the chronotope in that Bakhtin wishes to distance himself from the merely 
epistemic basis for Kantian and neo-Kantian apposition and temporality.  Kant radicalized 
time and space after Newton, who treated them as absolute and empty forms outside of 
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‘man.’  Kant rejected any talk of time and space from the vantage point of the things-in-
themselves, and instead makes of time and space empty forms of intuition which in turn 
make possible synthetic a priori perception of objects.559  As transcendental conditions, 
however, they remained unconditioned and outside the categories of the understanding—
hence this special restriction of time and space to forms of intuition.  Kant’s account, 
however, is merely an epistemological critique of the extent to which time and space are 
presupposed by our experience of objects.  As such, the Kantian Critical notions of time 
and space are nothing more than the “gnoseological subject” thinking time and thinking 
space; they are not lived space-time itself.560   
In a seemingly surreptitious comment, now infamous among scholars, Bakhtin 
states that he has borrowed Einstein’s Theory of Relativity “almost as a metaphor 
(almost, but not entirely).”561  As to what degree Bakhtin truly meant it as metaphor we 
will leave to one side.  He says that he utilises the term as a literary-theoretical device and 
although we may presume he was familiar with Einstein’s General and Special Theories, 
he makes no direct use of them.  Nevertheless, Emerson and Morson note five points of 
intersection between Einstein’s theory of time-space and Bakhtin’s chronotopicity.   
First of all, time-space connotes an irreducible whole.562  
Second, there are multiplicities of time-space, and we “must entertain the 
possibility, or consider the necessity, of choosing among available ones or discovering 
new ones.”563  Morson and Emerson point to Lobachevsky’s thesis that space has multiple 
possible autonomous logics and the Euclidian “cannot be assumed in advance.”564  We 
ought to think about time-space as a unity but with a multiplicity of virtual—i.e., 
possible—actualizations that cannot be determined beforehand or deduced apodictically.  
Morson and Emerson also point to what Bakhtin calls the “Galilean chronotope 
consciousness.”565  The reference is not given but they seem to be referring to the so-
called “Galilean linguistics consciousness,”566 which is a polyphonous linguistics that 
relativizes discourse to its particular “double-voicedness” and seeks to give an account for 
it in its “living and evolving” dynamism.  If Morson and Emerson did misspeak it has 
nevertheless been a productive parapraxis, since it emphasizes the special theory of the 
chronotope which relates to Bakhtin’s theory of discourse in the novel.  In any case, 
Bakhtin chooses to focus on the age old trope surrounding the epochal change effected by 
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Galileo.  Galileo’s celestial discoveries and the Copernican heliocentric model of the 
universe led to the displacement of ‘man’ from what was hitherto his cosmic centrality in 
creation.  Here the idea of a point of view, or perspective, casts doubt on the divinely 
fixed order of nature and of ‘man’s’ place in it.  Reflexively this new order of nature will 
further complicate the Renaissance and modern image of ‘man,’ and we will return to this 
theme below. Third, Morson and Emerson point out that we can assume a special 
organization of the chronotope centred around the body of each individual; and by this we 
mean bodies and individuals in general and not only the bodies of human individuals.  
These bodies may include but are not limited to molecular bodies, social organizations 
and institutions, individual persons, texts, utterances, extraverbal phenomena, and so 
forth.567  In the concept of the chronotope Bakhtin links certain types of the novel—as a 
body of literature—with the specific genres and thematic content that lends to it its 
specific sense of space-time.  Buy these genres are themselves treated as irreducible 
bodies around which space-time is uniquely structured. 
Fourth, the chronotope is a diachronic concept and is in flux.  Later ameliorations 
to the Newtonian chronotope as expressed in celestial mechanics, for example, can stretch 
and change the chronotope without breaking it; for example, specialists can work 
antagonistically but recognizably as Newtonians within Newtonian physics.  
Nevertheless, Kant’s a priori intuited time and space as pure “sequence” and “apposition” 
which have a wholly transcendental character would necessitate a chronotope of its own 
that is essentially different from the Newtonian.568  Likewise Galileo and Einstein would 
have their own distinct time-space perspective.569   
Finally, the focus of Bakhtin’s conceptualization of chronotopicity may not be 
transcendental, as in Kant, but the chronotope is presupposed by all experience 
nonetheless.  Time-space is not an object of experience but is a condition of its 
possibility.  The chronotope could be understood as a transcendental category in the sense 
that it opens up all possibility of experience, but it is nevertheless relative in that each 
particular chronotope is subject to contextualized ideological inflections and a historically 
conditioned faculty of perception.  To be more precise, there is no chronotope—singular; 
there are only chronotopes.  Insomuch as they implicate a particular socio-historical 
space-time, chronotopes are essential to axiological intonation.570  
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Central to both Bakhtin’s theory of discourse and chronotopicity in the novel is 
the image of ‘man’ which a particular motif embodies.571  In fact, all images can become 
saturated with “chronotopic motifs”; they can carry an “aura”—the gothic castle is an 
example.572  Yet even though the chronotope plays a large role in the background, and 
even though the notion of chronotopicity informed Bakhtin’s thought at least since the 
Ukhtomsky lecture, Morson and Emerson believe the carnival theory of the novel often 
contradicts chronotopicity; nevertheless, they find the discourse and chronotopic theories 
of the novel to be largely in accord.573  They seem to want to reduce one theory to the 
other instead of setting them in dialogue.  It is not clear that they understand that the 
Rabelaisian chronotope envelopes the carnivalesque—that is, carnival is essential to the 
Rabelaisian chronotope.  For example, the much-discussed image of the “pregnant death” 
ties together the historical past and future in the present.574  This grotesque image 
therefore requires a certain historically conditioned perspective regarding time-space.  As 
such, it hardly seems possible that the theories of chronotopicity and carnival could be 
mutually exclusive.  Morson and Emerson’s ambitious critical work tends toward a 
hyper-rationalized account of Bakhtin’s work in which all the pieces are supposed to fit 
smoothly in place.  This approach is impossible for a thinker like Bakhtin, who is really 
more of a cultural theorist and scholar than a ‘critical’ philosopher—in spite of his early 
flirtations with Kant.   
The image of a pregnant death returns in highly complex way in Bakhtin’s work 
on Dostoevsky.  Here there is another explicit connection with a life and death series 
directly associated with temporality and space.  In fact, it is tempting to see the 
complexity of the life-death series in Crime and Punishment raised to a higher level than 
is seen in Rabelais; Raskolnikov’s crisis of existential inaction seems to point to a folding 
over of the grotesque image of the pregnant death on itself.  That is to say, whereas 
Rabelais ‘gives it to us straight,’ Dostoevsky adds another layer of complexity.  His 
images—where there are any at all—are incomplete and rely on what is said or thought 
by the personalities in the novel.  Although suffocating, Raskolnikov’s room opens onto 
the world and is the very opposite of à huis clos scenes in other existentialist works—
Sartre being the primary example, of course.  Consider what Bakhtin says: “Raskolnikov 
lives, in essence, on a threshold: his narrow room, a ‘coffin’ (a carnival symbol here) 
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opens directly onto the landing of the staircase, and he never locks his door.”575  Here he 
stifles himself in an open room.  He broods and deliberates.  His inaction weighs on him 
like death.  But the specifically carnivalesque invocation of the coffin suggests to us that 
this death is also an incubation of life.  How can this be?  We know that what he is 
waiting for is the transubstantiation of his spiritual struggle into the murder of the 
pawnbroker.  The life that gestates in this room, therefore, is a death.  So long as he is 
suspended by inactivity in his coffin/room he carries the symbol of death within himself.  
When he finally actualizes this symbolic death it is as if he is giving birth to death.   
If we regard the threshold between the life-death series in terms of this bi-polar 
double-voiced carnivalesque image, the positive polarity of Raskolnikov’s delay 
immediately emerges.  During the long slow movement of Raskolnikov’s deliberation 
regarding the brutal murder he will commit, we implicitly understand that time is 
everywhere marked by a plenistic delay and threshold space which must be traversed.  As 
a result, the threshold images play an essential role in Crime and Punishment:  
The threshold, the foyer, the corridor, the landing, the stairway, its steps, doors 
opening onto the stairway, gates to front and back yards, and beyond these, the 
city: squares, streets, façade, taverns, dens, bridges, gutters.  This is the space of 
the novel.  And in fact absolutely nothing here ever loses touch with the threshold 
... we can uncover just such an organization of space in Dostoevsky’s other works 
as well.576 
 
The trope of the threshold leaves the reader suspended to tarry on that which is always 
about to happen.  As such, it is intimately associated with positive delay—i.e., a time 
which must be traversed and which actively incubates death.  Once again, we can see no 
reason why Morson and Emerson indict Bakhtin for having contradictory allegiances to 
the notions of the carnivalesque and the chronotope; in-themselves, these notions are 
simply not contradictory.   
In terms of the speech genre, Bakhtin calls the invocation of an entire genre by the 
use of a single evaluative word the “stylistic aura” which surrounds the word.577  By 
analogy we would say that the chronotopic motif—here the threshold—invokes an entire 
chronotopic organization.  The motif of the public square, the façade, the doorway, and in 
particular this coffin-like room in which Raskolnikov procrastinates, all auratically 
conjure this chronotopic sense of delayed time and threshold space.578   
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Michael Gardiner reminds us that the idea of the aura in Bakhtin is reminiscent of 
Benjamin’s similar concept; there the aura is described as the irrefutable sense that is 
carried by a “presence in the here and now.”579  Strictly speaking, the aura is more limited 
in Benjamin.  The filmic genre, for example, cannot carry an aura of the actor or character 
on screen.580  Here we begin to perceive Bakhtin’s noteworthy silence regarding 
specifically modern chronotopes and genres; again, this omission has been drawn out in 
Gardiner’s The Dialogics of Critique, and very interestingly for us, bears some 
connection to “Benjamin’s account of the demise of ‘aura’ in the modern world.”581  If we 
take an example from fin-de-siècle stage-craft, the difference between aura-less film and 
auratic stage presence is akin to the different experiences one would have at watching 
Sarah Bernhardt perform the role of Hamlet in the opera houses of Europe versus 
watching her perform the same role in the short film Le Duel d’Hamlet of 1900.582  For 
Benjamin, it is the gulf between the past—tradition—and the modern that effects “[t]he 
perte d’auréole (the loss of halo, or aura)”.583  Filmic reproducibility destroys this halo 
and changes the medium of art qua reproducible artefact.584  Gardiner’s observation that 
Bakhtin shies away from modernist forms of artist production may be likened to the 
Critical Theoretical school’s neo-luddite-esque reservations regarding modern technology 
in general.  Thus the evaluation of the chronotope as a stylistically auratic motif alongside 
speech genres invites a stand-alone work on the modern and postmodern chronotopes in 
literature and art.  The same could be said of the need for a study on the postmodern or 
poststructuralist chronotope.  Here the Bakhtinian might suppose, in choral support of 
Fredric Jameson, that the postmodern chronotope has exhibited a progressively more 
depthless, weak and schizophrenic historicity, and is ultimately temporally and spatially 
intensive.585  Such an analysis is quite beyond the scope of the present work, but we mark 
its possibility here parenthetically. In any case, the auratic power of the genre motif 
applies equally to the chronotopic motif.  The chronotopic motif has the power to evoke a 
“whole complex of concepts” which implicate a particular image of ‘man’ and by 
implication a whole literary chronotope.586   
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7.2   A Little History of the Novel:  
Novelistic Genres and Forms of the Chronotope 
 
We will now review some of these chronotopic genres as they are presented in both 
“Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel” and “The Bildungsroman”.587  These 
genres to follow in detail are the novel of ordeal, the Greek adventure novel, ancient 
biography and autobiography (specifically the Platonic and the encomium), the folkloric, 
the Medieval chivalric romance, the baroque novel, and the Bildungsroman. 
The hours and days traversed in the novel of ordeal leaves no permanent mark on 
its hero and heroine. 588  As Morson and Emerson explain, the novel of ordeal exhibits an 
“unreal conception of the effect of experience and time in traditional romance.”589  
Chance figures at the forefront of adventure-time in the ordeal, and specifically the 
chance which submits the protagonists to a test by some god or Loki-like prankster.  
Nevertheless, these chance happenings mark only a digressive time rather than the time of 
pure “duration”590; the delay to which the hero is subjected is an empty delay for its own 
sake and merely serves to create an obstacle of empty time and space which must simply 
be traversed.  Since the trial of the hero is not meant to change him, he emerges from it 
wholly unscathed.  Time therefore has an absolute “reversibility” and space is completely 
interchangeable.591  Morson and Emerson point out that simultaneity plays a dramatic 
influence in the development of this intensive delay—“suddenly” is frequently used.592  I 
would suggest that Shakespeare’s The Tempest uses the reversible adventure-time first 
found in the chronotope of the Greek romantic novel.  The shipwreck, Caliban’s plotting, 
Ariel’s half-mocking lament for Ferdinand’s father who is assumed dead—“those are 
pearls that were his eyes”—none of this makes any difference in the least to the unfolding 
of events, and everything is put right in the end.593  The world against which the Greek 
romance takes place must be of the empty-husk variety—i.e., univocal, and it must also 
be an “alien” world.594  If it were too familiar, if it took place “at home,” inevitably the 
chronotope would be destabilized by realist or other contextualizing factors.595  The hero 
must travel, just as Telemachus does at the beginning of the Odyssey in setting out to find 
his father.  Testing is prominent in the Greek romance, but if the hero and heroine are to 
prove their mettle they must hold fast to an unchanging character: the ordeal tests their 
virtue to show their character is immutable and unalloyed.  There is no trace of the all 
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important chronotopic motif of becoming and change.596  Certainly standard 
Shakespearean comedies such as Pericles also rely on the vast empty delay of arrival, 
since Pericles spends most of the adventure-time of the play racing between ports.   
The second type of ancient chronotope is found in Apuleius’ The Golden Ass and 
Petronius’ Satyricon; these constitute the two lonely examples of the Greek adventure 
novel.  These works present an admixture of two chronotopes “adventure-time” and 
“everyday-time.”597  The central motif is that of the metamorphosis, and Lucius’ 
transformation into an ass and back is an example of the peculiar change inherent in 
metamorphosis.  Change is not absolute; it is change alongside identity.  Lucius is both 
ass and Lucius at once.  Bakhtin cites three specific genealogical lines from which the 
idea of metamorphosis is formed: Greek philosophy, the Eleusinian cults, and the “purely 
popular folklore.”598  The Greek adventure novel moves forward in fits and starts, and it 
has an unusual “temporal sequence” as a result.599  One thematic component of this 
chronotope bares the stamp of cyclicity while another that of the unfolding series of 
events.  As the adventure novel genre changes, the trope of metamorphosis gets cut off 
from its wider significance and becomes narrowly construed and employed to dramatize 
the hero’s merely individual change; this hermeneutical proposition remarkably echoes 
the sublimation of the carnivalesque by the bourgeois cult of the individual.600  
Regardless of this diminution in status of the theme of change from cosmic to individual, 
however, the “crisis” faced by the hero will compel him to change.601  The positive 
polarity of time is therefore explored in the Greek adventure novelistic genre. 
 In antiquity, the ancient biography and autobiography genres did not exist in 
novelistic form.  Nevertheless there were two such examples of Greek texts which 
explicitly take up this “new type of biographical time.”602  In the first type, the Platonic 
form—such as is found in the Phaedo—is organized around the Platonic maxim ‘know 
thyself.’603  What is Bakhtin thinking here?  He posits an ancient genre for which there is 
no exemplar text.  The motifs of ancient biography and autobiography remain scattered 
throughout various works and will become important—in changed form—in the 
Bildungsroman; he obviously wants to trace the roots of biographical space-time back to 
its earliest forms, even if these forms exist only in fragments.  Again, in the ancient 
biography and autobiography genres we bear witness to the individual metamorphosis 
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that was first developed with the Greek adventure novel, only instead of seeking the 
cosmic truth of universal metamorphosis of becoming, Platonic biographical motifs tend 
toward an “idealized-biographical scheme.”604  What counts for biographically pertinent 
information here is not the personal and merely private affairs of the individual but the 
idealized individual as he is in essence.  This is perhaps the first instance of the 
gnoseological subject’s entrance into Western thought.  The form of time is that of the 
metamorphosis, of course, but this transformation functions according to a hierarchical 
logic of knowledge.  We return here then to the four rungs of Plato’s ladder of knowledge 
that we saw in Section Two of the present work: vis-à-vis the supernal realm of 
conjecture, belief, and understanding as well as the supernal realm of knowing.605  We 
will have more to say about this hierarchy below.   
The second type of chronotypical biographical motif is the encomium and its 
emphasis is on the real-life chronotope of the individual who is being memorialized.  The 
biographical form of life in the encomium is one opened outward and formed by the 
spaces of the public square—the agora.  The public square shaped public life completely.  
It was the site of official political manoeuvring, of collective defence, of civic pride, and 
even where “revealed truth [was] realized concretely and fully incarnated, made visible 
and given a face.”606  One’s “public self-consciousness” is determined by the entelechy or 
purpose, and the energetic and analytic biography are the two structural strategies for the 
ancient biographical motif.607  In the energetic form character is predetermined from the 
start, but it is only revealed through a logic of discovery or unfolding, while “character 
itself does not grow, does not change, it is merely filled in.”608  In the analytic, time 
remains empty and unimportant beyond providing a space for this unfolding of character-
logical traits.609  In this second type of ancient biography, we are given just enough 
information throughout the life of the hero to support an analytical reconstruction of the 
protagonist’s life, but again the biographical events are mere facts; they do not effect 
change in the character.  In neither of these cases, the Platonic or the encomium, do we 
yet have a depth image of ‘man.’  The Greeks notoriously tended to ignore the home 
economy of the private sphere and inner life, and therefore whatever personal inflections 
and biographical information that appears here is crucial for the public exterior man and 
not his inner life.  
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 Essential to the idea of chronotopicity in general is Bakhtin’s notion of the 
fullness of time.610  This idea expresses the tenet that time cannot be understood solely by 
making reference to its separate aspects.  My present establishes its sense according to 
what has come before it and what is anticipated to come after it.  As we have said, 
Morson and Emerson note the essential difference between Bakhtin’s theory of 
chronotopicity and the carnivalesque.  We said that they misunderstand how time-space is 
subsumed in the Rabelaisian chronotope—and notably in the image of pregnant death.  
The folkloric chronotope is very nearly co-extensive with the Rabelaisian, although no 
doubt the Rabelaisian images of gluttony, of the grotesque body, of those infamous 
billingsgate (and blasphemes), of the underworld, giagantism (scale), etc., all add such a 
richness and uniqueness that Bakhtin could not help but give Rabelais his very own 
unique sense of space-time.611  Bakhtin’s idiosyncratic theory of the novel is built on the 
presumption that folkloric culture was, up until the modern period, the populist mode of 
existence.  Folkloric culture remains embedded in the bi-polar life processes of life and 
death, of work and leisure, of sowing and reaping.  Its chronotope is therefore everywhere 
stamped by cyclicity.  Nature and ‘man,’ as macrocosm and microcosm, both find 
themselves everywhere marked by this cyclicity.612  There is also a second prominent 
feature regarding time, namely “historical inversion.”613  Another major difference 
between the folkloric and the Rabelaisian chronotope leaps out at us: the folkloric 
chronotope is nostalgic for a lost golden-age, and it tends to interpret present and future 
events from the vantage point of an idyllic past or a singular future event—i.e., it is 
eschatological.614  In spite of this eschatological and gold-age longing, the folkloric 
chronotope is steeped in the real time of natural events and processes.  As such the 
Rabelaisian chronotope will draw heavily from it. 
 As a genre, the Medieval chivalric romance is largely steeped in the Greek 
romance trope of testing, only the ordeal here is distinctly that of testing Christian 
virtue.615  The temporal motifs of this genre are broken down into a series of “adventure-
fragments.”616  The motif of an alien world returns here to set the hero on his adventure 
away from home and into the ordeal.  Unlike the Greek romance, the chivalric adventure 
novel requires a hero for whom this miraculous alien world is welcomed with open arms.  
Here the hero maintains his identity because of providential interference not in spite of it.  
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The logic of the chivalric romance is therefore that of living up to one’s potential through 
time rather than retaining one’s atemporal identity which is more or less set in stone ab 
ovo.   
In its later manifestation, in Dante, in Guillaume de Lorris’ Roman de la Rose, in 
Langland’s Piers Plowman, the Medieval chivalric romance stretches itself out into an 
“encyclopaedic” form.617  Here both the vertical axis of simultaneity and the horizontal 
axis of succession take hold, but only the vertical axis carries with it the intuited fullness 
of time, and the real historical succession of events counts positively only insofar as it can 
be sensibly relocated in vertical simultaneous groups of relations.  Nevertheless, Bakhtin 
seems to espy the loosening of the official hierarchical (neo-Platonic) great chain of being 
within the genre of the Medieval chivalric romance.  Time begins to fill up with its 
positive aspect; time is becoming the effectual time of becoming, so to speak.   
For example, Dante’s circles of hell reorganize various historical sinners not 
according to their temporally causal date of damnation, but according to the intensity of 
their sin.  In this way Count Ugolino is found in the ninth circle of hell, physically above 
rather than temporally after Judas, Brutus, and Cassius—for Ugolino’s treachery is 
merely to Florence etc., not the whole of the Roman Empire or the Kingdom of Heaven.  
It makes no difference here what historical order to which each transgression belongs; the 
sinners are accorded their lodgings spatially according to the grotesqueness of their act of 
betrayal.618  Still, the vertical scale of nature is torqued in Dante: 
The mighty impact of the upward vertical movement is opposed by the no less 
mighty impulse to break through toward the horizontal of real space and historic 
time, the tendency to understand and form destiny outside the hierarchical norms 
and values of the Middle Ages.  Hence the extraordinary tension of the balance 
created in his world by Dante’s titanic power.619 
 
This tension is caused by the ambiguity and the double-voiced tendencies in Dante that 
mark, for Bakhtin, the early warning system of the poet avant-garde who sees the writing 
on the wall.  History is becoming positively marked.  The fixed hierarchy in which there 
exists nothing new under the sun is beginning to horizontalize into historical becoming.  
Ugolino and Judas occupy the spatial territory they do because of Dante’s sense of the 
shifting ground underneath the feet of official culture.  Things are changing.  Measure 
according to the image of God and custom is becoming measurement according to ‘man.’  
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Dante’s chronotope is therefore not marked exclusively by verticality but by a tension 
between ordered simultaneity and plenary succession.  It is as if the slow realization that 
the pure simultaneity of the ideal world of forms began to become embedded in the real 
historical formation of concepts.  It is as if the roots of the supermundane began to be 
unearthed to show, quite literally, the material embodied and historically contingent 
source of our ideas. 
The baroque novel is the last novel of ordeal that occupies Bakhtin’s attention.  
The hero is writ large in the baroque novel.  The ordinary events of everyday life do make 
an appearance but on a grand scale.620  The interval between the normal unfolding of the 
hero’s life is once again interrupted by the ordeal, and again it “lacks any real 
biographical duration”; however, the baroque novel establishes a positive “psychological 
time” within this interval: “this time possesses a subjective palpability and duration.” 621  
Nevertheless this psychological time is not localizable to any specific situation in the 
hero’s life.  The hero does not effect change in the world and neither does the world 
change him.    
 The Bildungsroman combines the complexity of the baroque ordeal with its 
“psychological time” with the biographical motif.  Stendhal, Balzac, and Dostoevsky all 
exemplify this generic typology.622  The trope of testing breaks down into sub-generic 
species: artistic competence, bureaucratic and vocational testing, ethical suitability for 
life, biological fitness, intellectual and social aptitude, and the various ordeals of the ‘new 
woman,’ all by times inflect the category of the Bildungsroman.623  The Bildungsroman—
typically translated as the “novel of education”—emerges as a genre in the late 18th 
century in Germany and especially with Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister.624  The image of 
‘man’ portrayed in the novel of education has now overturned the static characterization 
of the ‘man’ who can withstand the ordeal and remain himself.625  Whether this self is 
latent and must unfold or is extolled by the author from the beginning is no longer 
relevant to the form of the chronotope, since the protagonist’s life now is understood as 
one which is set out as a task to be accomplished rather than merely to be endured 
without compromise.  Thus the “ready-made hero” is discarded by the Bildungsroman for 
a new image of the ‘man’ of emergence and becoming; in essence he becomes 
temporalized626: “Time is introduced into man, enters into his very image, changing in a 
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fundamental way the significance of all aspects of his destiny and life.  This type of novel 
can be designated in the most general sense as the novel of human emergence.”627  
Emergence can take five different forms: the cyclical (related to the life-cycle of the 
hero), emergence from youth into adolescence, biographical and autobiographical 
emergence (the cyclical element is dropped), didactic-pedagogical emergence (the ‘novel 
of education’ is of this type), and finally the image of ‘man’s’ individual emergence is 
portrayed according to and alongside historical time.628  The importance of this last type 
of emergence cannot be overstated for either the history of the novel or for Bakhtin’s 
theories of chronotopicity.  The novel as a thousand year-old cultural technology of folk 
culture begins to move out of the shadows into a self-reflexive dialogue with the image of 
‘man’ in terms of becoming.  One might say the novel becomes a plateau in which human 
beings culturally dialogue with themselves about where they have come from and where 
they are going. 
 There is a real sense in Bakhtin that he is not only interested in preparing a 
taxonomy of novelistic genres.  In itself this would be a pointless exercise that would be 
productive only for highly specialized literary theorists.  The emergence of the novel of 
emergence, if one might put it so circuitously, seems to have a special significance for 
Bakhtin; his Bildungsroman book was, after all, dedicated to it.  It is as if the novel has 
itself come of age.  The Bildungsroman of historical emergence presents us finally with a 
literary genre that has the teeth to show not only ‘man’s’ becoming but the becoming of 
the world in history.  This sub-species of novel catches a view of its protagonist at the 
very precipice of personal and societal change—although as we have just seen not every 
type of Bildungsroman deals with both personal and historical change; in any case, what 
is important here is that the genre in its entirety links the personal and social becoming.  
The destiny of the individual and the destiny of the world meet in the singular series of 
events portrayed, and these events “achieve a significant assimilation of real historical 
time.”629  For Bakhtin, Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel achieve the greatest 
synthesis of these two moments in the entire history of the novel.  Goethe plays a 
secondary but likewise crucial role, and the remainder of our reconstruction and analysis 
shall focus on the chronotope and image of ‘man’ in these two authors.  In regards to 
Rabelais’ chronotope, I propose to draw from Rabelais and his World rather than simply 
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to repeat what Bakhtin has said in “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel.”  This 
will add to what Bakhtin has said in the chronotope essay as well as help draw together 
the less overt traces of the Rabelaisian chronotope in his Rabelais book, and it will also 
serve to further contradict the notion that carnival folk-festive culture cannot be 
reconciled to the chronotope.  
 
7.3  A Pregnant Death:  
The Rabelaisian Chronotope 
 
I will begin with a prehistory of the horizontalization of hierarchy found in Rabelais.  The 
neo-Platonists believed that all things emanate and return to the One.630  Pseudo-
Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus, Proclus’ Elements of Theology, and the pseudo-
Aristotelian Liber de causis were the Medieval sources for the neo-Platonic notion of 
hierarchy.631  Not only did the Medievals believe in hierarchical order, but the order 
almost always descended from high to low and was caused by the One and not the other 
way around.632  Edward P. Mahoney’s commentary on Proclus shows this logic of high to 
low in action: “even the last or lowest kinds of existents depend on something above 
them, for if they did not they would withdraw into non-being and vanish.”633  Points of 
disagreement emerge around the possibility of gaps between the gradations of being 
which ascend the scale as well as whether or not these gradations represent species or 
individuals.634  The One serves here as the literal zero sum from which all other beings 
emanate, just as all numbers begin and progressively grow more distant from the number 
one or the single unit.635  Pseudo-Dionysius’ legacy for his Medieval inheritors lay in 
adding the language of spatiality and distance from the One to this zero sum hierarchy: 
Dionysius’ adoption of spatial language to explicate metaphysical hierarchy is 
particularly noteworthy, since it will be reflected in various Medieval and 
Renaissance thinkers.  In like fashion, his acceptance of a principle of continuity, 
according to which the lowest in a higher rank of things touches the highest in a 
lower rank, would be reflected in Medieval discussion.636 
 
Pseudo-Dionysius also held that if God—i.e., the One—was being in-itself, then all 
beings had their being only in him.  This idea is called the “doctrine of participation.”637  
Aquinas expanded this argument and claimed that the closer any entity climbed on the 
ladder of being the more actualized it becomes.  Matter on the other end of the scale is 
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mere potentiality, and the further the entity falls from grace, as it were, the more potential 
replaces and degrades actuality.638  Matter also plays this role for Marsilio Ficino, “since 
it is closest to non-being and further from God.”639  Nevertheless, for Aquinas, humans 
were the most actualized of species—likewise gold was the highest actualized mineral.640  
Paul of Venice begins at the opposite pole of non-being and posits that all beings can be 
ordered according to their distance from non-being.641  Paul offered this thesis as a bolster 
to the idea that God himself, as a perfect being, must be infinitely—and therefore 
equally—distant from all other beings.  Therefore, beings must be ordered strictly 
according to the pole from which they are not infinitely distant—i.e., from matter or non-
being.  The central conflict here arises from the notion that while God is being in-itself 
and therefore must be the measure of all things he is likewise perfect and therefore cannot 
partake in imperfect being.642  This contradiction has contributed to the philosophical 
factions and fragmentation surrounding the notion of hierarchy within the scholastic 
discourse of scala naturae. 
 Lovejoy’s central tenet, out of which emerges his entire history of the idea of the 
great ladder leading up to God, is that the good as it appears in Plato sets out the 
Medieval philosophic cornerstone that he calls “cosmic determinism.”643  As we have 
already seen in Section Two, Platonic philosophy placed ‘the good’ outside of the world 
of appearances; this had the effect of making hypotheses and testing by dialectic the 
proper method to approach true knowledge of the good.  Thought had to leap over 
appearances.  This view was, according to Lovejoy, a “dialectical necessity” in the 
Academy: 
The idea of the good is a necessary reality; it cannot be other than what its essence 
implies; and it therefore must, by virtue of its own nature, necessarily engender 
finite existents.  And the number of kinds of these is equally predetermined 
logically; the Absolute would not be what it is if it gave rise to anything less than 
a complete world in which the ‘model,’ i.e., the totality of ideal Forms, is 
translated into concrete realities.  It follows that every sensible thing that is, is 
because it—or at all events, its sort—cannot but be, and be precisely what it is.  
This implication, it is true, is not fully drawn out by Plato himself; but since it is 
plainly immanent in the Timaeus, he thus bequeathed to later metaphysics and 
theology one of their most persistent, most vexing, and most contention-breeding 
problems.644 
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While Mahoney suggests that Lovejoy is simply mistaken regarding this latency of 
cosmic determinism in the Timaeus, we can only fault Lovejoy with a retrogressive 
projection of this determinism from the standpoint of the Medievals onto Plato.645  While 
we mark this methodological and hermeneutical error on the part of Lovejoy, we can 
nevertheless uphold the supposition that cosmic determinism did come down to us from 
at least the time of Proclus in the form of a hierarchical chain of being.  The mutability of 
this chain is another matter entirely and we shall not deal with it here.  What is essential 
for our purposes is that this notion of a dialectical necessity not only existed as a profound 
centripetal force in scholastic and popular thought during the Middle Ages, but also that 
it held all official creeds firm within its grasp.  One could (sometimes) argue as to 
whether or not God’s perfection was infinitely distant from ‘man,’ but not the centrality 
of God in the universe.  One could (sometimes) argue whether God was the measure of 
all things, but one could not argue the same for ‘man.’  This marked fixity of the Middle 
Ages begins to slide during the Renaissance, and not just in the well-schooled opinions of 
the philosophers, but primarily in unofficial art and popular culture.  We say again: this 
loosening begins in culture, in everyday life, not in philosophy!  This sliding was not born 
overnight, but quite to the contrary, was celebrated in unofficial folk-festive cultural 
production, simultaneously alongside byzantine hierarchical agelast austerity, and the 
‘sobriety’ of scholastic dialectical thought. 
 The new image of ‘man’ as the measure of all things is essential to understanding 
the change that was occurring during the Renaissance.  I would suggest that the import of 
this change in the history of the West, from a vertical hierarchy where the image of God 
is the cosmic determining principle to the image of ‘man’ as the new standard of 
measurement, cannot be overestimated.  While Rabelais was himself immersed in the bi-
polar sympathetic notion of microcosmic echo of macrocosm, the polarity that measures 
everything from the point of view of the image of God is overturned in Rabelais and in 
the Renaissance in general.  This polarity was destined to fracture the hierarchical cosmic 
logic that we have been reviewing; Bakhtin says: “The human body was the centre of 
philosophy that contributed to the destruction of the Medieval hierarchic picture of the 
world and to the creation of a new concept.”646   
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 Bakhtin glosses Aristotle’s influence over the Medieval hierarchical ordering of 
nature.  He also says nothing of Paul of Venice or other’s inversions of gradation 
according to the distance from God to the distance from non-being.  He does give an 
account of Aristotle’s four elements—so important to the late Medieval understanding of 
movement and substance, these being earth, water, air, and fire.  The image of the 
elements themselves is hierarchical in nature, since they are adjudged to be at home or 
away from their natural cosmic quarter depending on their spatial location in the cosmos.  
Above fire—often considered the highest element—there is a purported fifth element 
known as the quintessence.  We have already noted that the neo-Platonic and Christian 
worldview of the Medieval period indeed had a polarity of high and low which was, 
without fail, arranged hierarchically.  We have also noted that these poles, again without 
fail, were the first principle at one end and matter at the other. According to Bakhtin 
this movement from high to low shifts during the Renaissance to a reference forward and 
backward.647  A sense of ‘man’ in a state of becoming begins to enter into the discourse of 
the scala naturae, and this idea—which originates out of Medieval hierarchical being—is 
destined to overturn it, just as, we might say, the unofficial presents from within the 
official seeds of its own overturning.  Bakhtin does not explicitly state this, and we must 
never lose sight of the fact that the two types of being—i.e., static hierarchical being and 
dynamic being as becoming—exist together as poles.  Rabelais exemplifies this flattening 
of hierarchies since he is “consistently materialistic” and makes the human body—i.e., 
the image of ‘man’—the measure by which all other “material components of the 
universe disclose ... their true nature.”648  By exceeding his terrestrial limits, ‘man’ 
exceeds his own nature.  By defeating his fixed place in terra nostra, ‘man’ boldly 
ventures out into terra incognita.  By making the unofficial-fantastic an official reality, 
Renaissance ‘man’ brings to life the knowledge of the ancient world only to finally part 
ways with it.  The unquestioned hierarchical order of things is replaced in the 
Renaissance by a new image of ‘man,’ and this image is of a human animal beholden to 
becoming—to material nature—and not to the fixity of a dogmatic feudal order: 
Thanks to navigation and the invention of the sail, men have entered into material 
contact.  Mankind has become one.  After the invention of aviation (which 
Rabelais foresees), man will direct the weather, will reach the stars and conquer 
them.  This entire image of the triumph of mankind is built along the horizontal 
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line of time and space, typical of the Renaissance.  Nothing remains of the 
Medieval hierarchical vertical.649  
 
The succession of generations does the heavy lifting in this paradigmatic shift.  It is only 
because my children’s children’s children will arrive at terra incognita and begin to map 
it that this new image of ‘man’ can take hold and vouchsafe the human becoming.  For 
Rabelais, this horizontality of successive discovery concerns human beings in general and 
not individuals.  This picture of the body as the measure of all things is historical and 
material but not personal.  Neither is it merely biological.  
One could be tempted to see in Freud and Weismann a similar account of the non-
personal becoming of the human species, since generally speaking this notion serves to 
ground Weismann’s germ plasm and soma and Freud’s Eros and death instinct.  This was 
the case with Freud’s Weismannian turn in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, as we have 
seen.  There, Freud’s conjectures that the mortal part, the soma, could be seen as simply a 
means for the germ plasm to perpetuate itself—this is Weismann’s theory and Freud is 
tempted to accept it.  Of course, he does not.  But the supposition that death itself is a 
mere “expediency” to remove the “pointless luxury” of individual immortality borders in 
close proximity to Rabelais’ grotesque image of a pregnant death650; however, as we  
have likewise seen, Freud’s bourgeois subjectivism renders him incapable of seeing the 
positive polarity in this subterfuge of the soma by the germ plasm.  There is no 
Rabelaisian laughter in the idea that the individual is a mere luxury—a mere plaything of 
destiny.  Moreover, Weismann’s mortal and immortal aspects of life are indeed merely 
biological.  Notwithstanding his transference of these biological hypotheses to his 
psychoanalytic principles, Eros and the death instinct, Freud also omits the importance of 
cultural history from this account of species unfolding.  What is important for Rabelais, 
and a fortiori for the Renaissance world, is the new cultural turn realizing itself through 
the image of ‘man’ in historical becoming.  Freud remains an agelast.  He cannot see the 
positive polarity of becoming—the real pleasure motive of the death instinct. 
 As we have seen, the gradations of being were not univocally held to be top-down 
in the Middle Ages.  Nor was every theologian a Thomist, and thus not everyone held that 
measurement ran according to the two poles, the first principle and non-being, or 
alternately God and matter.  Indeed, figures such as Paul of Venice and Richard 
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Swineshead believe that if God had placed ‘man’ at an infinitely distant and fixed gulf 
from perfection, then the gradation of beings must be wholly determined from the bottom 
polarity of non-being.651  Bakhtin tells us that the marriage of the Christian cult of 
redemption and Pseudo-Dionysius’ hierarchy of gradations lent to the Medieval world a 
bi-polar and vertical logic of “ascent and fall.”652  It is clear that Bakhtin is again painting 
with very broad strokes.  The official Medieval world was not as univocal as he seems to 
believe, but depended to a great extent on who was speaking ex cathedra; be it a 
particular political family represented by Papa on St. Peter’s chair or whomever was 
currently serving as Charlemagne’s de facto heir, there is not one but a multeity of 
Medieval periods.   
 Nevertheless, one understands here that Bakhtin wants to talk about the Medieval 
period thematically in order to provide a general account of the transformation to the 
Renaissance without over complicating the transformation.  This shift can therefore be 
generally understood as the rise of a new standard of measurement.  The universally 
important and ostensibly unchanging image of God becomes the liquid and relative image 
of ‘man’ in the process of becoming.  It will be objected that we already are well aware of 
this fact, and that Bakhtin adds nothing to what has been made explicitly in Pico’s preface 
to the 900 Thesis, the so-called “Dignity of Man.”  Nevertheless, the general thrust of the 
official Medieval axiological inflection indeed seems to have been highly polarized in 
favour of the supernal image of the Demiurge and Pantocrator.  Bakhtin shows us that the 
new ‘dignity’ of ‘man’ is centred specifically in the image of ‘man’s’ body.  
 The Medieval conception of time is also highly polarized high to low.  The 
unmoving first principle negates the movement of matter and its constant shifting of 
forms.  The simultaneity of the vertical insured the possibility of an instantaneous rebirth 
in Christ through redemption.  Officially there was no possibility of growing into this new 
life in Christ, nor was the city of God built upon the real life urban denizens.  All merely 
human history is negated by a double movement.  First the official vertical hierarchical 
order is privileged and then polarized high to low.  While the everyday communities of 
‘men’ were by and large the exclusive sites around which our antecedent broke bread 
together and suffered in silence, it was the univocal image of the city of God that 
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mystified the noble, cleric, and popper alike in official life.  However, Dick Hebdige 
reminds us that the official polarization of the community of the realm itself has a history:  
In classical Mediterranean cultures, once the hospitality traditionally extended to 
the stranger had been exhausted, access to the civitas—the community and its 
sustaining networks of ritual, privilege, obligation—remained contingent on a 
more primeval order of belonging: an investment in the urbs, literally, in the 
stones of the city.  With the establishment in 18th century Europe of a bourgeois 
public realm where differences, ideally, were to be ‘aired’—owning property and 
speaking ‘properly’ became the dual prerequisites for being heard at all.653 
 
In other words, if we attempt to understand the modern and ancient world through the 
lens of the Medieval hierarchical order, we find that this hierarchy does not disappear 
during the Renaissance and even repeats in other forms during the Enlightenment in the 
form of early bourgeois ideology.  Additionally, if we project this hierarchical reference 
backwards, we see that this hierarchical order appears in the civitas and is organized 
around the real material social structures inherent in Roman civic duty and earlier in the 
political organization surrounding the Greek polis.  No doubt, showing the historicization 
of hierarchical forms is itself an infinite task.  Although this task remains outside of the 
present critique, we mark here not only that the Medieval vertical hierarchical structure 
itself has a pre-history, but that it has left remainders.  Hierarchy itself is subject to 
becoming and does not disappear during the Renaissance.  
 Nevertheless, Bakhtin is correct to show, albeit retrospectively and from the point 
of view of the present, that official Medieval culture “devalued time.”654  But with the 
cultural rejuvenation during the Renaissance, the ‘centre could not hold,’ so to speak.  
The official hierarchical structuring of high to low in which “historic time was 
obliterated” began to collapse in Rabelais’ world.655  The Medieval trope of the 
underworld plays this collapse out.  For Bakhtin, the official fear inducing Pantocrator 
that rebuked the underworld began to give way to the flesh and blood chthonic source of 
real everyday and biological life—albeit a biology within a cultural history. 
At the time of Rabelais the hierarchical world of the Middle Ages was crumbling.  
The narrow, vertical, extratemporal model of the world, with its absolute top and 
bottom, its system of ascents and descents, was in the process of reconstruction.  
A new model was being constructed in which the leading role was transferred to 
the horizontal lines, to the movement forward in real space and in historic time.656  
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Now the lower bodily stratum which had been officially censured begins its work of 
grounding—in every sense of the word—the scholastic and idiosyncratic simultaneity of 
forms in their actual loam and earth origins.  The abstraction from these material origins 
had placed the emphasis on the soul’s personal redemption or damnation—and to hell 
with the acquisition of one’s daily bread.  What was important was how one spent the 
next life not the millennial folk-festive celebration of collective embodied existence 
through time.  But in Rabelais’ world this is all supposed to have changed according to 
Bakhtin.  Unofficial folk-festive culture, the images of the grotesque body, billingsgate, 
curse words—i.e., parodied excommunications, the low culture of the marketplace, all of 
these socioeconomic realities of everyday life begin to slip into the mainstream cultural 
production.657  What is at stake is no longer a merely individual abeyance to the 
authoritarian Byzantine Pantocrator, but the growing awareness that our ancestors have 
become, quite literally, the earth out of which our nourishment grows.  And as they are, 
so shall we be, as the ubiquitous late Medieval and Renaissance memento mori remind us. 
 Collective life does not end in individual death.  The “vital process” is in some 
sense a continuum.658  This is what is lost in the agelast austerity of the Medieval focus on 
the deceased’s successful assent up to heaven—i.e., the knowledge that material life will 
blossom anew and for its own sake.  The sobriety of the bourgeois culture likewise forgot 
this truth.  Although it has survived—in the ‘good-old’ Irish wake, for example, by and 
large, and sadly, the contemporary mind knows nothing of the promise of life inherent in 
death.  We see even in contemporary monotheistic religious belief of hierarchy that the 
distinctly individual conception of death, as ascension to the pearly gates, or descent into 
hell and damnation not only merely repeats the vertical hierarchical logic of official 
Medieval culture, it also obfuscates the truth latent in folk-festive culture—death is not 
impotent but full of the power of life.  This truth is lost in Paul’s epistle to the church at 
Corinth.  There, faith is placed solely on the power of the resurrection.659  There, the early 
neo-Platonic polarities of the first principle and matter, of God and earth, of being and 
nothingness, of life and death, are first sown into the fresh soil of Christian dogma; these 
polarities become highly polarized.  There, we already see the apotheosis of the 
Pantocrator at the expense of the degradation of the earth.  Consider what Paul says: 
So also is the resurrection of the dead.  The body is sown a natural body, it is 
raised a spiritual body.  There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body.  And 
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so it is written, “The first man Adam became a living being.”  The last Adam 
became a life-giving spirit.  However, the spiritual is not first, but the natural, and 
afterward the spiritual.  The first man was of the earth, made of dust; the second 
Man is the Lord from Heaven.  As was the man of dust, so also are those who are 
made of dust; and as is the heavenly Man, so also are those who are heavenly.  
And as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall also bear the image 
of the heavenly Man.  Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit 
the kingdom of God; nor does corruption inherit incorruption.  Behold, I tell you a 
mystery: We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed—in a moment, in the 
twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet.  For the trumpet will sound and the dead 
will be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed.  For this corruptible must 
put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality.  So when this 
corruptible has put on incorruption, and this mortal has put on immortality, then 
shall be brought to pass the saying that is written: “Death is swallowed up in 
victory.”  “O Death, where is your sting?  O Hades, where is your victory?”660  
 
The “man of dust” is degraded being.  The first Adam who came from the dust is fated to 
return to it.  Only the redemption offered in Christ can vouchsafe the transmigration of his 
soul, but not to the underworld.  The earth becomes something wholly morbid, and is 
polarized as mere corruption.  The spirit and the flesh are eternally alienated from each 
other.  The lower bodily stratum and the grotesque, by association with all that is low, are 
both corrupted by association with the seedy underbelly of life in decay.  Sexuality, via its 
association with the sexual organs, is merely a necessary evil.  The seed can only be 
redeemed through a metamorphosis into a spiritual organ.  He who worships the earth and 
all that is low becomes an eternally corrupted pariah by association.  The flesh is soiled, 
grimy, dirty, alloyed, maculate; literally and etymologically speaking, it is profane—i.e., 
“not dedicated to religious use, secular.”661 
 Contrariwise, in the Rabelaisian image of death, there is also the victory of life—
life does triumph over death just as in the Apostle’s epistle.  However, this triumph is 
announced in death; it is immanent to it—and an earthly death at that.  It is not a victory 
from outside and it is not a refutation of the flesh, but a rejuvenation of it: “in Rabelais’ 
novel the image of death is devoid of all tragic or terrifying overtones.  Death is the 
necessary link in the process of people’s growth and renewal.  It is the ‘other side’ of 
birth.”662  The birth of Pantagruel, Gargantua’s son, marks the loss of his mother; 
Gargantua’s wife dies in labour.  There is an ambiguity here, at the moment of the 
interstice between death-life.  In the bi-polar Rabelaisian images of life and death series, 
death is composed from the point of view of ‘death’s’ immanent power to generate new 
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life and not from the individual birth and death of Pantagruel and Badebec respectively.663  
The mother-son continuum of life is emphasized.664 
 There is solace in death, even individual death, but it is not merely the solace that 
others will be born.  The joy in death is not a mere decrease in the surface population, as 
Alastair Sim’s Scrooge would have it—agelast that he is.665  The merely biological 
repetition of the organism is not the species of joy that Gargantua nourishes.  The birth of 
his son would be small comfort if it were merely the guarantee that the generations will 
continue on ad nauseam; a merely biological death pertains only to bare life.  Instead, 
inherent in the pregnant death is the assurance of progress.  Life will not go on as it has; 
the death that is the cause of life is a promise of history, it is the “growth of historic 
man.”666  Our children’s children’s children will inherit the benefit of hindsight—a terra 
incognita—but even this truth is too polarized and idealistic for Bakhtin.  Even progress 
alone is not enough to provide a “gay death,”667 so long as we mean a progress that 
considers only individual reward.  Death is the joyful embodied rejuvenation of life.  
Only once we step entirely outside of individual ego can death become a festivity.  
Calculations of individual gain and loss do not belong here.  Bakhtin espies in Rabelais 
the celebration of the very principle of human historical progress.  The sting of death is 
amputated only when viewed in terms of the life historical process and the cosmic body 
replaces the individual body.668  Decay is also the influx of vital minerals into the soil.  
Sickness is also the quickening of a virus—viruses that also strengthen future generations 
of their hosts.  Christian nourishment is the sacrament; the spirit is fed on the body, blood, 
and wounds of Christ.  But human bio-historical nourishment is grown quite literally from 
the bodies of our ancestors.   
Thus Rabelais’ world begins to find official expression for the unofficial truth of 
folk-festive culture and the grotesque decaying body.  The double body of life and death 
finds its expression in the bi-polar image of the collective social body and most especially 
in the frontier between growth and decay: “if we consider the grotesque image in its 
extreme aspect, it never presents an individual body; the image consists of orifices and 
convexities that present another, newly conceived body.  It is a point of transition in a life 
renewed, the inexhaustible vessel of death and conception.”669  The cosmic body in no 
way reflects the obsession of the Medieval mind with the fate of the individual soul, nor 
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does it make a forward looking reference to the bourgeois morality of the individual 
which we have discussed above.  The cosmic body is the supernal (spiritual) body, to be 
sure, but only insofar as it remains inseparable from the material body and the lower body 
polarity of existence.  The cosmic body is also and everywhere the chthonic body.  
On a macro-level, the Rabelaisian chronotope expresses more than this dual body 
of life and death viewed simply from the vista of the cosmic body.  The revelation of the 
historical becoming of ‘man,’ the birth of this new image of ‘man,’ is the death knell of 
the “old dying world [which] gives birth to the new one.”670  In a tour de force Bakhtin 
closes the chapter on the “Material Bodily Lower Stratum” by conjoining all the major 
elements of his entire corpus.  The dual body present in the grotesque image and the 
lower moiety of the human animal must also be understood as the flesh made word.  Just 
as Harlequin’s stuttering sickness gives birth to the word, so the image of the dual body 
gives birth to a double tonality—high and low.  Just like the soma, the utterance is also 
beholden to decay and rejuvenation, and is pulled into the cycle of birth and death.  The 
official worship of the blood and wounds of Christ is also an unofficial curse—it is 
“stately, plump Buck Mulligan’s” jesting invocation: “For this, O dearly beloved, is the 
genuine Christine: body and soul and blood and ouns.”671   
Rabelais’ world was complex and contradictory, and his chronotope is Janus-
faced as a result; his discourse is double-voiced.  Within it, the inward dialogical struggle 
between the official Eucharistic utterance and the unofficial joyfully parodic blaspheme 
are co-present.  Both the monotone of orthodoxy and the duality of folk-festive culture 
are locked in an inseparable polarity.  This is not to say that in the Rabelaisian 
chronotopic motif the stylistic scales are wholly balanced.  There is no question that 
Rabelais did not extol the virtues of the agelasts and folk-festive laughter equally, but 
neither does he attempt to expunge either the negative or positive poles of death, of life, 
of the image of God, and of the new image of ‘man’: 
In reality, it is a dialogue of the face with the buttocks, of birth with death.  We 
find a similar manifestation in the antique and Medieval debates between winter 
and spring, old age and youth, fasting and abundance, old times and new, parents 
and children.  These debates are an organic part of the system of popular-festive 
forms, related to change and renewal.  (Such a debate is recalled by Goethe in his 
description of the Roman Carnival.)672  
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But this dialogue does not reduce to a unity.  The struggle between the official and 
unofficial, the vertical and the horizontal, simultaneity and succession, being and 
becoming, these are all “incompleteness” itself, they are unfinalizable and undecidable.673   
 
7.4 In the Fullness of Time:  
Goethe’s Chronotope and the Roman Carnival 
 
We will now restrict ourselves to a few remarks regarding Goethe’s chronotope and the 
Bildungsroman.  Bakhtin appears to have worked on the two major studies dedicated to 
chronotopicity, “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel” and “The 
Bildungsroman”, contemporaneously.674  What survives of Bakhtin’s book length work 
on Goethe covers much of the material we have discussed regarding the various genres of 
the novel in history.  The chronotopicity text is to some extent a lengthy expansion of the 
Goethe monograph, and we are thankful to have an overlap in the material, although the 
destruction of the Bildungsroman book by advancing German troops during World War 
Two is a great loss by any standard.675  There is also a connection to later 19th and 20th 
century thought regarding time and space, vitalism, and morphological and historical-
evolutionary studies in both essays.  As Larissa Rudova states, in “Bergsonism in Russia: 
The Case of Bakhtin”, there is much that is similar in Bakhtin’s theory of the chronotope 
with Bergson idea of temporality, most notably his praise for Goethe’s second sight—his 
ability to “see time in space.”676  For his own part, Bakhtin highlights the fact that Goethe 
“did not want to (and could not) see that which was ready-made and immobile.”677  What 
is essential here is to distinguish Goethe’s reliance on this time in space, and more 
generally, how the theory of the chronotope merges time added to space as a fourth 
dimension.  There is also a felt necessity in Goethe to be present to morphological 
change—to be a witness to becoming in action.  It is as if time itself becomes a living 
entity which can be seen “in its course” by the right pair of eyes.678   
The role played by the Renaissance in loosening the vertical hierarchical fixity of 
scala naturae is evidently complimented by this visual figuration of time during the 
Enlightenment.679  The roots of historicity are found in the 18th century, which further 
cultivated the soil of cyclical time and the Medieval immobile and ahistorical sight.  A 
prescience for what is to come as well as an acute awareness of the actual philological 
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and socioeconomic history is sown in this period, and for Bakhtin this new kind of 
see(d)ing the present through a forward and backward reference culminates in Goethe: 
one begins to see signs of historic time.  The contradictions of contemporary life, 
having lost their absolute, God-given, eternal nature, revealed a historical 
multitemporality—remnants of the past, and rudiments and tendencies of the 
future.  Simultaneously the theme of the ages of man, evolving into the theme of 
generations, begins to lose its cyclical nature and begins to prepare for the 
phenomenon of historical perspectives ... In Goethe—who in this respect was the 
direct successor and crowning figure of the Enlightenment—artistic visualization 
of historical time ... reaches one of its high points.680 
 
Two points stand out here.  First, we are concerned specifically with the faculty of a 
historical vision, and second, this vision is properly understood as artistic.  The artist’s 
eye goes right to the bottom of metamorphological existence.  Goethe often claimed that 
he could even see ideas as they grew out of or were added to experience.681  Thought was 
tied up with seeing for Goethe and vice versa.  He says, “my observation is itself 
thinking, and my thinking is a way of observation.”682  Yet as visually astute as Goethe 
was, he had trouble conceiving of the invisible; indeed, for Goethe, “the invisible did not 
exist,” and nature could not be theorized in an abstract disjunction from the object in 
question.683  We will therefore note parenthetically that Goethe would have had trouble 
accepting Platonic philosophy, with its reliance on what Lovejoy calls the “Idea of ideas” 
or “the good,” which is itself invisible while making visible.  Instead, it is the concrete 
marriage of thought and objects in succession that was Goethe’s remarkable aesthetic 
talent.  Even words could not be detached from the occasion of their inspired poetic or 
scientific instantiation, and this distinct poetics Goethe calls “objective writing.”684   
 The word and the diagram have a special relationship for Goethe.  Ideas were 
equally expressible in words and images; in fact, the word and the diagram complement 
one another: “Goethe was averse to words that were not backed up by any actual visible 
experience ... With a few strokes he would sketch on paper a subject or locality that 
interested him, and he would fill in the details with words, which he would inscribe 
directly on the drawing.”685  We see the importance of the diagram in his so-called 
“propitious encounter” with Schiller.  On the night he first met his future Sturm und 
Drang alumni, Goethe found himself forced to resort to a diagrammatic expression of his 
idea of plant metamorphosis in order to make it visible for his interlocutor.686  
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Furthermore, he connects this manifold relation between the ideas, words, and diagrams 
directly to time in his Italian Journey.  Immediately after Goethe arrived in Italy he was 
struck by the extent to which sunrise and sunset still determined local quotidian practices: 
“We Cimmerians hardly know the real meaning of day ... But here, when night falls, the 
day consisting of evening and morning is definitely over, twenty-four hours have been 
spent, and time begins afresh.”687  ‘When in Rome’... set your watch by the local clock.  
An efficacious rule, no doubt, but what if local time still runs according to a Medieval 
logic of the liturgical hours or diurnal time?  Daily ritual in Verona was organized 
according to what we would today call the circadian clock, from matins to the obligatory 
“‘Felicissima note!’”688  In order to orientate himself to the local custom of counting the 
hours from sunset, Goethe devised a complicated table—a “diagram”—for comparison 
with Carlsbad clock time.  The tangible need to make time visible is itself made visible in 
this diagram.689 
 The visual basis of Goethe’s thought saw the past well up inside the present.  He 
saw the present heavily laden with an unfolding future.  If we want an image for this 
phenomenon, we might compare Goethe’s imaginative seeing to Eadweard Muybridge’s 
time-lapse photography.  Meteorological phenomena, the expansion and contraction of 
vegetative matter, geological sediment, the Medieval and Roman ruin, the whole of his 
world could not be understood merely according to simultaneous apposition of objects in 
space—as was the case in the Kantian chronotope of the intuitions of time and space.  
Objects emerged in time and Goethe everywhere tried to show that all phenomena were in 
the process of emergence, regardless of the fact that they appear to the naked eye in 
ready-made form.690   
We would not want, however, to give the impression that this second-sight was in 
anyway mystical or omniscient.  Quite to the contrary, Goethe abhorred abstract 
hypotheses which “lacked any necessary and visible connection with the surrounding 
reality.”691  As he told Schiller, the intentional direction of Goethe’s work always 
proceeded “from the whole to the parts” and not the other way around. 692  Therefore, if 
some fragment of the past could not be shown to be connected in an “unbroken line of 
historical development,” Goethe was less than interested and even fearful of these 
spectres.693  The “estranged past” could not be made visually coherent as a process of 
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metamorphosis.694  The isolated individual object that could not be conditioned in terms 
of the larger whole was unstable and one could not deduce its necessary connection with 
the successive flow of time.  This is the first methodological principle with which 
Bakhtin’s analysis of Goethe’s vision supplies us.  We may see this as the negative 
polarity of Goethe’s vision of time. 
 The second principle can be seen as the positive polarity.  If the isolated fragments 
of the past are dead spectres from which Goethe could not see a visible connection with 
the present, the contiguous parts which could be seen in terms of a whole were 
“creative.”695  Past natural objects and cultural ruins expressed a dehiscence that 
overflowed into the present and even projected themselves in anticipation of their destiny.  
Where the past and future find their effectiveness in the present, Goethe’s visual 
imagination bore witness to the “fullness of time.”696   
The Goethean chronotope is at once forward and backward looking and is always 
grounded in the duration of unbroken temporal succession.  Goethe’s botanical studies 
trained his sight to be active and to see beyond the mere apposition of objects in spatial 
simultaneity.  Thus it would not be too much to posit that temporally-continuous objects 
provided him with an organic architectonic method of answering all phenomena that 
displayed even a microscopic trace of continuous metamorphosis: 
When I see before me something which has already taken shape, and inquire about 
its origin and trace back the process as far as I can follow, I become aware of a 
series of stages.  Naturally, these cannot be observed side by side with the 
physical eye but must be pictured mentally as a certain ideal whole. 
Inclined at first to postulate certain stages, I am finally compelled, since 
Nature never proceeds by skips and jumps, to regard the sequence of 
uninterrupted activity as a whole, annulling individual details so as not to destroy 
the total impression.697 
 
Goethe corrected the romantic vision of the past as a golden age; he resisted the messianic 
eschatological vision of the future as an unchanging mass to be endured until the 
instantaneity of the second coming.  These types of chronotopic vision—the folkloric for 
example—denied nature her creative impulse and the law of continuous successive 
development through time; for Goethe they are versions of an unnatural and perverse 
seeing.  By contrast, Goethe displays a poetic and scientific comprehension of the holistic 
process of growth and decay according to the fullness of time.698 
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 Third, Goethe’s interest in the unity of time does not extend to a universal or 
cosmic whole.  He is not invested in reducing all of nature to a monistic principle merely 
in the unity of local objects in temporalized space.  Bakhtin emphasizes the 
socioeconomic and historical basis of this “locality,” and therefore Goethe remains a 
humanist thinker who shunned the non-human speculative perspectives of abstract 
thought.  The vast spaces emptied of human habitation, which are the bread and butter of 
the Romantic pictorial expression, were “‘pathetic’” and impotent in his eyes.699  The 
paintings of Caspar David Friedrich, for example, or the slightly later American 
landscape painting of the Hudson River School, are too depopulated and evince nothing 
of “man the builder” or time from the vista of human perception.700  The “living human 
scale” is missing from these ostensibly sublime depictions.701  Where these Romantic 
tropes do show up in Goethe—and his early career is practically obsessed with them—he 
retrospectively attributes to them a “‘gloomy’” sort of omission of the real living present, 
even in his own work.702  He need not have been so self-critical, since the trope of the 
isolated and depopulated locality nowhere lacks a “realistic component.”703   
Not every subject lent itself to Goethe’s “chronotopic visualizing.”704  Goethe 
lamented that the French Revolution was an “unsurveyable subject,” and he thus 
attributes the frustration of his attempts to finish The Natural Daughter to the general-
economy and disparate openness of this event. 705  The revolution was simply too 
complex and unruly to form a conception from the whole.  The same impotence recurs in 
terms of conceiving the invisible in Italian Journey during the Roman Carnival: “I know I 
shall encounter the objection that a festivity of this kind cannot really be described, that 
such a tumult of people, things and movements can only be absorbed by each spectator in 
his own way.”706  The Roman Carnival is simply too big to see all at once, one must 
participate and accept her perspectival view.   
  As is well known, Goethe was a source of inspiration to Bakhtin throughout his 
career, but the descriptions of carnival here will be surprisingly familiar to anyone 
coming to Goethe’s Italian Journey after reading the Rabelais book.  Folk-festive and 
carnival culture is still alive in the Roman Carnival.  It is the time of the upside down 
inversion of official culture.  Here the festival is not paid for by the Vatican or the Roman 
politicians, but is instead a festivity that “the people give themselves.”707  Nothing seems 
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to be out of bounds during the Carnival, and there is every kind of social degradation and 
merry-making—“except fisticuffs and stabbing.”708  Goethe also notes that the division 
between official and unofficial society “seems to be abolished for the time being; 
[moreover,] everyone accosts everyone else, all good-naturedly accept whatever happens 
to them, and the insolence and licence of the feast is balanced only by the universal good 
humour.”709  Perhaps most interestingly, there is actually an official signal for “complete 
licence” given in the afternoon by ringing the bells of the Capitol.710  Licentiousness 
between men and women is also common in the Roman Carnival, and Goethe accounts 
for the permissibility of this unofficial behaviour by pointing out that the men have 
travestied their gender by donning women’s garb:  
Young men disguised as women of the lower classes in low-necked dresses are 
usually the first to appear.  They embrace the men, they take intimate liberties 
with the women, as being of their own sex, and indulge in any behaviour which 
their mood, wit or impertinence suggests. 
One young man stands out in my memory.  He played the part of a 
passionate, quarrelsome woman perfectly.  “She” went along the whole length of 
the Corso, picking quarrels with everyone and insulting them, while her 
companions pretended to be doing their best to calm her down.711 
 
Fools, or Pulcinellas also play their role in the festivities, and notably “imitating the God 
of Gardens” by, one assumes, displaying his priapic member.712  Other carnivalesque 
moments include mock trials for women and their cicisbei, the wearing of Janus-faced 
and “humourous and satirical masks” and caricatured costumes, confetti wars, and mock 
coronations.713 
As we might imagine, the interstice between parodical brawling and the danger of 
earnest violence is very fine.  Goethe notes this most clearly in his section on the confetti 
wars which often ensue during processions through the thronged crowds: “There is no 
doubt that many of these fights would end with knives being drawn if that famous 
instrument of torture of the Italian police, the corde, was not hung up at various corners to 
remind everyone, in the midst of their revelry, that it would be very dangerous to use a 
dangerous weapon at this moment.”714   
There are also so-called “grotesque performances” complete with the premature 
pregnancy of a grotesquely deformed infant.715  Curses and profanities are heard during 
the festival of the moccoli, or candles.  In this festivity those who are not carrying candles 
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are ‘threatened’ with (s)laughter: “‘Sia ammazzato chi non porta moccolo—Death to 
anyone who is not carrying a candle,’” and no doubt the threats and the curses have their 
effect from the metaphorical blowing out of the candle, which of course symbolizes 
death. 716  Finally, Goethe waxes sentimental in his “Ash Wednesday” entry as the 
festivities draw to a close.  He comments briefly on the symbolism of public obscenity 
and this topsy-turvy world that combines the images of pregnancy and death, of love and 
hate, of festival and war, and of the ubiquitous double-voicedness of this official and 
unofficial world:  
In the course of these follies our attention is drawn to the most important stages of 
human life: a vulgar Pulcinella recalls to us the pleasures of love to which we owe 
our existence; a Baubo profanes in a public place the mysteries of birth and 
motherhood, and the many lighted candles remind us of the ultimate ceremony. 
The long, narrow Corso, packed with people, recalls to us no less the road 
of our earthly life.  There, too, a man is both actor and spectator; there, too, in 
disguise or out of it, he has very little room to himself and, whether in a carriage 
or on foot, can only advance by inches, moved forward or halted by external 
forces rather than by his own free will; there, too, he struggles to reach a better 
and more pleasant place from which, caught again in the crowd, he is again 
squeezed out.717 
 
Most imagistically, Goethe compares the brevity of life to the horse as it rushes by on the 
Corso during the race.  Although Goethe does not make explicit reference to it, the 
horserace is itself a millennial image that must remind one, especially in Rome, of the 
political races that took place in the hippodromes of the ancient Empire.  In this way we 
understand that the celebrations during the Roman Carnival are not simply a moment 
outside of the official quotidian time; they are instead the outward sign of the swelling 
and dehiscent effusion of a folk historical culture whose living waters still course beneath 
the urbs of the Roman roads.718  
 Bakhtin is clearly attracted to the concrete reality of the Goethean chronotope, and 
likely draws from him much of his ideas regarding the carnivalesque.  Even where there 
exists a dialogic struggle between Goethe’s chronotope and the Romantic abstraction of 
“geological and geographical landscape,” this Romantic abstraction carries along with it 
the positive polarity of plenistic—human-cultural—time and space.719  We must stress 
here the infused synthesis which Bakhtin espies in Goethe between living “terrestrial 
space” and its reciprocal relation with historically productive and popular culture.  
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Bakhtin does not speak of answerability in the Bildungsroman fragment, but it clearly 
underpins this reciprocity between ‘man’ and his localized natural environs as they 
achieve their visible synthesis in the Goethean chronotope—i.e., the fullness of time 
taken according to contiguous human history.  The Roman aqueduct at Spoleto, for 
example, serves as an example for Goethe of a human cultural production that is 
organically wedded to its environment.  To paraphrase “Art and Answerability”, the 
Roman builders had to answer ‘with their own architectural constructions for what they 
had experience and understood in the natural geography of their surroundings.’720   
Neither Goethe nor Bakhtin believed a sufficient historic and socioeconomic 
production could be “torn from reality.”721  In discourse and in life time and space are 
merged into an inseparable whole.  This is not to say that time is wholly reduced to space 
or vice versa, only that they must be seen together within the social milieu and 
socioeconomic succession of human historical production: “space and time are bound 
together into one inseparable knot.  Terrestrial space and human history are inseparable 
from one another in Goethe’s integrated concrete vision.  This is what makes historical 
time in his creative work so dense and materialized, and space so humanly interpreted and 
intensive.”722   
In this section we have stated that, for Bakhtin, the Renaissance break with the 
Medieval world slowly replaces the image of God Pantocrator with the image of ‘man.’  
Often derided for its torpid response to the “feeling for time,” the Enlightenment 
nevertheless produced some of our first philosophers of historicity.723  Bakhtin names 
Lessing, Winckelmann, and Herder as examples.724  Kant’s distinction between 
Naturbeschreibung and Naturgeschichte, or physiography and physiogony, is an 
important addition to this list.725  This awakening to the flow of time as the real everyday 
historical continuity that finds its home only in the human animal became the formative 
force of Goethe’s chronotopic visualizing.  For Bakhtin, the force of history comes to the 
fore in Goethe’s humanist sensitivity to time as it is realized by the unfolding of objects 
heavily laden with the past and pregnant with the future.  Goethe likewise injects the past 
into the present but a past that is as much a becoming as is the present.  In Goethe’s 
chronotopic vision of the fullness of time “everything is intensive” 726; even petrified 
nature can come alive again to the studied eye that has learned to see, while the invisible 
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Platonic worship of the ideal is something that keeps us shoe-gazing.  The Bildungsroman 
provides its own novel education for historical humankind with which it teaches itself a 
new image of the world and our place in it; so too, we must continue to endeavour to 
learn from the past which wells up around us, if we do not want to be simply swept away 
in the deluge.   
As it was with Pico so it is with Goethe.  Humans are the “nuptial bond of the 
world,” in whom the whole of the object in its history, its sense (historicity), its 
productive actuality and potential, and its very living essence are wed in this plenary 
effusive Goethean vision that Bakhtin calls the fullness of time.  
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Conclusion 
At the beginning of the last section I appended a long quotation from Bakhtin that has by 
now been very well trodden by scholars.  In it, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin penned 
some of the last words that he would write during his lifetime.  He exhorts his reader to 
take up the works of the past and infuse them with a new life, since “nothing is absolutely 
dead: every meaning will have its homecoming festival”—I hope that I have lived up in 
some small way to his expectations and answered as an ethically active reader.  We read 
philosophy as members of a species in becoming who are beholden to time.  We are 
bound by the greatest weight imaginable.  Too often we are caught up for weeks and 
months and years in a style of life that forgets the movement of time and the great cosmic 
comedy in which we are but momentary players—but we are players, witnesses.  As a 
result, many of us have forgotten or never learned how to see with a temporally piercing 
vision; we treat time as something to be leapt over or merely endured.  We treat ourselves 
as coextensive with our proper names.  We forget how to laugh when the daimon comes 
out and plays its little joke on us.  Great time destroys our best intentions and erases our 
most erroneous missteps, but we ought to try to remember—as a culture rather than 
merely as individuals—that time is likewise creative.  Reading the Greeks, the Medievals, 
Rabelais, Goethe and Dostoevsky edify us.  But this activity in and of itself is pointless if 
we do not take what we have learned in these authors and attempt to ethically respond to 
the world in which we are living, and if we do not attempt to anticipate what is to come.  
Lastly, because in the last analysis, and with a view to great time, we really are bound up 
in a comedy of human errors, we need to learn to laugh at ourselves again—as the cosmos 
does. 
Heraclitus personifies time as a child playing at draughts and on whose shoulders 
the sovereignty of the cosmos rests.727  Shakespeare called those buffoons who are 
summoned by their master to witness his death “the fools of time”; they were to mark the 
greater truth in his passing and thus offer some solace.728  Marx roguishly rejuvenates 
Hegel: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in 
world history occur, as it were, twice.  He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the 
second as farce.”729  Rabelaisian laughter fits squarely within this tradition of time’s 
serious playfulness: 
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Time itself abuses and praises, beats and decorates, kills and gives birth; this time 
is simultaneously ironic and gay, it is the ‘playing boy’ of Heraclitus, who wields 
supreme power in the universe.  Rabelais builds an extraordinarily impressive 
image of historical becoming within the category of laughter.  This was not 
possible before the Renaissance, when it had been prepared by the entire process 
of historical development.730  
 
History itself has a double-voice.  To seriously mix metaphors, the dust-bin of history 
burst into spontaneous laughter; in the Rabelaisian chronotope, time’s laughter is 
personified in the concrete material image of the fool.    
In closing out this little history of Bakhtin, I would like to provide a short 
narrative of my own creation.  Like Ivan Karamazov, I never wrote the story down, and 
half in the spirit of jest and half in keeping with the occasion, I shall allow Ivan to 
introduce it in a quoted utterance: 
“I made up this poem in prose and I remembered it.  I was carried away when I 
made it up.  You will be my first reader—that is, listener.  Why should an author 
forego even one listener?”731 
 
Here is my story: Nietzsche says the gods died laughing when one of their number, an 
“old wrath-beard of a god,” proclaimed himself as the only deity.732  Rabelais would have 
finished the story as follows: this agelast god then proclaimed himself king of all ‘men’!  
He was so tightly wound, old and brittle, that every day he beshit himself so that everyday 
his chasuble had to be discarded.  The god said, “I must not let men see that I have soiled 
my own garments!  It they see that I have beshit myself, they will think that I am no god 
at all, but only a lowly creature like themselves.”  Saying this he hid his garments 
underground, in Hades.  A millennium passed like this, and then another.  And, when 
time it was that he came near unto the Earth, all the men cowered in fear of the ‘one true 
god.’  But, when he returned on high on the days leading up to Lent, and when they were 
sure that he could not hear them—for his hearing was very poor, then they themselves 
burst out in laughter.  It was a spontaneous bum-gut laughter like that of the old gods 
before them.  And when they could not laugh any longer for fear of rupture, the folk 
spoke to each other and said: “By the testicles of Hercules!  Who is this creature who 
calls himself ‘the highest’ and ‘almighty god,’ but has not even the sense to bathe his 
soiled robes and instead buries them in the earth?”733   
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dialogue in Leaves of Grass itself.  In fact, this is not the most interesting reading of Whitman, but washes 
over passages in which Whitman finds himself speaking with soldiers and sea-farers, and with other 
authors.  More importantly, it betrays the struggle between Whitman the contemporary, the journalist, who 
deals with “contemporary” questions and Whitman the prosaic poet, who has all of the populist esprit 
found in Rabelais and also an eye to great time: “there are millions of suns left,” “Song of Myself”, 2, 
Leaves of Grass, p. 50.  Of course it is most especially the apparent lack of the personal faccia a faccia 
conversation in Whitman that Lock most strongly reacts against, and with this I simply disagree—even in 
the Rabelais book the personal is only infused with meaning because it is forever in dialogue with great 
time, because it can laugh at its own morality, which nevertheless partakes in the immortality of great time.  
Cf. also Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, pp. 151-2:  
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Every great writer participates in such a dialogue; he participates with his creativity as one of the 
sides in this dialogue.  But writers themselves do not create polyphonic novels.  Their rejoinders in 
the dialogue are monologic in form; each has one world of his own while other participants in the 
dialogue remain with their worlds outside the work.  They appear with their own personal worlds 
and with their own immediate, personal words.  But prose writers, especially novelists, have a 
problem with their own word.  This word cannot be simply their own word (from the I).  The word 
of the poet, the prophet, the leader, the scientist, and then the word of the ‘writer.’  It must be 
grounded.  The need to represent somebody.  The poet relies on inspiration and a special poetic 
language.  The prose writer does not have this poetic language. 
 Only a polyphonist like Dostoevsky can sense in the struggle of opinions and ideologies 
(of various epochs) an incomplete dialogue on ultimate questions (in the framework of great time).  
Others deal with issues that have been resolved within the epoch. 
 The journalist is above all a contemporary.  He is obliged to be one.  He lives in the 
sphere of questions that can be resolved in the present day (or in the near future).  He participates 
in a dialogue that can be ended and even finalized, can be translated into action, and can become 
an empirical force.  It is precisely in this sphere that ‘one’s own word’ is possible.  Outside this 
sphere ‘one’s own word’ is not one’s own (the individual personality always transcends itself); 
one’s own word cannot be the ultimate word. 
Whitman is not easily placed in this scheme, but neither is he easily excluded.  He is indeed committed to 
the infinitude of becoming and as such ought to be given to the unfinalisability of dialogue.  Though his 
poetry is formally epic, it is well known that it is prosaically so.  Jason Frank picks up on the distinctly 
polyvocality of the American patois which was, after all, Whitman’s immediate contribution to the 
American epic.  See his essay “Aesthetic Democracy: Walt Whitman and the Poetry of the People”, The 
Review of Politics, p. 419:  
On the topic of polyvocality and the multitudinous self, Whitman has a striking affinity with the 
work of Mikhail Bakhtin, who is similarly concerned with the socially embedded forms of speech 
that occupy different and overlapping regions of a given language.  Bakhtin calls this complex 
social background of meaningful speech production ‘heteroglossia.’  For Whitman, a key 
distinction of the American language, which emerges from and helps (re)enact American 
democracy, was precisely such luxuriant proliferation of speech idioms. Whitman writes that 
the immense diversity of race, temperament, character—the copious stream of humanity 
constantly flowing hither—must reappear in free rich growths of speech....  The opulence 
of race-elements is in the theory of America.  Land of the Ensemble, to hear consenting 
currents flow, and the ethnology of the States draws the grand outline of that hospitality 
and reception that must mark the new politics, sociology, literature and religion 
[emphasis added]. 
In speaking with Dock Angus Ramsay Currie regarding this problem, he suggested I imagine the two 
figures speaking together over a pint.  Would they both recognise avenues in which they might build 
bridges toward the other’s position that they might communicate with understanding?   I have a hard time to 
believe that they would not.  And we need not look beyond the evident personalities that emerge from 
Bakhtin and Whitman’s writings—Bakhtin’s theories of polyphony and authorship remains textual even 
where it suggests such personalities can be heard in the texts.  I also cannot help myself but quote again 
Whitman’s own utterance, which betrays at once his personal commitment to language as a concretized 
real-life process: “‘Language... is not an abstract construction of the learn’d, or of dictionary makers, but it 
is something arising out of the work, needs, ties, joys, affections, tastes, of long generations of humanity, 
and has bases broad and low, close to the ground.  Its final decisions are made by the masses,’” qtd. in 
Frank, p. 424.  As to Dostoevsky’s own infamous obsession with journalism and especially with the 
newspaper, see Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 30 and especially f.n. 40, p. 45: “‘Do you get any 
newspapers?’  Dostoevsky asked one of his female correspondents in 1867.  ‘For God’s sake, read them, 
one can’t do otherwise nowadays—and this is not to be fashionable, but so that the visible connection 
between all things public and private might be stronger and more obvious.’”  Bakhtin is himself quoting 
from Leonid Grossman’s Poetika Dostoevskogo.  
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 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 60.  During Bakhtin’s philosophical apprenticeship, the primary 
nucleus of the “Marburg School” of neo-Kantianism consisted of Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), Paul 
Natorp (1954-1924), and Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), see Craig Brandist, “The Bakhtin Circle”, Internet 
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Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/bakhtin/>, 08/07/2012.  Nina Perlina places Paul 
Natorp’s paper “Free Will and Responsibility” high on the list of Bakhtian influences during his neo-
Kantian days.  See Perlina Funny Things are Happening on the Way to the Bakhtin Forum, p. 3: “The 
Natorp-Bakhtin illustration is only one of many primary sources that inspired Bakhtin’s work, and all await 
their definitive integration into his creative biography.”  See also Ann Shukman, “M. M. Bakhtin: Notes on 
his Philosophy of Man”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. II, ed. Gardiner, p. 358: “Closest of all to Bakhtin was 
probably Hermann Cohen who so deeply influenced Bakhtin’s friend Matvei Kagan.  In a letter of 1921, we 
find Bakhtin writing urgently to Kagan to ask for a copy of ‘Cohen’s ethics’ so that he could finish his 
study ‘The Subject in Morality and the Subject in Law’ (evidently never finished).” 
51
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 59. 
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 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 60. 
53
 See Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 59.  Since for him there was nothing truly noumenal and 
since all phenomena was conceptual, Cohen went so far as to claim that “‘matter is only an hypothesis.’” 
54
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 136. 
55
 The original reads: “Im Anfang war die Tat,” Faust: erster und zweiter Teil, I:1237, p. 28.  The full 
passage follows the movement of Faust’s thought as he contemplates which comes first word or deed, as he 
cannot believe that words are the apex of all things—the origin of all existence, and the supreme power he 
seeks to usurp.  Contemplating all the possible meanings of das Wort, before arriving at what he takes to be 
the divinely inspired conclusion that the connotation is deed and not sign.  The audience is no doubt meant 
to assume that the impetus for this thought is John’s gospel, 1:1, p. 713, which reads, “In the beginning was 
the word,” or, more precisely, Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος.  No doubt this passage would have stood out to the 
Bakhtin who wrote Toward a Philosophy of the Act, since one of the keystone ideas found therein is 
crystallized in the Russian word Slovo, which indeed carries the connotation of both word and the action 
which puts it to use.  It is therefore not a far cry from act or deed (postupok) itself and would doubtlessly be 
understood as such in the Russian imagination.  Cf. Gardiner, “The Bakhtin Circle and the Theory of 
Ideology”, The Dialogics of Critique, f.n. 13, p. 209:  
It worth noting that the Russian term slovo utilized by the Bakhtin Circle, which is generally 
translated as ‘word’, actually means both word as it is generally understood in English (that is, as a 
discrete phonetic entity forming a meaningful element of language) as well as the method of 
putting words to use (their concrete implementation) in actual discourse. It is therefore very similar 
to the ancient Greek logos, which designates “not merely the capacity for rational discourse but the 
rational faculty underlying and informing the spoken word in all its forms” (Harris and Taylor 
1989:xi). 
The full passage from Faust is as follows: 
’Tis writ, ‘In the beginning was the Word.’ 
I pause, to wonder what is here inferred. 
The Word I cannot set supremely high: 
A new translation I will try. 
I read, if by the spirit I am taught, 
This sense: ‘In the beginning was the Thought.’ 
This opening I need not weigh again, 
Or sense may suffer from a hasty pen. 
Does thought create, and work, and rule the hour? 
’Twere best: ‘In the beginning was the Power.’ 
Yet, while the pen is urged with willing fingers, 
A sense of doubt and hesitancy lingers. 
The spirit comes to guide me in my need, 
I write, ‘In the beginning was the deed.’ 
See Goethe, Faust: Part One, I:1237, p. 71. 
56
 “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 129. 
57
 Gardiner, “Ecology and Carnival: Traces of a ‘Green’ Social Theory in the Writings of M. M. Bakhtin”, 
Theory and Society, f.n. 78, p. 804.   
58
 Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 102.  
59
 Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 105. 
60
 See Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 104:  
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Formalism, when it became a poetics, turned out and still turns out to be a discourse on nothing or 
on something which does not matter....  What was new in Formalism [was] the prime importance 
which it accords to the linguistic raw material in the process of drawing up a theory of literature—
and [Formalism successfully reduced] its scope to a merely technocratic level, a supplementary 
proof of the conventional concept of literature as an expression of historical reality 
A supplement, that is, to the “historical attitude” of early 20th century literary study which had rejected 
Symbolism in favour of a method that could deliver up the internal laws of the literary device, see Kristeva, 
“The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 103. 
61
 Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 104. 
62
 See Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, pp. 105-6. 
63
 Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 106. 
64
 Husserl’s first book The Philosophy of Arithmetic was indeed psychologistic, and the “Prolegomena” to 
his second book, Logical Investigations, was a refutation of his earlier position regarding the origin of 
numbers.  See Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, § 3, p. 13: “Logic is a theoretical discipline, formal and 
demonstrative, and independent of psychology: that is one view.  For the other it counts as a technology 
dependent on psychology, which of course excludes the possibility of its being a formal, demonstrative 
discipline like the other side’s paradigm arithmetic.”    
65
 For these fallacies see Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 106. 
66
 Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 107. 
67
 Charles Lock, “Carnival and Incarnation: Bakhtin and Orthodox Theology,” Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 286. 
68
 Bocharov, “Conversations with Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, pp. 6-7.  Here Bakhtin 
begins to answer Bocharov’s question about the authorship debate surrounding the Voloshinov books and 
Medvedev’s The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship and winds up talking more generally about 
religious censorship in 1920’s Russia; presumably Bakhtin is also sorry that he had to frame his work 
within the discourse of Marxism.  We would have to take Bocharov at his work here, as Bakhtin’s gestures 
and utterances are here quoted and inflected through Bocharov’s representation.  We should therefore be 
wary about accepting this account wholesale and without critical distance.  Bakhtin says,  
“You see, I felt that [writing those books] was something I could do for my friends.  It wasn’t hard 
for me to do, for I thought that I would still write my own books, books without these unpleasant 
additions.”  Here he grimaced at the title [Marxism and the Philosophy of Language].  “After all, I 
didn’t know that it would turn out the way it has.  And then, such things as authorship, a name—
what significance do they have?  Everything that was created during the past half century on this 
graceless soil, beneath this unfree sky, all of it is to some degree morally flawed.” 
“But, M. M., if we forget about Voloshinov’s book for the moment—it’s a rather difficult 
case—may I ask what could be morally flawed in your book on Dostoevsky?” 
“How can you say that?  The way I could have written it would have been very different 
from the way it is.  After all, in that book I severed form from the main thing.  I couldn’t speak 
directly about the main questions.” 
  “What main questions, M. M.?”  
 “Philosophical questions.  What Dostoevsky agonized about all his life—the existence of 
God.  In the book I was constantly forced to prevaricate, to dodge backwards and forward.  I had to 
hold back constantly.  The moment a thought got going, I had to break it off.  Backward and 
forward” (he repeated this several times during the conversation).  “I even misrepresented the 
church.”  M. M. had in mind the passage in the first chapter in which he argues with B. M. 
Engelgardt’s article “The Ideological Novel of Dostoevsky.”  Engelgardt interprets Dostoevsky’s 
world in Hegelian terms as the dialectical becoming of one spirit.  But, insists Bakhtin in his book, 
“the unified evolving spirit was organically alien to Dostoevsky. ... An image for Dostoevsky’s 
world that reflects his perspective,” continues Bakhtin, “would be the church as a communion of 
unmerged souls ... or perhaps it would be the image of Dante’s world.”  This statement is indeed 
followed by a qualification: “The concrete artistic links between the various planes of the novel, 
their combination in the unity of the work, must be explained and demonstrated by the material of 
the novel itself, and both ‘Hegelian spirit’ and ‘church’ distract equally from this immediate task.’”  
Bocharov quotes from Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, pp. 26-27.  
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 Cf. Bréhier, The History of Philosophy: The Middle Ages and the Renaissance, pp. 3-5.  Bréhier charts 
the hypostatization of these heresies within the early Church.  Notably he marks that “we must carefully 
separate West from East” where heretical determination is concerned.  The Church of Antioch “refused to 
see in Jesus Christ anything but a man perfected by divine grace, and it rejected metaphysical combinations 
of God and man,” p. 2.  Arius thought Christ was wholly mortal even if he was prima inter pares in terms 
of creation, p. 2.  The Council of Trent was in part meant to resolve this issue, p. 3.  St. Augustine himself 
combated both Donatism and Pelagianism, see Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the 
Development of Doctrine, Vol. 1, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, p. 308:  
Of the many “heresies” against which Augustine defended the catholic faith, the two most virulent 
were Donatism and Pelagianism, both of which dealt with the doctrine of divine grace, and 
specifically with the relation between grace and perfection.  Donatism charged that the mediation 
of grace through the church and the sacraments was vitiated when the administrator of the 
sacraments had lost his Christian perfection through a serious fall into sin.  Pelagianism maintained 
that man still faced the same choice faced by Adam between sin and perfection, and that therefore 
grace was helpful, but not necessary in the sense in which Augustine taught. 
Bréhier provides a final detail, p. 3: “The Church in its role as an institution necessary for the dispensation 
of divine grace was incompatible with both of these heresies.  Today these struggles may appear to us as an 
early scholastic or legalistic encounter between agelast austerity, but we ought also to see behind it a 
political striving to unify a front against an exterior secular world that was often still hostile to Christians 
and, ironically enough, as a political enterprise to overcome factionalism within them Empire.  Most 
academics rightly have reservations that anything productive can come from the conceptual traditions of the 
Christian Church(es), but here too we ought to be careful to separate the dogmatic from the thematic.  In no 
form does the Christian Church encompass all of its own philosophical bases, which often begin before it 
and continue after it.  We cannot be committed materialists of the kind Bakhtin would endorse and ignore 
the very real history of ideas which courses beneath the stones of the Christian Church; these ideas are 
human ideas before they are Christian, and they are as equally double-voiced as are all other human ideas.  
This is why I have attempted to frame my discussion in terms of the Byzantine and Kenotic traditions rather 
than Christian vs. secular, or perhaps worse still Christological vs. philosophical.  It is not enough to state 
that we are anti-Christian or irreligious.  We must determine what it is in Christian doctrine and religion 
that we oppose.  Short of this we are very much in danger of bringing these oppositions into our thought by 
the back door, and surreptitiously repeating in the secular what we have thoughtlessly rejected in the 
religious. Below I will attempt to show that it is the mystical, the austere, the dogmatic elements, as well as 
the doctrine of original sin in Christianity to which Bakhtin was opposed; as a materialist interested in 
building a bridge to the theological and the critical, he emphasized the here and now, flesh and blood, 
compassionate, and concrete aspects of the Christian conception of the world and self-other relations. 
Bakhtin’s relationship to Christian doctrine is not as transparent as some theorists have thought.  To say 
‘Bakhtin is a thinker of the social’ or a ‘materialist’ is not enough.  Not only would this position dismiss 
much of Bakhtin’s early writings, it would paint all Christian ideas with the same brush.  We in the West 
and especially from the vantage of 2000 years of atrocious crusading, marauding, and hierarchical 
structures of power, have good reason to do so, but this ought not be taken as an excuse to look no further.  
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 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 84, emphasis mine. 
71
 See White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin: Fraternal Reply to Robert Young”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 211: “as ‘Bakhtin’ notes, ‘the word used in quotations marks, that is, felt and used as 
something alien’ indicates how the word is distributed on various places and at various distances from the 
plane of the authorial word.  For the moment, ‘Bakhtin’ is more appropriate, more appropriated, than 
Bakhtin.  He will have to wait a while for his homecoming festival.” 
72
 For Cohen, see Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, pp. 59-62; for Buber and Manichaeism, p. 80.  
Holquist is certainly aware of the differences that enter into the dialogue between Cohen and Buber, see his 
introduction to Art and Answerability, p. xxxv: “Of course, the whole emphasis on architectonics and 
aesthetics in these early Bakhtin essays is quite different in its implications from anything in Cohen or 
Buber.”  My concern is that Holquist tends to equate these three thinkers because of the religious 
connection only to find that this supposed connection is actually quite differently orientated; this connection 
seems to trump the other very real influences exhibited in Bakhtin’s particular stance on the I/Thou in 
Buber or Cohen’s neo-Kantian monism.  That said, Clark and Holquist’s account is relatively balanced, but 
they are not explicit enough as to their motivation for making these connections or in showing how this 
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equation benefits Bakhtin scholarship beyond providing interesting background information as to which 
philosophical trends Bakhtin was in dialogue with.  As we have already stated, the biographers do provide 
cursory checks and balances regarding the Cohen-Bakhtin interface, see Clark and Holquist, MB, p. 60.   
Regarding Meier: Meier was the founder of a religious sect known as Voskresenie.  He was a 
“mystical anarchist” and was a “very tough Marxist” in Bakhtin’s estimation, who sought to build bridges 
between the two ideologies.  He wanted to “link religion and revolution, communism and ‘Christ.’” See 
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 128. 
73
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 120. 
74
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 122.  Dialogism is Holquist’s term for Bakhtin’s Ürprinzip.  I am 
not entirely satisfied with this term, since it would seem to hypostatize what to my mind is not an 
ontological assertion but a method or disposition toward thought and action—even though it is based on the 
ontological divide between subjects. 
75
 See Lock, “Carnival and Incarnation: Bakhtin and Orthodox Theology”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 286-7. 
76
 Raymond Geuss’ “Introduction”, in Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. xii.  See also Plato’s account of 
the Socrates’ recurring dream “in different shapes” in which he is told to “compose music,” Phaedo, 60r5ff.  
See also Nietzsche’s commentary on this passage in the The Birth of Tragedy, §14, p. 71.  James M. Curtis 
also picks up on this theme in his “Michael Bakhtin, Nietzsche, and Russian Pre-Revolutionary Thought”, 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 235-6:  
For Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy, it was Socrates who dissociated the Apollonian and the, 
Dionysian by asking such abstract questions as, ‘What is the Good?’’ and ‘What is he Beautiful?’  
Throughout the first third of twentieth century, intellectuals all over Europe found in this historical 
scheme a way to analyze the malaise of their own times.  The Birth of Tragedy served as a major 
source for T. S. Eliot, for example, who found what what he called a ‘dissociation of sensibility’ 
had occurred in the seventeenth century after the death of John Donne, the last poet who could fuse 
thinking and feeling.”  
If he was the last metaphysical poet however, Donne was far from the last poet drawn to metaphysics; it 
may be remembered that Eliot pursued post-graduate work in philosophy at Harvard where he studied under 
non-other than George Santayana, and then studied Bergson and Maurras—“the reactionary Catholic 
monarchist”— at the Sorbonne, cf. The Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry, Vol. 1, ed. 
Jahan Ramazani et al., p. 460. 
77
 See Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 15: “For Christianity the fact of suffering in life means 
primarily that life is not just, that it is even essentially unjust, that it pays for an essential injustice by 
suffering, it is blameworthy because it suffers.  The result of this is that life must be justified, that is to say, 
redeemed of its injustice or saved. ...  Even when Christianity sings the praises of love and life what curses 
there are in these songs, what hatred beneath this love!  It loves life like a bird of prey loves the lamb; 
tender, mutilated and dying.” 
78
 Cf. John Dillon’s “Introduction” to Plotinus’ The Enneads, p. lii.  The reference is to The Republic, vi, 
509b. 
79
 Cf. Jacques Derrida’s Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, p. 49. 
80
 For topos ouranios, cf. Derrida Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, p. 48. 
81
 On the Idea of Ideas, see section seven below. 
82
 For Plato’s discussion of this hierarchy, cf. The Republic, vi, 507a-511e.  
83
 For more on Kantian intuitions of time and space see section seven below. 
84
 I will return to this otherworldly character and to neo-Platonic thought, as well as Proclus’ place in it, the 
last section of the present work, on Chronotopicity below. 
85
 Lock, “Carnival and Incarnation: Bakhtin and Orthodox Theology”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, 
p. 288-9.  Lock’s understanding here is most perspicuous and accurately shows that there is no “virgule” 
between Bakhtin’s orthodoxy and his philosophical concepts: 
It is important here to insist that we are not talking about ‘theology in code’ or of an ‘encrypted’ 
Christianity.  Such concepts imply a system and a stability of meaning which happen to be 
provisionally or contingently obscured by exigency, wit or cunning.  That would be a form of 
Gnostic heresy such as Docetism, which sees the flesh as mere clothing or guise, or pedagogical 
device for the Divine.  Bakhtin’s theory of heteroglossia can be well expressed in anti-gnostic 
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terms: context is not that which enables text to be manifest, but that which is integral to text if text 
is to avoid the abuses of system and monologue. 
86
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 84. 
87
 Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 391. 
88
 Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 390. 
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 Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 391. 
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 Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 392. 
91
 Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 390.  Notably, the idea that all ‘men’ are related in faith 
tends to subvert both Byzantine  hierarchical virtue and the neo-Platonic hierarchical virtue (supermundane) 
: “All men are brothers not in a spiritual Christian sense, as having a common Father in heaven, but in an 
earthly sense, of a common origin, or common blood.” 
92
 Again, see section seven below. 
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 White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”,  Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 209. 
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 White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 211. 
95
 What’s more, Holquist is responsible for co-editing Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Art and 
Answerability, Speech Genres, and he helped Emerson translate The Dialogical Imagination. 
96
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 167.   
97
 See also Michael Gardiner’s Critiques of Everyday Life, p. 44: “Voloshinov and Medvedev, were more 
overtly Marxist.  Medvedev even occupied several important government positions in education and culture 
in the nascent Soviet regime.” 
98
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 167.  For more on Voloshinov’s writings as a propaedeutic, see 
Section Five below. 
99
 On indirect and quasi-direct discourse, as well as reported speech, see Voloshinov, Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language, p. 116: 
Reported speech is regard by the speaker as an utterance belonging to someone else, an 
utterance that was originally totally independent, complete in its construction, and lying outside the 
given context.  Now, it is from this independent existence that reported speech is transposed into 
an authorial context while retaining its own referential content and at least the rudiments of its own 
linguistic integrity, its original constructional independence.  The author’s utterance, in 
incorporating the other utterance, brings into play syntactic, stylistic, and compositional norms for 
its partial assimilation—that is, its adaptation to the syntactic, compositional, and stylistic design 
of the author’s utterance, while preserving (if only in rudimentary form) the initial autonomy (in 
syntactic, compositional, and stylistic terms) of the reported utterance, which otherwise could not 
be grasped in full. 
Certain modifications of indirect discourse and, in particular, quasi-direct discourse in 
modern languages evince a disposition to transpose the reported utterance from the sphere of 
speech construction to the thematic level—the sphere of content.  However, even in these 
instances, the dissolution of the reported utterance in the authorial context is not—nor can it be—
carried out to the end.  Here, too, aside from indications of a semantic nature, the reported 
utterance preserves as a construction—the body of the reported speech remains detectable as a 
self-sufficient unit. 
100
 White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 225. 
101
 White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 218.  See also Michael 
Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique, p. 75:  
Thus, as Allon White has recently argued, Bakhtin et al. remain ‘humanists’ in the sense that they 
retain an interest in freedom, the fulfilment of human potentiality, and the cessation of oppression, 
but also in the more technical sense that they continue to ascribe importance to the category of 
‘agency’—that is, a belief in the creative or active role of collective human praxis vis-à-vis the 
making of history.  The conception of ‘history’ maintained by the individual members of the 
Bakhtin Circle is not, however, teleologically inscribed or inexorable: it is ‘open’, a horizon of 
unfulfilled possibilities which is ‘capable of death and renewal, transcending itself, that is, 
exceeding its own boundaries” 
102
 White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 216. 
103
 White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 216. 
104
 White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner,p. 217. 
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105
 White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 216: 
In his essay on “Speech Genres” ‘Bakhtin’ makes it clear that speech is generic and conventional 
to an astonishing degree and that there is no linguistic space in which the individual makes 
utterance free from systematic cultural inflection.  But ‘Bakhtin’ does allow individuals a reflexive 
and creative relation to speech genres such that, to parody Marx, people make language but only 
on the basis of what language has made of them.  
106
 Bakhtin, “Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences”, Speech Genres, p. 170. 
107
 Hume’s thoroughgoing scepticism does not precisely preclude the force of sense-certainty.  By analogy 
White’s interpretation of the Bakhtinian subject as semantic personhood does not preclude the feeling of 
being a subject, even though it would be impossible to point to where this subject has not first been 
conditioned to from head to toe qua subject.  The trouble I often have with post-structuralism, especially of 
the Foucauldian brand, is that there the world seems devoid of people.  On Hume’s ambivalence toward the 
force of certainty granted in sensual existence, see Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 268-9: 
But what have I here said, that reflections very refin’d and metaphysical have little or no 
influence upon us?  This opinion I can scarce forbear retracting, and condemning from my present 
feeling and experience.  The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in 
human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and 
reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probably or likely than another.  Where am 
I, or what?  From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return?  
Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread?  What beings surround me? And on 
whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me?  I am confounded with all these 
questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with 
the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty.   
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, 
nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, 
either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, 
which obliterate all these chimeras.  I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am 
merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours’ amusement, I wou’d return to these 
speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to 
enter into them any farther. 
Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin’d to live, and talk, and act 
like other people in the common affairs of life.  But notwithstanding that my natural propensity, 
and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general 
maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all 
my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the 
sake of reasoning and philosophy. 
108
 See Alexei Bogdanov, “Ostranenie, Kenosis, and Dialogue: The Metaphysics of Formalism According 
to Shklovsky”, The Slavic and East European Journal, p. 50: 
As a theological term, kenosis originates in Philippians 2:5-8, where St. Paul speaks of 
‘Christ’s’ ‘self-emptying’: 
Have this mind among yourselves, which is yours in ‘Christ’ Jesus, who, though he was 
in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied 
himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men.  And being found 
in human form he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death on the 
cross. 
The issue remains controversial among the theologians, especially with regard to the degree of 
‘Christ’s’ self-emptying.  While the conservative tradition maintains that ‘Christ’, in his kenosis, 
did not give up any of his divine attributes, the most radical interpretations suggests that not only 
did ‘Christ’ cease to be God at that moment, but that God as such became incarnated and thus lost 
all of his original attributes and died, which seems to justify Nietzsche’s infamous insight 
concerning the death of God. 
109
 On degree see previous footnote. 
110
 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 78. 
111
 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 79. 
190 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
112
 I owe the phrase “standing in someone else’s shoes” to a conversation with Michael Gardiner; the phrase 
was his, not mine.  On lack of chronological order, see Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, 
Art and Answerability, p. 27: “It should be kept in mind that the constitutive moments of projecting oneself 
into the other and of consummating the other do not follow one another chronologically; we must 
emphasise that the sense of each is different, although in living experience projection and consummation 
are intimately intertwined and fuse with one another.”   
113
 Allon White has reservations about the appropriateness of Shukman’s own Bakhtinian appropriations, as 
I mentioned briefly in this section.  Nevertheless, Shukman’s commentary on Einfuhlung, at least, notes that 
Bakhtin indeed rejects or partly rejects the idea as it is expounded in Dilthey and by the neo-Kantians.  See 
Shukman, “M. M. Bakhtin: Notes on his Philosophy of Man”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. II, ed. Gardiner, p. 
357-8. 
114
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 16: 
pure empathising as such is impossible.  If I actually lost myself in the other (instead of two 
participants there would be one—an impoverishment of being), i.e., if I ceased to be unique, then 
this moment of my not-being could never become a moment of my consciousness; non-being 
cannot become a moment in the being of consciousness—it would simply not exist for me, i.e., 
being would not be accomplished through me at that moment.  Passive empathising, being-
possessed, losing oneself—these have nothing in common with the answerable act/deed of self-
abstracting or self-renunciation. 
115
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 16: “In self-renunciation I actualise with utmost activeness 
and in full the uniqueness of my place in being.  The world in which I, from my own unique place, 
renounce myself does not become a world in which I do not exist, a world which is indifferent, in its 
meaning, to my existence: self-renunciation is a performance or accomplishment that encompasses being-
as-event.” 
116
 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 16. 
117
 See J. O. Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary, p. 87-8. 
118
 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, C, CC, “Religion in the Form of art”, p. 439.  
119
 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, C, CC, “Religion in the Form of art”, p. 457:  
The externalization {or kenosis} of substance, its growth into self-consciousness, expresses the 
transition into the opposite, the unconscious transition of necessity; in other words, that substance 
is in itself self-consciousness.  Conversely, the externalization of self-consciousness expresses this, 
that it is in itself the universal essence, or—since the Self is pure being-for-self which in its 
opposite communes with itself—that is just because substance is self-consciousness for the elf, that 
it is Spirit.  Of this Spirit, which has abandoned the form of Substance and enters existence in the 
shape of self-consciousness, it may therefore be said—if we wish to employ relationships derived 
from natural generation—that it has an actual mother but an implicit father.  For actuality or self-
consciousness, and the in-itself as substance, are its two moments through whose reciprocal 
externalization, each becoming the other, Spirit comes into existence as their unity. 
120
 In reality, even a wholly aesthetic subject must admit of a unique life apart from the other.  Again, no 
absolute mergence is possible, and my consciousness will never appear within the consciousness of another. 
121
 Jacobs, “Bakhtin and the Hermeneutics of Love”, Bakhtin and Religion: A Feeling of Faith, ed. Susan 
M. Felch and Paul J. Contino, p. 40. 
122
 Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 389. 
123
 For “alibi in being,” see Toward a Philosophy of the Act, passim.  For example, p. 42: 
An answerable act or deed is precisely that act which is performed on the basis of an 
acknowledgement of my obligative (ought-to-be) uniqueness.  It is this affirmation of my non-alibi 
in being that constitutes the basis of my life being actually and compellently given as well as its 
being actually and compellently projected as something-yet-to-be-achieved.  It is only my non-
alibi in being that transforms an empty possibility into an actual answerable act or deed (through 
an emotional-volitional referral to myself as the one who is active).  This is the living fact of a 
primordial act or deed which produces for the first time the answerably performed act—produces 
its actual heaviness, compellentness; it is the foundation of my life as a deed-performing 
{postuplenie}, for to be in life, to be actually, is to act, is to be unindifferent toward the once-
occurrent whole. 
124
 Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 389. 
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125
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 12. 
126
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 18. 
127
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 18. 
128
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 17. 
129
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 18. 
130
 Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 390-1. 
131
 Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 390-1. 
132
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 22. 
133
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 24. 
134
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 25. 
135
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 25. 
136
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 25. 
137
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 25. 
138
 That is, the answerable deed is not achieved through its simple rational justifiability, but this does not 
make it irrational.  This simply means that what counts as the ethically affirmative component in 
answerability is the attention to the unique actuality of being in its everyday becoming.  See Bakhtin, 
Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 30: 
The ongoing event can be clear and distinct, in all its constituent moments, to a participant in the 
act or deed he himself performs.  Does this mean that he understands it logically?  That is, that 
what is clear to him are only the universal moments and relations transcribed in the form of 
concepts?  Not at all: he sees clearly these individual, unique persons whom he loves, this sky and 
this earth and these trees... and what is also given to him simultaneously is the value, the actually 
and concretely affirmed value of these persons and these objects.                                        
139
 See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 468-73. 
140
 See Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, pp. 52-9.  
141
 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 53. 
142
 See Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 53: “The inward has 
lost any authoritative outward form, but has not yet found a ‘form’ for the spirit (‘form’ in the strict sense 
does not apply here, for it is no longer aesthetic: the spirit is not something given, but something present in 
itself as a task to be accomplished” 
143
 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, pp. 53-4. 
144
 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 54. 
145
 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 54.  We begin to see here 
Martin Buber’s influence on Bakhtin’s thought, where there is an internal ‘thou’ category burped into 
existence.   
146
 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 54. 
147
 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 55. 
148
 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 55. 
149
 Münchhausen is supposed to have been able to raise himself by his own hair. 
150
 See Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 7. 
151
 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 56. 
152
 Cf. Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 57. 
153
 On love, particularly as it relates to the non-coincidence of subject and world or subject and object—and 
these are not wholly the same phenomenal relation—see Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, 
Art and Answerability, p. 82: 
Sympathetic co-experiencing of the hero’s life means to experience that life in a form completely 
different from the form in which it was or could have been, experienced by the subiectum of that 
life himself.  Co-experiencing in this form does not in the least strive toward the ultimate point of 
totally coinciding, merging with the co-experienced life, because such merging would be 
equivalent to a falling away of the coefficient of sympathy, of love, and, consequently, of the form 
they produced as well.  A sympathetically co-experienced life is given form not in the category of 
the I, but in the category of the other, as the life of another human being, another I.  In other 
words, a sympathetically co-experienced life is the life of another human being (his outer as well 
as his inner life) that is essentially experienced from outside.  
192 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
See also Bakhtin’s analysis of love in Pushkin’s lyric “Parting”, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, pp. 65-75; 
this analysis provides an excellent example of the non-coincidence of subject and other in the ethical 
moment of sympathetic co-experiencing as it takes place in verbal art. 
154
 Bakhtin also takes up this theme of the other as reduced to pure objectivity in Problems in Dostoevsky’s 
Poetics.  See, for example, his commentary on the Romantic novel where the hero is reduced to mere 
function of “implementer of authorial pathos,” p. 12. 
155
 Cf. Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p.128. 
156
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p.129. 
157
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 129.   
158
 Kristeva qtd. in Lock, “Bakhtin and Orthodox Theology”, MB Vol. I, ed Gardiner, p. 286. 
159
 Clark and Holquist, MB, p. 130. 
160
 On the witness and the judge, see Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 137: 
The witness and the judge.  When consciousness appeared in the world (in existence) and, perhaps, 
when biological life appeared (perhaps not only animals, but trees and grass and also witness and 
judge [the Bergsonian image?]), the world (existence) changed radically.  A stone is still stony and 
the sun still sunny, but the event of existence as a whole (unfinalized) becomes completely 
different because a new and major character in this event appears for the first time on the scene of 
earthly existence—the witness and the judge.  And the sun, while remaining physically the same, 
has changed because it has begun to be cognized by the witness and the judge.  It has stopped 
simply begin and has started being in itself and for itself (these categories appear for the first time 
here) as well as for the other, because if has been reflected in the consciousness of the other (the 
witness and the judge): this has caused it to change radically, to be enriched and transformed.  
(This has nothing to do with “other existence.”) 
Note that while Bakhtin calls this the advent of consciousness I have called it the beginning of reflection.  
Obviously there is a distinction being made here, but I do not believe by consciousness—in this section at 
least—Bakhtin means nothing short of what Merleau-Ponty has termed “radical reflection.”  This notion 
emphasizes the incomplete and distinctly perspectival and essentially creative phenomenological, 
participative, consciousness of something; the witness is not the transcendental ego, and the judge is not a 
form of absolute reflection—nor is it a return to the rationalistic gnoseological subject.  See Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 70-1: 
If a universal constituting consciousness were possible, the opacity of the fact would disappear.  If 
then we want reflection to maintain, in the object on which it bears, its descriptive characteristics, 
and thoroughly to understand that object, we must not consider it as a mere return to a universal 
reason and see it as anticipated in unreflective experience, we must regard it as a creative operation 
which itself participates in the facticity of that experience.  That is why phenomenology, alone of 
all philosophies, talks about a transcendental field.  This word indicates that reflection never holds, 
arrayed and objectified before its gaze, the whole world and the plurality of monads, and that its 
view is never other than partial and of limited power.  It is also why phenomenology is 
phenomenology, that is, a study of the advent of being to consciousness, instead of presuming its 
possibility as given in advance.  It is striking how transcendental philosophies of the classical type 
never question the possibility of effecting the complete disclosure which they always assume done 
somewhere.  It is enough for them that it should be necessary, and in this way they judge what is 
by what ought to be, by what the idea of knowledge requires. [This is not the ought as it appears in 
Bakhtin; it is the ought of the transcendental a priori ego.]  In fact, the thinking ego can never 
abolish its inherence in an individual subject, which knows all things in a particular perspective.  
Reflection can never make me stop seeing the sun two hundred yards away on a misty day, [or by 
perceptual constancy,]  or seeing it ‘rise’ and ‘set,’ or thinking with the cultural apparatus with 
which my education, my previous efforts, my personal history, have provided me. 
161
 Recently purchased by the British Library.  See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-
17732310>, 08/07/2012.  According to the unofficial history of St. Cuthbert’s Gospel, it had been buried 
inside the coffin of St. Cuthbert’s.  According to the British Library, there is a “13th century note added on 
f. ii verso: ‘The Gospel of John which was found at the head of our blessed father Cuthbert lying in his 
tomb in the year of his translation.’  The codex was purchased for £9 million, 08/07/2012.  See images of 
the text at the British Library website: 
<http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Viewer.aspx?ref=add_ms_89000_fs001r>, 08/07/2012.   
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162
 See OED “word,” 
<http://www.oed.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048/view/Entry/230192?rskey=X3ExQNandresult=1&isAdvance
d=false#eid>: 
Cognate with Old Frisian word (West Frisian wurd), Old Dutch wort (Middle Dutch wort, word, 
Dutch woord), Old Saxon word (Middle Low German wort), Old High German wort (Middle High 
German wort, German Wort), Old Icelandic orð, Old Swedish orþ (Swedish ord), Old 
Danish orth (Danish ord), Gothic waurd, all denoting both ‘an utterance’ and ‘an element or unit 
of speech, a word’ < the same Indo-European base as Lithuanian vardas name, forename, title, 
Latvian vārds word, forename, promise, classical Latin verbum word, showing an extended form 
of the Indo-European base of ancient Greek ῥήτωρ (earlier ϝρήτωρ) speaker, (Epic and Ionic) 
ἐρέω (earlier ϝερέω; Attic ἐρῶ) I shall say, and perhaps also Sanskrit vrata behest, command. 
163
 Cf. Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique, p. 65. 
164
 Cf. Bakhtin, “Toward a Methodology of the Human Sciences”, Speech Genres, p. 170. 
165
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 56. 
166
 Qtd. in Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 254. 
167
 Rousseau, “The Perpetual Crises of modernism and the Traditions of Enlightenment Vitalism”, in The 
Crisis in Modernism, ed. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass, p. 52.  See also Clark and Holquist, 
Mikhail Bakhtin¸ pp. 100-102.  Clark and Holquist name Kanaëv “the most important new member of the 
group for Bakhtin”, p. 102.  
168
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 174.   
169
 The occasion, that is, according to Clark and Holquist, but Nina Perlina reminds us that before Nikolai 
Lossky was forced to leave Russia in 1922 he had written a brochure titled Sovremennyj vitalizm 
(contemporary vitalism).  Kanaëv and Bakhtin’s article not only takes this title, it “is a studied copy of 
several chunks cut from the first part of Lossky’s work.  It seems clear that inspiration for this article cannot 
be granted exclusively to Ukhtomsky.  Kanaëv and Bakhtin’s paper appeared in 1926.  See Perlina, Funny 
Things are Happening on the Way to the Bakhtin Forum, p. 13. 
170
 Cf. Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin “The Leningrad Circle”, Mikhail Bakhtin, f.n. 13, p. 367:  
Baxtin, ‘Sovremennyj vitalizm,’ Čelovek i priroda, no. 1 (1926): 33-42; no. 2 (1926): 9-22.  Nos. 2 
and 3 of this periodical announced another ‘Kanaëv’ article in the next issue, but none appeared.  
Kanaëv concentrated on the topic of Goethe as a naturalist but also wrote on morphological 
questions and the history of evolutionary theory, multiple births, hydras, and Leclerc de Buffon.  
In providing his concise history of vitalism, one which Rousseau fears that “no single chapter, no matter 
how well researched or well written, can hope to do justice to,” p. 17, Rousseau’s scholarly achievement is 
actually quite stunning.  Moreover, he remembers to address all the right questions regarding historical-
critical aspects of his survey; regarding the term ‘science’ for example—“Whose science? Which science? 
Where? When? Under what conditions?, p. 21.”  He also provides the right interface between the political 
motivations of various currents in the vitalist and mechanist controversies of the 17th through the 19th 
centuries—and his position seems on face value to itself be informed by Bakhtin’s own commitment to a 
loosely Marxist historical materialism: “one cannot generalize that a vitalist’s politics, religion, science, and 
so forth, ought to be of a piece: uniform, homogenous, isomorphic.  Yet one is persuaded that there was 
something then approximating a ‘vitalistic mind-set’ as distinguished from the previous mechanistic one, 
and that it extended from scientific method to ideological mind-set and personal politics”, p. 44—i.e., from 
life to consciousness.   
171
 Indeed, Bakhtin seems to follow Marx in his supposition that the path to science is not straight and 
narrow, but evolves in fits and starts, contractions and false starts.  See the 1872 preface to the French 
edition of Capital, Vol. 1, p. 104: “There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the 
fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits.”   
172
 Rousseau, “The Perpetual Crises of modernism and the Traditions of Enlightenment Vitalism”, in The 
Crisis in Modernism, ed. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass, p. 53.  Rousseau commits a pretty glaring 
gaffe here, however, stating that Hermann Cohen was one of the more noteworthy members of the 
Leningrad Circle professing themselves to be neo-Kantians.  Given that Cohen was the leading proponent 
of neo-Kantianism up until his death in 1918 and worked out of Marburg, and that to the best of my 
knowledge never set his foot in Leningrad or even on Russian soil, I cannot see how this was possible, 
unless of course some of the members had learned the art of resurrecting the dead from their affiliation with 
Voskresenie, whose name means ‘Sunday’ or ‘resurrection,’ see Clark and Holquist, p. 141.  Rousseau 
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himself is an accomplished cultural theorist working at or affiliated with various prestigious schools in the 
United States and Britain, it is hard for me to believe that this is anything more than a simple parapraxis.  
Nevertheless, the obviousness of the slip does not bolster one’s confidence that Rousseau has read Clark 
and Holquist carefully.  This could be problematic, since they remain the cornerstone source on which he is 
building his case for Bakhtin’s critical assessment of vitalism.  Since Clark and Holquist are also one of my 
own touchstones of reference, I have everywhere endeavoured not only to read them closely, but critically.   
173
 Rousseau, “The Perpetual Crises of modernism and the Traditions of Enlightenment Vitalism”, in The 
Crisis in Modernism, ed. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass,  p. 54.  
174
 Gardiner, “‘The Incomparable Monster of Solipsism’: Bakhtin and Merleau-Ponty”, p. 136.  See also 
Clark and Holquist, p. 102: “This interest [in biological science] led Bakhtin to write the review article 
‘Contemporary Vitalism,’ which appeared in 1926 in the popular scientific journal Man and Nature... under 
Kanaëv’s  name, the first of Bakhtin’s articles to be published under a friend’s name.” 
175
 We have already seen how the shift from the purely external physical body to the internalization of 
consciousness of the world as a task of seeking redemption informed Bakhtin’s work anthologized in Art 
and Answerability.  Thus the external world of the ancients was likewise the origin of the movement of 
consciousness for the Greeks—although it was not yet material in the modern sense.  A similar notation is 
expressed in “Toward a Methodology of the Human Sciences”, p. 165: “The influence of extra-textual 
reality in the shaping of the writer’s artistic vision and the artistic thought (and the vision of thought of 
others who create culture).”  It is certainly arguable that Bakhtin did not follow Marx and Engels in all 
things, but one cannot help imagining Bakhtin sipping black tea and nodding his head in agreement while 
reading The German Ideology, and specifically this passage worthy of An Introduction to Marx 101, p. 47: 
Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.—real, active men, as they are conditioned 
by a definite development of their productive forces and of their intercourse corresponding to 
these, up to its fullest forms.  Consciousness can never be anything else then conscious existence, 
and the existence of men is their actual life-process.  If in all ideology men and their circumstances 
appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their 
historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process. 
Again, cf. “Toward a Methodology”, p. 164: “True understanding in literature and literary scholarship is 
always historical and personified.” 
176
 Perlina takes this undecidable approach.  See Perlina, Funny Things are Happening on the Way to the 
Bakhtin Forum, p. 15: “Without denying the validity of Kanaëv’s statement that Bakhtin had published at 
least one text under his name, we are still not sure whether Bakhtin actually wrote the article…  What we 
can now clearly see is that in 1926, Bakhtin had copied several parts of Lossky’s brochure on vitalism for 
his friend Kanaëv.” 
177
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, The Crisis of Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy, ed. 
Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass, p. 76.  For Hypotheses non fingo (“I do not make hypotheses”) see 
also Joseph Henry Green’s “Recapitulatory Lecture”, Vital Dynamism, p. 100, where Green attempts to 
save the reputation of John Hunter from the “charge of ill founded and visionary opinions... [by] banishing 
hypotheses, fictions, and arbitrary assumptions, and by considering Life as a Law.”   
178
 Cf. Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 78. 
179
 For the original formulation of these tidy distinctions at the heart of Kant’s critical philosophy, cf. “On 
the ideal of the highest good”, Critique of Pure Reason, A805/B833, p. 677: “All interest of my reason (the 
speculative as well as the practical) is united in the following three questions: 
1. What can I know? 
2. What should I do? 
3. What may I hope?” 
For the “participative thinking” (uchastnoe myshlenie) performed by participative consciousness see 
Toward a Philosophy of the Act, passim, and esp. p. 8: 
Participative thinking predominates in all great systems of philosophy, either consciously and 
distinctly (especially in the Middle Ages) or in an unconscious and masked form (in the systems of 
the 19th and 20th centuries).  One can observe a peculiar lightening of the very term ‘being’ or 
‘reality.’  Kant’s classical example against the ontological proof, that a hundred real thalers are not 
equal to a hundred thinkable thalers, has ceased to be convincing.  
Bakhtin here refers to Kant’s logical exposition against the ontological proof for God’s existence, Critique 
of Pure Reason A596/B624-A600/B628, pp. 566-68.  The ontological proof is excellently summarized by 
195 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Schopenhauer in his On the Principle of Sufficient Reason, II, § 7, pp. 16-7: “According to Descartes, the 
existence of God is contained in the conception of God, therefore it becomes an argument for his actual 
being.”  With his heel, Schopenhauer strikes at the head of the viperous precision of rationality: “Wär’ der 
Gedank’ nicht so verwünscht gescheut, Man wär’ versucht ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen” (“Were not the 
thought so cursedly acute, One might be tempted to declare it silly”), p. 12.  Kant’s refutation of the 
ontological proof simply arrives at the conclusion that simply thinking a thing adds nothing to its existence, 
and if this were not the case the conception of the thing would not be the conception of the thing since 
something has been added to the predicate—namely being, which Kant understands as relegated to the 
copula alone.  Therefore, in Kant’s example, “a hundred actual dollars do contain the least bit more than the 
merely possible”, A599/B627, p. 567.  The reason why we think a hundred actually dollars greater in sum 
to the conception of them is because the two are joined synthetically, and so further conceptions follow 
such as ‘I am rich.’  But the concept of a hundred thalers is not changed by the actual existence of the 
money.   
 Bakhtin no longer finds this argument convincing since the argument is ordained merely in the 
theoretical sphere and does not actually participate in being.  For him once-occurrent being-as-event does 
add a valuative accent to the concept in participative consciousness; he continues:  
What is historically on hand once and only once in the reality that was determined by me in an 
once-occurrent manner is, indeed, incomparably heavier.  But when it is weighed on theoretical 
scales (even with the addition of a theoretical constatation of its empirical existence) in detachment 
from its historically valuative uniqueness, it is highly unlikely that it will prove to be heavier than 
what is merely thinkable.  Historically actual once-occurrent being is greater and heavier than the 
unitary being of theoretical science, but this difference in weight, which is self-evident for a living 
and experiencing consciousness, cannot be determined in theoretical categories. 
As an aside, Vadim Liapunov conjectures that Bakhtin’s “participative thinking” could be related to interest 
in Kierkegaard and more generally the German das seinsverbundene Denken, or “thinking that derives or 
relates to ‘eine reale Existenz’ (an actually existing human being),” and which is contrary to Bewußtsein 
überhaupt, or “pure cognizing,” Toward a Philosophy of the Act, f.n. 29, p. 86.  I am in full agreement with 
the spirit if not the letter of Liapunov’s observation. 
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 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 79.  
181
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 79. 
182
 Cf. Hegel’s Phenomenology, C, (DD), p. 492.  There Hegel compares the movement of history, which he 
sees as the negative aspect or reflection of ‘Spirit,’ to a “gallery of images.”  In the process of revealing 
itself to itself through the movement of history, Spirit takes on a succession of forms each of which is, 
according to Hegel, internalized and preserved in the inward being of Spirit. The process is supposed to 
continue through this internalization of the forms of Spirit achieved in their external extensive historical 
aspect until absolute knowing is achieved, at which time history ceases to unfold, or so it is typically held 
that Hegel believed this to be the case, especially by apologists for capitalism such as Fukuyama, although 
the very idea of such an eschatological achievement was detestable to Bakhtin and I am inclined to agree 
with him.  The difference between Hegel’s use of the phrase “succession of Spirits” and my own, 
“succession of forms” is therefore meant to call attention simply to the analogous and often inherited 
continuity of concepts from one age of vitalism to another, and in no way is to be understood as an attempt 
to rejuvenate Hegel’s idea of Spirit, or “the absolute notion.”  Another example lies in the work of Tran-
Duc-Thao, who attempted to wed Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity, as described in The Crisis, with 
dialectical materialism via this type of Hegelian historical-spiritual synthesis, and who could be said to be 
an adherent to the positivist camp in the philosophy of science; see for example Leonard Lawlor’s Derrida 
and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, pp. 55-6 : 
Dialectical materialism... ‘defines the truth of scientific concepts insofar as it reproduces in 
consciousness the real processes by which life constitutes itself in the general movement of 
material structures.  Even consciousness, a region apparently heterogeneous to the physico-
chemical, presents no great difficulty for ‘the very movement of positive explanation’; as Tran-
Duc-Thao says, ‘the act of consciousness in its lived meaning is defined exhaustively by the 
dialectic of behavior.’  Transcendental structures such as temporalization  ‘coincide in a strict 
manner’ with real structures which merely preceded them in real time; real time is the only type of 
priority for Tran-Duc-Thao.  Dialectical materialism’s subject matter, therefore would be the 
‘evolution of life leading to humanity’ 
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Far from deconstructing Tran-Duc-Thao’s line of argument, the young Derrida destroys Tran-Duc-Thao’s 
account in the latter’s thesis The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Phenomenology.  According to Lawlor, 
Derrida’s account leaves Tran-Duc-Thao either entirely on the side of dogmatism or without having 
grounded the sciences: “It is hard to know how [Tran-Duc-Thao] can account for objective knowledge... by 
rejecting phenomenology’s subjectivism, Tran-Duc-Thao seems to appeal again to some sort of thing-in-
itself.  If this interpretation is correct, then Tran-Duc-Thao relapses into dogmatism.  But, on the other hand, 
if Tran-Duc-Thao is not presupposing some sort of materialist metaphysics, then it must be the case that the 
natural sciences remain entirely ungrounded for him.  Basing their priority entirely on real time, he does not 
provide the conditions for the possibility of the sciences,” Lawlor, p. 56.  Husserl had initiated his project 
explicitly to account for this ground by way of intentionality, and specifically meaning-intention and 
meaning-fulfilment, see Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. I, “Investigation I”, “Chapter 1”, §§ 9-12, pp. 
191-8. 
183
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 80. 
184
 See for example, Husserl’s direction on this point, regarding what he calls the mathematization of nature 
in which “nature itself is idealized under the guidance of the new mathematics; nature itself becomes—to 
express it in a modern way—a mathematical manifold (Mannigfaltigkeit),” Crisis, II, § 9, p. 23.  Against 
the Husserlian culture of idealism we may read Heisenberg’s commitment to empirical verification as the 
ground of the sciences, Physics and Philosophy, p. 83: 
Descartes considered [cogito ergo sum] as the solid ground on which he could build his system.  It 
is in fact true that this statement has the certainty of a mathematical conclusion, if the words 
‘cogito’ and ‘sum’ are defined in the usual way or, to put it more cautiously and at the same time 
more critically, if the words are so defined that the statement follows.  But this does not tell us 
anything about how far we can use the concepts of “thinking” and “being” in finding our way.  It is 
finally in a very general sense always an empirical question how far our concepts can be applied. 
For Arendt, Galileo’s remarkable discovery of the universal application of math to nature—Husserl’s so-
called “Mannigfaltigkeit” had colonized the lifeworld and corroded the active life of man, sic., The Human 
Condition, p. 261: 
The modern astrophysical world view, which began with Galileo, and its challenge to the adequacy 
of the senses to reveal reality, have left us a universe of whose qualities we know no more than the 
way they affect our measuring instruments, and—in the words of Eddington—‘the former have as 
much resemblance to the latter as a telephone number has to a subscriber.’  Instead of objective 
qualities, in other words, we find instruments, and instead of nature or the universe—in the words 
of Heisenberg—man encounters only himself.   
185
 See Rousseau, “The Perpetual Crises of Modernism”, p. 39, where we are reminded that Geoffrey 
Cantor had recognized and written a dissertation on Newton’s vitalism as early as 1743. 
186
 Eichner, “The Rise of Modern Science and the Genesis of Romanticism”, p. 9.  To hear David Abram 
speak, who is a self described eco-phenomenologist rather than a vitalist, one might think that d’Holbauch 
supposition that an invisible hand guided gravity was still very much alive.  See David Abram, “How to 
Think about Science”,  Ideas, CBC Radio, <http://www.cbc.ca/ideas/episodes/2009/01/02/how-to-think-
about-science-part-1---24-listen/#episode12> 17/07/2012:  
...gravity was an uncanny mystery to our brothers and sisters at the dawn of the scientific age, but 
once it began to be spoken of as a law—the law of gravity—as soon as we speak of it as a law we 
stop noticing it, because it’s just happening automatically and so there’s nothing very mysterious 
there.  But what is this mystery?  We define it even today as ‘mutual attraction of bodies at a 
distance,’ which is as good a definition for Eros as I know.  The attraction of my body to the body 
of the earth and the earth’s flesh for my flesh, that I am in a kind of ongoing erotic relationship to 
the earth at every moment as is each stone that I toss up into the air and finds its way right back to 
contact with the ground.  But how different our experience would be if we find out that gravity is 
Eros.  So it seems to me that, with a bit of attention and a careful attentiveness to how we speak, 
we can begin to notice and make evident once again how wild and quite outrageous everything still 
is.  This interaction or reciprocity between our organism and a larger world that we did not create 
or invent—a world that created us. 
187
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 81: “We term contemporary vitalism critical in the subjective 
sense, that is, we mark only the fact that its representatives strive to be critically-minded, whether they 
succeed or not.” 
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188
 See Rousseau, “The Perpetual Crises of Modernism”, pp. 29-37.  For Robinet, see Lovejoy, p. 281: 
“Robinet was one of the earlier prophets of the élan vital.”  See also, p. 277, where he points to what he 
calls Robinet’s “‘retrotensive method’... the result... was the establishment, by a single stroke of logic, of a 
whole group of important philosophical conclusions—among them, hylozoism, panpsychism, and a peculiar 
sort of panlogism, a doctrine of the ubiquity of the rudiments of rationality in all natural things.”  See also, 
p. 282: [h]ere, manifestly, is a philosophy of l’evolution créatrice in outline; and its resemblance to its 
twentieth-century counterpart is heightened by the fact that it too is, in the end, puzzlingly combined with a 
species of phenomenalism; the matter which hampers the active principle is nevertheless its product and 
exists only as an appearance, while the active principle is in itself non-spatial.”  Also, for Nisus Formativus, 
see Blumenbach, An Essay on Generation, p. 68; also “On the Natural Varieties of Mankind”, On the 
Natural Varieties of Mankind, p. 194.  Kant is one of the first to present the purported purposiveness of 
nature as a merely “regulative principle,” and is by far the most thorough in attempting to expand and 
ground this purposiveness (Zweckmässige) in epistemology—specifically in reflective judgement.  See 
Critique of the Power of Judgement, II, § 61, 5:359-5:361, p. 233-4. 
189
 Cf. Müller-Sievers, Self-Generation, p. 58: “In organic beings, Kant argues, ‘normal’ causality {nexus 
effectivus} is conjoined with a causality of final causes {nexus finalis}....”  See also, The Critique of the 
Power of Judgement, § 61 “On the objective purposiveness of nature”, 5:360, p. 233.  
190
 The Critique of the Power of Judgement, § 61 “On the objective purposiveness of nature”, 5:387, p. 259.  
191
 An explanation of the third antinomy, or “Third Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas,”    Beginning from 
the thesis that there is more than one type of causality, i.e., more than just natural—or efficient—cause, 
Kant deduces an “absolute causal spontaneity” that is self-caused.  A wholly efficient account of causation 
amounts only to an infinite succession of causes.  We also must presume a first cause.  Nevertheless, an 
infinite regress of causes is assured a priori, since this first cause, being efficient, would necessarily rely on 
an antecedent external cause.  Therefore, we must assume a second type and one which is self-generating 
and does not itself rely on a prior external cause.  
The antithesis account that Kant provides begins from the assumption that there is only efficient 
cause.  The proof runs like this: if one assumes a free cause at the beginning of a successive chain, and 
thereby claims to have done away with the necessity of an exterior cause for this original cause, then one 
can no longer provide a basis for efficient cause at all.  By assuming an original freedom and spontaneity 
that any self-caused event implies, one cannot at the same time hold that this free cause will then follow 
according to the necessity that efficient cause implies: “one cannot say that in place of the laws of nature, 
laws of freedom enter into the sources of the world, because if freedom were determined according to laws, 
it would not be freedom, but nothing other than nature.” 
The third antinomy does not resolve itself into the univocal thesis of efficient cause or the equally 
univocal antithesis of free cause, since their seeming mutual exclusion is illusory.  Kant places the 
presumption of an originary free-cause that initiates the succession of causes entirely on the side of the 
transcendental a priori side of cognition.  The understanding does not derive the idea of a first cause from 
experience, but provides it as a necessary presupposition.  Likewise, the antithesis statement, that there is 
only efficient cause, relies on the fact that nowhere in experience are we presented with direct evidence for 
spontaneous self-generated causes.  Furthermore, it is only from experience that we come to understand a 
priori that there must have been a beginning, since it is only through experience that we witness change.  In 
the example Kant provides, I can think the possibility of my free decision to get up out of the chair I am 
sitting in without contradicting the determinism of efficient cause.  On the one side there is an absolute 
beginning—i.e., my decision which causes me to purposively get up out of the chair. This spontaneity is to 
be viewed as a truly self-caused beginning to a succession of causes and does not require a reference to any 
prior external cause.  On the other side mechanical cause continues according to its laws.  There is no 
conflict, since any mechanical account of causation will be wholly on the side of temporal succession, and 
therefore must always presuppose an antecedent cause.  On the one side reason insinuates a first mover.  On 
the other side experience provides us with the idea of succession, change, and efficient cause.  Finally, we 
can only think the possibility of freedom as existing outside of the world, since it cannot admit antecedent 
causes, and since we must think of nature according to efficient cause, without which it could only be 
thought of as “confused and disconnected.”   See Critique of Reason, A444-51/B472-79, pp. 484-89. 
192
 Müller-Sievers, Self-Generation, p. 44. 
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193
 The Critique of the Power of Judgement, §71, “Preparation for the resolution of the above antinomy”, 
5:389, p. 260-1.  See also Steigerwald’s Kant’s Concept of Natural Purpose and the Reflecting Power of 
Judgement”, p. 729: 
[Kant] argued that if the tow maxims are converted into constitutive principles for determinative 
judgement, the antinomy is transformed into ‘a conflict within the legislation of reason.’  If the 
principles of the reflecting power of judgement are taken as having objective reality, and an idea of 
reason regarding the final cause of nature as either intentional or unintentional is used for 
determinative judgements, the dispute between them becomes dogmatic, similar to the antinomy of 
the first Critique.  And as in the first Critique, Kant’s solution was to expose this conflict as 
illusory by critically examining the principles in relation to our cognitive powers and their 
limitations.  Reason’s demand for principles aims at the unconditioned, at the supersensible basis 
that makes things possible and that makes nature itself possible.  But for human cognition not all 
possible ideas have actuality, for our ideas to have an objective basis, they require the 
understanding to be conditioned by given sensible intuitions. 
194
 Cf. The Critique of the Power of Judgement, §. 71, “Preparation for the resolution of the above 
antinomy”, 5:389, p. 260-1:  
All appearance of an antinomy between the maxims of that kind of explanation which is genuinely 
physical (mechanical) and that which is teleological (technical) therefore rests on confusing a 
fundamental principle of the reflecting with that of the determining power of judgement, and on 
confusing the autonomy of the former (which is valid merely subjectively for the use of our reason 
in regard to the particular laws of experience) with the heteronomy of the latter, which has to 
conform to the laws given by the understanding (whether general or particular). 
195
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 81.  He names the usual suspects of this brand of ‘neo-vitalism’ as 
follows: Hans Driesch, Johannes Reinke, William Stern, and E. von Hartmann, although these do not 
“comprise a single school of thought.”  Reinke is spelled Rainke in the translated paper, though I take it that 
this is a typographical error.  
196
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 82. 
197
 The fantastic regenerative properties of the polyp, or hydra, plays an important role here in convincing 
Driesch and provides a powerful visual image of the regulative powers of the purported life force as it did 
for Blumenbach before him.  For Leeuwenhoek, who discovered the polyp’s regenerative powers, and for 
Trembley who rediscovered them, the polyp did not represent the regenerative nisus so much as the 
“missing link” between plants and animals, see Lovejoy, p. 233.  Blumenbach had made experiments with 
cutting individual polyps to watch the process of regeneration and even succeeded in more radical attempts 
at splicing halves of green and brown armed polyps together.  When he cut the polyp, he found that the 
“little mutilated animal” regenerated the excised part of its body, but did so such that the new growth was 
“always diminished in bulk,” Blumenbach, On Generation, p. 69.  The new growth did not show any 
marked change in form, however, and Blumenbach became convinced that there must be some Lebenskräft, 
and of a “material basis” (Lenoir, “Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism”, p. 84), which both 
stimulated and guided its generation, nutrition, and production, see Richards, “Kant & Blumenbach on the 
Bildungstrieb”, p. 18.  It was essential, however, that this force not be taken as something somehow 
external to the matter of which the organism was composed—as for example in Robinet’s active principle 
which impresses itself on matter from the outside. 
Cf. also Lovejoy, p. 281, where he explains that for Robinet, in the beginning, brute matter is dominant 
where matter is actually a ‘clogging’ of spontaneous action, which the puissance active must struggle to 
overcome.  Gradually that “matter becomes less an obstacle than the instrument whereby the force achieves 
its end.”  Lovejoy also notes that Robinet seems to have discarded the principle of continuity that had 
guided him to his theory of individual gradations in the principle of plenitude. 
Lenoir draws our attention to this point, Lenoir, “Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism”, p. 84 : 
Two features of Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb are extremely important to bear in mind.  The first is 
that it could not be reduced to the chemical constituents of the generative fluid.  Blumenbach 
repeatedly emphasized the immanent teleological character of his conception of the Lebenskräft. 
The formative force existed in the organization of the Zeugungssaft [i.e., the procreative fluid] as a 
whole: change any of its constituent elements and the organization of the whole was not just 
altered; it was completely destroyed.  On the other hand, it is to be emphasized that this 
teleological agent was not to be considered a kind of soul superimposed on matter. This form of 
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vitalism he found objectionable in Buffon’s concept of the moule interieur and in Wolff’s 
conception of the vis essentialis.  For Blumenbach the Bildungstrieb did not exist apart from 
matter, but is could not be explained in terms of its constitutive elements.  
See also Zammito on the Nisus formativus/Bildungstrieb in Blumenbach, p. 80:  
In the terminology of Blumenbach, Kant discriminated between a Bildungskraft—‘the vis plastic 
of the ancients, which works merely via mechanism’ and a Bildungstrieb which Blumenbach 
conceived as a ‘nisus formativus’ that worked organically’.  Girtanner was clear that 
Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb was a Lebenskraft, namely ‘that force by virtue of which the chemical 
and physical laws are subordinated under the laws of organization’.  Because life forms showed 
characteristics reproduction, growth through nourishment and assimilation, regeneration of lost 
organs and self-healing generally—which could not be assimilated to the mechanistic model of 
natural science, they represented anomalies requiring recourse to teleological judgement, the 
analogy of ‘purposiveness.’ 
Lenoir also reminds us that the holy grail of organic science in this early stage of its development was the 
unification of the forces of “reproduction, generation, and nutrition under a general law,” Lenoir, “Kant, 
Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism”, p. 84.  
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 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 84. 
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 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 84. 
200
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 84-5. 
201
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 85. 
202
 These experiments are recorded in Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 85.. 
203
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 86. 
204
 On “prospective potential” and “prospective significance” see Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”,  p. 86. 
205
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 86. 
206
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 87. 
207
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 88, and f.n. 13, p. 97. 
208
 See also, The Critique of the Power of Judgement, § 61 “On the objective purposiveness of nature”, 
5:360, p. 233, and Müller-Sievers, p. 58: “In organic beings, Kant argues, ‘normal’ causality {nexus 
effectivus} is conjoined with a causality of final causes {nexus finalis}....”   
209
 Driesch, The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 141.  Emphasis Driesch’s.  
210
 Cf. Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 91. 
211
 Cf. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, p. 94: 
Furthermore, it is not that the eye has to be photo-sensitive—we know this.  The whole 
surface of the tegument—no doubt for various reasons that are not visual—may be photosensitive, 
and this dimension can in no way be reduced to the functioning of vision.  There is a certain 
adumbration of photo-sensitive organs in the pigmentary spots.  In the eye, the pigment functions 
fully, in a way, of course, that the phenomenon shows to be infinitely complex.  It functions within 
the cones, for example, in the form of a rhodopsin.  It also functions inside the various layers of the 
retina.  This pigment comes and goes in functions that are not all, or always immediately 
discoverable and clear, but which suggests the depth, the complexity and, at the same time, the 
unity of the mechanisms concerned with light. 
 I would add the example of photosynthesis too, perhaps, unless we would like to wax poetical and speak of 
photosynthesis in terms of the plant seeing the sun through its own visual organ. This would be the 
inverse—as opposed to the obverse reading of photosynthesis as vision.  Lacan would, however, reject this 
reading as leaving out the internalization and projection of the name-of-the-father, or the function of the law 
of the phallus in the scopic drive.   
212
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 94.  Bakhtin waxes poetic here: “Harmony is a subjectivist 
construct, like the beauty of crystal or the grace of the fallow deer.” 
213
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 94. 
214
 Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 94.  In other words looking back from the end to the beginning... 
we term this series of causes teleological and purposive.  Thus the teleological series reveals itself to be 
simply a causality posited retrospectively, the wished-for end, a telos (goal), and all that is necessary for its 
realization, the means.” 
215
 Interestingly Voloshinov uses the suffix –izm in his 1927 title Frejdizm, rather than the more 
“derogatory” ‘-shchina’, which, “when attached to a proper name... means the excesses or bad times 
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associated with that personality” as in Dostoevshchina as used in Lunacharsky.  See Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics, f.n. f, p. 35.  Voloshinov’s choice, assuming it is self-conscious, betrays his 
ambivalence toward Freud’s psychoanalysis. 
216
 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 2. 
217
 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 284. 
218
 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 284. 
219
 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 285. 
220
 Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, p. 72. 
221
 Bakhtin, “Art and Answerability”, Art and Answerability, p. 1. 
222
 White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. 1, ed. Gardiner, p. 219. 
223
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, pp. 19-20. 
224
 This misdiagnosis of the event is similarly described in Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, pp. 4-5: 
all bodies are causes in relation to each other, and causes for each other—but causes of what?  
They are causes of certain things of an entirely different nature.  These effects are not bodies, but, 
properly speaking, ‘incorporeal’ entities.  They are not physical qualities and properties, but rather 
logical or dialectical attributes.  They are not things or facts, but events.  We cannot say that they 
really exist, but rather that they subsist or inhere....  They are not substantives or adjectives but 
verbs. 
See also “Of the Event”, Logic of Sense, pp. 148-53.  
225
 Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 20. 
226
 Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 136. 
227
 Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 137. 
228
 Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 137. 
229
 Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 137. 
230
 Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 138. 
231
 Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 139:   
Even in antiquity we single out what is ready-made and finalized, and not what has originated and 
is developing.  We do not study literature’s preliterary embryos (in language and ritual).  The 
narrow (‘specialists’’) understanding of specifics.  Possibility and necessity.  It is hardly possible 
to speak about necessity in the human sciences.  Here it is scientifically possible only to disclose 
possibilities and the realization of one of them.  The repeatability and unrepeatability. 
In other words, the work of the humanities is to be judged from the point of view of the supra-I.  Does it 
speak to objective existence?  Does it artfully answer one of the big questions in life through a personal, 
i.e., embodied form?  Does it itself have a rotund semantic personality?  Can you engage it in conversation?   
232
 For “germ-plasm” and Freud’s ontogenetic account of the organism, cf. for example, Freud’s “Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, §. VI, pp. 316-35, and esp. p. 318:  
What Strikes us in this is the unexpected analogy with our own view, which was arrived at along 
such a different path.  Weismann, regarding living substance morphologically, sees in it one 
portion which is destined to die—the soma, the body apart from the substance concerned with sex 
and inheritance—and an immortal portion—the germ-plasm, which is concerned with the survival 
of the species, with reproduction.  We, on the other hand, dealing not with the living substance but 
with the forces operating in it, have been led to distinguish two kinds of instincts: those which seek 
to lead what is living to death, and others, the sexual instincts, which are perpetually attempting 
and achieving a renewal of life.  
Later Freud questions whether or not there is, after all, only one instinct, p. 325:  
But it is all the more necessary for us to lay stress upon the libidinal character of the self-
preservative instincts now that we are venturing upon the further step of recognizing the sexual 
instinct as Eros, the preserver of all things, and of deriving the narcissistic libido of the ego from 
the stores of libido by means of which the cells of the soma are attached to one another.  But we 
now find ourselves suddenly faced by another question.  If the self-preservative instincts too are of 
a libidinal nature, are there perhaps no other instincts whatever but the libidinal ones?  At all 
events there are none other visible. 
233
 For example, in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, Freud speculates that even death has come down to 
multicellular organisms as “a matter of expediency” and not, as Anaximander held, of necessity.  Here 
Freud tries to show his own theory of “Eros” or the “sexual instincts” and Thanatos—here “the death drive” 
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or the “ego-instincts”—can be found also independently through the study of morphology.  Like the 
“‘slipper-animalcule’” (a.k.a. ciliate infusorians—p. 320), which dies as a result of “its incomplete voidance 
of the products of its own metabolism” (p. 321), Freud’s entire theory of the instincts moving from 
pulsation or agitation in the somatic to the release through their sublimation in objects depends on an 
assumption of pressure building from within that seeks release by expulsion from the organism—i.e., 
exteriorization.  We will see how, in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”, Freud complicates this theory and 
shows it to be a highly dynamic and ambiguous process. 
The Anaximander fragment to which I am referring, is that which is the subject of Heidegger’s infamous 
paper “The Anaximander Fragment”.  David Farrell Krell’s translation reads as follows: 
Whence things have their origin, there they must also pass away according to necessity; for they 
must pay penalty and be judged for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time. 
Heidegger, “The Anaximander Fragment”, Arion, p. 576. 
234
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 113. 
235
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 113. 
236
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 113-4. 
237
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 116. 
238
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 116. 
239
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 116-7. 
240
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 117. 
241
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 118. 
242
 Cf. for example, Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 134: “At the very 
beginning, it seems, the external world, objects, and what is hated are identical.  If later on an object turns 
out to be a source of pleasure, it is loved, but it is also incorporated into the ego; so that for the purified 
pleasure-ego once again objects coincide with what is extraneous and hated.”  The radical reading of Freud, 
I suggest, would then be that love—or Eros—is always a positive force that expresses itself by affirming 
that which it loves by incorporating it into one’s own identity, which can include consuming it, etc., but also 
simply working to ameliorate a project, fix a table, mend a jacket, etc.  I think Freud wants a radical 
separation of what is loved as an extension of one’s own identity and that which is hated as an object that is 
always-already other.  It is clear that while this synonymy of love/interiority/subject may not be absolute, 
for Freud they do stand in polar distinction to hate/exteriority/object and certainly become absolutely 
synonymous by the instantiation of the pleasure-ego. 
243
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 118. 
244
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § i, p. 277.  For more on Freud’s principle 
of constancy of pressure see Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, f.n. 1, p. 117.  
For afflux see ibid., bottom of p. 116.  See also “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § i., 
f.n. 2, p. 277:  “The ‘principle of constancy’ dates back to the very beginning of Freud’s psychological 
studies.  The first published discussion of it of any length was by Breuer (in semi-physiological terms) 
towards the end of Section 2(A) of his theoretical part of the Studies on Hysteria.” 
245
 Cf. Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 116: “Above all, [the instincts] 
oblige the nervous system to renounce its ideal intention of keeping off stimuli, for they maintain an 
incessant and unavoidable afflux of stimulation.” 
246
 Again see Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 127. 
247
 “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 123.  For the reversal of scopophilia into 
exhibitionism, cf. pp. 126-7.   
248
 Cf. Freud, “Instincts”, p. 127. 
249
 Cf. Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 127: “For at the beginning of its 
activity the scopophilic instinct is auto-erotic: it has indeed an object, but that object is part of the subject’s 
own body.  It is only later that the instinct is led, by a process of comparison, to exchange this object for an 
analogous part of someone else’s body.” 
250
 I will not deal with repression and sublimation here.  “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” was followed by a 
paper on “Narcissism” and, it is thought, one on sublimation “formed the subject of one of [Freud’s] lost 
metaphysical papers, Freud, “Instincts”, Metapsychology, f.n. 4, p. 123.  To deal with all four vicissitudes 
would be beyond the purpose of touching upon them here.  In any case, Freud’s own feelings on the 
repression of the scopic drive would have to be worked out according to his paper on “Repression” and his 
definition of sublimation in his paper “On Narcissism”, Metapsychology, p. 88: “Sublimation is a process 
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that concerns object-libido and consists in the instinct’s directing itself toward an aim other than, and 
remote from, that of sexual satisfaction; in this process the accent falls upon deflection from sexuality.”   
251
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 129. 
252
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 137. 
253
 Cf. Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 132 
254
 See “‘introjects’”, Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 133. 
255
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, pp. 133-4. 
256
 Cf. Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 134:  
For the pleasure-ego the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable, which it has 
incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to it.  It has separated off a part of its 
own self, which it projects into the external world and feels as hostile.  After this new arrangement, 
the two polarities coincide once more: the ego-subject coincides with pleasure, and the external 
world with unpleasure (with what was earlier indifference). 
257
 The three opposites in love are love-hate, loving-being loved, and love-unconcern or indifference.   
Freud enters into this discussion of love to show how Eros and the other instincts such as scopophilia, have 
their vicissitudes as they pass through the three polarities. Cf. Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On 
Metapsychology, p. 131: 
Perhaps we shall come to a better understanding of the several opposites of loving if we reflect that 
our mental life as a whole is governed by three polarities, the antithesis: 
Subject (ego) – Object (external world), 
Pleasure-Unpleasure, and 
Active-passive.  
The antithesis ego-non-ego (external), i.e., subject-object, is, as we have already said, thrust upon 
the individual organism at an early stage, by the experience that it can silence external stimuli by 
means of muscular action but is defenceless against instinctual stimuli.  This antithesis remains, 
above all, sovereign in our intellectual activity and creates for research the basic situation which no 
efforts can alter.  The polarity of pleasure-unpleasure is attached to a scale of feelings, whose 
paramount importance in determining our actions (our will) has already been emphasized.  The 
antithesis active-passive must not be confused with the antithesis ego-subject-external-world-
object.  The relation of the ego to the external world is passive in so far as it receives stimuli from 
it and active when it reacts to these. 
258
 Cf. Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 118: “[e]very instinct is a piece of 
activity; if we speak loosely of passive instincts, we can only mean instincts whose aim is passive.” 
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 Cf. Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 127. 
260
 But not his body’s object.  Note, this is before the organ—the phallus—is split from the body in the 
Lacanian movement from imaginary to symbolic. 
261
 See Freud  “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, f.n. 2, p. 132-3.  
262
 For these two principles of mental functioning , the “reality-ego” and the “pleasure-ego” cf. also “Two 
Principles of Mental Functioning”, On Metapsychology, p. 42: “While the ego goes through its 
transformation from pleasure-ego into a reality-ego, the sexual instincts undergo the changes that lead them 
from their original auto-eroticism through various intermediate phases to object-love in the service of 
procreation.”  
263
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, 138. 
264
 Cf. Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 125: “[a] primary narcissism, not 
derived from sadism in the manner I have described, seems not to be met with.” 
265
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 128. 
266
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 35. 
267
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 135 
268
 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, pp. 115-9. 
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 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 10. 
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 Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 136. 
271
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § iv., passim. 
272
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § iv., p. 298. 
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 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § iv., p. 298. 
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 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § iv., p. 298. 
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 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § iv., p. 299. 
276
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § iv., p. 301. 
277
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § iv., p. 301. 
278
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § i., p. 276. 
279
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § i., p. 278. 
280
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § i., p. 279. 
281
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § iv., p. 304. 
282
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § iii., p. 290-1. 
283
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § v., p. 307.  
284
 The game referred to was played by an un-precocious child who was apparently upset at the absence of 
his mother but nevertheless repeated the painful departure by substituting “any small objects he could get 
hold of and throwing them away from him into a corner.”  Freud assumes that the game is meant to mete 
out revenge upon the mother’s head for going away and to obtain some control over the situation by being 
the one to symbolically compel her departure, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, § ii., p. 285: “Throwing 
away the object so that it was ‘gone’ might satisfy an impulse of the child’s, which was suppressed in his 
actual life, to revenge himself on his mother for going way from hi.  In that case it would have a defiant 
meaning: ‘All right, then, go away!  I’m sending you away myself.’” 
285
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § iii., p. 294. 
286
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § v., p. 309. 
287
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § v., p. 310.  Notice that the sun again 
returns as the symbolic and archetypal figure of historical time.  We saw this with Bakhtin’s propositions 
regarding great time, see “From Notes Made from 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 137.  We have also 
witnessed the image of the sun playing a symbolic role in Plato in terms of the light of the idea which 
makes the invisible visible.    
288
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § v., p. 311. 
289
 The paraphrase, of course, is not completely in keeping with Freud’s theory, since both the death drive 
and Eros would have been present at the dawn of the first organic life on earth.  See Bakhtin, “Toward a 
Methodology of the Human Sciences”, Speech Genres, p. 162. 
290
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § v., p. 312. 
291
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § vi., p. 316. 
292
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § vi., p. 318. 
293
 For his own part, in this essay, Freud makes the claim that he has always been a dualist thinker.  I see no 
evidence that this is the case—as we have tried to show regarding the vicissitudes of the instincts that are 
always orientated in such a way as to serve to benefit the subject, to bolster the ego, and which ultimately 
ignore or attempt to incorporate all difference—the other—as merely a moment within the ego.  We may 
take the following quotation as further evidence, as Freud himself does not seem to understand that dualism 
implies an irresolvable and essential difference in kind, and he attempts to make of it instead a matter of 
difference in degree by supposing that his thought has become “even more definitely dualistic than before.”  
See Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle.” On Metapsychology, § vi., p. 326: “Our views have from the 
very first been dualistic, and today they are even more definitely dualistic than before—now that we 
describe the opposition as begin, not between the ego-instincts and sexual instincts but between life 
instincts and death-instincts.”  
294
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § vi., p. 319. 
295
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § vi., p. 320. 
296
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § vi., p. 320.  Freud backs up this claim by 
citing the American biologist Woodruff.  
297
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § vi., p. 323. 
298
 See, for example, Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § ii., 287: “even under 
the dominance of the pleasure principle, there are ways and means enough of making what is in itself 
unpleasureable into a subject to be recollected and worked over in the mind.” 
299
 From the 1986 album Hounds of Love.  
300
 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 291. 
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 Bakhtin, “Speech Genres”, Speech Genres, p. 62 and 66. 
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 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 172. 
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 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 172. 
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304
 See for example, Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 83:  
Certain of these objective facts of behaviour are physiological (ultimately, physiochemical) in 
character.  Such facts can be studied by the methods that form the basis of the reflex doctrine of 
Academician Pavlov and his school by the methods that have been so brilliantly and soundly 
argued by the late Jacques Loeb in his renowned theory of tropisms or by other variants of the 
basically unitary physiological method.  But when it comes to an explanation of human behavior 
all this supplies us very little.  In particular, those conflicts of verbalized behaviour, with which 
Freudianism confronts us, need, if they are to be properly understood, a rigorous and 
thoroughgoing account of socioeconomic factors.  Only with the help of the flexible methods of 
dialectical materialism have we the possibility of illuminating those conflicts. 
305
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 172. 
306
 See Köhler chapters I and III, “A Discussion of Behaviourism” and “A Critique of Introspection” 
respectively. 
307
 Freud’s theories regarding association are another intersection in the narrative of the development of 
Freud’s theory of the unconscious.  See Allon White’s “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and 
Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. Gardiner, p. 340: White reminds his reader that ‘Anna O.’ was 
actually responsible for the ‘discovery’ of the cathartic method from which Breuer formulated his theory; 
this qualification was first made by Ernest Jones.  
308
 See Freud, “A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis”, Metapsychology, pp. 50-7.  Freud also 
makes the distinction between the descriptive and the systematic unconscious in the 1915 paper on The 
Unconscious, but there “no plain distinction appears to be made between the latter and the ‘dynamic’” 
unconscious, “Editor’s Note” to “A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis”, Metapsychology, p. 49.  
The “purely descriptive” unconscious describes that which appears to be latent in consciousness (Bewusst), 
such as was the case in Bernheim’s experiments with post-hypnotic suggestion.  Here the patient would be 
placed under hypnosis and then given a command.  After being brought out of hypnosis the patient has no 
recollection of this command.  Nevertheless he obeys, performs the task which had been suggested by 
Bernheim consciously “though not knowing why.”  Thus the descriptive unconscious is very simply the 
name Freud gives to the “condition of latency,” p. 50.  The dynamic unconscious is the distinction Freud 
made after hypothesizing that the unconscious was both “active and unconscious at the same time,” p. 52, 
and therefore suggests a continuous stirring beneath consciousness—i.e., a latently active unconscious.  By 
his own admission, Freud originally believed the unconscious was the territory of “weak” ideas that were 
inchoate and not fully formed, but he soon changed his mind.  The unconscious did not seem to be a realm 
of the merely latent, and he therefore posited the ‘foreconscious’ (vorbewusst)  to do the work of latency 
and retained ‘unconscious’ (Unbewusste) for “ideas [kept] apart from consciousness in spite of their 
intensity and activity,” p. 53.  Finally, largely through his work with dream analysis, Freud ‘discovered’ the 
inner workings of the unconscious were systematic and partook in active repression.  This ‘discovery’ 
comes about by understanding that the ordinary content of waking conscious life comes into contact with 
the systematicity of the unconscious during sleep.  Dreams are therefore a window into the unconscious, p. 
55-6.  After this new development, Freud posited his theory of the systematic unconscious which does the 
work of repression, etc: “The system revealed by the sign that the single acts forming parts of it are 
unconscious we designate by the name ‘The Unconscious’, for want of a better and less ambiguous term....  
And this is the third and most significant sense which the term ‘unconscious’ has acquired in 
psychoanalysis,” p. 57.  Freud reserves the term Bewusstsein for that which is actively known in 
consciousness—i.e., “consciousness of something”, see “Editor’s Note”, “The Unconscious”, 
Metapsychology, f.n. 1, p. 165. 
309
 See Reich, The Function of the Orgasm, pp. 124-5: 
In 1920, Freud had published “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, in which initially as a hypothesis, 
the death instinct was placed on an equal footing with the sexual instinct, indeed was accorded 
deeper instinctual force.  Young analysts who had not yet begun to practice and those analysts who 
did not grasp the structure of the sexual theory began to apply the new ego theory.  It was a very 
disturbing situation.  Instead of sexuality, analysts began to speak of ‘Eros.’  Mediocre therapists 
claimed that they were able ‘to put their hands on’ the superego, a concept that had been 
theoretically postulated to help grasp the psychic structure.  They operated with it as if it were a 
concretely established fact.  The id was ‘wicked,’ the superego sat on a throne with a long beard 
and was ‘strict,’ and the poor ego endeavoured to ‘mediate’ between the two. ... Sexuality became 
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something shadowy; the ‘libido’ concept was deprived of every trace of sexual content and became 
a figure of speech.  ... Form eclipsed content; the organization [, the International Psychoanalytic 
Association,] became more important than its task.  The process of deterioration, which has 
destroyed every great social movement in history, set in.  Just as the primitive Christianity of Jesus 
was transformed into the Church, and Marxist science became fascistic dictatorship, many 
psychoanalysts soon became the worst enemies of their own cause. 
Bakhtin’s idea that Freudian psychoanalysis is wholly subjective becomes especially compelling when the 
following lines are considered in connection with Freud’s own life, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, § iii., 
p. 292:  
The compulsion which is here in evidence [vis-à-vis the compulsion to repeat] differs in no way 
form the compulsion to repeat which we have found in neurotics, even though the people we are 
now considering have never shown any signs of dealing with a neurotic conflict by producing 
symptoms.  Thus we have come across people all of whose human relationships have the same 
outcome: such as the benefactor who is abandoned in anger after a time by each of his protégés, 
however much they may otherwise differ from one another, and who thus seems doomed to taste 
all the bitterness of ingratitude; or the man who time after time in the course of his life raises 
someone else into a position of great private or public authority and then, after a certain interval, 
himself upsets that authority and replaces him by a new one. 
310
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 45. 
311
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 45: “Every cell in the living organism contains the combination of both 
kinds of instincts—Eros and Death; to the one and the other, respectively, correspond the physiological 
processes of construction (anabolism) and destruction (catabolism) of living matter.  As long as a cell is 
alive, Eros is dominant.”  
312
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 45. 
313
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 46. 
314
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 88:   
Let us now return to those ‘psychical’ conflicts upon which psychoanalysis is based and which 
psychoanalysis attempts to explain in terms of a struggle between the conscious and the 
unconscious.  From an objective point of view, all these conflicts are played out in the element of 
behavioural ideology.  They are not ‘psychical’ but ideological conflicts and, therefore, they 
cannot be understood within the narrow confines of the individual organism and the individual 
psyche.  They not only go beyond the conscious, as Freud believes, they also go beyond the 
individual as a whole. 
For Bakhtin on the vocabulary of ‘official’ and ‘unofficial,’ see “Discourse in the Novel”, passim.  See also 
Bakhtin, “Epic and Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 20, and Problems in Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 90. 
315
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 75-6.  On Bakhtin’s ambivalence toward Freud, see Caryl Emerson’s 
“Bakhtin at 100”, MB vol. II, ed. Gardiner, p. 299: “Bakhtin admired [Freud] as a great innovator, an 
otkryvatel’ or opener up of new worlds, whose work unfortunately had no ‘serious continuation on Russian 
soil’; when pushed toward a personal assessment, Bakhtin admitted that with his Kantian orientation, he of 
course found the Freudian orientation ‘alien to him.’” 
316
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 85. 
317
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, pp. 77 and 87. 
318
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 79. 
319
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 78. 
320
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 79. 
321
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 79-80. 
322
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 80.   
323
 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.274.  As usual the terms of expression of their critique is 
breathtaking and perspicacious, and in this case actually somewhat ‘childlike’, pp. 273-4:  
Which comes first, the chicken or the egg—but also the father and the mother, or the child?  
Psychoanalysis acts as if it were the child (the father is sick only from his own childhood), but at 
the same time is forced to postulate a parental pre-existence (the child is sick only in relation to a 
father and a mother).  This is clearly evident in the primal position of the father of the horde.  
Oedipus itself would be nothing without the identifications of the parents with the children; and the 
fact cannot be hidden that everything begins in the mind of the father: isn’t that what you want, to 
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kill me, to sleep with your mother?  It is first of all a father’s idea: thus Laius.  It is the father who 
raises hell, and how brandishes the law (the mother tends to be obliging: we mustn’t make this into 
a scene, it’s only a dream, a territoriality).  Lévi-Strauss puts it very well: ‘The initial theme of the 
key myth is the incest committed by the hero with the mother.  Yet the idea that he is ‘guilty’ 
seems to exist mainly in the mind of the father, who desires his son’s death and schemes to bring it 
about....  In the long run it is the father who appears guilty, through having tried to avenge himself, 
and it is he who is killed....  This curious indifference toward incest appears in other myths.’...  So 
it is that psychoanalysis has much difficulty extracting itself from an infinite regression: the father 
must have been a child, but was able to be a child only in relation to a father who was himself a 
child, in relation to another father. 
324
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 81. 
325
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 81. 
326
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 82. 
327
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 82. 
328
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 23. 
329
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 23. 
330
 Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 24. 
331
 Cf. Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 83. 
332
 Sartre charged Merleau-Ponty with equating words and things, and in a sense he is correct, since we first 
gather our lexicon not as a lexicon but as things in the environment.  For the child, ‘wa-wa’ means equally 
‘water,’ and ‘I am thirsty,’ and is not even separable from the gesture he makes to grasp the glass his 
mother holds out to him. Cf. Sartre, “What is Writing”, in What is Literature, p. 6: “Once and for all he has 
chosen the poetic attitude which considers words as things and not as signs.” See also p. 12, where Sartre is 
building his argument that poetry makes objects of words, and that Merleau-Ponty conflates both the word 
with the object and poetic writing with painting:  
[Tintoretto’s sky’s, like poetic word-objects, has a] strangeness [that] arises from the fact that, in 
order  to consider it, we place ourselves on the other side of the human condition, on the side of 
God.  If this is the case, one easily understands how foolish is would be to require a poetic 
engagement.  Doubtless, emotion, even passion—and why not anger, social indignation, and 
political hatred?—are at the origin of the poem.  But they are not expressed there, as in a pamphlet 
or in a composition.  Insofar as the writer of prose exhibits feelings, he illustrates them; whereas, if 
the poet injects his feelings into his poem, he ceases to recognize them; the words take hold of 
them, penetrate them, and metamorphose them; they do not signify them, even in his eyes.  
Emotion has become thing; it now has the opacity of things....  
333
 Allon White’s “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 341. 
334
 Parrington, “In Perspective: Valentin Voloshinov”, MB, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 63.  Parrington goes on 
to show that this type of research was being actively carried out by Voloshinov’s contemporary, the child 
psychologist and linguist, L. S. Vygotsky. 
335
 Cf. Kant, Critique of Reason, “A833/B861, p. 691-2:  
For its execution the idea [of an architectonic] needs a schema, i.e., an essential manifoldness and 
order of the parts determined a priori from the principle of the end.  A schema that is not outlined 
in accordance with an idea, i.e., from the chief end of reason, but empirically, in accordance with 
aims occurring contingently (whose number one cannot know in advance, yields technical unity, 
but that which arises only in consequence of an idea (where reason provides the ends a priori and 
does not await them empirically) grounds architectonic unity. 
Actually, to clarify, what I disagree with is that reason itself can be established a priori without a 
historically contingent component that gathers its force from the socioeconomic descent of human beings 
and cultural practices.  A lot is tied up in this and we could certainly write a whole treatise on the difference 
between Bakhtin’s allocation of architectonic unity to consciousness (material consciousness that is) and 
Kant’s transcendental a priori reason.  We simply do not have the space or time to do so here. 
336
 “Speech Genres”, Speech Genres, p. 65. 
337
 Allon White’s “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 342: “as Wolfgang Hartmann has shown, in Germany in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian 
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war, traditional processions and festivities were rapidly militarized and incorporated into the symbolism of 
the state. 
338
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 252. 
339
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 252. 
340
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 252. 
341
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 125. 
342
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 37. 
343
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 36. 
344
 White’s “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 341. 
345
 White’s “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 342. 
346
 White’s “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 342.  For “return of the repressed” see White, p. 345.  
347
 White’s “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 345: 
Bourgeois carnival is a contradiction in terms.  Positive elements of the carnival tradition—such as 
the “regenerative power of laughter,” the utopian and politically subversive aspects of folk culture 
and its social openness—become lost or perverted by the emergence of bourgeois individualism.  
Bakhtin is right to suggest that post-Romantic culture is, to a considerable extent, subjectivized 
and interiorized, and on this account is related to private terror, isolation and insanity rather than to 
robust, communal celebration.  Bakhtin, however, does not give us a convincing explanation of 
this sublimation of carnival.  Social historians, on the other hand, tend not to consider processes of 
sublimation at all: for them, carnival came to an end and that was that.  Social historians tend not 
to believe in the “return of the repressed.” 
348
 White’s “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 348: “A common mechanism the hysteric employs in order to cope with the threat of the 
grotesque body is a top/bottom displacement in an uncanny manner, the ritual inversion of the body found 
in carnival.” 
349
 For White’s interpretation of the case of Renata, see “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and 
Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. Gardiner, p. 344-5.  Dr. Schnyder was influenced by Freud’s work on 
hysteria. 
350
 White’s “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 346. 
351
 White’s “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 348. 
352
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 308. 
353
 cf. Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, pp. 304-12.  Originally, Geschichte der Grotesken Satyre  
354
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 304. 
355
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 307. 
356
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 308. 
357
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 308. 
358
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 308. 
359
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 310. 
360
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 310. 
361
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 312. 
362
 Stein, “A Transatlantic Interview”, The Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry, Vol. 1, 
ed. Jahan Ramazani et al., p. 988. 
363
 White’s “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. 
Gardiner, p. 349. 
364
 Loy, “Gertrude Stein”, The Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry, Vol. 1, ed. Jahan 
Ramazani et al., p. 281. 
365
 Loy, “Aphorisms”, The Lost Lunar Baedeker: Poems of Mina Loy, p. 152. 
366
 Loy, “The Effectual Marriage or the Insipid Narrative of Gina and Miovanni”, The Lost Lunar Baedeker: 
Poems of Mina Loy, p. 36. 
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367
 Other images of the lower bodily stratum included in Loy’s poem sound like bad black-metal band 
names, and include “mucous-membrane”, “trickle of saliva,” and “the skin-sack”, see “Songs for 
Johannes”, Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry, Vol. 1, ed. Jahan Ramazani et al., p. 
269-70. 
368
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 306. 
369
 Bakhtin, “Form Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 135. 
370
 Emphasis mine, Barnes, Nightwood, p. 15, see also p. 14:  
He moved with a humble hysteria among the decaying brocades and laces of the Carnavalet; he 
loved that old and documented splendour with something of the love of the lion for its tamer—that 
sweat-tarnished spangled enigma that, in bringing the beast to heel, had somehow turned toward 
him a face like his own, but which though curious and weak, had yet picked the precise fury from 
his brain. 
371
 White, “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. Gardiner, 
p. 346:  
Placed on the outside of the grotesque carnival body articulated as social pleasure and celebration, 
the female bourgeois subject introjects the spectacle as a phobic representation. Exclusion here 
entails the return of the excluded as desire and fear.... Carnival was too disgusting for bourgeois 
life to endure... it was a symbol of the community and communality which the bourgeoisie had had 
to deny in order to emerge as a distinct and ‘proper’ class. 
372
 White, “Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis”, MB, vol. IV, ed. Gardiner, 
p. 351. 
373
 Joyce, Ulysses, pp. 366-7. 
374
 Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 15. 
375
 John Parrington also makes this point clear in his article “In Perspective: Valentin Voloshinov”, MB, 
Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 63. 
376
 Again, see Parrington, “In Perspective: Valentin Voloshinov”, MB, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 63.   
377
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 50. 
378
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 50. 
379
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 50. 
380
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 50. 
381
 Merleau-Ponty uses the word “exclamations,” Child Psychology, p. 50. 
382
 For Saussure, the sign, or “linguistic entity” can be studied synchronically from the vantage point of two 
essential characteristics, namely its association with and negative differential from other signs.  Cf. 
“Concrete Entities of a Language”, Course in General Linguistics, pp. 101-2:  
1. Any linguistic entity exists only in virtue of the association between signal and signification. 
... 
2. A linguistic entity is not ultimately defined until it is delimited, i.e., separated from whatever 
there may be on either side of it in a sequence of sounds.  It is these delimited entities or units 
which contrast with one another in the mechanism of the language. 
383
 Cf. Émile Bréhier’s The History of Philosophy: The Middle Ages and the Renaissance, p. 30:  
The sharp distinction between the essential and accidental [species and genera] attributes makes 
possible a clear statement of the problem of universals.  For universals, whose reality was the 
subject of speculation, are nothing but the genera and species—for example, ‘animal’ and ‘man’—
which are essential attributes of the individual like Socrates.  On this point Boethius’ 
commentators, such as Pseudo-Hrabanus Maurus (whose Super Porphyrium is generally assigned 
to the first half of the eleventh century), followed the hints that appeared in the writings of their 
master and that had their source in Aristotle.  They repeated what had been said by Boethius and 
also by Simplicius: that the Categories, the study of attributes, cannot refer things (since res non 
praedicatur) but only to words as signifiers of things.  Hence the solution, imbued with the spirit 
of Aristotle, the problem of universals: genus and species exist only by virtue of predicates 
essential to the individual.  “Individuals, species, and genus are one and the same reality (eadem 
res), and universals are not, as is sometimes stated, something different from individuals. 
Here is not the place to enter into the scholastic debate between realists and nominalists.  What we may 
want to get at here, is the profoundly idiosyncratic differentiation between the primary and secondary, the 
essential and accidental parts to wholes and the confusion that can occur through time.  We are not referring 
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to the conception of species in biology that has tended to change throughout the history of Linnaean 
science; although there is evidence for this, it can be usually accounted for by simple error of classification 
and stays within the same tired game whose rules have ossified and are beginning to crack.  What we are 
referring to has more to do with an idea of becoming, where I may treat myself or others as the genera 
“animal” at times and all that that term may connote, and at other times I might treat myself as the species 
of animal “human” and sometimes a species of human on down to “Jim.”  Still this model appears to remain 
arborescent.  It does not have to be regarded as such, however, for the determination does not have to be 
made from outside, as if a topography is always primarily responsible for the determination of properties.  
We can also begin from within the “organism” taking it immanently and affirming the value it itself 
expresses dynamically; the same can apply the play of signs, but it is really premature to introduce the idea 
here, so we append it as a footnote to a footnote.  Sufficed to say, in becoming categories shift and have not 
the holding power they do in that long used tree like model of Aristotelian categorization.  This discussion 
will be more essential and less accidental to our own when we have occasion to critique universal logic 
according to the possible play of differences. 
384
 For Saussure’s theory of linguistic value there are two main categories of such association: the 
syntagmatic—or value by proximity in the constructed sentence, and the associative value—or value 
weighed by family or species association.  See his students’ lecture notes from “Syntagmatic Relations and 
Associative Relations”, Course in General Linguistics, pp. 121-5. 
385
 By static we are implying Saussure’s idea of a state, and we shall return to this conception of the 
historical non-movement of what Saussure calls the synchronic aspect of language below. 
386
 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, passim, esp. pp. 99-100.  
387
 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, passim, esp. p. 99. 
388
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 51. 
389
 For more the difficulties surrounding the problem of the historical utterance, diachrony v. synchrony, 
etc., cf. Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, “Static Linguistics and Evolutionary Linguistics”, esp. § 9 
“Conclusions”, pp. 96-8.  
390
 Saussure, See Course in General Linguistics, “General Observations”, p. 100.  Here we may also 
consider Deleuze’s attempt to show that the difference in linguistics is itself relative and not absolute, as 
Saussure purports it to be, p. 118:  
Everything we have said so far comes down to this.  In Language itself, there are only differences.  
Even more important than that is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes 
positive terms between which the difference holds [i.e., associative differences which imply 
positive significations and thus family resemblances], in a language there are only differences, and 
no positive terms. ... The proof of this lies in the fact that the value of a sign may change without 
affecting either meaning or sound, simply because some neighbouring sign has undergone a 
change.    
For Deleuze, Saussure actually translates difference for-itself into a difference of opposition, and therefore 
the linguistic idea (of difference) is not difference as the active play of the speaker of language, but is the 
reactive passivity of the listener—of the scholiast one might say as ‘opposed’ to the philosopher, Difference 
and Repetition, pp. 204-05: 
To return to the linguistic Idea: why does Saussure, at the very moment when he discovers that ‘in 
language there are only differences,’ add that these differences are ‘without positive terms’ and 
‘eternally negative’?  Why does Trubetzkoy maintain as sacred the principle that ‘the idea of 
difference’ which is constitutive of language ‘presupposes the idea of opposition’?  Everything 
points to the contrary.  Is this not a way of introducing he point of view of consciousness and 
actual representations into what should be the transcendent exploration of the Idea of the linguistic 
unconscious—in other words, the highest exercise of speech in relation to the point zero of 
language?  When we interpret differences under the category of opposition and as negatives, are 
we not already on the side  of the listener, even that of the bad listener who hesitates between 
several possible version of what was actually said and tries to find himself by establishing 
oppositions?  In other words, are we not on the lesser side of language rather than the side of the 
one who speaks and assigns meaning?  Have we not already betrayed the nature of the play of 
language—in other words, the sense of that combinatory, of those imperatives or linguistic throws 
of the dice which, like Artaud’s cries, can be understood only by the one who speaks in the 
transcendent exercise of language?  In short, the translation of difference into opposition seems to 
210 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
us to concern not a simple question of terminology or convention, but rather the essence of 
language and the linguistic Idea.  When difference is read as opposition, it is deprived of the 
peculiar thickness in which its positivity is affirmed.  Modern phonology lacks a dimension which 
would prevent it from playing with shadows on a single plane. 
What we have in the linguistic idea then is a conflation of difference and opposition that is typical of the 
listening subject rather than the speaking other; Saussure’s account has not left the ontology of 
representation and does not touch upon presentation and active creation.  In this situation the listener, an a 
fortiori the linguist—is passive and not active; we might think here of the aforementioned notion of the 
understanding as answerable in Bakhtin’s account (see previous section).  This type of listening and this 
type of difference as opposition is indeed ‘ready-made.’  It does not sponsor or understand—i.e., answer—
the active speech event. 
391
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 51. 
392
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 52. 
393
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 52. 
394
 Cf. for example Jespersen’s Language: Its Nature, Development, and Origin, p. 420: 
Now, it is a consequence of advancing civilization that passion, or, at least, the expression of 
passion, is moderated, and we must therefore conclude that the speech of uncivilized and primitive 
men was more passionately agitated than ours, more like music or song.  This conclusion is borne 
out by what we hear about the speech of many savages in our own days.  European travellers very 
often record their impression of the speech of different tribes in expressions like these: 
‘pronouncing whatever they spoke in a very singing manner,’ ‘the singing tone of voice, in 
common conversation, was frequent’.... 
These facts and considerations all point to the conclusion that there once was a time when 
all speech was song, or rather when these two actions were not yet differentiated; but perhaps this 
inference cannot be established inductively at the present stage of linguistic science with the same 
amount of certainty as the statements I am now going to make as to the nature of primitive speech. 
This would be precisely the legacy in which David Abram makes his attempt to show that language is 
indeed connected primordially to the world in out of which it comes into being by its sonorous affect.  We 
shall have more to say on this later.  In any event, he has been much criticised for this position; Ted 
Toadvine accuses him of a return to animism:  
things are not inert and passive in Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions but alive, suggesting to Abram a 
kind of phenomenological animism that would demand from us the revision of  an entire series of 
traditional dualisms... but it is precisely this “subjectivization of nature” [Rudolf Bernet’s , which 
Toadvine compares to Abram’s own view] that reveals the limits of the dialogical view of 
perception, as Merleau-Ponty himself brings out.  I the course of his descriptions of the correlation 
between the body and the world, he already calls attention to its anthropomorphizing teleology... 
Merleau-Ponty is explicit... that defining the thing as a correlate of the body and our life does not 
exhaust its meaning, since it does not disclose the ‘non-human element’ that it harbours 
(Phenomenology of Perception, 375)”, Toadvine, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature, p. 57. 
The validity of Toadvine’s critique of Abram’s, to my mind, correctly diagnosis a spirit in Abram’s work 
that betrays a seeing that shows up the connectedness in all things, but the ambiguity in Merleau-Ponty’s 
own position rests upon the difference between naive-consciousness’ view of the world as that which is as it 
is experienced and radical reflection which must have a respect for the fundamental alterity in all things: 
“This [alterity and self-standing]will become clear if we suspend our ordinary preoccupations and pay a 
metaphysical and disinterested attention to it.   It is then hostile and alien, no longer an interlocutor, but a 
resolutely silent Other, a Self which evades us no less than does intimacy with an outside consciousness.”  
Toadvine understands this distinction and mentions it, but I have trouble damning Abram’s approach since 
it is implicitly marked by a concern for finding new or forgotten modes of our connectedness with the 
world, and can be equally found in Merleau-Ponty’s work... and there is a distinctly dialectical action 
happening here where I am a part of an earth that is nonetheless an Other.  See also  “Sense Experience”, 
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 249: 
The sensible gives back to me what I lent to it, but this is only what I took from it in the first place 
.  As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not set over against it as an a cosmic idea of blue such 
as might reveal the secret of it, I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery, it ‘thinks itself 
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in me,’* I am the sky itself as it is drawn together and unified, and as it begins to exist for itself... 
but....”  
...and we could go on dialectically attempting to think this relation, as we shall have occasion to.  For now 
let us just make a note for ourselves of that which we have left to think... this dialectic between myself and 
the object I “consummate” as Bakhtin has put it in Art and Answerability.  We have not yet even begun to 
think the problem of the Other inside ourselves... that which the Greeks knew as the daimonion [Birth of 
Tragedy, p. 66 and Arendt’s Human Condition, pp. 179 and 182], and which we require Other’s outside of 
ourselves to consummate through an exotopic excess of seeing “which provides the foundation for a certain 
sphere of my own exclusive self-activity... all those actions, that is, which render the other complete 
precisely in those respects in which he cannot complete himself by himself,” Bakhtin, Art and 
Answerability, p. 24.  
*[<<En soi se pense et convient à soi-même>> qt. fr. Valéry, Le Cimetière marin]   
395
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 52. 
396
 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, “Apparatus of Capture”, p. 430. 
397
 As was the case according to Hobbes.  Cf. Leviathan, I, iv, p. 101: 
But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower 
of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of 
his former language.  And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the 
world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from 
them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew 
every where more copious. 
398
 On the aporetic nature of community, see Caputo’s Deconstruction in a Nutshell, pp. 107-9.   
399
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 52 
400
 Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 52, “the appearance of articulated language is like an 
‘Ursprung’ (a springing forth).” 
401
 The “speech circuit” is depicted on p. 11 of Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics. 
402
 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p. 80. 
403
 By comparison, the two ameliorations of language study which are usually evoked the 
conventional/arbitrary nature of the sign and the negative differential apply specifically to langue and are 
more obvious and less suggestive in producing a method for linguistic study.  They are not the primary 
distinction which must first be made, but are secondary and follow from this first set of distinctions between 
synchrony and diachrony and langue and parole. 
404
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 53. 
405
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 57. 
406
 Usually we say that there are eight parts of speech, and these are nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, 
pronouns, prepositions, interjections and conjunctions.  
407
 Merleau-Ponty, “The Intertwining—The Chiasm”, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 147. 
408
  See for example, “The Object of Study”, Course in General Linguistics, p. 9.  Bühler makes this claim 
on p. 8 of his Theory of Language.  In his Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, Voloshinov also 
touches upon these conflicting/complementary streams in language, where he describes the “four basic 
trends” of what he calls the “individualistic subjectivism” experience of language—a trend he criticises as 
unsupportable, since it misses the fundamentally social network in which the utterance maintains its 
existence.  He follows Humboldt’s definitions of ergon and energeia, where the former is a “ready-made 
product... as a stable system,” and the latter “an unceasing process of creation.”  The other two trends are as 
follows: “the laws of language creation are the laws of individual psychology” and “creativity of language 
is meaningful creativity, analogous to creative art.”   According to Voloshinov  “Hamann and Herder were 
Humboldt’s predecessors so far as this trend is concerned.  See Voloshinov p. 48.  More on Voloshinov’s 
critique of the Russian Formalists and his propaedeutic to any future Marxist philosophy of language to 
follow, esp. regarding the four opposed trends in abstract objectivist linguistics of which Saussure is a 
proponent, according to Voloshinov. 
409
 Saussure, “The Object of Study”, Course in General Linguistics, p. 9.  Cf. also Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations, Vol. II, p. 73, which takes a similar tack but with pure logic or the a priori as its own object 
of inquiry which is to be kept separate from normative reasoning: 
here, as elsewhere where philosophical interests are concerned, it is important to separate the a 
priori sharply from the empirical, and to recognize that, within this widely conceive discipline, the 
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findings of formal semantics relevant for grammarians have a peculiar character: they belong to an 
a priori discipline that should be kept apart in its purity.  Here as elsewhere, one must subscribe to 
a great Kantian insight, and steep oneself in its sense: that one does not enrich, but rather subverts, 
the sciences if one blurs their boundaries.  One must realize that a universal grammar in this widest 
sense is a concrete science which, like all concrete sciences, frequestnly brings together for 
explanatory purposes findings whose theoretical place lies in hand, and in a priori sciences, 
frequently brings together for explanatory purposes findings whose theoretical place lies in 
essentially different theoretical sciences, in empirical sciences, on the one hand, and in a priori 
sciences, on the other.  Our age, orientated towards natural science, sees to it that generalizing, 
empirical investigations are not neglected in the grammatical field, nor in any other.  What is a 
priori is not so favoured; even though all basic insights lead back to the a priori, our age’s sense 
for it almost threatens to wither away.  I therefore fairly take up the cudgels for the old doctrine of 
a grammaire générale et raisonnée, a philosophical grammar, for its obscure, undeveloped 
intention aiming at the ‘rational’ in speech, in the true sense of the word, and in particular at the 
‘logic’ of speech or its semantic a priori. 
We may compare this nomological priority to Kant’s own programmatic in the first Critique, “The 
Architectonic of Pure Reason”, A842/B870-A843/B871, pp. A696-7:  
It is of the utmost importance to isolate cognitions that differ from one another in their species and 
origin, and carefully to avoid mixing them together with others with which they are usually 
connected in their use.  What chemists do in analysing materials, what mathematicians do in their 
pure theory of magnitude, the philosopher is even more obliged to do, so that he can securely 
determine the proper value and influence of the advantage that a special kind of cognition has over 
the aimless use of the understanding.  Hence human reason has never been able to dispense with a 
metaphysics as long as it has thought, or rather reflected, though it has never been able to present it 
in a manner sufficiently purified of everything foreign to it.  The idea of such a science is just as 
old as speculative human reason; and what reason does not speculate, whether in a scholastic or a 
popular manner?  [The scholastic and popular manners Kant refers to are two contemporary 
schools of thought against which Kant opposed his architectonic of pure reason, the former being 
much more canonical and the later much too loosey-goosey for Kant’s liking and of which his 
student Herder was a proponent.]  One must nevertheless admit that the distinction of the two 
elements in our cognition, one of which is in our power completely a priori but the other of which 
can be derived only from experience a posteriori, has remained very indistinct, even among 
professional thinkers, and hence the determination of the bounds of a special kind of cognition, and 
thus the genuine idea of a science with which human reason has so long and so intensively 
occupied itself, has never been accomplished.  For the scholastic, or academic, vs. the popular 
approaches to philosophy in Prussia which were contemporary in Kant’s day, see the 
“Introduction” to Kant’s Logic, p. 22. 
410
 Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language: for trends see p. 47; for “arteries” p. 61; for 
“individual subjectivism” and “abstract objectivism” see p. 48. 
411
 Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 48. 
412
 See Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, pp. 48 and 57: 
The fundamental outlook on language of [individual subjectivism] amounts... to these four basic 
principles:  
1. Language is activity, an unceasing process of creation (energeia) realized in individual speech 
acts; 
2. The laws of language creativity are the laws of individual psychology; 
3. Creativity of language is meaningful creativity, analogous to creative art;  
4. Language as a ready-made product (ergon), as a stable system (lexicon, grammar, phonetics), 
is, so to speak, the inert crust, the hardened lava of language creativity, of which linguistics 
makes an abstract construct in the interests of the practical teaching of language as a ready-
made instrument. 
.... 
The outlook of the second trend can, on the whole, be summarized in the following basic 
principles: 
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1. Language is a stable, immutable system of normatively identical linguistic forms which the 
individual consciousness finds ready-made and which is incontestable for that consciousness 
2. The laws of language are the specifically linguistic laws of connection between linguistic 
signs within a given, closed linguistic system.  These laws are objective with respect to any 
subjective consciousness. 
3. Specifically linguistic connections have nothing in common with ideological values (artistic, 
cognitive, or other).  Language phenomena are not grounded in ideological motives.  No 
connection of a kind natural and comprehensible to the consciousness or of an artistic kind 
obtains between the word and its meaning. 
4. Individual acts of speaking are, from the viewpoint of language, merely fortuitous refractions 
and variations or plain and simple distortions of normatively identical forms; but precisely 
these acts of individual discourse explain the historical changeability of linguistic forms, a 
changeability that in itself, from the standpoint of the language system, is irrational and 
senseless.  There is no connection, no sharing of motives, between the system of language and 
its history.  They are alien to one another.  
413
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Freud’s strength lies in his having brought these issues pointedly to the fore and in having gathered 
the material for their investigation.  His weakness lies in his having failed to understand the 
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the narrow confines of the individual organism and its psyche.  Processes that are in fact social 
are treated by Freud form the point of view of individual psychology. 
With this disregard of sociology is coupled another basic deficiency in Freud—the 
subjectivity of his method (granted, a subjectivity somewhat disguised, for which reason it has been 
a debatable feature).   
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See also “meta-,” <http://www.oed.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048/view/Entry/117150#eid37412815>, 
08/07/2012: 
ancient Greek µετα- (before a vowel µετ- , µεθ- ), use as combining form of the 
preposition µετά ‘with’, ‘after’, ‘between’, probably ultimately < the same Indo-European base 
as MID prep.1  Compare Mycenaean Greek me-ta ‘together with’, which is perhaps the original 
sense in Greek. In ancient Greek and Hellenistic Greek µετα- is combined chiefly with verbs and 
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to classical Latin words in trans- TRANS- prefix. Occasionally µετα- represents the 
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speak here in the chorus of others.  But in a chorus I do not sing for myself; I am active only in 
relation to the other and I am passive in the other’s relationship to me; I exchange gifts, but I do so 
disinterestedly; I feel in myself the body and the soul of another. (Whenever the purpose of a 
movement or an action is incarnated into the other or is coordinated with the action of the other—
as in the case of joint labour—my own action enters into rhythm as well.  But I do not create 
rhythm of myself: I join in it for the sake of the other). 
Without taking upon oneself the provisional role of the choral support, therefore, one cannot join with the 
other—a necessary step in the phenomenologically complex process of consummation. 
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 Cf. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 90:  
As an artist, Dostoevsky did not create his ideas in the same way philosophers or scholars create 
theirs—he created images of ideas found, heard, sometimes divined by him in reality itself [—i.e., 
in the discourse of life], that is, ideas already living or entering life as idea-forces.  Dostoevsky 
possessed an extraordinary gift for hearing the dialogue of his epoch, or, more precisely, for 
hearing his epoch as a great dialogue, for detecting in it not only individual voices, but precisely 
and predominantly the dialogic relationship among voices, their dialogic interaction.  He heard 
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both the loud, recognized, reining voices of the epoch, that is, the reigning dominant ideas (official 
and unofficial), as well as voices still weak, ideas not yet fully emerged, latent ideas heard as yet 
by no one but himself, and ideas that were just beginning to ripen, embryos of future worldviews.  
‘Reality in its entirety,’ Dostoevsky himself wrote, ‘is not to be exhausted by what is immediately 
at hand, for an overwhelming part of this reality is contained in the form of a still latent, unuttered 
future world.’ 
See also Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 114: “The poet acquires his 
words and learns to intone them over the course of his entire life in the process of his every-sided contact 
with his environment.” 
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 Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 110: “Let us stress once again 
that we have in mind here not those ideological evaluations that are incorporated into the content of a work 
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finds expression in the very manner in which the artistic material is viewed and deployed.” 
468
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 Othello would not fall, that is, because the hero’s breadth of character must not be lowered beneath the 
status of Iago.  Even if one believes that Othello is brought morally lower than Iago by the end of the text, 
this breadth must remain greater than Iago’s.  Nevertheless, this does not suggest that Shakespeare 
subordinates their world to his authorial intent.  Consider, for example,  N. G. Chernyshevsky’s  utterance 
on the relation of Shakespeare to his heroes: “the most difficult thing would be to write as Shakespeare 
wrote: he portrays people and life without saying what he himself thinks on the questions that are resolved 
by his characters in a way appropriate for each.  Othello says ‘yes,’ Iago says ‘no,’ Shakespeare says 
nothing, he has no desire to state his love or lack of love for a ‘yes’ or a ‘no,’” qtd. in Bakhtin, Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 66.  Yet even if he does not subordinate their world to his own, the dramatic genre 
itself does not support the polyphony that one finds in the novel and almost exclusively, for Bakhtin, in 
Dostoevsky.  Apparently following up on the original publication of Problems, Lunacharsky believes that 
Shakespeare exhibits the same ability to create a multitude of worlds and, thus, polyphony within his works 
as does Dostoevsky.  For Bakhtin, Shakespeare was certainly one of the greatest talents in literature, but the 
dramatic form does not lend itself to the co-existence of multiple worlds, since “drama is by its very nature 
alien to genuine polyphony; drama may be multi-levelled, but it cannot contain multiple worlds; it permits 
only one, and not several, systems of measurement.”  Thus, while Shakespeare may not subordinate Iago 
and Othello’s world to his own, they themselves belong to one monological world and not to two 
monological worlds in dialogue with one another.  “In our opinion Dostoevsky alone can be considered the 
creator of genuine polyphony.”   See Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 33-4. 
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 Byronic, at least, in my best estimation, since Voloshinov simply says “Romantic.”  Surely this is the 
form of listener found in part, however, in embryo in “Childe Herald’s Pilgrimage” and more fully fleshed 
out in the bathetic Don Juan, since the listener is by turns derided and neither the hero nor the author seem 
to care one speck for what she makes of their discourse.  See Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse 
in Art”, Freudianism, p. 112.  It may be the case, however, that Voloshinov à la Bakhtin means to imply the 
Romantic hero more generally, as certainly this is how Bakhtin describes the lyric in Romantic poetry in 
“Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”.  Cf. also See Art and Answerability, p. 180:   
It is inevitable that lyrical moments occupy a prominent place in the Romantic hero (the love of 
woman, just as in lyric).  The attitude or position with respect to meaning that is deposited in the 
Romantic character has ceased to be authoritative and is only re-experienced, lyrically re-
experienced.  The author’s position outside the Romantic hero is undoubtedly less stable than it 
was in the case of the Classical type of hero.  The weakening of this position leads to the 
disintegration of character; the boundaries begin to be effaced, the centre of value is transposed 
from the boundaries into the very life of the hero (into his cognitive-ethical directedness from 
within himself).  Romanticism is a form of the infinite hero: the author’s reflection upon the hero 
is introduced inside the hero and restructures him; the hero takes away from the author all of his 
transgredient determinations and uses them in his own self-development and self-determination, 
with the result that his self-determination becomes infinite.  Parallel to this occurs a destruction of 
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the boundaries that demarcate cultural domains (the idea of the whole or integral human being).  In 
this context, we find seeds of irony and of “playing a fool.”  The unity of a work often coincides 
here with the unity of the hero; the transgredient moments become fortuitous and dispersed, losing 
their unity.  Or the unity of the author becomes emphatically conventional, stylized.  The author 
begins to expect revelations from the hero.  There is an attempt to force an admission from within 
self-consciousness, which is possible only through the other; an attempt to do without God, 
without listeners, without an author. 
Note that the author’s responsibility not to imbue the work with his own personal cognitive-ethical 
ideological intonations begins to collapse here; this taboo is transgressed precisely to the extent to which the 
author collapses into the hero; the discourse of life breaks through into art rather than supporting it, which is 
precisely the opposite of the architectonic role of answering for the hero (from outside) that the author is 
meant to play in heroic composition.  The result is a destruction of the unity of the work, which itself 
fragments into merely mechanical relations.  The same mechanical relations we are warned in “Art and 
Answerability” cannot ethically answer the event, p. 2, for example: “Nor will it do to invoke ‘inspiration’ 
in order to justify want of answerability.  Inspiration that ignores life and is itself ignored by life is not 
inspiration but a state of possession.”  No doubt Wordsworth’s “Intimations of Immortality” would suffice 
as an example of this kind of possession.   
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 See also Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 387. 
547
 Dostoevsky, “Rebellion”, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 251.  
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 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 90. 
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 Cf. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 91. 
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 See Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 90. 
551
 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 25. 
552
 Here we find the source of Kristeva’s accusation that Bakhtin’s Problems is problematic for its 
participation in psychologism.  But Bakhtin no-where denies this type of unified truth, he simply 
determines that it is monological and does not respect the personal inflection that ideas take on as they are 
liberated from the virtual realm and brought into a participatory struggle between consciousnesses. 
553
 Bakhtin, “Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences”, Speech Genres, p. 170. 
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 1 Corinthians 15:55. 
555
 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part I., “Of Voluntary Death”, p. 97. 
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 See Section Two. 
557
 See Morson and Emerson’s Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 367:  
Kant, of course, argued long ago that time and space are indispensable forms of cognition, and 
Bakhtin explicitly endorses this view.  But he differs from Kant by stressing that in Chronotopic 
analysis, time and space are regarded “not as ‘transcendental’ but as forms of the most immediate 
reality.”  Bakhtin’s crucial point is that time and space vary in qualities; different social activities 
and representations of those activities presume different kinds of time and space.  Time and space 
are therefore not just neutral ‘mathematical abstractions.  Or, to be more precise, the concept of 
time and space as mathematical abstractions itself defines a specific chronotope that differs from 
other chronotopes. 
 See also Bernhard F. Scholz’s “Bakhtin’s Concept of ‘Chronotope’: The Kantian Connection”, MB Vol. II, 
ed. Gardiner, p.  151:  
time and space were for Kant forms of perception rather than of thought.  How, then, can Bakhtin 
speak of the chronotope as a ‘formally constitutive category of literature,’ and of the ‘image of 
man in literature,’ and support this claim with a reference to a passage in Kant which deals with 
forms of perception rather than with categories of thought?  The phrase “not as ‘transcendental’ 
but as forms of the most immediate reality,” which, as we shall see later on, stands most in need of 
commentary. 
558
 Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 102.   
559
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A39/B56, p. 183:  
Time and space are accordingly two sources of cognition, from which different synthetic 
cognitions can be drawn a priori, of which especially pure mathematics in regard to the cognitions 
of space and its relations provides a splendid example.  Both taken together are, namely, the pure 
forms of all sensible intuition, and thereby make possible synthetic a priori propositions.  But 
these a priori sources of cognition determine their own boundaries by the very fact (that they are 
merely conditions of sensibility), namely that they apply to objects only in so far as they are 
considered as appearances, but do not present things in themselves. 
560
 See Michael Holquist’s “Introduction” to Art and Answerability, pp. xxi-xxiii. See also Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 115, where the gnoseological is characteristic of the ‘academic’ or Socratic 
dialectic. 
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 This much discussed statement is left unexplained. See Emerson and Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation 
of a Prosaics, p. 367: “By this cryptic comment Bakhtin appears to mean that the relation of ‘chronotope’ to 
Einsteinian ‘time-space’ is something weaker than identity, but stronger than mere metaphor or analogy.”  
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 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 368. 
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 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 368. 
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 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 368. 
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 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 368. 
566
 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 327. 
567
 Morson and Emerson, and Emerson’s Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 368:  
Bodies must organize their own external activities and internal processes in time and space.  
Organisms operate by means of, and must coordinate, a variety of rhythms differing from each 
other and from those of other organisms.  Furthermore, different social activities are also defined 
by various kinds of fused time and space: the rhythms and special organization of the assembly 
line, agricultural labour, sexual intercourse, and parlour conversation differ markedly. 
568
 Scholz, “Bakhtin’s Concept of ‘Chronotope’”, MB Vol. II., ed. Gardiner, p. 154.  
569
 Both of these latter chronotopes are relative in essence—albeit not in the same manner.   
570
 Morson and Emerson, and Emerson’s Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 369: “for Bakhtin all 
meaning entails evaluation, chronotopes also define parameters of value.” 
571
 Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 85: “The 
chronotope as a formally constitutive category determines to a significant degree the image of man in 
literature as well.  The image of man is always intrinsically chronotopic.” 
572
 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 372. 
573
 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 372-3:  
In effect, the discourse and chronotope theories of the novel are two aspects of the same theory.  
The form-shaping ideology of the novel includes both a view of languages of heteroglossia and a 
way of understanding time and space. ... Whereas the discourse and chronotope theories are almost 
fully complementary, the carnival theory is only occasionally complementary with, and more often 
contradictory to, the other two. 
As we already know, “Contemporary Vitalism” was published in 1926.  Rabelais and his World was 
completed in 1940 at which time it was “submitted as a doctoral dissertation” and subsequently rejected.  
See Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique, p. 45.  
574
 See for example, Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 412:  
It is the world passing through the phase of death on the way to birth.  This is not to understand by 
those who see in such images a bare, purely negative satire of definite, strictly limited 
contemporary manifestation.  It would be more correct (though not quite accurate to say that these 
images are oriented toward the entire scope of the contemporary world, toward the present as such, 
and that they represent this present in the sequence of the past giving birth to the future, or in the 
past’s pregnant death. 
Of course here Bakhtin is referring to the grotesque image of the dying body; however, insomuch as 
carnival makes light of individual death through the medium of cosmic laughter, the carnivalesque does not 
contradict the theory of chronotopicity so much as it infuses the Rabelaisian chronotope with a particular 
space-time that contradicts other chronotopes—especially chronotopes such as the Newtonian, Kantian or 
the neo-Platonic chronotope, all of which abstract from the present materially grounded time-space.  See 
also Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel,” The Dialogic Imagination, p. 198: 
The nature of Rabelaisian laughter is revealed in its full vividness in the death series, at the points 
of intersection of this series with the eating, drinking and sexual series [, also found in the 
carnivalesque,] and in its direct association of death with the birth of new life.  Here are revealed 
the authentic sources and traditions of this laughter; the application of this laughter to the whole 
wide world of sociohistorical life (“the epic of laughter”), to an epoch, or more precisely to the 
boundary line between two epochs, exposing its perspectives and its subsequent historical 
generative force. 
575
 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 170. 
576
 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 170.   
577
 Bakhtin, “Speech Genres”, Speech Genres, p. 88-9.  See also Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: 
Creation of a Prosaics, p. 375. 
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578
 For Raskolnikov’s coffin-esque room, see Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 170. 
579
 Cf. Benjamin, “The Work of Art…”, The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproducibility, § xi, 
p. 31.  Strictly speaking, Gardiner link’s the process of significant contextualization with the artistic device 
of defamiliarization in Bakhtin to the Benjaminian auratic character of the work of art—re-
contextualization of this sort was the bread and butter of the Dadaist movement.  See The Dialogics of 
Critique, p. 92.  Nevertheless, there is nothing to restrict us from expanding the defamiliarising power of 
the sign with the invocation of an auratic aspect of the chronotopic motif in the work of art, since the 
motif—and the word—invokes not only the genre to which it belongs but is also the particular expression 
of the type of perceptual time-space to which it belongs—i.e., chronotopicity is also invoked by the auratic 
character of the word.  
580
 In film we have a double mediation: on the one hand we have the filmic apparatus, vis-à-vis the camera, 
lights, staging, and also the “specialists” who direct the action even while fragmenting it.  For Benjamin’s 
discussion of the media of film and its transparent use of the apparatus to convey the preservation of one’s 
humanity in the face of the apparatus, cf. Benjamin, “The Work of Art…”, The Work of Art in the Age of 
Technological Reproducibility, § X, p. 29-31.  Film is not all bad for Benjamin.  Film tends to open up the 
room for play.   See Benjamin, “The Work of Art…”, The Work of Art in the Age of Technological 
Reproducibility, § xi, f.n. 23, pp. 48-9: “what is lost in the withering of semblance and the decay of  the 
aura in works of art is matched by a huge gain in the scope for play [Spiel-Raum].  This space for play is 
widest in film.  In film, the element of semblance has been entirely displaced by the element of play.” 
581
 See Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique, p. 172:  
It is indeed strange that Bakhtin, although living in a period of accelerated technological and 
industrial development (that was, of course, even more pronounced in the Russian context, which 
helps explain why Russia was such a hot-bed of avant-garde modernist experimentation in the arts, 
architecture, design and so on) never attempts to assess the nature or importance of other forms of 
media (film, photography, radio) and their possible impact on the prevailing structures of human 
communication and consciousness.  This is congruent with his seeming lack of interest in 
modernist literature an his habitual utilization of pre-bourgeois writers as exemplars of a literary 
dialogism (Cervantes, Rabelais, classical Greek and Roman authors) or, in the case of Dostoevsky, 
on the periphery of capitalism.  Parenthetically, it could be remarked that the loss of ‘immediacy’ 
in speech and writing was inevitable with the consolidation of typographic culture after the mid-
19th century.  This can certainly be ‘dehumanizing’ in a certain sense, but in another (pace 
Benjamin’s account of the demise of ‘aura’ in the modern world as developed in his seminal essay 
“The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproduction”), typographic culture is at least 
potentially more democratic and emancipatory than previous modes of communication and 
information storage (chirographic, oral, and so on).   
582
 Bernhardt’s film is available for viewing at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mp_v_dP8s-8 > 
22/07/2012. 
583
 This loss is supposed to affect the poet first and foremost.  “Hence [Baudelaire’s] mythomania,” see 
Benjamin, “Central Park”, New German Critique, § 13, p. 38.   
584
 Benjamin, “The Work of Art…”, The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproducibility, § v, p. 
24:  
[t]he first truly revolutionary means for reproduction (namely photography, which emerged at the 
same time as socialism), art felt the approach of that crisis which a century later has become 
unmistakable, it reacted with the doctrine of l’art pour l’art—that is, with a theology of art… for 
the first time in history, technological reproducibility emancipates the work of art from its parasitic 
subservience to ritual.  To an ever-increasing degree, the work reproduced becomes the 
reproduction of a work designed for reproducibility.  
See also Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 23: 
the changing technical capacity to reproduce, disseminate, and sell books and images to mass 
audiences, coupled with the invention of first photography and then film (to which we would now 
add radio and television), radically changed the material conditions of the artists’ existence and, 
hence, their social and political role.  And apart from the general consciousness of flux and change 
which flowed through all modernist works, a fascination with technique, with speed and motion, 
with the machine and the factory system, as well as with the stream of new commodities entering 
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into daily life, provoked a wide range of aesthetic responses varying from denial, through imitation 
to speculation on utopian possibilities. 
To this David Harvey reiterates that the essential difference is that the aura has been collapsed into artwork.  
Before the age of technological reproducibility, the artist himself “had to assume an aura of creativity, of 
dedication to art for art’s sake, in order to produce a cultural object that would be original, unique, and 
hence eminently marketable at a monopoly price,” The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 22.   
585
 See Jameson’s thesis statement to Postmodernism: or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 6:  
The exposition will take up in turn the following constitutive features of the postmodern: a new 
depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in contemporary ‘theory’ and in a whole new 
culture of the image or the simulacrum; a consequent weakening of historicity, both in our 
relationship to public History and in the new forms of our private temporality, whose 
“schizophrenic” structure (following Lacan) will determine new types of syntax or syntagmatic 
relationships in the more temporal arts; a whole new type of emotional ground tone—what I will 
call “intensities”—which can best be grasped by a return to older theories of the sublime; the deep 
constitutive relationships of all this to a whole system; and, after a brief account of postmodernist 
mutations in the lived experience of built space itself, some reflections on the mission of political 
art in the bewildering new world space of late or multinational capital.  
An interesting exploration of the postmodern chronotope could begin in this thesis statement with a special 
emphasis on the weak and highly fragmented—schizophrenic—temporalities and depthless and 
technologically sublime space in the postmodern.  The work of Edward Burtynsky exhibits particularly apt 
motifs with which to begin this auratic exploration of the postmodern chronotope.  Another possibility 
would be the exploration of multinational spaces of what David Harvey calls “flexible accumulation” and 
its effect on the postmodern chronotope in individual lives.  See Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 
Part III, “The Experience of Space and Time”, pp. 201-359.   Yet again, Reinhardt Koselleck’s idea of 
“Neuzeit” would offer a possible genealogical account of the rise of the modern chronotope of ‘new 
time’—the time of the daily news and of progress.  Cf. “‘Neuzeit’: Remarks on the Semantics of the 
Modern Concept of Movement,” Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, pp. 231-266.  Reinhart 
Koselleck describes what he dubs the immanent temporalization of history.  In using this phrase Koselleck 
identifies the Modern’s concept of time as it may be distinguished from the pre-modern or Medieval 
concept.  Specifically the phrase refers to the inherently subjective way in which time is experienced by 
humankind in the modern period.  According to Koselleck since the modern period began, historical events 
have increasingly taken on their own internal time, and this internal time is distinct from a natural or 
objective time or clock time, or circadian time.  Internal time is contingent upon the Moderns’ emphasis 
that the annals of history are the record of humankind’s progress toward its telos—vis-à-vis. the unfolding 
of human capacities.  Since the Medieval era, any historical event that speeds the process toward that 
goal—whatever that telos may be—is understood as accelerating time, and vice versa.  The immanent 
temporalization of history, then, is the adding of a temporal component to historical events and their 
analysis.  According to Koselleck, historical events have their own internal time which can be said to be 
relative; that is to say, historical events come to influence how humankind experiences time.  Time is no 
longer empty and additive as it was in the Middle Ages—in the sense that ‘there is nothing new under the 
sun,’ but it now has a qualitative component that distinguishes one day from the next such that it is better by 
virtue of it being new.  It is this newness with which a genealogy of a distinctly modern chronotope—one 
that Bakhtin does not take up, would have to first explore.  Koselleck’s following chapter in Futures Past 
on the “‘Space of Experience’” would no doubt also be enlightening in this regard.  
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 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 379. 
587
 Much of what is to follow regarding the three ancient forms of Chronotope may well have their original 
inspiration in the lectures and work of Ivan Ivanovich Tolstoy, whether by direct influence in the classroom, 
through Bakhtin’s brother Nikolai, or through Tolstoy’s works.  See Perlina, Funny Things are Happening 
on the Way to the Bakhtin Forum, p. 8-9:  
While teaching language courses, Tolstoy was responsible for translating the major body of early 
Greek prose into Russian.  In his seminars, he raised a group of young scholars who translated 
Lucian, Longus, Chariton, Heliodorus—in short, the very Greek authors that Bakhtin discusses in 
the pages of his essay Forms of Time and of the Chronotope of the Novel.  Professor Tolstoy 
worked on menippean dialogues and translated the famous Lover of Lies by Lucian.   
588
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 94.  
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 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 377. 
590
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 90: “All the events 
of the novel that fill this hiatus are a pure digression from the normal course of life; they are excluded from 
the kind of real duration in which additions to a normal biography are made.” 
591
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 100. 
592
 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 378.  Flight, capture, avoidance, 
secrecy, long delays with sudden advances into furious action are also familiar motifs in the gothic genre.  
See for example Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto: 
Delay might give [Manfred] time to reflect on the horrid measures he had conceived, or produce 
some circumstance in [Hippolita’s] favour, if she could for that night at least avoid his odious 
purpose.—Yet where conceal herself!  How avoid the pursuit he would infallibly make throughout 
the castle!  As these thoughts passed rapidly through her mind, she recollected a subterraneous 
passage which led from the vaults of the castle to the church of Saint Nicholas.  Could she reach 
the altar before she was overtaken, she knew even Manfred’s violence would not dare to profane 
the sacredness of the place; and she determined, if no other means of deliverance offered, to shut 
herself up forever among the holy virgins, whose convent was contiguous to the cathedral.  In this 
resolution, she seized a lamp that burned the foot of the staircase, and hurried toward the secret 
passage. 
Far from obstructing the movements of the protagonists, the emptiness of spaces and lack of spatial 
description lends to this sudden freedom of movement.  Suddenly there is a lamp in front of Hippolita that 
is placed in this empty space by a deus ex machina function.   
593
 Shakespeare, The Tempest, I:2, p. 123. 
594
 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 379. 
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 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 379. 
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 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 105. 
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 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 111. 
598
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 112. 
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 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 113. 
600
 See sections four and five. 
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 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 115. 
602
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 130. 
603
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 130: In the heart 
of the biographical and autobiographical motif “lies the chronotope of ‘the life course of one seeking true 
knowledge.’” 
604
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 131. 
605
 See § 2 above and Plato, The Republic, vi, 507a-511e. 
606
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 132. 
607
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 131. 
608
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 141. 
609
 See Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 142. 
610
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 146: “Even the 
ancient novel had a certain minimum fullness of time peculiar to it alone.” 
611
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 146. 
612
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 210: 
All the peculiarities that we have pointed out so far may be said to be positive features in folkloric 
time.  But a final feature of this time (on which we will now pause), its cyclicity, is a negative 
feature, one that limits the force and ideological productivity of this time.  The mark of cyclicity, 
and consequently of cyclical repetitiveness, is imprinted on all events occurring in this type of 
time.  Time’s forward impulse is limited by the cycle.  For this reason even growth does not 
achieve an authentic becoming. 
613
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 147. 
614
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 147-8:   
The present and even more the past are enriched at the expense of the future. ... Another form that 
exhibits a like relationship to the future is eschatology.  Here the future is emptied out in another 
way.  The future is perceived as the end of everything that exists, as the end of all being (in its past 
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and present forms).  In this respect it makes no difference at all whether the end is perceived as 
catastrophe and destruction pure and simple, as a new chaos, as a Twilight of the Gods, as the 
advent of God’s Kingdom—it matters only that the end effect everything that exists, and that this 
end be, moreover, relatively close at hand.  Eschatology always sees the segment of a future 
separating the present from the end as lacking value; this separating segment of time loses its 
significance and interest, it is merely an unnecessary continuation of an indefinitely prolonged 
present. 
615
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 13. 
616
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 151. 
617
 Bakhtin, “Forms of time and Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 155. 
618
 See Dante, The Divine Comedy: Inferno, xxxiii-xxxiv, pp. 300-17.  
619
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 403. 
620
 See Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 13. 
621
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 14-15. 
622
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 16.  Bakhtin also provides a chronology of 
instantiations of the bildungsroman on pp. 19-20: 
There exists a special subcategory of the novel called the ‘novel of education’ (Erziehungsroman 
or Bildungsroman).  Usually included (in chronological order) are the following major examples of 
this generic subcategory: Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (classical), Wolfram von Eschenbach’s Parzival 
(Middle Ages), Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel.  Gimmelshausen’s Simplicissimus (the 
Renaissance), Fénelon’s Télémaque (neoclassicism), Rousseau’s Emile (since there is a 
considerable novelistic element in this pedagogical treatise), Wieland’s Agathon, Wetzel’s Tobias 
Knout, Hippel’s Lebensläufe nach aufsteigender Linie, Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister (both novels), 
Jean Paul’s Titan (and several of his other novels), Dickens’ David Copperfield, Raabe’s Der 
Hungerpastor, Gottfried Keller’s Der grüne Heinrich, Pontoppidan’s Lucky Peter, Tolstoy’s 
Childhood, Adolescence, and Youth, Goncharov’s An Ordinary Story and Oblomov, Romain 
Rolland’s Jean-Christophe, Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks and Magic Mountain, and others. 
623
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 16: 
In subsequent history the very idea of the ordeal is filled with the most diverse ideological content.  
This type includes (in later Romanticism) testing for vocation, for genius, and for membership in 
the elect.  Another subcategory includes the testing of Napoleonic parvenus in the French novel, 
testing for artistic genius and, in parallel, the artist’ fitness for life (künstlerroman), and, finally, 
testing the liberal reformer, the Nietzschean, the immoralist, the emancipated woman, and a 
number of other subcategories....  A special subcategory of the novel of ordeal is the Russian novel 
of ordeal, which tests man for his social fitness and general worthiness (the theme of the 
‘superfluous man’).  
No doubt the Underground Man would be a hero of this latter type, as well as the (anti-)hero in Gide’s The 
Immoralist.  
624
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 19.  The Bildungsroman is also referred to as the 
Erziehungsroman, literally the novel of upbringing or rearing.  
625
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 19. 
626
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 20-1. 
627
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 21. 
628
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 22-3. 
629
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 24. 
630
 According to Edward P. Mahoney, in his “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, this is not strictly true 
in terms of cause.  While the “one highest being” is the origin of all things, neo-Platonism holds that 
“beings intermediate on the scale” of nature cause each other according to their position in the hierarchy of 
the great chain of being.   
631
 Edward P.  Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 220.  For Pseudo-Dionysius, see also 
Dionysius the Areopagite, “On the Heavenly Hierarchy”, The Works of Dionysius the Areopagite III, i-ii, 
pp. 13-4:  
hierarchy is, in my judgement, a sacred order and science and operation, assimilated, as far as 
attainable, to the likeness of God, and conducted to the illuminations granted to it from God, 
according to the capacity, with a view to the Divine imitation. ... The purpose, then, of Hierarchy is 
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the assimilation and union, as far as attainable, with God, having Him Leader of all religious 
science and operation, by looking unflinchingly to His most Divine comeliness, and copying, as far 
as possible, and by perfecting its own followers as Divine images, mirrors most luminous and 
without flaw, receptive of the primal light and the supremely Divine ray, and devoutly filled with 
the entrusted radiance, and again, spreading this radiance ungrudgingly to those after it, in 
accordance with the supremely Divine regulations. 
For more on the link between early Christian thought and neo-Platonism, see Bréhier, The History of 
Philosophy: The Middle Ages and The Renaissance, pp. 17-8: 
The Christian image of the universe and the neo-Platonic image share a common rhythm: both are 
theocentric images that describe dual motion of things, the way in which things move outward 
from their first principle and then return to the principle.  In the Christian image the succession of 
these moments is a series of events, each of which has as its starting point a free initiative: creation 
and fall, redemption and a future life of bliss.  In the neo-Platonic image, successive moments are 
derived from a natural, eternal necessity: outward motion or movement away from the first 
principle represents a change in that the same reality that was initially in a state of absolute unity 
(the first principle) is divided more and more as it proceeds through the lower levels of being, and 
the return represents a reversal of the process of division, which now gives way to unity.  
On the attribution of the Liber de causis to Aristotle, see Leo Catana, The Concept of Contraction in 
Giordano Bruno’s Philosophy, p. 104. 
632
 Arthur O. Lovejoy notes the tendency in human thought to prejudice the direction of this chain of 
causation, The Great Chain of Being, p. 316: “the causal relation [between these graded beings of scala 
naturae], however gratuitous, seems natural to the human mind—that the ‘lower’ must be derived from the 
‘higher,’ the cause be, at the least, not less than its effects.”  In other words, since the higher beings in the 
hierarchy are themselves closer to the one, they have greater perfection than the lower and therefore also the 
puissance to cause the lower.  The lower beings, since they are inferior, cannot be the cause of the higher 
beings.    
633
 Edward P.  Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 220. 
634
 For example, Aquinas thought that the gradations did represent species while Plotinus believed these 
rungs were not species but “spheres of being.” This difference is glossed over by Lovejoy.  See Edward P.  
Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 219 and Lovejoy The Great Chain of Being, p. 75-6.   
635
 See Edward P.  Mahoney, in his “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 221. 
636
 Edward P.  Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 221.  Locke will later adopt this 
language of spatiality, ibid, p. 228. 
637
 Edward P.  Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 223. 
638
 Edward P.  Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 222.  The ‘subtle doctor,’ Johannes 
Duns Scotus rejected the notion that non-being—i.e., absolute potential—had any part to play in the great 
chain of being; he likewise rejects the idea that matter can play any part in the degree of perfection-
imperfection, see Edward P.  Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, pp. 223 and 224.  Albertus 
Magnus is a gradation between Pseudo-Dionysius and Aquinas both in chronology and as regards the 
development of this notion of hierarchy in the Medieval period. 
639
 Edward P.  Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 224. 
640
 Edward P.  Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 222-3. 
641
 Edward P.  Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 224: “For Paul the scale of being 
(latitude entis) begins with the zero grade of being (non gradus entis) and runs through species insofar as 
each species is at a different distance from the zero grade.” 
642
 See Edward P.  Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 224.  Perhaps it is an unfortunate 
truth for us that this conflict continued to harass the best minds in the West for centuries.  Of course Bacon, 
Gassendi, Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes and Leibniz, and many others of the early modern period are 
often credited with having de-linked the divine chain of being, and at the very least to have spent their time 
working on combating dogmatism in all its recognizable forms.  Nevertheless, Galileo’s teacher Francesco 
Buonamici took part in this debate, and Galileo himself “argues against the notion of God serving as a 
measure of all things according to their distance or receding from him....”  Nevertheless, for Galileo “there 
seems to be no ‘metaphysical’ explanation for the order of things other than what lies hidden in the Divine 
Mind,” Mahoney, p. 226-7.  Certainly it bears repeating that no paradigmatical shift happens all at once but 
comes about only in fits and starts.  While Descartes declared the subject wholly un-philosophical, Leibniz 
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attempted a reworking of the great chain of being that did not rely on the poles of God and matter or 
perfection and imperfection, see Mahoney, p. 227.  Even the benefit of hindsight should come with a 
modicum of critical reserve, and we ought to hesitate before making of these enlightened van-guards of the 
Renaissance prescient men of the future come to set the record straight.  This type of retrospective method 
always projects onto the past the ideology of the present, as we have seen, and it typically also betrays an 
intellectual audacity where one is certain we now have the correct story. 
643
 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 80. 
644
 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 54. 
645
 Mahoney’s article serves as an excellent critique of Lovejoy regarding the origin of the notion of great 
chain of being.  Lovejoy locates its pre-history in Plato’s Timaeus and Republic as well as Aristotle’s 
supposed metaphysical basis for the principle of plenitude, which itself is taken by Lovejoy as a pre-history 
of the notion of the one as found in Plotinus.  Lovejoy also goes astray, says Mahoney, in excluding 
Proclus’ very original notion of hierarchy which are “simply not there” in Plotinus, as Lovejoy asserts.  
Regarding the so-called “Idea of Ideas” in Plato from which the travesty of the scala naturae was originally 
supposed to have sprung, see Lovejoy p. 39.  For Aristotle’s basis for the principle of plenitude, see 
Lovejoy, p. 55.  For Plotinus, see Lovejoy, pp. 61-3. 
646
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 362. 
647
 For Bakhtin’s gloss on Aristotle’s metaphysical image of the cosmos and this change from verticality to 
horizontality, see Rabelais and his World, p. 363. 
648
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 366. 
649
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 367. 
650
 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, p. 319. 
651
 Edward P.  Mahoney, “Lovejoy and the Hierarchy of Being”, p. 224-5. 
652
 For this wedding of Christian redemption and neo-Platonism, see Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, pp. 
401 and 402 respectively. 
653Hebdige, “The Machine is Unheimlich: Wodiczko’s Homeless Vehicle Project”, Public Address, p. 61. 
654
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 402. 
655
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 395. 
656
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 403. 
657
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 404: 
Not the ascent of the individual soul into the higher sphere but the movement forward of all 
mankind, along the horizontal of historic time, becomes the basic criterion of all evaluations.  
Having done its park upon earth, the individual soul fades and dies altogether with the individual 
body; but the body of the people and of mankind, fertilized by the dead, is eternally renewed and 
moves forever forward along the historic path of progress. 
658
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 405. 
659
 1 Corinthians 15:12-13: “Now if Christ is preached that He has been raised from the dead, how do some 
among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead?  But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then 
Christ is not risen.  And if Christ is not risen, then our preaching is empty and your faith is also empty.” 
660
 1 Corinthians 15:42-55. 
661
 See O.E.D. Online entry “profane,” 
<http://www.oed.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/view/Entry/152024?rskey=FCPYZh&result=1&isAdvanced=false
#eid>, 08/07/2012.:  
Middle French prophane, prophaine, profane (French profane) not sacred (1228 in Old French), 
not pertaining to a religious order (1384), that acts impiously (1486) and its etymon classical 
Latin profānus (in post-classical Latin also prophanus, frequently in Medieval MSS: see note) not 
dedicated to religious use, secular, not initiated into a religious rite, ceremonially unclean, impious, 
also as noun, denoting a person who is uninitiated or impious, lit. ‘before (i.e., outside) the temple’ 
<pro- PRO- prefix1 + fānum FANE n.2 Compare Catalan profà (1460), Spanish profano (late 14th 
cent. as prophano), Portuguese profano (15th cent.), Italian profano (a1321).  
662
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 407. 
663
 See Rabelais, Gargantua and Pantagruel, Book II, Chapter III, “Of the Grief Wherewith Gargantua was 
moved at the decease of his wife Badebec”, p. 128:  
“My wife is dead, well, by G—(da jurandi) I shall not raise her again by my crying: she is well; 
she is in paradise at least, if she be no higher: she prayeth to God for us; she is happy; she is above 
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the senses of our miseries, nor can our calamities reach her.  What though she be dead, must not 
we also die?  The same debt, which she hath paid, hangs over our heads; nature will require it of 
us, and we must all of us, some day, taste of the same sauce; let her pass then, and the Lord 
preserve the survivors, for I must now cast about how to get another wife.”  
664
 One could argue it’s actually the father-son continuum.  Rabelais’ was a man of his time.  It seems clear 
to me that both are implicated, although Rabelais clearly emphasizes Pantagruel’s likeness—and therefore 
his connection—to his father not his mother. 
665
 See Dickens, “A Christmas Carol”, Stave 1, The Christmas Books, p. 12.  
666
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 406. 
667
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 408. 
668
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 318:  
let us point out that the grotesque body is cosmic and universal.  It stresses elements common to 
the entire cosmos: earth, water, fire, air; it is directly related to the sun, to the stars.  It contains the 
signs of the zodiac.  It reflects the cosmic hierarchy.  This body can merge with various natural 
phenomena, with mountains, rivers, seas, islands, and continents.  It can fill the entire universe. 
The hierarchy to which Bakhtin refers here in no way reflects the Medieval official hierarchy of vertical 
polarity.  Note that he says “cosmic hierarchy.”  It is clear in this passage that Bakhtin is referring to pre-
mediaeval Aristotelian thought, not the hypostatized system of ethics based on Aristotle’s cosmos.  
Although it is beyond the scope of the present work, a comparison between Deleuze and Guattari’s smooth 
space and the cosmic body is begging both in this passage and, so far as I am aware, in Bakhtinian 
scholarship generally. 
669
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 318. 
670
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 435. 
671
 Joyce, Ulysses, p. 2-3.  This is Buck Mulligan’s spiritual invocation of the body of Christ during his 
black mass at the opening of the novel.  James Thornton, as always, sheds more light on the passage than I 
could hope to, Allusions in Ulysses, p. 11-2: 
Mulligan’s statement seems to be a general parody of lesson 26 of the Maynooth Catechism (“On 
the Blessed Eucharist”) and to relate especially to the first question of that lesson: “What is the 
Blessed Eucharist?” to which the reply is “The Blessed Eucharist is the sacrament of the body and 
blood, soul and divinity of Jesus Christ, under the appearances of bread and wine.”  The version 
cited is that of 1882, which was in use throughout Joyce’s lifetime.  Farmer and Henley’s Slang 
and its Analogues lists “blood-an’-ouns” and explains it as “an abbreviated form of an old and 
blasphemous oath—‘God’s blood and wounds!’” 
672
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 434. 
673
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 435. 
674
 According to Clark and Holquist’s annotated bibliography, Bakhtin was began “Roman vospitanija i ego 
značenie v istorii realizma” (“The Bildungsroman and its Significance in the History of Realism”) in 1936 
and “Formy vremeni i xronotopa v romane” (“Forms of time and of the Chronotope in the Novel” in 1937.  
Both were finished the following year, in 1938.  Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 354. 
675
 Just one more casualty of Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa, the manuscript was actually at the publishers 
ready for printing.  See Holquist’s Introduction to Speech Genres, p. xiii. See also Morson and Emerson, 
and Emerson’s Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 373-4:  
At times, the chronotope essay reads as if it were written intermittently, its author occasionally 
running out of steam or leaping over topics and periods less interesting to him.  And, as we have 
noted, the essay’s history of the assimilation of history ends, for no discernible reason, with 
Rabelais.  As if to fill in some of the gaps, Bakhtin in two other essays offered further observations 
clearly derived from the same complex of ideas: “The Bildungsroman and Its Significance in the 
History of Realism (toward a Historical Typology of the novel),” apparently a surviving fragment 
of a complete book on the novel of education, and portions of “Epic and Novel.”  
676
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 13. 
677
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 28. 
678
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 25. 
679
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 26. 
680
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, pp. 26-7. 
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681
 Goethe makes this claim during his discussion of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, “Influence of the New 
Philosophy”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings, p. 229:  
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason had long since appeared, but it lay completely beyond my orbit.  
Nevertheless, I was present at many a discussion of it, and with some attentiveness I could notice 
the old question continually reappearing, namely, how much we ourselves and how much the 
outside world contributes to our intellectual existence.  I had never separated the two and when I 
did philosophize about subjects in my own way, I did so with unconscious naïvety, in the belief 
that I actually saw my views before my very eyes. 
682
 Goethe, “Considerable Assistance form One Ingeniously Chosen Word”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings, 
p. 235. 
683
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 28.  See also Goethe, “Considerable Assistance form 
One Ingeniously Chosen Word”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings, p. 235.  There one Dr. Heinroth is quoted as 
praising Goethe for his “objectively active” thought in which there is an absolute reciprocity between 
seeing and Goethe’s thought ingressing into objects.  
684
 Goethe, “Considerable Assistance form One Ingeniously Chosen Word”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings, 
p. 236: the concrete situatedness of the object is at root of Goethe’s poetic method and explains his 
“inclination toward the occasional poems to which I was irresistibly inspired by special occurrences.  And 
thus it has been noticed that something particular is always at the basis of each of [his] poems, a definite 
nucleus for a more or less significant product.” 
685
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 28.   
686
 The recounting of this encounter is really a charming anecdote; Goethe’s ambivalent feeling for the 
young poet was clearly present in this first meeting.  See “Propitious Encounter”, Goethe’s Botanical 
Writings, p. 217: 
We had reached [Schiller’s] house, the conversation lured me in.  I gave a spirited explanation of 
my theory of the metamorphosis of plants with graphic pen sketches of a symbolic plant.  He 
listened and looked with great interest, with unerring comprehension, but when I had ended, he 
shook his head, saying, “That is not an empiric experience, it is an idea.”  I was taken aback and 
somewhat irritated, for the disparity of our viewpoints was here sharply delineated.  ... Controlling 
myself, I replied, “How splendid that I have ideas without knowing it, and can see them before my 
very eyes.” 
687
 Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 58. 
688
 Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 59. 
689
 Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 61.  See also Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 31-2:  
Goethe goes on to develop in detail the method he has chosen for translating organic Italian time 
into German, that is, ordinary time, and he appends a sketch in which he uses concentric circles to 
give a visually graphic image of the relationship between the two kinds of time. 
This organic Italian time (the calculation of time proceeds from the actual setting of the 
sun, which, of course, takes place at different hours during different times of the year) is 
inseparably interwoven with all of Italian life, and Goethe repeatedly turns his attention to the 
latter.  All his descriptions of Italian everyday life are pervaded with a sense of everyday time, 
measured by the pleasures and labour of the vital human life.  This feeling for time profoundly 
permeates his celebrated description of the Roman Carnival.  
Cf. Reproduced from Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 61 where the diagram is reproduced.    
690
 Cf. Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 29. 
691
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 33.  Bakhtin points to the example in Italian Journey 
in which Goethe rebukes a tourist guide for trying to infer an ancient battle scene which had left no visible 
trace.  See also Goethe, Italian Journey, pp. 227-9.  There, on his visit to a “pleasant valley in the 
mountains south of Palermo,” Goethe provides us the example of the “stupid” tourist guide who arbitrarily 
mixed up “past and present” by trying to make visible an ancient battle fought by Hannibal during the Punic 
Wars.  Goethe had no interest in these invisible remnants of the past.  He spent the day collecting sediment 
that had been deposited on the banks of the river, instead, and tried to explain to the guide that these 
“specimens” were visible traces of the “prehistoric earth.”   
692
 Goethe, “Propitious Encounter”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings, p. 217 
693
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 33.   
694
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 33. 
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695
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 34. 
696
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 34. 
697
 Goethe, “Preliminary Notes for a Philosophy of Plants”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings, p. 93. 
698
 See Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 36: 
In the process of developing a sense of time, Goethe overcomes the ghostly (Gespenstermässiges), 
the terrifying (Unerfreuliches), and the unaccountable (Unzuberechnendes), which were strong in 
his initial feeling of a merged past and present.  But the very sense of the merging of times 
remained in complete and undiminished force and freshness until the end of his life, blossoming 
into an authentic fullness of time.  The ghostly, terrifying, and unaccountable in it were 
surmounted by the structural aspects, already disclosed by us above, which are inherent in n this 
way of visualizing time: the aspect of an essential link between the past and present, the aspect of 
the necessity of the past and the necessity of its place in a line of continuous development, the 
aspect of the creative effectiveness of the past, and, finally, the aspect of the past and present being 
linked to a necessary future. 
699
 Goethe qtd. in Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 35. 
700
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 35. 
701
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 35. 
702
 Goethe qtd. in Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 35. 
703
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 36. 
704
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 36. 
705
 Goethe, “Considerable Assistance form One Ingeniously Chosen Word”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings, 
p. 236. 
706
 Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 446, written on the occasion of Goethe’s second visit to Rome.   
707
 Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 446. 
708
 Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 447. 
709
 Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 447. 
710
 Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 450. 
711
 Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 451. 
712
 Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 451. 
713
 See Goethe, Italian Journey, pp. 451, 454, 548-9, and 460, respectively. 
714
 Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 459. 
715
 See Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 461. 
716
 See Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 467. 
717
 See Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 469. 
718
 For more on the Roman, or “New Year” Carnival’s relation to Rabelais and his World¸ see also 
Gardiner, Dialogics of Critique, pp. 44-5. 
719
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 37. 
720
 Cf. the phrase which we have already quoted from “Art and Answerability, Art and Answerability, p. 1: 
“I have to answer with my own life for what I have experienced and understood in art....” 
721
 Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, pp. 353-4: “when discourse is torn from 
reality, it is fatal for the word itself as well: words grow sickly, lose semantic depth and flexibility, the 
capacity and to expand and renew their meanings in new living contexts—they essentially die as discourse, 
for the signifying word lives beyond itself, that is, it lives by means of directing its purposiveness outward.”  
Bakhtin draws a similar conclusion in terms of the fullness of the folkloric chronotope vs. the negativity 
with which its eschatological aspect regards the present form of reality, “Forms of Time and of the 
Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 149:  
Images of [the eschatological future] were inevitably located in the past, or transferred to some 
Land of Cockaigne, beyond the seven seas; their dissimilarity to a cruel and evil present-day 
reality was measured by temporal and spatial distancing.  But such images were not taken out of 
time as such, they were not torn out of the real and material world of the here-and-now.  On the 
contrary, one might even say that all the energy of this presumed future served only to deepen and 
intensify images of material here-and-now reality, and above all the image of the living, corporeal 
human being: a man grew up at the future’s expense. 
The complexity of this passage cannot go without further commentary.  The eschatological and mythic 
chronotopes that seek a golden utopic age are not wholly without their own striving for reality, but the 
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reality for which they strive remains a mere possibility.  The eschatological vision takes itself for a univocal 
and monological absolute, but it is nevertheless embedded in what it sees as a very real and oppressive 
present.   
722
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 40. 
723
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 42. 
724
 Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 42. 
725
 There Kant distinguished once and for all between a true genetic history of nature and its mere 
description on which the taxonomies of Linnaeus and Buffon had been constructed.  See for example Sloan, 
“Buffon, German Biology, Historical Interpretation of Biological Species”, p. 126: 
But in his 1777 paper, Kant achieved a clarity far greater than that of Buffon, with his explicit 
distinction between Naturgeschichte, meaning the genetic history of nature, and 
Naturbeschreibung, the description of nature….  With this new basis, Kant was able to achieve a 
significantly greater rigour of analysis than Buffon ever achieved, and with this made a rigorous 
distinction between the taxonomic concepts as applied in the domain of Naturbeschreibung from 
their function in Naturgeschichte. 
See also Kant’s paper “Determination of the Concept of the Human Race”, Anthropology, History, and 
Education, p. 153: 
Initially, when looking only for characters of comparison (in terms of similarity or dissimilarity), 
one obtains classes of creatures under a species.  If one looks further to their phyletic origin, then it 
must become apparent whether those classes are so many different kinds or only races.  The wolf, 
the fox, the jackal, the hyena and the house dog are so many classes of four-footed animals.  If one 
assumes that each of them require a special phyletic origin, then they are so many kinds.  
However, if one concedes that they also could have originated from one phylum, then they are 
only races of the latter.  In natural history (which is concerned only with generation and phyletic 
origination kind and species are not distinguished as such.  This distinction occurs solely in the 
description of nature, in which only the comparison of marks matters.  What is here called kind, is 
often only called race there. 
See also Kant’s “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy” where this distinction is most clearly 
stated: “I would propose the word physiography (Physiographie) for the description of nature and the word 
physiogony (Physiogonie) for natural history.”  
726
 See also Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 40: “In it, space and time are bound together 
into one inseparable knot.  Terrestrial space and human history are inseparable from one another in 
Goethe’s integrated concrete vision.  This is what makes historical time in his creative work so dense and 
materialized, and space so humanly interpreted and intensive.”  See also p. 42:  
Everything—from an abstract idea to a piece of rock on the bank of a stream—bears the stamp of 
time, is saturated with time, and assumes its form and meaning in time.  Therefore, everything is 
intensive in Goethe’s world; it contains no inanimate, immobile, petrified places, no immutable 
background that does not participate in action and emergence (in events), no deteriorations or sets.  
In Goethe’s world there are no events, plots, or temporal motifs that are not related in an essential 
way to the particular spatial place of their occurrence, that could occur anywhere or nowhere 
(‘eternal’ plots and motifs).  Everything in this world is a time-space, a true chronotope. 
...everything is intensive.... 
727
 Heraclitus, Fragment 52, The Cosmic Fragments, xiii.  Deleuze tells us that “Heraclitus had two 
thoughts which are like ciphers: according to one there is no being, everything is becoming; according to 
the other, being is the being of becoming as such”, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 23.  These, it would seem, 
are related to the two tables, the chance of the gods and the necessity of man: “these two tables are not two 
worlds.  They are the two hours of a single world, the two moments of a single world, midnight and 
midday, the hour when the dice are thrown, the hour when the dice fall back.”  Cf. also p. 24: “the child 
plays, withdraws from the game and returns to it.  In this game of becoming, the being of becoming also 
plays the game with itself; the aeon (time), says Heraclitus, is a child who plays, plays at draughts.” 
728
 Shakespeare, “Sonnet 124”, The Complete Sonnets and Poems, p. 629. 
729
 Marx, Marx and Modernity: Key Readings and Commentary, ed. Robert J. Antonio, p. 227. 
730
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 435-6. 
731
 Dostoevsky, “Rebellion”, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 255. 
732
 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part III., “Of the Apostates”, § 3, p. 201. 
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733
 I have borrowed the phrase “By the testicles of Hercules” from “Book IV” of Gargantua and 
Pantagruel, p. 535.  “Bum-gut” comes from the same, Chapter IV, “Book I”, p. 13. 
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